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Introduction
Monica Billio
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia
Simone Varotto
ICMA Centre, Henley Business School, University of Reading, UK
Pandemics are disruptive events that have profound consequences 
for society and the economy. This volume aims to present an anal-
ysis of the economic impact of COVID-19 and its likely consequenc-
es for our future. This is achieved by drawing from the expertise of 
authors who specialise in a wide range of fields including fiscal and 
monetary policy, banking, financial markets, pensions and insurance, 
artificial intelligence and big data, climate change, labour market, 
travel, tourism and politics, among others. We asked contributing 
authors to write their chapters for a non-technical audience so that 
their message could reach beyond academia and professional econ-
omists to policy makers and the wider society. The material in this 
volume draws from the latest research and provides a wealth of ide-
as for further investigations and opportunities for reflection. This al-
so makes it an ideal learning tool for economics and finance students 
wishing to gain a deeper understanding of how COVID-19 could in-
fluence their disciplines. 
The volume begins by taking a historical perspective. Moreno, On-
gena, Ventula Veghazy and Wagner explore the linkages between the 
Great Recession of 2008-09 and the current pandemic. They argue 
that the ways in which the former crisis was fought may have a bear-
ing on the severity of the outcomes of the current crisis. Governments 
that piled up debt to bail out banks in their country may have divert-
ed resources away from critical sectors including public health ser-
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vices. This in turn may have curtailed the ability of those countries to 
contain the spread of the virus and offer adequate health treatment 
to the sick. Similarly, job losses following the Great Recession, espe-
cially among young people (e.g. in Italy and Spain) may have created 
a greater incentive for younger generations to live at home with their 
parents. Such proximity between younger and older people, with the 
latter more vulnerable to the infection, may have led to higher mor-
tality rates during the pandemic. Finally, forbearing bank supervi-
sors that have allowed banks to keep in their balance sheet ‘zombie’ 
firms following the last crisis may have created the pre-conditions 
for government funding to fall in the ‘wrong hands’ of failing compa-
nies, rather than healthy ones, during the current crisis. 
Historical comparisons are further stretched back by Bell, Lacey 
and Prescott who look at the lessons from the Black Death of 1348-
51, which may still be relevant today. They argue that restricting 
freedom of movement, especially if protracted in time, can generate 
resentment and lead to social unrest and political turmoil. Events in 
fourteenth century England suggest that governments need to act 
quickly to address social injustice when social tension is high be-
cause of a pandemic. History also teaches us that psychological re-
actions of crisis-affected masses may lead to nationalistic tenden-
cies. This is further explored by Halikiopoulou who focuses on the 
rise of populism in Europe. The author distinguishes between coun-
tries already dominated by populist movements and those where pop-
ulists are in opposition parties. A pandemic, and the resulting eco-
nomic crisis, may create an opportunity for populists in opposition 
to gain more support from the voters that are worst affected by the 
economic downturn. A likely consequence of ‘my-country-first’ poli-
cies, which can find quick appeal in periods of economic and health 
crises, is protectionism. Laker identifies clear signs of protectionist 
trends emerging from the pandemic and warns that these can have 
disproportionate consequences for developing economies as they are 
more dependent on imports for critical medical supplies and their 
population’s basic needs. 
The UK experience during the First and Second World Wars as well 
as the Great Recession is examined by Scott to shed light on the fis-
cal implications of COVID-19 and the likely consequences for British 
taxpayers. He argues that the austerity measures that could follow 
fiscal expansion during the current pandemic would be misguided. 
Past events suggest that fiscal austerity may have the unintended 
consequence of slowing economic growth and generating mass un-
employment, while a less fiscally conservative approach would lead 
to a stronger and sustainable recovery.
Busetto, Dufour and Varotto extend the fiscal policy analysis to 
continental Europe. They show that pre-existing debt levels influence 
governments’ ability to sustain their pandemic-hit economies. Ger-
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many’s relatively low debt-to-GDP ratio has helped it to implement a 
‘fiscal bazooka’ to protect its economy without paying the price of a 
substantially higher cost of borrowing. Italy, on the other hand, with 
a more contained fiscal expansion, is expected to experience a more 
punitive increase of its borrowing costs. This, in turn, would have a 
further negative impact on its already anaemic growth prospects. 
Financing costs in European countries are also explored by Billio, 
Costola, Mazzari and Pelizzon who look at the repo market. Specifical-
ly, they focus on the effect on repo rates of monetary policy announce-
ments made by the European Central Bank (ECB) during the pandem-
ic. They find that countries in Europe’s periphery, e.g. Italy and Spain, 
may be highly dependent on the ECB support to keep their repo rates 
in line with those of other countries. An announcement made by the 
ECB that it would not intervene to support countries with higher sov-
ereign risk was sufficient to generate a substantial divergence of their 
repo rates from those of low risk countries. A subsequent ECB an-
nouncement which clarified that the Central Bank would indeed sup-
port weaker economies caused an immediate realignment of the repo 
rates. This highlights the critical role that monetary policy can have 
to contain the effect of the pandemic on financial markets.
The connection between sovereign risk and bank risk has become 
more evident since the European sovereign debt crisis. Andries, On-
gena and Sprincean observe that such connection and feedback loop 
have become stronger during the pandemic but are not as important 
as they were during the sovereign crisis. This is partly the result of 
stricter bank regulation that has made banks better able to with-
stand periods of instability. Lazar and Zhang examine in detail some 
aspects of the new bank rules and conclude that they might lead to 
banks overestimating risk and keeping higher than needed equity 
capital levels, which are sub-optimal.
Stock markets reacted strongly to the spread of COVID-19. Ramel-
li and Wagner analyse the stock performance across 90 countries in 
different phases of the crisis: incubation, outbreak, fever and recov-
ery. They find highly levered companies to be the ones with a more 
volatile behaviour, which confirms the role of debt in amplifying eco-
nomic shocks and uncertainty. Worryingly, corporate debt levels have 
increased since the start of the pandemic, which may contribute to 
further market instability in case of future outbreaks of the virus. 
This has reawakened the debate about whether corporations should 
still be incentivised to pile up debt through the tax deductibility of in-
terest payments.1 The authors also perform an industry analysis that 
1 See Financial Times article “Should We End the Tax Deductibility of Business Inter-
est Payments?”. 22 July 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/426c1465-9561-4300-
8d3e-2430e4124c93.
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reveals how energy firms, banks, consumer services and the trans-
portation sector were the worst affected by the crisis. Dufour breaks 
down these effects at the country level for the US and the UK and ob-
serves similar patterns. Banks are badly affected as loan defaults are 
expected to rise and low interest rates compress banks’ profit mar-
gins. Regulatory restrictions on banks’ dividend payouts have put 
further downward pressure on bank stocks. Energy firms and, par-
ticularly, oil companies have suffered from the largest contraction in 
demand ever recorded. Kalyuzhnova and Lee explain that this, com-
bined with persistent excess supply, produced a ‘perfect storm’ for 
the industry. Furthermore, demand may not go back to pre-pandem-
ic levels for some time. This may be caused by lower oil consumption 
resulting from, among other factors, changes in people’s attitude to-
wards air travel and companies embracing more extensively work-
ing-from-home practices and virtual meetings instead of international 
corporate travels. An obvious casualty of travel restrictions follow-
ing COVID-19 lockdowns worldwide is tourism. Palmer considers the 
short-term and long-term consequences of the pandemic on consum-
er behaviour. He argues that lifting restrictions will not automatically 
reset the clock back to pre-pandemic times. The lockdowns are likely 
to make tourists more prudent when planning their holidays, at least 
in the short term. But in the long run the sector is likely to recover 
thanks to its capacity to reinvent itself as it did repeatedly in the past.
Travel restrictions have also had profound consequences for the 
real estate sector. In addition, Mattarocci and Roberti argue that 
the residential and commercial real estate markets in Europe were 
also impacted by site-visit limitations, the lower disposable income 
of householders and falling revenues of commercial tenants. The au-
thors suggest that householders may seek bigger dwellings in the fu-
ture to be able to work from home more comfortably. The preferred 
relocation areas for households and offices could be outside city cen-
tres because of their greater affordability and their lower infection 
risk as they are less densely populated. 
The insurance industry was also affected by the current pandem-
ic. However, Ioannides explains that insurers and reinsurers are well 
capitalised to absorb the shock of this crisis, even though their loss-
es so far have been substantial at US $200 billion. Sutcliffe argues 
that the increased elderly mortality rates because of COVID-19 may 
benefit life insurers and defined benefit pension funds, but only in 
the short run unless there are further and extensive infection waves. 
He concludes that those who moved out of their defined benefit pen-
sions or cashed in their defined contribution pensions during the pan-
demic, when asset prices were depressed, are losers from this crisis.
An obvious question for institutional investors and individuals is 
how to structure an investment portfolio in such a way that makes it 
resilient to pandemic risk. González, Jareño and Skinner explore this 
Monica Billio, Simone Varotto
Introduction
Monica Billio, Simone Varotto
Introduction
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 17
A New World Post COVID-19, 13-20
question by investigating the risk reduction that may result by di-
versifying portfolios into cryptocurrencies. They conclude that some 
cryptocurrencies (Ethereum and Bfinance) have the potential to con-
trol risk, while others (Bitcoin, Litecoin and Tezos) are less effective 
in this respect. However, risk reduction comes at the cost of lower 
risk adjusted returns.
Social distancing has limited our ability to see family and friends 
and also to participate in leisure activities. Football fans across Eu-
rope have been prevented from attending live matches and the foot-
ball industry has suffered financially as a result. Reade and Singleton 
point out that football’s decision makers should rethink the alloca-
tion of resources within the industry to help it recover. Greater in-
vestment in women football, a small role for agents and perhaps state 
intervention could all contribute to resolving football’s current and 
more long-standing issues.
Borri takes a close look at Italy, the first country to witness high 
infection rates in Europe. From a careful analysis of the measures 
taken in the country, which varied across cities and regions, he con-
cludes that the Italian experience can be a useful case study for pol-
icy makers to assess the costs and benefits associated with different 
approaches to tackling future waves. Donadelli, Gufler and Castellini 
argue that COVID-19 containment measures were introduced with 
delay and were badly communicated by the Italian government. The 
resulting uncertainty had the strongest effect on the construction, 
education, manufacturing and hospitality sectors and may slow down 
their recovery phase.
Arundale and Mason examine the coronavirus crisis from the 
perspective of private equity (PE) and venture capital firms. Their 
assessment is that the inevitable short-term contraction in this in-
dustry’s activity is likely to revert to pre-pandemic levels in the not-
so-distant future. The undervaluation of public companies may gener-
ate good opportunities for PE firms. However, start-ups may struggle 
to find funding in the current economic environment unless govern-
ments support their growth. Antypas predicts that PEs as well as 
hedge funds will be big players in the mergers and acquisitions mar-
ket over the next few months. Before the pandemic, these firms had 
accumulated a lot of ‘dry powder’, that is capital available for invest-
ments. Furthermore, their long-term investment horizon makes them 
particularly attractive to distressed firms. 
The drastic reduction in air travel and road congestion in cities 
around the world has undoubtedly had a positive impact on the en-
vironment with lower levels of pollution and CO
2
 emissions. Battis-
ton, Billio and Monasterolo review the fiscal and monetary policies in 
Europe and challenge their short-term objective of taking the econ-
omy back to ‘business as usual’. Instead, the authors suggest that 
the adoption of longer term objectives aiming to an alignment with 
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the EU Green Deal and the EU corporate taxation policies would be 
more beneficial and as cost-effective. Indeed, the European Central 
Bank has recently taken a pro-environmental stance that is in line 
with the authors’ proposed policy response.2 Bardsley also propos-
es that central banks should support an environmentally friendly re-
covery. But, he points out that this should not be done through bond 
purchases in the secondary market, which are “regressive and stra-
tegically blind”. Instead, he favours an open monetisation of public 
sector borrowing and discusses different ways in which this could 
be implemented.
Unemployment has risen dramatically during the pandemic. Raz-
zu examines the pandemic consequences for the labour market in 
the UK with a focus on gender inequality. His analysis of recent 
studies and the data available so far reveals that unemployment has 
increased more for low paid jobs and in sectors such as retail, ac-
commodation and food services where women are more likely to be 
over-represented. He also finds that, because of school closures, 
women are more likely than men to devote additional time to child-
care and household work, which may have a substantial impact on 
their career prospects. The gender pay gap may also have increased 
during the current crisis and the government’s suspension of the 
requirement for large firms to publish the gender pay differentials 
among their employees has not helped bring more equality to the 
UK labour market.
A form of labour market inequality that has had a dramatic impact 
in India concerns seasonal workers. Daripa reports that 120 million 
villagers were made unemployed overnight when the Indian govern-
ment sanctioned a total lockdown on March 24, 2020. These work-
ers were left without any support and 9 weeks after the lockdown the 
vast majority of them could still not benefit from government spon-
sored food rations under India’s Public Distribution System. The au-
thor argues that the lack of political representation of these work-
ers has left their voice unheard when it comes to government policy. 
Mouritzen, Rezaei and Liu focus on how the coronavirus influenced 
the flow of international talent and specifically examine the experi-
ence of European researchers in China. Cross-country mobility of 
researchers can increase scientific productivity with ultimate ben-
efits for the economy. The authors show preliminary evidence that 
a large proportion of European researchers that were based in Chi-
na before the pandemic has now left the country and is not planning 
to return or is uncertain about that possibility, which is a concern.
2 See “Lagarde Puts Green Policy Top of Agenda in ECB Bond Buying”. The Finan-
cial Times, 8 July 2020. https://www.ft.com/content/f776ea60-2b84-4b72-9765-
2c084bff6e32.
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COVID-19 has also accelerated the adoption of digital technolo-
gy and artificial intelligence (AI) in the corporate world. Pasha ex-
plores what this means in terms of the skillset that employees need 
to develop to thrive in the new working environment. Adaptability 
emerges as a key quality for personal success. Liu and Guo further 
analyse the business transformation that AI, big data and data ana-
lytics are producing in the business world. They also discuss ethical 
and cybersecurity implications. Finally, Chen looks at how alterna-
tive data sources can be used to support decision-making especially 
in critical times like those faced during the current pandemic. There-
fore, unlocking the potential of new data sources can be key to mak-
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We aim to sketch possible linkages between features of the 2008-09 finan-
cial crisis and outcomes of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. We do not aspire 
to theoretically and/or empirically establish such links in this chapter, but 
rather seek to point out a few possible channels. Our hope is that future re-
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search (including our own, i.e. we are pursuing cross-country and 
within-country testing) can reject or confirm some of the conjectures 
regarding the impact of the 2008-09 financial crisis on the unfold-
ing health and economic outcomes of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic. 
Empirical testing for sure can occur comparing countries, but also 
across localities, banks, and firms.
We will focus on three features of the financial crisis, i.e. bank 
bailouts that were often costly, SME credit which became more con-
strained, and bank regulation that became stricter. We will then dis-
cuss their intermediate outcomes in terms of the accumulation of 
sovereign debt and possible cuts in public health spending, the slow-
ing of economic growth and labour mobility, and bank zombie lend-
ing, to arrive at the COVID-19 pandemic severity in terms of infec-
tion and death rates and difficulties in designing and implementing 
economic support policies.
Figure 1 below provides a small roadmap to the rest of the discussion.
2008-2009 Global Financial Crisis
Costly bank bailouts Constrained SME credit Stricter bank regulation
Sovereign debt 
accumulation
Lack of local economic 
growth  
Bank zombie lending
Funding cuts in public 
health sector and 
crowding at retiree homes
Young employees cannot or 
do not leave parental home 
or town
Many zombie firms clog 
product markets




Figure 1 links elements of the financial crisis in 2008-2009, through their impact on
public health and economic outcomes since then, on characteristics of the COVID-19
pandemic in 2020. Financial elements are in red, public health elements are in blue, and
economic elements are in green.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the costly bank bailouts,
Section II the constrained SME credit, and Section III the strict bank regulation. Section IV
concludes by discussing a few possible empirical testing strategies and offers preliminary
findings.
I. Costly Bank Bailouts
Bank bailouts are complex phenomena.1 In Berger, Nistor, Ongena and Tsyplakov (2020)
we  note  that  bank  bailouts  are  not  the  “one-shot”  events  commonly  described  in  the
literature.  Bank  bailouts  are  instead  dynamic  processes  in  which  regulators  “catch”
financially distressed banks; “restrict” their activities over time; and “release” the banks
from restrictions  at  sufficiently  healthy  capital  ratios.  Even  more  important  than  their
1 Berger and Roman (2020) provide an excellent kaleidoscopic review of bank bailouts as these occurred
around the world.
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Figure 1 links elements of the financial crisis in 2008-09, through 
their impact on public health and economic outcomes since then, 
on characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. Financial el-
ements are in red, public health elements are in blue, and econom-
ic elements are in green.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I discusses the 
costly bank bailouts, Section II the constrained SME credit, and Sec-
tion III the strict bank regulation. Section IV concludes by discuss-
ing a few possible empirical testing strategies and offers prelimi-
nary findings.
Figure 1 The channels through which the Global Financial Crisis affected 
the COVID-19 Pandemic Outcomes
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1 Costly Bank Bailouts
Bank bailouts are complex phenomena.1 In Berger, Nistor, Ongena 
and Tsyplakov (2020) we note that bank bailouts are not the ‘one-shot’ 
events commonly described in the literature. Bank bailouts are in-
stead dynamic processes in which regulators ‘catch’ financially dis-
tressed banks; ‘restrict’ their activities over time; and ‘release’ the 
banks from restrictions at sufficiently healthy capital ratios. Even 
more important than their complexity is their potential cost to the 
taxpayers. Both capital injections and debt guarantee bailouts led 
to governmental outlays that resulted in further governmental debt 
buildups in many countries in Europe. While it is true that the picture 
is dynamic and complex, as a significant portion of the capital injec-
tions were later recouped and most debt guarantees never led to any 
claims, the UK government for example probably ‘borrowed’ around 
£150 billion (and was exposed for ten times that amount) according 
to its own National Audit Office.2 This amount represented around 
10% of general government gross debt (which stood at £1,821.3 bil-
lion at the end of the financial year ending March 2019, equivalent to 
85.2% of gross domestic product). As a matter of relevant compari-
son, that £150 billion is higher than the yearly budget of the Nation-
al Health Service (NHS) by a dozen or so billions.3
The linkage from one government budget item to another one is 
never straightforward, as demands are many and money is fungible. 
At the same time also in the case of the NHS it is hard to overlook an 
actual decrease in its budget in 2009 after 50 years of year-on-year 
growth and the slower growth thereafter.
In any case, the financial crisis led to costly bailouts, not only in-
creasing sovereign debt but also putting pressure on other govern-
mental spending, including those in the public health space, making 
dealing with any pandemic more challenging. Think about the impact 
of lower funding prior to 2020 on the functioning or even existence 
of pandemic coordination units, the number of hospital beds includ-
ing intensive care units, staff and their specialisation, etc. However, 
1 Berger and Roman (2020) provide an excellent kaleidoscopic review of bank bail-
outs as these occurred around the world.
2 On December 15, 2010 in its Second Report on the financial crisis, the National Au-
dit Office reported that the “scale of the support currently provided to the banks has 
fallen from its peak of £955 billion to £512 billion as at 1 December 2010. However, the 
amount of cash currently borrowed by the Government to support UK banks has risen 
by £7 billion since December 2009 to a total of £124 billion” (https://www.nao.org.
uk/report/maintaining-the-financial-stability-of-uk-banks-update-on-the-
support-schemes/).
3 See for example the websites of the Institute for Fiscal Studies and the UK Econom-
ic and Social Research Council on Health Spending: https://www.ifs.org.uk/tools_
and_resources/fiscal_facts/public_spending_survey/health_spending.
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not only hospital care but also elderly care may have been affected, 
leading to lower quality care for the elderly in more packed facilities, 
attended by fewer quality staff with fewer medical on-site facilities 
again making the pandemic outcomes potentially worse.
In addition, the further build-up of governmental debt due to the 
bailouts may have made it more difficult to set up very large and/or 
the appropriate economic assistance packages when needed (due to 
an actual or implied government budget constraint).4
2 Constrained SME Credit
The financial crisis led to a worsening of access to credit for house-
holds and corporations alike. Especially SMEs in periphery countries 
(such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) were negative-
ly affected. Banks, for example, ended up closing branches in those 
countries, which in Bonfim, Nogueira and Ongena (2020) we show to 
involve losses for (small) firms locally.
A lack of local credit access led to increasing local unemployment 
and worse economic conditions. Take Spain. With a real estate boom 
underway, once past the mandatory school age, many youngsters had 
directly entered the labour force to work in the well-paying real estate 
construction sector. Once the crisis hit, these youngsters found them-
selves quickly out of jobs and out of money, but strong family networks 
kept them off the street by bringing them back to live with their par-
ents or other older relatives. And later, after a few years, when condi-
tions in Spain improved, this lost generation may have found it chal-
lenging to find a job far away from their home town, maybe also not 
wanting to move too far away from their now aged parents or relatives.
Overall, the financial crisis may have made living at home or in 
the hometown for 20-to-30-year olds in countries like Spain and Italy 
(which was already prevalent) more common. In addition, this living-
in-close-proximity of older and younger people due to the financial 
crisis may have made COVID-19 infections more likely and deadly as 
younger people often carry the virus asymptomatically while espe-
cially older adults seem more likely to succumb to it.
4 In Andrieș, Ongena and Sprincean (2020) we assess the impact of the pandemic in 
Europe on sovereign CDS spreads using an event study methodology. We show that a 
higher number of cases and deaths and public health containment responses during 
the pandemic significantly increase the uncertainty among investors in European gov-
ernment bonds.
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3 Strict Bank Regulation
Finally, higher capital requirements and loan loss provisioning in-
troduced after the financial crisis may have led banks to wait long-
er to recognise potential loan losses. In Bonfim, Cerqueiro, Degryse 
and Ongena (2020), for example, we argue how in spite of growing 
regulatory pressure applied in the opposite direction in most devel-
oped economies, ‘zombie lending’ remains a widespread practice 
by banks (see also Acharya et al. 2019). We then exploit a series of 
large-scale on-site inspections made on the credit portfolios of sev-
eral Portuguese banks to show how these inspections affect banks’ 
future lending decisions making an inspected bank 20% less likely 
to refinance zombie firms, immediately spurring their default. Over-
all, we document that banks seemingly reduce zombie lending be-
cause the incentives to hold these loans disappear only once they are 
forced to recognise losses.
This forced recognition of losses, and in general, the willingness by 
supervisors to force banks to recognise and restructure, may matter a 
great deal, both for subsequent economic growth and also for the pos-
sibilities for an optimal pandemic economic policy response. In Gropp, 
Ongena, Saadi and Rocholl (2020), for example, we show that during 
the recent crisis in the US regions with higher levels of supervisory 
forbearance on distressed banks, there was less restructuring in the 
real sector: fewer establishments, firms, and jobs were lost if more 
distressed banks remained in business. We find that in these regions 
the banking sector is less healthy for several years after the crisis, 
manifested in lower capital, and higher non-performing assets ratios. 
But consistent with the cleansing hypothesis, regions with less super-
visory forbearance during the crisis experienced a better productiv-
ity growth path after the crisis with more establishment entries, job 
creation, and employment, wages, patents, and output growth. There-
fore, it seems to be a matter of short-term gain, long-term pain, with 
both zombie firms and zombie banks depressing economic activity for 
a long time after a financial crisis has been unspooling.
If zombie firms (and zombie banks) are so difficult to get rid of, 
their presence for sure also makes the implementation of government 
lending programmes to help firms through the early and mid-stages 
of the pandemic compromised from the very start. This is because 
money ends up in the ‘wrong hands’ and banks are all too happy to 
have a deep-pocketed co-underwriter, i.e. the government, of the set 
of zombie firms they have continued to service.
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4 Testing Strategy: Preliminary Exploration
There are several levels at which the impact of the financial crisis on 
the unfolding of the COVID-19 pandemic can be assessed. At the coun-
try level, correlations can be assessed of the measures of the severity 
of the financial crisis in terms of the loss in output growth, increase in 
sovereign debt or subsequent build-down in the public health sector 
and the (pre-lockdown) severity of the pandemic in terms of infections 
and death rates. At the local level, in Spain for example, one can assess 
how measures of changes in health care expenditures (after minus be-
fore the financial crisis) are related to financial crisis measures. In ad-
dition, we can study how measures of changes in living in close prox-
imity (after versus before the crisis) are predicted by financial crisis 
measures. Based on these assessments, one can then see how predict-
ed values of these two sets explain the COVID-19 pandemic measures, 
controlling for the level of healthcare and the level of living in proximity.
We present here some preliminary analysis for the Spanish case, 
which provides motivation for further formal work (which we pur-
sue ourselves). We focus first on the relation between foreclosures, 
which capture the severity of the financial crisis across provinces, and 
changes in public health expenditures. Using data from the Spanish 
Property Registrar, we identify the number of per-capita foreclosures 
across the 50 provinces (‘Provincias’) in 2012.5 That year is the second 
trough of the Spanish double dip recession and is associated with the 
deepest phase of the sovereign debt crisis, which ended in an impor-
tant bailout for Spanish banks. Public bailouts in Spain reached 60 bil-
lion EUR, around 6% of GDP. We correlate three foreclosure measures 
with the percent changes in per-capita public health expenditures 
across provinces relative to 2009, the year with highest per-capita 
public health expenditure prior to crisis-driven cuts. Data for health 
care expenditures were collected from the Spanish Health Ministry 
at the regional level.6 This expenditure data from the 17 regions (‘Co-
munidades Autónomas’) was then distributed across provinces pro-
portionately to the province population. The average province drop 
in public health expenditures relative to 2009 was 8%, 12%, 12% and 
6% in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, respectively. Table 1 shows the re-
sults for three measures: foreclosure initiatives, materialised foreclo-
sures, and settlements between the household and the bank aimed to 
give back the property with no further payments (‘dación en pago’).
5 Foreclosures data from the Property Registrar was downloaded from: https://
www.registradores.org/actualidad/portal-estadistico-registral/estadisti-
cas-de-propiedad.
6 Public health expenditures was obtained from: https://www.mscbs.gob.es/esta-
dEstudios/estadisticas/sisInfSanSNS/pdf/egspGastoReal.pdf.
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Table 1 Correlations between per-capita foreclosure measures per province in 2012 










2013-2009 -0.32** -0.30** -0.30**
2014-2009 -0.30** -0.26** -0.29**
2015-2009 -0.26* -0.24* -0.19
2016-2009 -0.25* -0.24* -0.22
2017-2009 -0.18 -0.19 -0.15
2018-2009 -0.13 -0.15 -0.12
Measures of foreclosures are: initiations of foreclosures procedures, foreclosure 
procedures materialized, and settlements between household and bank to give back the 
property with no further payments. One and two stars imply statistical significance 
at the 10% and 5% confidence levels, respectively.
Results in table 1 suggest that provinces with a higher intensity of 
foreclosures due to the financial crisis experienced significantly neg-
ative changes in health care expenditures in 2013, 2014, 2015 and 
2016. There may be a number of mechanisms at work behind these 
correlations, such as the need to shift public expenditures to other 
items, such as unemployment benefits. Additionally, lower tax col-
lection during those years, the need to reduce fiscal deficits during 
those years and an overall higher fiscal burden seem to have taken a 
toll precisely in provinces heavily hit by the financial crisis. We also 
note that these negative correlations are pervasive throughout the 
sample, including the latest year, 2018, though their size and statis-
tical significance naturally decrease over time.
The severity of the Spanish financial crisis had a relevant impact 
in terms of the unemployment rate, which reached 26% in 2013. The 
real estate bubble of the 1990s and 2000’s burst in 2009, when con-
struction abruptly came to a halt and many young low-skilled work-
ers were laid off. Unemployment was particularly high among young 
workers, reaching above 50% of active young population. The re-
sponse of these workers came in different forms. While some moved 
to other countries, returning home was definitely an option for many 
of them. If, consequently, household sizes increase and older children 
are staying in the same home, this could have had an impact in the 
transmission of the COVID-19.
To assess the relation between the Spanish financial crisis and 
the potential changing patterns of co-residence in Spanish house-
holds, we retrieve yearly province-level census data from IPUMS 
from 2009 to 2018: family size, age of the eldest child, and the age 
spread between the eldest and youngest child. We then correlate 
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changes in these co-residence measures – also with 2009 being the 
base year – and the 2012 foreclosure measures.
Table 2 shows the results. Strikingly, each correlation in the ta-
ble starting in 2014 is positive, implying that households in provinces 
that were harder-hit by the financial crisis, experienced either high-
er growth or a lower decrease in the household size in the following 
years. Not all correlations are significant. Interestingly, significance 
is generally higher for later years, indicating that perhaps there is 
a lag by which the co-residence effects are borne out. The strongest 
results are obtained for the age of the eldest child. While with these 
data it is not possible to distinguish whether these descendants re-
turn home after being laid off or stay at home after the financial cri-
sis, both channels are consistent with our results and could potential-
ly contribute to an increased likelihood of disease contagion during 
the pandemic. Overall, the findings are consistent with the hypoth-
esis stated above, at least at the unconditional level (i.e. not control-
ling for other relevant factors).
Table 2 Correlations between per-capita foreclosure measures per province  
in 2012 and changes in co-residence census measures across households
Foreclosure measure Family size Age eldest child Age spread children
2013-2009 initiations -0.21 -0.09 -0.15
materializations 0.15 0.10 0.03
settlements -0.05 0.02 -0.08
2014-2009 initiations 0.14 0.15 0.14
materializations 0.22 0.12 0.05
settlements 0.25* 0.28** 0.24*
2015-2009 initiations 0.34*** 0.39*** 0.25*
materializations 0.16 0.16 0.10
settlements 0.21 0.15 0.14
2016-2009 initiations 0.20 0.28** 0.23*
materializations 0.29** 0.34*** 0.25*
settlements 0.15 0.23 0.20
2017-2009 initiations 0.09 0.17 0.18
materializations 0.27** 0.21 0.20
settlements 0.18 0.25* 0.21
2018-2009 initiations 0.18 0.24* 0.16
materializations 0.28** 0.24* 0.24*
settlements 0.22 0.29** 0.18
Measures of foreclosures are: initiations of foreclosures procedures, foreclosure 
procedures materialised, and settlements between household and bank to give back 
the property with no further payments. Measures of co-residence are: changes in 
family size, changes in the age of the eldest child at home, and changes in the age 
spread between the eldest and youngest child. One, two and three stars imply 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
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As a third descriptive exercise, we explore the relation between the 
financial crisis and the use of nursing homes for the elderly, com-
monly known in Spain as elderly residences. Elderly residences have 
been at the centre of the COVID-19 impact in Spain. In particular, 
and while official data are not available at the time of the writing of 
the article, it is widely believed that more than half of the deceased 
died in elderly residences.7 We measure the usage intensity of el-
derly residences with two different ratios provided by the IMSERSO 
(Spanish Institute for Elderly and Social Services) in 2018, the lat-
est year available.8 The first one is the ratio between users of elder-
ly residences in a given province and the province population. The 
second one is the ratio of users of elderly residences in a given prov-
ince and their total capacity. The residences considered here are on-
ly those under public funding.
Table 3 shows the correlations between the two residence ratios 
and the changes in public expenditures in health services with re-
spect to 2009. The correlations are negative in most cases, implying 
that provinces that reduced their per capita public health expendi-
tures by a larger amount were also those with a more intensive us-
age of the elderly residences under public funding in 2018. These 
correlations become larger and more significant for the 2014-2009 
year interval. Thus, provinces with more crowded elderly residenc-
es were also the ones that experienced more serious public health 
expenditure cuts. This finding points at potential trouble for these 
provinces in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, as their response 
may be hindered by both overcrowded residences and less public 
health resources. 
7 See, for instance, the June 6th, 2020 newspaper interview with the President of the 
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Table 3 Correlations between elderly residence ratios of intensive usage in 2018 
and changes in per-capita health expenditures per province with respect to 2009
Residence users divided  
by province population
Residence users divided  








Measures of residence ratios are: residence users divided by province population, 
and residence users divided by residence positions in the province. The residences 
considered are those under public funding. One and two stars imply statistical 
significance at the 10% and 5% confidence levels, respectively.
In future work, we aim to test more formally the links among the four 
dimensions considered in this chapter: severity of the financial crisis, 
changes in health expenditures, changes in household co-residence 
and overcrowding of elderly residences. The preliminary results pre-
sented here at least suggest the possibility that provinces more af-
fected by the financial crisis suffered higher public health expendi-
ture cuts, a higher increase in household co-residence as a response 
to the crisis as well as more crowded elderly residences ex-post. This 
combination of factors might have exacerbated the consequences of 
COVID-19 in these provinces.
Overall the main question that will need to be addressed is “How 
to better manage systemic risks – from cyber attacks and pandem-
ics to financial crises and climate change – in a globalized world” 
(Goldin, Mariathasan 2014). Fighting the fires of one realisation of 
such a global systemic risk, i.e. the financial crisis, may have lead 
to consequences for how another realisation one decade later, i.e. 
the COVID-19 pandemic, is having its impact and is being handled. 
The whole picture calls for more creative thinking, acting and re-
source allocation at all levels and by all agents (government, house-
holds and firms) to enhance system resiliency, in accordance with 
the costs and benefits involved. But in the end, and not simplifying 
too much, global systemic risks likely also call for a sure-footed glob-
al ‘systemic’ approach.
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1 The Economic Shock of Pandemics
Concerns over the spread of the novel coronavirus in March 2020 
translated into an immediate economic slowdown. Stock markets 
were hit: the UK’s FTSE 100 seeing its worst days of trading for 
many years (This is Money 2020)1 and additionally the Dow Jones 
and S&P500 in the US. Money had to go somewhere and the price of 
gold – seen as a stable commodity during extreme events – reached 
a seven-year high.2 
The real economic impacts became more evident as globally we 
saw a country by country lockdown of normal activities. In the UK 
this translated into a Government bailout of a scale never previously 
seen or imagined.3 Soon economists were predicting a ‘Greatest re-
cession’, as governments struggled with their exit plans and attempt-
ing to reconcile levels of debt never seen in peacetime, alongside the 
prospect of mass unemployment – perhaps at levels that would take 
economies back to the 1980s (or worse).4
Whilst it was perhaps immediately clear (to economic commenta-
tors rather than governments) that the COVID-19 pandemic and as-
sociated lockdowns were going to have a long term downwards effect 
on the world economy, it became more and more tricky to link events 
to historical pandemics. The main differentiating factor is the ability 
of current governments to lockdown their citizens for long periods 
of time, a feat that would have been beyond the means of medieval 
rulers (who, in any case, would have had fewer qualms about send-
ing out the labourers to work during a pandemic).
So whilst acknowledging the challenges, a look back at history can 
help us consider the economic effects of public health emergencies 
and how best to manage them. In doing so, however, it is important 
to remember that past pandemics were far more deadly than coro-
navirus, which has a relatively low death rate (Parker 2020). With-
out modern medicine and institutions like the World Health Organ-
ization, past populations were more vulnerable. It is estimated that 
This is an expanded version of an original article in the Conversation by the same au-
thors (Bell, Lacey, Prescott 2020).
We would like to thank the editors of this volume for helpful comments and also An-
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the Justinian plague of 541 AD killed 25 million and the Spanish flu 
of 1918 around 50 million.5 
By far the worst death rate in history was inflicted by the Black 
Death. Caused by several forms of bubonic plague, it lasted from 
1346 to 1353, killing anywhere between 75 million and 200 million 
people worldwide and perhaps one half of the population of England 
(Benedictow 2005). As we will describe, the economic consequenc-
es were also profound.
2 ‘Anger, Antagonism, Creativity’
It might sound counter-factual – and this should not minimise the con-
temporary psychological and emotional turmoil caused by the Black 
Death – but the majority of those who survived went on to enjoy im-
proved standards of living. Prior to the Black Death, England had suf-
fered from severe overpopulation.
Following the pandemic, the shortage of manpower led to a rise in 
the daily wages of labourers, as they were able to market themselves 
to the highest bidder. The diets of labourers also improved and includ-
ed more meat, fresh fish, white bread and ale (Dyer 1989, 158-60). 
Although landlords struggled to find tenants for their lands, chang-
es in forms of tenure improved estate incomes and reduced their de-
mands. But the period after the Black Death was also, according to 
economic historian Christopher Dyer (2005, 429), a time of “agita-
tion, excitement, anger, antagonism and creativity”. 
Across Europe, the reaction of many governments was to try to 
hold back the tide of supply-and-demand economics (Cohn 2007). In 
France, King John II passed detailed regulations for northern France 
controlling work practices, wages and prices. Similar regulations had 
been enacted in southern France in 1348. In Spain, legislation in Cas-
tile stipulated that lords could specify the place and time of work of 
rural labourers, while in Aragon, work was made obligatory for all 
except the ill, the old and children under 12. Italian city states also 
attempted to control wages and prices. The most well-known labour 
legislation is however the various ordinances and statutes passed by 
the English government from 1349.
The ‘problem of labour’ became a preoccupation of English parlia-
ments and governments. Between 1349 and 1430, one third of the 77 
parliaments which met passed legislation attempting to control wag-
es, terms of service and prices (Given-Wilson 2000, 85). An initial Or-
dinance of Labourers in 1349 specified that every man or woman, free 
or unfree, aged sixty years or younger without income from land or 
5 https://www.rwjf.org/en/blog/2013/12/the_five_deadliesto.html.
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trade must work for whoever required their labour. Wages were set at 
the levels that had been customary in 1346 and anyone receiving ex-
cessive wages forfeited the excess sum to the king. Victuallers were 
also obliged to sell their wares for ‘reasonable’ prices (Poos 1983, 29).
These provisions were elaborated and enshrined in statute in 
1351.6 The 1351 Statute of Labourers incorporated a table of set 
wage rates for specific occupations. It stipulated that servants were 
obliged to serve for entire years, and not by the day (Poos 1983, 30). 
Subsequent legislation expanded and refined the national pay scales, 
with even pay rates for stipendiary chaplains being controlled in 
1362. Enforcement was also progressively tightened. In 1361, mone-
tary fines for breaches of labour legislation were replaced by brand-
ing of the letter F for Falsity on the forehead (although there is no ev-
idence this punishment was ever inflicted [Cohn 2007, 476]). A 1388 
statute required letters of authorisation for any worker travelling 
away from home (Bennett 2010, 12). 
This was the first time an English government had attempted to 
micromanage the economy. However, the aim of the government in 
the 14th century was not to promote economic growth but rather to 
maintain the existing social order. In a world where social ranks were 
seen as God-given, governments thought there was a moral impera-
tive to restrict excessive consumption or accumulation of wealth by 
those classes not entitled to it. These concerns also led to sumptua-
ry legislation which for example specified which social groups could 
wear what type of clothes with poorer people “allowed to wear only 
blanket and russet wool” (Sponsier 1992, 275). Legislation such as 
this sought to preserve society as it was before the pandemic – just 
as furloughing sought to deep freeze the economy in 2020, only the 
medieval legislation was not temporary.
But this attempt to regulate the market did not work. Enforcement 
of the labour legislation led to evasion and protests. In the longer 
term, real wages rose as the population level stagnated with recurrent 
outbreaks of the plague. Landlords struggled to come to terms with 
the changes in the land market as a result of the loss in population. 
There was large-scale migration after the Black Death as people took 
advantage of opportunities to move to better land or pursue trade in 
the towns. Most landlords were forced to offer more attractive deals 
to ensure tenants farmed their lands. However, any suggestion that 
women benefitted, even temporarily, from the situation through in-
creased job opportunities and incomes, seems to be a myth. Research 
has shown that women lost out by accepting permanent contracts and 
the perceived security they offered, despite the fact that casual work 
was better remunerated (Humphries, Weisdorf 2015).
6 https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/seth/statute-labourers.asp.
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The failure of the government’s attempts to control the labour mar-
ket is vividly illustrated in legal records. In Surrey, William Cothull 
found John Egger wandering and able to work. Cothull offered to em-
ploy Egger as a ploughman for a year. Egger refused, so Cothull had 
Egger arrested and put in the stocks until he agreed to work for him 
(Bennett 2010, 17). Others were more successful in evading the leg-
islation. A common trick was to claim that you already worked for 
someone else: when Peter de Semere offered work to William atte 
Merre of Merrow in February 1350, William claimed he was unable 
to work for Peter because he was already a serf of the prior and con-
vent of St Mary at Boxgrove on the priory’s manor of Merrow, and 
the justices found in William’s favour (Horrox 1994, 317). Others sim-
ply disappeared. John Carter a ‘common labourer’ took an oath be-
fore the constables of Apley in Lincolnshire in June 1373 to work in 
that village the following summer and autumn but vanished a week 
later (Poos 1983, 31).
The inequities of the labour legislation led to resistance. In 1350, 
two constables in the village of Preston in Suffolk tried to force Rich-
ard Digg, a common labourer, to work for various men in the vil-
lage. The vicar objected and demanded to know by what authority 
Digg could be ordered to work. The vicar excommunicated the con-
stables and, encouraged by the vicar, Digg refused to serve and in-
stead earned his own living as a wage labourer (Bennett 2010, 22-3).
The idea that labourers might not work according to the customary 
patterns and could earn their own living as wage labourers offend-
ed many. Wage labourers were often portrayed as idle and feckless, 
wasting their time in taverns and gaming (itself a sign that they had 
more disposable income). William Langland in his great moral poem 
Piers Plowman contrasted the honest virtuous figure of the plough-
man with the wage labourers who were portrayed as rootless wasters 
unwilling to do an honest day’s work, akin to fraudulent beggars (Dy-
er 2000). These themes were taken up by the gentry and merchants 
in parliament who complained about workers refusing to accept the 
statutory levels of pay and leaving before the end of their service:
For fear of such flights, the commons now dare not challenge or 
offend their servants, but give them whatever they wish to ask, in 
spite of the statutes and ordinances to the contrary – and this chief-
ly through fear they will be received elsewhere. (Dobson 1981, 73) 
A new middle class of men (almost always men) emerged. These were 
people who were not born into the landed gentry but were able to 
make enough surplus wealth to purchase plots of land. Clement Pas-
ton (of the Norfolk family who bequeathed the famous medieval letter 
collection) took advantage of the Black Death to accumulate substan-
tial landholding in the vicinity of Paston. It is possible that Clem-
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ent started life as a peasant bondsman, but he accumulated enough 
wealth to have his son educated in the law and in two generations 
the family rose rapidly through the ranks of the gentry.7 Recent re-
search has shown that property ownership opened up to market spec-
ulation (Bell, Brooks, Killick 2019a) and this market allowed inves-
tors to speculate and profit (Bell, Brooks, Killick 2019b). 
Meanwhile, England was still at war with France and required 
large armies for its campaigns overseas. This had to be paid for, and 
in England led to more taxes on a diminished population. The par-
liament of a young Richard II came up with the innovative idea of 
punitive poll taxes in 1377, 1379 and 1380, leading directly to social 
unrest in the form of the Peasants’ Revolt of 1381.8 This revolt, the 
largest ever seen in England, came as a direct consequence of the re-
curring outbreaks of plague and government attempts to tighten con-
trol over the economy and pursue its international ambitions. When 
the rebels met the King at Mile End, they demanded that serfdom 
should be abolished and that all land should be held at a rent of four 
pence an acre. They also requested that the laws controlling when 
and for whom men and women should work should be abolished and 
that nobody should be forced to work against their will and without 
a written agreement (Dobson 1981, 161). 
3 Lessons for Today
While the plague that caused the Black Death was very different to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, there are some important lessons here for 
future economic growth. First, governments must take great care to 
manage the economic fallout. Maintaining the status quo for vested 
interests can spark unrest and political volatility. Second, restrict-
ing freedom of movement can cause a violent reaction. We have al-
ready seen the tensions around lockdown as a result of COVID-19. 
At the time of writing, it is unclear how far further restrictions will 
be necessary, but it is worth noting that there were five further out-
breaks of bubonic plague in Britain between 1360 and 1390 and these 
recurrences, combined with resentment against the restrictions on 
the labour market, contributed significantly to the tensions which 
led to the revolt in 1381.
In the wake of the Black Death schemes for government borrow-
ing collapsed amidst accusations of corruption and misconduct. As 
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ed reforms to the wool markets (wool was England’s most import ex-
port in the period). The government broke up the old cartels that had 
dominated the trade and these reforms were successful in generating 
a level of profit that was unsurpassed for the rest of the Middle Ag-
es (Ormrod 2011, 369). As Boris Johnson conducts negotiations over 
the Brexit deal he would do well to bear in mind the importance of 
boosting overseas trade.
The pandemic of bubonic plague in the 14th century brought to 
the fore anxieties about social change and inequality. Attempts by 
the magnates and gentry over a period of decades to control these 
changes led to large-scale social unrest. Today, the slow reaction of 
governments to the disproportionate effects of the COVID-19 virus 
on BAME populations has fostered the unprecedented international 
protests by the Black Lives Matter movement following the killing of 
George Floyd. The 14th-century experience reinforces the need for 
government to act swiftly to address issues of social injustice at a 
time when pandemics have heightened social and cultural anxieties. 
Plus, we should not underestimate the knee-jerk, psychological re-
action. The Black Death saw an increase in xenophobic and antisemit-
ic attacks.9 It unleashed waves of persecution: against beggars and 
priests in Narbonne, Carcassonne and Grasse; pilgrims in Catalonia; 
Catalans in Sicily; and most infamously Jews across German-speak-
ing regions of Central Europe, through the Rhineland and thence into 
Spain, France and the Low Countries (Cohn 2018, 48-53). In England, 
resentment at the role of merchants from the Low Countries in the 
wool trade led to xenophobic massacres of Flemings during the 1381 
revolt. Fear and suspicion of non-natives changed trading patterns. 
There will be winners and losers economically as the current pub-
lic health emergency plays out. In the context of the Black Death, 
elites attempted to entrench their power, but population change in the 
long term forced some rebalancing to the benefit of labourers, both 
in terms of wages and mobility and in opening up the market for land 
(the major source of wealth at the time) to new investors. Population 
decline also encouraged immigration, albeit to take up low skilled or 
low-paid jobs. All are lessons that reinforce the need for measured, 
carefully researched responses from current governments.
9 https://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/01/health/01plague.html.
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1 Introduction
Aside from its terrible human toll (which will have enduring impacts), 
the economic costs of the coronavirus pandemic will be catastrophic, 
both in the short and longer term. Can Britain learn anything from 
three previous episodes of international crises that massively in-
creased its national debt, while destabilising the domestic and world 
economies: the First and Second World Wars and the Credit Crunch?
In some respects, the coronavirus pandemic is different from these 
crises – it inflicts no significant damage on physical infrastructure; it 
has not skewed industrial output towards a ‘war economy’, and – un-
like the Credit Crunch – it has not laid bare more fundamental in-
stabilities and insolvencies among key sectors and firms. However, 
in common with these crises, it will hugely inflate government debt, 
while generating further costs of economic reconstruction, to save 
businesses that are fundamentally solvent, but have been driven to 
the brink of collapse by the lock-down. Britain will also face a major 
expansion in unemployment and other welfare costs, at least in the 
short and medium term.
The previous crises are illuminating in showing the solutions that 
British policy-makers have repeatedly advocated. Influential voices 
(particularly the Treasury, Bank of England, and leading bankers and 
City figures) repeatedly advocated placing much of the burden of ad-
justment on lower income groups, via policies of savage deflation and 
public expenditure cuts. In only one case did politicians reject this ad-
vice, in the special circumstances of an electorate who had learned the 
lessons of the government response to the First World War aftermath 
and took the opportunity of the 1945 election to vote in a radical gov-
ernment, committed to social reconstruction and the welfare state.
2 The First Crisis: 1914-31
The First World War was both an unprecedented humanitarian dis-
aster and a huge negative shock to the international economy. Both 
belligerents and neutral countries greatly expanded their industri-
al production, especially for staple commodities such as coal, iron 
and steel, and textiles (which formed the core of Britain’s industrial 
base), creating a problem of massive excess capacity following the 
Armistice (Scott 2007, 74-85). Until the final months of war, it had 
been assumed that the outcome would probably be a stalemate, with 
a strong Germany possibly switching from a fighting war to an eco-
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nomic conflict with Britain (Cline 2017, 157-81). This challenge was 
to be addressed by policies of industrial reconstruction and job cre-
ation – partly via a massive building programme of ‘homes for he-
roes’ (state-subsidised municipal housing). However, the Treasury 
and Bank of England were strongly opposed to this strategy, which 
ran counter to their own plans for savage deflation, to bring the 
pound back to its pre-war gold standard parity and restore the City 
to its status as the world’s main financial centre (Peden 2000, 125). 
Germany’s sudden military collapse in autumn 1918 enabled the 
Treasury and Bank of England to implement their deflationary strate-
gy (Garside 1998, 27-9). This contrasted with the policies of most ma-
jor European nations, including Germany, France, and Italy, which, to 
varying degrees, relied on inflationary policies to reduce their debt’s 
real value. Adopting such a solution in Britain would have made a re-
sumption of Bank of England co-ordination of the international gold 
standard impossible, while shattering ambitions for a resumption of 
the City’s status as the world’s leading financial center (that, in any 
case, proved illusory). It would have also adversely impacted the mid-
dle classes – the bedrock of Conservative electoral support – by dras-
tically reducing the value of their fixed-interest stocks (Daunton 2002, 
64-6). Sparing the middle-classes by focusing on paying off the debt 
nevertheless enraged the very constituency that the policy was de-
signed to protect, as it entailed high taxation (by pre-1914 standards). 
The standard rate of income tax rose from 5.8% in 1913-14 to an inter-
war peak of 30% during the 1918-19/1921-22 tax years (Daunton 2002, 
883-9). Top rates were much higher, but a failure to address growing 
tax avoidance/evasion allowed the super-rich to dodge a growing pro-
portion of their taxes (Scott, forthcoming).
Returning to gold at pre-war parity (£1 = $4.86) required substan-
tial price falls to counter war-time inflation. However, the govern-
ment’s deflationary policy mainly acted to increase unemployment 
rather than reduce prices. Nevertheless, in April 1925 the Chan-
cellor, Winston Churchill, took Britain back to gold at its old pari-
ty (which proved to be substantially over-valued). As John Maynard 
Keynes famously noted, what he estimated to be a 10% sterling over-
valuation meant that:
whenever we sell anything abroad, either the foreign buyer has 
to pay 10 per cent more in his money or we have to accept 10 per 
cent less in our money. That is to say, we have to reduce our ster-
ling prices, for coal or iron or shipping freights… by 10 per cent 
in order to be on a competitive level, unless prices rise elsewhere. 
(Keynes 1970, 23; emphasis in original)
Britain was a negative outlier in terms of its poor economic growth 
during the 1920s, largely as a result of deflationary policy – which 
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continued after 1925 in order to defend its over-valued exchange rate 
(Eichengreen 2004, 322-3). Ultimately the policy was not sustainable; 
a loss of international confidence in sterling triggered a political cri-
sis in the summer of 1931 and one of the first acts of the new Conserv-
ative-led ‘National’ government was to take Britain off the gold stand-
ard. Contrary to the Treasury and Bank of England’s dire predictions, 
the value of the pound did not collapse, but settled at a more interna-
tionally competitive rate, which assisted Britain in achieving one of 
the strongest recoveries from the 1929-32 depression. However, de-
spite a surge in economic growth and employment, the staple indus-
tries (principally coal, iron and steel, and textiles) were slow to recov-
er from a decade of being priced out of international markets, creating 
what proved to be a permanent north-south divide in British prosperity.
3 The Second Crisis: 1939-51
The Second World War saw a much wider mobilisation of domes-
tic resources than the First, in a conflict where, for a time, Britain 
stood alone. At its peak, almost all working-age adults, including ci-
vilians, were subject to some sort of conscription and, thanks to the 
Luftwaffe, many urban residents faced a real threat of death or injury. 
Government accepted the imperative to keep food and other neces-
sities both affordable and available, via a system of rationing, price 
controls, and subsidies. These policies sharply reduced living stand-
ards for the upper and middle classes, while improving the nutrition 
of many manual workers’ families. Rationing did not remove dispar-
ities in living standards – the affluent retained their better housing, 
could still dine at smart restaurants where food was unrationed, and 
enjoyed better food at home by using the ration coupons of their do-
mestic servants. However, the system was based on equality of sac-
rifice and “fair shares” for all, according to needs, rather than wants 
(Roodhouse 2013, 2-6). 
Contrary to some popular accounts, there was no consensus within 
the war-time government that post-war economic policy should priori-
tise domestic reconstruction and Keynesian full-employment policy. An 
influential coalition of Bank of England and Treasury officials advocat-
ed an economic policy based on prioritising the restoration of sterling’s 
credit-worthiness – in the face of Britain’s huge war debts – through 
another round of severe deflation. Keynes criticised this group for pri-
oritising international “obligations” over the war-time commitment to 
build a fairer society – which would amount to a repetition of the 1920s 
gold standard debacle – though his direct influence was ended with his 
untimely death in April 1946 (Newton 2004, 262-3).
However, the deflationary lobby failed to appreciate the drastic 
change in popular opinion, reflecting the levelling tendency in socie-
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ty brought about by the collective nature of the war effort. Most sen-
ior politicians recognised the impracticalities of the Bank of England’s 
‘sterling first’ policy, while the remainder had their dreams shattered 
by Labour’s landslide 1945 election victory. Clement Atlee’s 1945-51 
Labour governments used a continuation of rationing and other war-
time direct controls to create a comprehensive welfare state and na-
tionalise what Labour saw as key areas of the economy, while avoiding 
any deflationary plunge into recession. Moreover, they achieved sub-
stantial economic growth, with GDP rising at a respectable 2.5% per 
annum from 1946-51. The October 1951 election saw the return of a 
Conservative government, which increasingly followed Treasury and 
Bank of England advice to prioritise a strong and stable pound and an 
early re-opening of the City, over wider domestic economic and social 
reconstruction. Nevertheless, many of the gains of the Attlee era, in-
cluding the NHS, the welfare state, and a commitment to full employ-
ment, persisted. 
4 The Third Crisis: 2008-15
The Credit Crunch was a very different type of economic shock than 
the two world wars, in part a financial crisis (on a scale never seen 
before), but also a crisis of the global economic system. From the 
1980s, governments had increasingly ceded their regulatory func-
tions to markets, private sector institutions, and central banks, on 
the basis of a philosophy that markets could fix any problems they 
could create, if set free from the heavy hand of the state. However, 
the events of autumn 2008 shattered this myth, as the spike in equi-
ties, house prices, and securities based on home mortgages suddenly 
burst, threatening to bring down the international financial system. 
The subsequent fall in house and equity prices over 2008-09 wiped 
out $1.5 trillion of British household wealth, equivalent to 50% of GDP 
(according to an IMF estimate), with 10% of home-owners facing neg-
ative equity (Tooze 2019, 156). Internationally, trillions of pounds of 
taxpayers’ money was mobilised by the world’s leading industrial na-
tions, to save banks from their own mistakes and mismanagement. 
The new reality produced a rapid, if short-lived, ideological volte-
face, with many of the people who had hitherto been the strongest ad-
vocates of market-based solutions making ever-more desperate pleas 
for massive government bailouts. As former Federal Reserve chair-
man Alan Greenspan admitted, “I made a mistake in presuming that 
the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks and others, was 
such that they were best capable of protecting their own sharehold-
ers” (Beattie, Politi 2008).
Across the developed world, eye-wateringly expensive bank bail-
outs were mobilised, via loans, recapitalisations, asset purchases, and 
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state-backed guarantees. These were reinforced by similarly huge 
government economic stimulus packages to prevent a global economic 
meltdown. Gordon Brown’s plan to recapitalise Britain’s ailing clear-
ing banks, while taking equity stakes in them, is generally regarded 
as one of the most successful bank bailouts (though the Labour gov-
ernments of which he had been Chancellor, then PM, must shoulder 
substantial responsibility for earlier failures to introduce stronger 
regulation) (Tooze 2019, 190-2). Meanwhile Britain’s clearing banks 
were remarkably unrepentant. For example, RBS – the world’s larg-
est bank on the eve of the crisis, based on its 2008 balance sheet – in-
sisted on honouring £1 billion of bonus contracts, despite just having 
been saved from bankruptcy by an enormous injection of taxpayers’ 
money (Tooze 2019, 292). Then, once the crisis was averted, the banks 
aggressively lobbied for a quick return to business as usual.
As in 1919 and 1945, the Treasury lobbied for prioritising deficit 
reduction over maintaining living standards (Tooze 2019, 349). The 
6th May 2010 general election failed to produce a Parliamentary ma-
jority, with the Tories gaining the most seats and the Liberals holding 
the balance of power. However, negotiations soon revealed the Lib-
erals’ top team to be dominated by economic liberals, having much 
more in common with the Tories than with Labour. They thus signed 
up to a Conservative programme of ‘austerity’, in stark contrast to 
their manifesto pledges. This was a very different brand of auster-
ity than that employed by the 1945-51 Labour governments, based 
around ‘fair shares’ and equality of sacrifice. Instead, austerity was 
disproportionately targeted on lower income groups, cutting welfare 
benefits and raising regressive taxes, particularly VAT. The rich were 
much less impacted, largely due to their ability to avoid or evade tax-
ation and make capital gains through borrowing at historically low 
interest rates to purchase houses or other scarce real assets, which 
rose in value owing to the volume of cash chasing them (Moore 2016). 
One major element of the Tory-Liberal austerity was a further roll-
ing back of the welfare state. From September 2009 to July 2016 over 
one million public sector jobs were cut or transferred to the private 
sector (outstripping the earlier cuts by the Thatcher or Major gov-
ernments) (Tooze 2019, 350). This included substantial cuts in police 
numbers (followed, several years later, by an epidemic of gun and 
knife fatalities), while the NHS was progressively starved of resourc-
es (relative to its sector-specific inflation rate), leaving it ill-equipped 
to cope with a major flu epidemic, let alone the worst pandemic for 
a century. There were also deep cuts in welfare benefits. The 2012 
Welfare Reform Act replaced unemployment-related and income ben-
efits by Universal Credit. Despite some positive features (such as ra-
tionalising the benefits system), it required claimants to wait over 
a month before receiving their first payment. As many had little or 
no savings, waiting five or six weeks without money often led to be-
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ing evicted from their homes and/or amassing huge debts to ‘pay-
day lenders’, charging extortionate interest rates. This plunged sub-
stantial numbers of families into the type of deep absolute poverty 
not seen in Britain since the 1930s, including several cases of death 
by starvation for vulnerable people refused benefits (Butler 2020). 
5 Lessons for the Pandemic
The pandemic is creating a debt burden of similar magnitude to these 
earlier crises. Britain’s budget deficit is likely to approach £350 mil-
lion by the end of 2020, while the national debt is expected to rise to 
over 100% of GDP (Warner 2020). However, this time there is particu-
larly widespread support for an expansionary solution, from a broad 
range of the political spectrum. Influential commentators have point-
ed out that debt is not as big a problem as the ‘Treasury view’ sug-
gests. Major trading nations typically borrow in their own curren-
cy, from their own people – though the debtors and creditors are not 
one and the same. Government debt is disproportionately owned by 
the rich, but less so than was the case in 1920 or 1945, owing to the 
rise of institutional investors that view government debt as a safe, 
if low yielding, asset. 
Adam Tooze and others have suggested that a wealth tax and/or 
a move against corporate and personal tax evasion would more fair-
ly realign debt holders and payers, thereby avoiding the recent pat-
tern of lower income groups being the main losers from crises and 
recessions. Moreover, these policies would avoid deflation and thus 
stimulate growth, in turn reducing the aggregate burden of the debt. 
Another round of Quantitative Easing would assist growth and the 
debt burden, while also further lowering interest rates and internal-
ising the debtor-creditor relationship (the state owes debts to itself). 
‘Printing money’ is potentially inflationary, but given the strong de-
flationary momentum of a ‘depression’ (even a threatened one) infla-
tionary pressures are severely muted (Tooze 2020). While Britain’s 
debts from the crisis appear staggering, they are unremarkable com-
pared to the other G7 nations (which have typically introduced larg-
er stimulus/support packages) and Britain has the advantage of ‘safe 
haven’ appeal to investors facing turbulent international conditions.1 
In addition to the obvious moral case for equitably spreading the 
costs of a catastrophe that has impacted all sections of society, there 
is also a strong economic case. As table 1 shows, while the deflation-
1 “The Guardian View on Government Debt: Sensible, not Spendthrift”. The Guardi-
an, 14 May 2020, 2. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/may/14/the-
guardian-view-on-government-debt-sensible-not-spendthrift.
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ary solutions pushed by the Treasury and Bank of England after the 
First World War and the Credit Crunch may have been beneficial for 
the City of London and the banking and financial sectors, this came 
at the cost of very slow aggregate growth. In contrast, the more ex-
pansionary and broadly-based policies pursued by the Attlee Labour 
governments achieved significantly higher growth, without prevent-
ing them from pursuing other priorities, such as physical reconstruc-
tion and founding the modern welfare state.
Table 1 Average GDP growth per annum during the first five, and ten, years 
following the three crises
Average GDP growth for recovery
Crisis Starting year 5 years 10 years
First World War 1919 -0.71 0.79
Second World War 1946 2.45 2.92
Credit Cruch 2009 1.94 1.86
Source: Williamson, S.H.  (2020). “Annualized Growth Rate of Various Historical 
Economic Series”. MeasuringWorth. https://www.measuringworth.com/
calculators/growth/index.php (UK GDP growth index)
Many eminent contemporary economists, notably J.M. Keynes in the 
first two crises and – during the Credit Crunch – Paul Krugman, were 
deeply critical of policy prescriptions that would both generate mass 
unemployment and reduce growth (Keynes 1931; Tooze 2019, 372). 
In 2020 there are particularly strong reasons for choosing an expan-
sionary strategy, aimed at boosting growth by creating the necessary 
conditions for the recovery of businesses hit by the crisis. First, this 
crisis is different from the three discussed above in that there is no 
‘fundamental disequilibrium’ in the economy from inflationary pres-
sures, speculative euphoria, world overproduction, or physical cap-
ital destruction. The problem is mainly one of hugely enlarged gov-
ernment debt, which could be addressed by long-term funding, taking 
advantage of extraordinarily low interest rates. As long as econom-
ic growth out-paces the interest rate on government bonds, the real 
burden of the debt will fall over time, even if it is never paid-off (Houn-
sel 2020). The government could also follow Gordon Brown’s prec-
edent in insisting that loans to ailing businesses should include an 
equity stake for the government. In addition to reducing firms’ debt 
problems, this would also effectively compel shareholders to make a 
contribution to their companies’ financial support.
Secondly, there is plenty of scope for raising tax rates for the 
rich. In 1970 the top 0.1% and top 1% of personal incomes had in-
come shares of 0.73 and 4.83% of all post-tax personal income. How-
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ever, tax cuts during the 1980s and 1990s, together with growing 
tax avoidance (facilitated by the abolition of capital export controls), 
boosted their respective incomes shares to 3.5 and 10.3% by 2000, 
while the twenty first century has seen further pre- and post-tax in-
come share gains for these groups (Atkinson 2007, 104-5). Even a par-
tial reversal of their tax cuts and tax evasion loopholes could greatly 
increase the income tax take, especially if accompanied by effective 
measures against tax avoidance/evasion. There is also good reason to 
think that initiatives to tackle endemic personal tax avoidance/eva-
sion would command stronger international support than in the pre-
COVID-19 era. Most other major nations face similar imperatives to 
increase the tax take. British governments have played no small role 
in covertly supporting the tax avoidance industry, as part of a broad-
er strategy to support the City of London. If the UK showed that it 
was finally serious about addressing tax avoidance/evasion, it might 
find strong support among other European nations.
Higher taxes for top incomes are also likely to be more politically 
acceptable in the wake of the pandemic. Government has taken on re-
sponsibilities to maintain the incomes of a substantial proportion of 
the population, together with interventions in the lives of British citi-
zens on a scale unprecedented in peacetime. This has produced a ‘lev-
elling tendency’ reminiscent of the Second World War. For example, 
the iron curtain that had separated the NHS and the private hospi-
tal sector was suddenly torn down in March 2020, effectively requisi-
tioning (by agreement) all private hospital capacity (Neville, Plimmer 
2020). A more tacit, but possibly more important, trend has been the 
re-evaluation of the societal ‘worth’ of occupations which, despite be-
ing skilled, have become relatively less well-paid since the 1980s, es-
pecially the nursing and other ‘caring’ professions. While during Te-
resa May’s administration her Chancellor, Philip Hammond, could 
brusquely sweep aside calls to remove the austerity-induced cap on 
public sector pay by stating that public-sector workers were already 
‘overpaid’ (Walker 2017), television coverage of NHS and other carers 
working long shifts at real risk to their lives (largely owing to short-
ages of vital equipment) gave the public a more realistic view of their 
calling. NHS and other care workers have emerged as the heroes of 
this conflict, as evidenced by an outpouring of popular support, rang-
ing from the Thursday night clapping ritual to street art.
While both May and, especially, Hammond, were arch fiscal con-
servatives, Boris Johnson’s interventionism during the COVID-19 
emergency and his longer-term record as London mayor paints a more 
complex picture of a politician who is at least prepared to consider 
other options if the political climate is conducive. With the possible 
exception of Winston Churchill’s war-time government, Conservative-
led administrations have typically preferred the “Night Watchman 
state” model, of intervention only to reset the market mechanism, 
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rather than the Bismarckian “developmental state” (Bresser-Perei-
ra 2016). However, it is at least plausible that this might be up for re-
evaluation, especially if the public and academics show their support 
for an expansionary route out of this crisis rather than another sac-
rifice of British economic growth and living standards to meet the 
narrow interests of the City and the banks.
However, while the Bank of England appears to be broadly support-
ive of an expansionary policy, the Treasury has reverted to type. Cor-
onavirus debts threaten to become “the battering ram for a new cam-
paign of austerity” (Tooze 2020). A leaked 5th March 2020 Treasury 
assessment proposed a package of tax increases and spending cuts 
(including a two-year public sector pay freeze) – equivalent to a 5% 
increase in the basic rate of income tax – to “enhance credibility and 
boost investor confidence”, despite there being no signs of investors 
losing confidence in Britain.2 Even the normally conservative Daily 
Telegraph was appalled, publishing an article beginning, “There is a 
special place in Purgatory for Her Majesty’s Treasury… Its COVID-19 
blueprint for fiscal retrenchment borders on macroeconomic insani-
ty [...] The thinking is a throwback to the inflexible ‘Treasury View’”, 
that so exasperated John Maynard Keynes (Evans-Pritchard 2020).
One of the most important lessons from all four crises is that 
the Treasury is past its sell-by date; indeed it was already past it in 
1920. A particularly valuable administrative innovation would be to 
replace the Treasury with an economics ministry, with a remit giv-
ing equal weigh to economic growth and the Treasury’s traditional 
finance functions. However, any real change would require a whole-
sale cull of senior staff, replacing the Treasury mandarins with pro-
fessional economists. Only then will the British economy finally be 
able to break free from the Treasury’s dead hand.
2 “Treasury says virus to cost £300 bn as it warns of tax rises and pay freeze: confi-
dential analysis of economic impact lays out options for the Chancellor to cover extraor-
dinary expense of lockdown”. Daily Telegraph, 13 May 2020, 1. https://www.press-
reader.com/uk/the-daily-telegraph/20200513/281479278596293.
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Abstract During the COVID-19 crisis, the combined effect of ECB communications, 
concerns on sovereigns’ stability, illiquidity and market expectations led to a flight to 
quality. This produced a sell-off of peripheral sovereign bonds that drove the repo rates 
of core and peripheral countries out-of-sync. Two ECB announcements affected the repo 
market, namely (i) the Press Conference of the ECB Governing Council on March 12, 2020 
and (ii) the announcement of a €750 billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program 
(PEPP). These two announcements had heterogeneous effects in the European repo 
market which we shall investigate.
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1 Introduction
The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the unprecedented lock-
downs imposed by European member states in March 2020 marked 
the beginning of a crisis in the repurchase agreements (namely ‘re-
po’) market. As a result, repo rates of European core countries (i.e. 
Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium) and peripheral coun-
tries (i.e. Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland and Portugal) went out-of-
sync.1 The events during this period not only shed light on the role 
of illiquidity and ECB announcements in this market, but also on the 
tight nexus between the repo and the secondary bond cash market. 
The repo market plays an essential role in banks’ liquidity and col-
lateral management as well as in the transmission of monetary poli-
cy (Cœuré 2017). Therefore, changes in monetary policy may impact 
on the repo rate and the wider financial system.
This paper investigates how monetary policy announcements by 
the ECB and specifically its quantitative easing announcements af-
fected European repo rates during the COVID-19 crisis. This is a 
time when many firms needed access to the repo market in order 
to manage intraday liquidity and collaterals. In particular, we high-
light how flight-to-quality impacted the repo market during the pan-
demic and how the repo market is strongly influenced by ECB mon-
etary announcements. 
2 The European Repo Market in the Last Decade
The market for repos consists of secured, over-collateralised, short-
term, two-leg money market transactions in which the cash-taker si-
multaneously sells a security at the current spot price and enters into 
a forward agreement to buy the security back at a pre-specified price. 
The difference between the selling and purchasing price of the security 
is the repo rate. Repo contracts are either driven by the need for fund-
ing (i.e. General Collateral - GC transactions) or the need for a specific 
collateral (i.e. Special Collateral - SC transactions). In GC transactions, 
the exchanged collateral is unspecified and can be chosen amongst a 
basket of deliverable securities. However, in SC transactions, the col-
lateral to be exchanged is specified. This is why special repos are en-
tered into at a lower rate than general collateral repos because collat-
1 In the European Union, peripheral countries are characterised by high debt-to-GDP-
ratios, lower employment levels and lower GDP per capita ratios (Kinsella 2012). Cluster-
ing between the core and the periphery was especially highlighted during the 2010-12 
sovereign debt crisis. Peripheral countries were the Member States that have been hit 
the most by the crisis. In this paper, the peripheral countries that are analysed are Italy 
and Spain and the core countries are Germany, France, the Netherlands and Belgium.
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eral scarcity may be envisaged as a dividend for the cash-taker, i.e. a 
convenience yield for holding the collateral rather than the cash. The 
collateral traded on such transactions is said to be ‘on special’, so that 
its repo rate is lower than the corresponding GC repo rate. With the De-
posit Facility Rate (DFR), the rate at which the Central Bank remuner-
ates reserves, being lower than zero, we have also started to observe 
negative repo rates. This implies that the buyer (who is lending cash) 
effectively pays an interest to the seller, who is borrowing cash (ICMA 
2013) or, put differently, the lender pays a fee to borrow the collateral. 
In the European market, repo agreements are mostly entered into 
three dealer-to-dealer electronic trading platforms: Eurex Repo, Bro-
kerTec and MTS (mostly for the Italian market), which link to several 
central clearing counterparties (CCPs), such as LCH.Clearnet LTD, 
LCH.Clearnet SA and Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia (CC&G) 
for the Italian market (Mancini, Ranaldo, Wrampelmeyer 2015). Eu-
rex Repo GmbH is the leading platform for GC transactions and re-
lies on Eurex Clearing AG (Deutsche Boerse Group) as CCP and on 
Clearstream for collateral management and settlement. This plat-
form uses mainly two baskets to manage transactions: the GCP ECB 
basket and the ECB EXTended basket. BrokerTec is the largest plat-
form for SC transactions and is operated by ICAP plc. MTS is part of 
MTS Group whose majority stake is owned by the London Stock Ex-
change (Mancini, Ranaldo, Wrampelmeyer 2015). 
Repo contracts are said to be over-collateralised as a haircut is ap-
plied to each operation in order to account for credit and liquidity risk. 
The collateral value is given by the difference between the market val-
ue of the traded collateral and the market value of the portion of col-
lateral used as haircut. The securities for which the lowest haircut is 
applied are central government bonds. However, sovereign risk in the 
euro area varies widely between core and peripheral countries. For this 
reason, the rate at which an investor is willing to lend cash in exchange 
for a collateral differs according to the sovereign risk of the collateral. 
This aspect is well represented in figure 1 which shows the Repo-
Funds Rate (RFR) indexes for Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Spain as well as the average repo rate for the Eu-
rozone [fig. 1]. RFRs are based on the average of both general and 
special collateral transactions settled on the three aforementioned 
platforms where the collaterals accepted are all government bonds. 
As it is shows, in January 2010, there was almost no difference in 
the RFR indexes for all the countries considered, i.e. the market was 
not charging different rates for transactions based on the German 
Bund or the Italian BTP. However, starting with the Greek sover-
eign crisis, repo rates began to diverge. The figure reports that the 
RFR indexes for Germany and the Netherlands are the lowest from 
that date onwards, indicating that German and Netherlands govern-
ment bonds represent the safest collateral traded in the market. By 
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contrast, the RFR index for Italy is riskiest collateral among the an-
alysed countries in most of the sample period (with Spain occasion-
ally taking the lead). 
More generally, figure 1 gives a historical representation of the ef-
fects of the ECB’s Balance Sheet Policies (BSPs) announcements on 
the repo market since the sovereign debt crisis (outliers are trimmed).2
Figure 1 RFRs from 2010 and some major announcements
This figure shows the average daily repo rates for six European countries (Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Spain) as well as the average repo rates 
for the Euro, the deposit Facility Rate offered by the ECB and five event lines. The five 
event lines represent: (1) SMP announcement on May 10, 2010; (2) Announcement of 
the 3 years Longer Term Refinancing Operations on December 8, 2011; (3) Outright 
Monetary Transactions (i.e. OMT) announcement on August 2, 2012; (4) Targeted Longer 
Term Refinancing Operations (TLTRO) on June 5, 2014; (5) Cash Security Lending Facility 
announcement on December 8, 2016. Repo Funds Rate data has been downloaded from 
http://www.repofundsrate.com/ for the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, France, 
the European Union, Germany and Italy. The RFR Netherlands and RFR Belgium time 
series start from May 16, 2016. Data on RFR Spain starts from August 6, 2012. The Deposit 
Facility Rate time series has been downloaded from the ECB’s Statistical Data Warehouse.
2 For a detailed description of the evolution of the repo market during the sovereign 
crisis of 2010-12 see Corradin, Maddaloni 2019.
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The pattern of the repo market is quite striking in the period after 
the QE announcement, i.e. after 2015. The implementation of a buy-
and-hold Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) led (mostly) Nation-
al Central Banks to buy central government bonds in the secondary 
cash market, in turn reducing the availability of collateral for repo 
transactions. The QE produced the strongest effects on repo rates 
of the safest countries due to their superior funding conditions, in-
creasing scarcity until even GC rates were pushed below zero. Fur-
thermore, two regulatory factors contributed to increase the scarci-
ty of High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) at reporting dates. Firstly, 
the implementation of the Basel III non-risk-weighted capital require-
ments, such as the leverage ratio, strengthened window dressing in 
banks’ balance sheets, increasing the scarcity of the safest collateral 
in these dates. Secondly, accounting practices and the implementa-
tion of the European market infrastructure regulation (EMIR) creat-
ed an opposite shock for the demand and supply of repo transactions 
in the periods in which these contracts were needed the most (Ranal-
do, Schaffner, Vasios 2019). For these reasons, core countries’ RFRs 
are affected by quarterly negative spikes, as the scarcity of HQLA 
is the highest in these periods. Interestingly, the effect on peripher-
al countries is the opposite. As one can see from figure 2, RFR Ita-
ly reached record-high levels on the same dates, due to the intrinsic 
risk of the collateral [fig. 2]. The average European effect has been 
negative overall.
This effect has been exacerbated through time, as highlighted in 
figure 2. The figure shows that the joint effect of the scarcity chan-
nel activated by the implementation of unconventional monetary pol-
icies and the enforcement of non-risk-weighted capital requirements 
in the Basel III framework inverted the usual relationship between 
repo rates and the DFR. This might be surprising given that at the 
DFR the ECB remunerates the excess reserves of banks, preventing 
transactions in the money market to be concluded at a lower inter-
est rate. However, as Arata et al. (2020) demonstrate, Basle III pre-
vents banks that have access to the ECB to arbitrage away transac-
tions concluded in the repo market at a lower interest rate than the 
DFR. Even if core countries’ repo rates adjusted to the 50 basis point 
cut of the DFR on September 18, 2019, scarcity and market segmen-
tation affected their levels by pushing them below it. 
3 The European Repo Market During the COVID-19 Crisis
How does the European repo market react to the COVID-19 crisis? 
In this section we highlight the role of policy announcements, con-
cerns on sovereigns’ stability, scarcity and market expectations on 
the economic outcomes of the health crisis in the repo market tur-
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moil of March 2020. The unfolding and resolution of the tensions de-
veloped mostly in a few weeks.
Three events characterised the evolution of the crisis: (i) the lock-
down in Italy at the end of February and first half of March, 2020; 
(ii) the Press Conference of the ECB Governing Council on March, 
12 2020, and; (iii) the announcement of a € 750 billion Pandemic 
Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP) on March 18, 2020. Figures 
2 and 3 depict the three events and the heterogeneous consequenc-
es of the announcements in the repo market. In figure 3, the sam-
ple of countries analysed is restricted to two core countries, name-
ly France and Germany, and two peripheral countries, namely Italy 
and Spain, to better focus on the dynamic between the core and the 
periphery [fig. 3]. 
Figure 2 RFRs in 2019 and 2020
This figure reports the RepoFunds Rates (RFRs) between August 2019 and May 2020. 
The blue dashed event line represents the change in the Deposit Facility Rate (DFR) 
occurred on September 19, 2019. RFR data has been downloaded from http://www.
repofundsrate.com/ for the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, France, the European 
Union, Germany and Italy. The DFR time series has been downloaded from the ECB’s 
Statistical Data Warehouse.
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Figure 2 shows that the six countries considered in our analysis en-
tered the COVID-19 crisis with different repo rates. The RFRs of Ita-
ly and Spain and the average Repo-Funds Rate of the Eurozone were 
above the DFR, whereas the average RFRs of core countries were be-
low the DFR. The difference between the Italian RFR and the German 
RFR indexes was equal to about 7 basis points, which was impacted 
a lot by the COVID-19 crisis. By March 17, this difference more than 
doubled and reached 17 basis points as the Italian RFR increased and 
the German and French RFRs significantly decreased. 
The figures review the differential effects of the policy announce-
ment on the repo market. Italy and Spain are the two countries most 
severely hit by the coronavirus, societally as well as economically. 
Figure 3 already shows a large increase of the Italian repo rates af-
Figure 3 RFRs during the COVID-19 crisis
This figure shows the RFRs during the COVID-19 crisis for two core countries (Germany 
and France) and two peripheral countries (Spain and Italy). The figure also reports six 
event lines that represent: (1) Enforcement of health measures in Italy on February 21, 
2020; (2) Beginning of the lockdown in Italy on March 9, 2020; (3) Meeting of the ECB 
Governing Council on March 12, 2020; (4) Activation of swap lines between the Bank 
of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the 
Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank on March 18, 2020; (5) Announcement 
of the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program on March 18, 2020; (6) Beginning of the 
Lockdown in Spain on March 28, 2020. RepoFunds Rate data has been downloaded 
from http://www.repofundsrate.com/ for Spain, France, Germany and Italy. 
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ter the national lockdown was imposed, but the Italian RFR, on the 
one hand, and the German and French RFRs, on the other, started to 
significantly diverge after the first policy announcement. Figure 3 de-
tails that repo rates signalled early warnings of distress in the first 
half of March. Indeed, as the consequences of the pandemic materi-
alised in Italy, concerns regarding the future economic and political 
measures that the country would have to implement started mount-
ing. As a result, a sell-off of securities started in this period (ICMA 
2020), making RFRs to trend downwards. However, this effect was 
not limited to core countries. Although March 2020 was character-
ised by a general appreciation of repo rates, the actual distress start-
ed after the first policy announcement on March 12, 2020. This event 
marked the beginning of a downwards adjustment of core countries’ 
repo rates, making them persistently move out-of-sync with respect 
to the peripheral ones. 
On March 12, the meeting of the ECB Governing Council deliber-
ated measures aimed at addressing the increasing distress in finan-
cial markets as the health crisis was spreading in Western Europe. 
In particular, the Council adopted a dovish monetary policy stance 
focused on liquidity injections via additional (Targeted) Longer-Term-
Refinancing-Operations. Additionally, it eased collateral eligibility 
criteria for securities pledged in Open Market Operations (OMOs). 
Moreover, to support the private sector, the Council decided to ex-
pand the existing Private Sector Purchase Programs, up until the 
effects of the crisis would diminish. Such measures were different 
from the ones taken by other Central Banks. For instance, the Fed-
eral Reserve cut interest rates by 150 basis points between March 
3, 2020 and March 15, 2020. On March 15, 2020, in contrast to the 
first attempts of a quantitative tightening in 2019, the Fed opted for 
the implementation of a new QE to support the smooth functioning of 
the market and the effective transmission of monetary policy. None-
theless, the dovish stance of the ECB Governing Council, a looming 
economic downturn and the ECB President’s statement that closing 
spreads between member states’ funding costs is not an ECB objec-
tive, failed to alleviate market tensions. Rather, the announcement 
re-awaked concerns on the financial stability of sovereigns, raising 
questions on the ability of peripheral countries struggling to tack-
le the coronavirus (like Italy) to cope with increased debt issuance. 
Consequently, the statement by the ECB President resulted in a flight 
to quality assets, which gave rise to a sell-off of the riskiest securi-
ties. In addition, spreads widened in the cash market and core repo 
rates collapsed to unprecedented levels in times when reporting ob-
ligations were not binding. In fact, the effects produced were mod-
erate with respect to 2019-year end effects (ICMA 2020), but persis-
tent and clustered between core and peripheral countries. Indeed, 
RFRs based on the safest collateral, plummeted to record lows, as 
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those treasuries were valued more with respect to the ones of oth-
er Eurozone states. 
Another aspect highlighted by figure 3 is that the French RFR 
reached a negative peak at -65.5 basis points, which is even lower 
than the one of Germany which stood at -63.6 basis points. This is 
surprising as Germany is almost invariably the preferred safe hav-
en in the sample period as shown in figures 1 and 2. However, the ef-
fect might be due to the fact that, in the European Union, the bulk 
of dollar-denominated transactions is carried out by French banks. 
By pledging collateral against liquidity, the amount of French sover-
eign bonds outstanding decreased, hence increasing their scarcity 
and decreasing their repo rate. In general, in the whole sample rep-
resented in figure 2, one can see that rates collapsed, and scarcity 
increased for several countries. But the impact on RFR Italy and RFR 
Spain was heterogeneous. Indeed, while the Spanish repo rate mildly 
cheapened during the week after the announcement, RFR Italy sig-
nificantly appreciated in the same period. The level of uncertainty 
for Italian sovereigns was such that the Repo Funds Rate moved out-
of-sync with respect to the sample of countries analysed. For these 
reasons, there is evidence that the joint effect of sovereign condi-
tions and the severity of the virus played a major role in driving re-
po rates, as the effects on Italy and Spain were significantly differ-
ent. The worsening of the health conditions in the latter country did 
not generate effects akin to the ones produced in the former. Howev-
er, the response of Spanish RFR may be affected by the second policy 
announcement described below. As it became clear that the spread 
of COVID-19 was not only regional and that the number of cases was 
increasing in all Western Europe, the tensions on the first policy an-
nouncement compounded up until the second policy event on March 
18, 2020, when the ECB Governing Council decided to implement a 
€750 Billion Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP). Indeed, 
the announcement marked the nadir of the crisis as it restored mar-
ket confidence into the stability of distressed sovereigns and alleviat-
ed pressures in the secondary bond cash market. For these reasons, 
the sell-off of risky assets ended and the negative trend and the vol-
atility of repo rates in the previous days bounced back, up to normal 
levels. In addition, after the announcement, French rates increased 
to usual levels. However, it seems that the effect is mainly due to the 
activation of swap lines: arrangements to provide foreign currency 
liquidity to domestic commercial banks via agreements between Cen-
tral Banks. As in Open Market Operations, Central Banks require the 
financial institutions to pledge HQLA as collateral in exchange for 
the currency. These measures are designed to tackle market stress 
and to alleviate illiquidity in dollar funding markets. In this period, 
the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the Eu-
ropean Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National 
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Bank agreed upon the implementation of standing US dollar liquid-
ity swap lines [fig. 3]. The last spike, which occurred in March 2020, 
marked the beginning of the last week prior to the first quarter-end, 
which is affected by reporting dates as previously explained. Then, 
the unfolding of the crisis drastically revealed the effect of the ECB 
communication policy on the sovereign bond cash market and, in 
turn, on the repo market.
4 Conclusions
The crisis that resulted from the outbreak of the coronavirus in West-
ern Europe did not only shed light on scarcity issues in the repo mar-
ket but also on the tight nexus between funding and secondary bond 
cash markets. It especially highlighted the impact ECB announce-
ments may have. Even though scarcity and market expectations on 
the economic outcomes of the health crisis may have significantly 
affected repo rates, there is evidence that the tensions originated 
from policy announcements may have fuelled the turmoil of March 
2020. Instead of alleviating market tensions, the economic outlook 
and the statement of the ECB President during the Q&A emphasis-
ing that the “ECB is not there to close spreads” reawakened concerns 
regarding the ability of peripheral countries struggling to tackle the 
virus to cope with increased debt issuance. The resulting flight to 
quality mostly affected core countries. There is also evidence that il-
liquidity in the dollar funding market may have further risen scarci-
ty for the countries more involved in foreign currency transactions, 
such as France. Instead, the peripheral countries hit by the pandem-
ic, e.g. Italy, were most negatively affected. As a result, their repo 
rates moved persistently out-of-sync with respect to the core coun-
tries. On the contrary, the announcement of expansionary monetary 
policies, the PEPP, significantly contributed to calm markets down, 
to restore confidence and its normal activity, and the swap lines re-
stored the German bund as the most demanded collateral.
The repo market has a pivotal role in preserving the liquidity of the 
money market. The COVID-19 crisis created significant liquidity needs 
largely for non-financial firms. While demand for repos increased sub-
stantially during the height of the crisis in February/March due to 
flight to quality, dealers’ capacity to intermediate that demand was 
relatively constrained. This limited the ability of many firms to access 
the repo market which was badly needed to manage intraday liquid-
ity and collaterals. Our analysis highlights the dependence of the re-
po market on central bank interventions in times of stress.
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1 Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic has completely reshaped the current macroeco-
nomic conditions and the economic outlook. According to the European Com-
mission, euro area GDP is expected to shrink, on average, by 7.7% in 2020. 
This contraction is far deeper than what was experienced during the Great 
Financial Crisis of 2008-09. Furthermore, the average contraction rate masks 
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marked cross-country heterogeneity, with countries hardest hit by 
the recession, such as Italy, Spain and France, facing a projected 
decrease in output of 9.2%, 9.4% and 8.4%, respectively.1 Euro ar-
ea countries have tackled the crisis with an unprecedented fiscal 
response. This will increase government budget deficits by sever-
al percentage points and will heavily affect the Debt-to-GDP ratios 
over the medium term.2 
In this chapter, we show that this fiscal expansion comes at a time 
when governments face substantially different financial constraints 
across the euro area. Germany, which was the most fiscally conserva-
tive country leading up to the crisis, has plenty of financial resources 
to respond to the economic downturn. Instead, other countries, such 
as Italy and Spain, did not manage to reduce their outstanding debt 
in the last decade, which limits their ability to respond to the crisis.3 
We also analyse several euro area yield curves during the pandemic 
and explain how they may be linked, at least in part, to expectations 
of increased budget deficits.
The effects of fiscal policy on the macroeconomy and on interest 
rates have been widely studied in the past.4 One of the main econom-
ic channels linking government bond supply and interest rates is du-
ration risk, as described in Vayanos and Vila (2009). A number of 
This paper should not be reported as representing the views of the European Cen-
tral Bank. The views expressed are those of the Authors and do not necessarily re-
flect those of the ECB.




2 Examples of newspaper on expected fiscal expansions are: “Germany Tears Up Fis-
cal Rule Book to Counter Coronavirus Pandemic”. Financial Times, 21 March 2020; “It-
aly Boosts Aid Package as Europe Battles Coronavirus Outbreak”. Financial Times, 
10 March 2020; “France to Extend Crisis Jobs Scheme for Up to Two Years”. Financial 
Times, 8 June 2020.
3 This was also reported in the international press. For example: “Spain’s Tight Budg-
et Puts Squeeze on Coronavirus Response”. Financial Times, 24 June 2020.
4 For example, Corsetti et al. (2013) find that strained public finances might affect 
macroeconomic stability by a sovereign-risk channel, which raises funding costs in the 
private sector. Bonam and Lukkezen (2019) show that, when government debt is risky, 
increased deficits raise interest rates and crowd out consumption. Blanchard (2019) 
argues that in the US, as long as interest rates are below growth rates, debt rollovers 
may have no fiscal cost. Hatchondo, Roch and Martinez (2012) study how economies 
pay a significant default premium in absence of fiscal rules. Laubach (2009) estimates 
how debt and deficits affect long-term forward rates in the US. Ghosh et al. (2013) esti-
mate for several countries a debt limit, which serves as an upper threshold for govern-
ment debt that would cause a sovereign default if surpassed. Other relevant work on 
fiscal policy and interest rates is for example: Reinhart, Sack, Heaton 2000; Cimadomo, 
Claeys, Poplawski-Ribeiro 2016; Arellano et al. 2013; Bi 2012; Jaramillo, Weber 2013; 
Kumar, Baldacci 2010; Falagiarda, Gregori 2015.
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empirical papers has found a positive relationship between different 
measures of bond supply and sovereign yields.5 Other related empir-
ical work has estimated the impact of asset-purchase programmes 
(Quantitative Easing) in US and in Europe, which lowered interest 
rates by effectively decreasing bond supply in the market through 
bond purchases.6 
The chapter is structured as follows: section 2 discusses fiscal pol-
icy developments in the euro area. Section 3 illustrates yield curve 
movements before and during the pandemic period and describes 
the relationship between sovereign yields and fiscal policy. Section 
4 concludes.
2 Fiscal Policy in the Euro Area
The fiscal position of the main euro area (EA) countries has been 
quite heterogenous in the last fifteen years. In figure 1, we show how 
budget deficits and Debt-to-GDP have evolved for Italy, Spain, France 
and Germany [fig. 1]. All countries responded to the Great Financial 
Crisis with a fiscal expansion, which deteriorated budget deficits and 
increased Debt-to-GDP ratios between 2008 and 2011. The situation 
stabilised in the last few years, with Italy, Spain and France run-
ning very similar budget deficits – below 3% – from 2016 onwards. 
The most fiscally conservative country was Germany, which ran a 
budget surplus from 2013 to 2019. This surplus contributed to a sig-
nificant reduction of German Debt-to GDP which shrank by 20 per-
centage points in the last decade. France and Spain currently dis-
play very similar levels of outstanding debt, while Italy is by far the 
country showing the worst Debt-to-GDP ratio which reached about 
140% in Q4 2019.
With such a high Debt-to-GDP ratio, Italy may soon show signs of 
”fiscal fatigue” (Ghosh et al. 2013). Specifically, government debt can 
be ultimately repaid in two ways: either with a nominal GDP growth 
rate higher than nominal sovereign yields (i.e. a positive GDP growth-
interest rate differential) or by running primary surpluses that will 
compensate the interest payments on debt. However, high levels of 
debt would need a substantial primary surplus in order to cope with 
mounting interest payments and reduce the outstanding amount of 
5 See, for example, Greenwood, Vayanos 2014; Billio et al. 2020; Krishnamurthy, Viss-
ing-Jorgensen 2012; Greenwood, Hanson, Vayanos 2015. 
6 Some of the papers tackling this effect are for example: D’Amico, King 2013; Gag-
non et al. 2011; Krishnamurthy, Vissing-Jorgensen 2011; Altavilla, Carboni, Motto 2015; 
Blattner, Joyce 2016; De Santis, Holm-Hadulla 2017; Li, Wei 2013; Joslin, Priebsch, Sin-
gleton 2014; Eser et al. 2019; Lemke, Werner 2020.
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Figure 1 Time series of budget deficit and Debt-to-GDP ratios for the four main EA economies. The upper 
panel shows the time-series of budget deficit/surplus for Spain (ES), Italy (IT), France (FR) and Germany (DE) 
from January 2006 to December 2019. The bottom panel shows Debt-to-GDP ratios. Source: ECB
Figure 2 Interest rates and nominal GDP growth rates for Spain, Italy, Germany and France. The figure 
shows average nominal interest rates and year-on-year nominal GDP growth rates for the largest euro area 
economies, Spain (ES), Italy (IT), Germany (DE), France (FR). The average interest rates are calculated as the 
mean of 1,5, and 10 year zero-coupon bonds. Source: ECB
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debt.7 Fiscal fatigue materialises whenever a government’s ability of 
increasing the primary balance cannot keep up with the rising debt. 
The current low level of interest rates may attenuate this problem if it 
persists in the future and is not reversed by a surge in sovereign risk.
In figure 2 we show the relationship between interest rates and 
GDP growth for the four countries [fig. 2]. Countries that show a pos-
itive GDP-interest rate differential over time would stabilise debt 
even by not running budget surpluses, as the nominal growth rate of 
the economy would be higher than the nominal borrowing rates to fi-
nance that growth. In the figure, all countries had a negative differ-
ential during the financial crisis, while it became positive in the sub-
sequent period. However, Italy and Spain had the worst differential 
across the entire sample. The Italian differential was positive only 
for a few years around 2016 and, compounded with the high level of 
debt, suggests a problematic fiscal position for the country.
Entering into 2020, Germany had clearly the highest fiscal flex-
ibility and financial resources to face a macroeconomic downturn, 
in contrast with all the other countries that would have struggled 
to find resources in case of a deep recession. Then, in response to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, euro area countries planned a substantial 
fiscal expansion in 2020 and 2021 to counter the economic damage 
stemming from nationwide shutdowns. Market expectations of budg-
7 The Government could increase the surplus by raising taxes or by cutting non-in-
terest expenditures.
Figure 3 Budget deficit forecasts for 2020 and 2021 surveyed before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic. 
This figure shows budget deficit survey forecasts for 2020 and 2021 obtained in January 2020 and in April 2020. 
Source: Consensus Economics
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et deficits have deteriorated consistently since the start of the crisis. 
In figure 3 we show how survey forecasts for government budgets 
changed from January to April 2020 [fig. 3]. Germany is the country in 
which the forecast for current and next year budget deficit changed 
the most in absolute terms. Indeed, the country’s budget forecast 
changed from an expected surplus to a sizable deficit both in 2020 
and in 2021. Moreover, all countries’ forecasts worsened, as all euro 
area economies planned a substantial increase in government spend-
ing to boost their economies. These forecasts signal that investors 
expect sizable budget deficits going forward, which will substantial-
ly increase future Debt-to-GDP ratios. 
In figure 4 we also show the time-series of the cross-sectional vol-
atility of budget deficit survey forecasts [fig. 4]. This variable could be 
interpreted as a measure of uncertainty regarding the overall size 
of current and future fiscal policy interventions. The spike in the 
last data point (April 2020) is unprecedented and is bigger in mag-
nitude than spikes recorded during both the Great Financial Crisis 
and sovereign debt crisis. Thus, this figure really shows how uncer-
tain market participants were about the magnitude of the fiscal pol-
icy response by euro area countries to the pandemic. Indeed, neither 
the size of such programmes nor to what extent this fiscal expansion 
would have been covered by European schemes, such as the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism or the Recovery Fund, were clear. This 
expected fiscal stimulus will then have to be financed by higher is-
suance of sovereign debt, which could put upward pressure on sov-
ereign yields, as investors might request a higher premium to ab-
sorb this higher supply of bonds. Quite likely, the impact on sovereign 
yields will vary across countries, with larger yield increases in coun-
tries with higher outstanding debt and sovereign credit risk.
3 Interest Rate Dynamics Before and During  
the COVID-19 Crisis
Sovereign bond market yields reflect current and expected macro-
economic conditions. Euro area interest rates have shown signs of 
stress during the pandemic period. Between February and May 2020, 
as shown in figure 5, the euro area GDP-weighted yield curve has de-
tached itself from the Bund and Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves, 
which are often used as euro area reference curves [fig. 5]. The OIS 
is a benchmark risk-free rate and the Bund is the German govern-
ment bond curve. The bottom-left side of the figure shows average 
yield curves in the months preceding the COVID-19 pandemic, when 
the three curves were in a tighter range. The crisis caused a rela-
tively small shift in the level of the euro area curve across all matur-
ities. In order to put things into perspective, we compare the current 
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Figure 4 Standard deviation of budget deficit forecasts. This figure shows cross-sectional dispersions 
of budget deficit survey forecasts for annual budget surplus/deficit from 2007 to 2020. 
The forecasts are for the same year overall budget balance. Source: Consensus Economics
bond market dynamics with the market dynamics before and during 
the Sovereign Debt Crisis, as shown in the graphs at the top of fig-
ure 5. The three curves were priced almost equally in the period pre-
ceding the Sovereign Crisis. However, during the worst part of the 
downturn, when investors were unsure about the solvency of some 
peripheral countries, a shift in the level of the euro area curve sug-
gests a complete repricing across all maturities of the yield curve.
Even though the size of yield movements has been smaller during 
the COVID-19 pandemic than during the Sovereign Crisis, the trans-
mission mechanism of these higher perceived risks has had a simi-
lar impact on the level and shape of the euro area curve. In figure 6, 
we show the time-series of these three curves at the 10-year matu-
rity [fig. 6]. During the past 15 years, the 10-year euro area yield has 
been very close to the Bund and OIS 10-year rates during tranquil 
times (before the financial crisis and after the end of the Sovereign 
Crisis), while it detached in times of market stress. The bottom pan-
el of the figure shows interest rate movements for the same 10-year 
yields in the period surrounding the Pandemic. The spread between 
the euro area yield and the Bund/OIS rate increased abruptly be-
tween the end of February and mid-March, when it was unclear what 
kind of monetary policy support the European Central Bank would 
provide. Then, on March 18, 2020 the ECB announced the Pandem-
ic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP). The PEPP was announced 
as an asset purchase program worth €750 billion, to be initially un-
dertaken by the ECB until the end of 2020. After the announcement, 
yield spreads retraced back from their previous maximum.
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However, the spread between the euro area 10-year yield and the 
Bund/OIS yields remained wider than before the crisis. Estimating 
the upward pressure of a fiscal expansion on interest rates during 
the COVID-19 crisis is not an easy task. Euro area interest rates have 
probably been driven by several different factors during this peri-
od. Further, the PEPP announcement and implementation contribut-
ed to a significant reduction of euro area yields. We tackle this issue 
by employing a simple linear model, and by comparing the estimated 
yield impact of a fiscal expansion with yield spreads movements dur-
ing the period preceding the PEPP announcement. Specifically, we 
focus on the period between the start of February and March 18th. 
This is when macroeconomic and fiscal policies had their full impact 
on yields, which was softened afterwards by the ECB’s monetary pol-
icy intervention. We calculate the potential impact of a fiscal expan-
sion as follows. First, we run a linear regression model to study the 
relationship between 10-year country-level yield spreads over the 
OIS rate and expected budget deficits relative to GDP. The sample 
period ends in December 2019, so as to exclude any data points from 
the current crisis. Second, we use the estimated coefficients from 
the model and multiply them by the expected fiscal expansion due 
to the COVID-19 crisis. This is calculated as the difference between 
the budget deficit forecasts taken in April 2020 and the same fore-
casts obtained in January 2020. Figure 7 reports the results of this 
exercise in basis points [fig. 7]. The estimated impact greatly varies 
across countries. We estimate that Italy and Spain would have had 
Figure 5 Average OIS, Bund and EA yields before and during the Sovereign Crisis and the COVID-19 Pandemic. 
This figure shows average OIS, Bund and Euro Area yield curves before and during the COVID-19 Pandemic 
and the Sovereign Crisis. The Pre-crisis periods are June 2010-December 2010 for the Sovereign Crisis 
and September 2019-January 2020 for COVID-19. The crisis periods are June 2011-December 2011 for the 
Sovereign Crisis and February 2020-April 2020 for the COVID-19 Pandemic. The Euro Area yield curve is 
calculated by a GDP-weighted average of national sovereign yields. Source: Refinitiv, ECB
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the most sizable yield increases, with 160 and 90 basis points, re-
spectively. Germany and France show a much smaller impact instead, 
with magnitudes of around 40 basis points for both. The main take-
away from the exercise is that the estimated yield change would be 
non-negligible especially for peripheral countries.
How does this empirical evidence square with actual yields ob-
served in the market? As mentioned before, we want to focus on the 
period preceding the PEPP announcement to reduce the confounding 
effect of the ECB’s monetary policy on yields. We can use this pre-
announcement period as a benchmark for yield changes that would 
happen, at least partially, without a clear monetary policy support. 
Figure 8 shows 10-year country-level yield spreads over the OIS from 
February to May 2020 [fig. 8]. Countries with the highest estimated 
impact from our model also had the greatest yield movements in this 
period. Examining the period from the beginning of February to the 
18th of March, yield spreads increased by about 125 basis points for 
Italy, 75 basis points for Spain, 30 basis points for France and re-
mained unchanged for Germany. Except for Germany, the magnitudes 
are not so far off from our estimated impacts.
Indeed, German Bunds were largely unaffected by the crisis, with 
yields remaining stable during this period. So, the expected large fis-
cal expansion in Germany did not have any effect on German yields, 
which is at odds with what observed in other countries. However, 
in our model we do not control other factors that might have driv-
en yields during the pandemic, such as flight-to-safety effects. Spe-
Figure 6 Time series of the OIS, Bund and euro area average 10 year yields. The upper panel of this figure 
shows time-series of OIS, Bund and euro area yields from January 2006 to May 2020. The bottom panel shows 
the same time-series from November 2019 to May 2020. The vertical dashed line in the bottom panel indicates 
the date the ECB announced the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program (PEPP). The euro area 10-year yield 
is calculated by a GDP-weighted average of national sovereign yields. Source: Refinitiv, ECB
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Figure 8 Country-level spreads over OIS between February and April 2020. 
This figure shows time-series of 10-year country-level yield over the 10-year OIS rate. Source: Refinitiv, ECB
Figure 7 Estimated impact of budget deficit shocks during the pandemic on yield spreads. This figure 
shows the estimated impact in basis points on euro area yield spreads of a shock on expected country-level 
budget deficits. The magnitudes are obtained as follows: 10-year country-level yield spreads over OIS are 
linearly projected onto expected budget deficit forecasts. Regression residuals are assumed to follow an 
AR(1) process. Further, the coefficients obtained by the regression are multiplied by a fiscal shock, which is 
calculated by looking at the difference between budget deficit forecasts obtained in December 2019 (pre-
pandemic) and in April 2020 (pandemic period). Source: ECB, Consensus Economics, Author’s calculations
cifically, the German Bund is widely considered a safe-haven asset. 
As a result its yield could experience downward pressure in times of 
high risk aversion. Thus, it is possible that the expected bond supply 
expansion by the German government was compensated by a higher 
demand for Bunds during the pandemic.
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4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we describe the fiscal adjustments made by the main 
Euro area countries following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Such countries planned a robust expansionary fiscal response af-
ter nationwide shutdowns caused a massive economic downturn. We 
consider the effect of deteriorating expectations of budget deficits on 
government bond yields during the pandemic period. From a policy-
making perspective, it is important to assess how fiscal constraints 
during expansionary fiscal interventions might affect interest rates, 
as upward pressure on national yields from higher debt might com-
promise fiscal and financial stability in the long-term.
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1 Introduction
The outbreak of the novel coronavirus, i.e. the SARS-CoV-2 and the 
disease it causes, i.e. the COVID-19, is a rare disaster that has affect-
ed the world economy in an unprecedented way. The severity of this 
global health crisis, which was declared a pandemic by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) on March 11, 2020, has been compared 
with that of the Great Influenza (Spanish Flu) from 1918-19 with up 
to 50 million worldwide fatalities (Boissay, Rungcharoenkitkul, 2020). 
At the time of writing, the total number of confirmed cases with COV-
ID-19 is almost nine millions, whereas the global death toll is near 
500,000 according to Johns Hopkins University.
Against the backdrop of highly globalised economies and integrat-
ed cross-border supply chains, the lockdown measures imposed in the 
majority of countries and the containment measures adopted to limit 
the spread of the virus have brought the global economy to a sudden 
stop, making this crisis truly different. Eichenbaum, Rebelo and Tra-
bandt (2020) note that pandemics depress the real economy through 
a reduction in both supply and demand. As a consequence, govern-
ments around the world have stepped in with a mix of health, fis-
cal, monetary, macroprudential, microprudential and market-based 
stimuli in order to help households and businesses to have a quick 
recovery.1 However, in the short run, these measures tend to boost 
the risk aversion of investors in government bonds, who are worried 
about the reduced fiscal capacity of countries that are too indebted 
(Andrieș, Ongena, Sprincean 2020).
We extend the analysis on European sovereign CDS spreads con-
ducted in Andrieș, Ongena, Sprincean (2020) to European banks’ 
CDS spreads, focusing on the sovereign-banks feedback loop dur-
ing the global financial crisis from 2007-09, sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe (2010-13), and the current health crisis. We find that inves-
tors’ reaction to the general lockdown measures imposed in Italy on 
March 9, 2020, which corresponds to the arrival of the pandemic in 
Europe, quantified through the abnormal performance of Europe-
an banks’ CDS spreads, is less pronounced than in the case of sov-
ereign CDS spreads. However, on a longer time frame their concern 
increases. Our findings suggest that the spillover effects from sov-
1 See the IMF Policy Tracker (https://www.imf.org/en/Topics/imf-and-covid19/
Policy-Responses-to-COVID-19) and the Global Policy Tracker from the Harvard Busi-
ness School (https://www.hbs.edu/covid-19-business-impact/Insights/Econom-
ic-and-Financial-Impacts/Global-Policy-Tracker). From March to May 2020, the 
largest fiscal stimulus in Europe as a percent of 2018 GDP was implemented by Italy 
(25.15%), followed by Denmark (11.94%), Belgium (11.40%) and Switzerland (10.75%). On 
average, the fiscal announcements as a share of GDP for developed economies (6.66%) 
are twice as high as those announced by developing countries (3.64%).
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ereigns to banks and vice versa, amplified following the COVID-19 
shock. But their magnitude is smaller compared to other recent cri-
sis episodes. This is the result of the solid position of the banks and 
their improved capacity to absorb losses due to stricter capital and 
liquidity regulation following the financial crisis of 2007-09.
2 Related Literature
European banks present specific features that substantially differ-
entiate them from the US ones. If the latter recovered to the pre-cri-
sis profitability level by 2013, the European banks still struggle to 
reach that level. This aspect is primarily explained by three factors 
(Carletti et al. 2020): (i) the European sovereign debt crisis which 
impacted severely especially the banks in peripheral countries (the 
GIIPS countries, i.e. Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain); (ii) 
the high level of non-performing loans: in the US, early government 
intervention helped banks to clear their balance sheets; and (iii) the 
macroeconomic environment: strong fiscal stimulus in the US com-
pared to a sober approach (austerity measures) in Europe. Moreover, 
Europe’s financial structure has become strongly bank-based, mak-
ing it more prone to systemic risk (Langfield, Pagano 2016).
The nexus between the risk profile of banks and countries has been 
addressed in various studies, and is mainly attributed to four chan-
nels that interact with each other: (i) the sovereign exposure chan-
nel; (ii) the safety net channel; (iii) the collateral channel; and (iv) the 
sovereign downgrade channel (BIS 2011; De Bruyckere et al. 2013; 
Dell’Ariccia et al. 2018). Banks hold in their balance sheets a signifi-
cant amount of public debt, averaging 30% in developed markets and 
45% in emerging markets (Arslanalp, Tsuda 2014). According to Ba-
sel Accords, banks have to maintain capital buffers with regulatory 
risk weights that depend on their asset exposures. However, European 
banks do not hold capital against their European debt exposures, i.e. 
they have zero-risk weight (Keddad, Schalck 2020). As a consequence, 
European banks are undercapitalized if a negative shock hits countries 
and sovereign risk increases (Kirschenmann, Korte, Steffen 2019). In 
empirical analyses sovereign risk is found to influence banks’ risk, es-
pecially in the context of the global financial crisis and sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe (Alter, Schüler 2012; De Bruyckere et al. 2013; Gib-
son, Hall, Tavlas 2016; Keddad, Schalck 2020).
The second transmission channel, the safety net channel, reflects 
the explicit and implicit guarantees provided by governments and 
central banks, especially for too-big-to-fail financial institutions, to 
support financial stability. When the fiscal position of countries wors-
ens, the value of public guarantees to the banking system reduc-
es, resulting in spillover effects from sovereign to bank risk (Alter, 
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Schüler 2012; Bertay, Demirgüç-Kunt, Huizinga 2013; Avino, Cotter 
2014). In the same vein, banking crises activate backstops, guaran-
tees and other resolution policies that affect public finance sustain-
ability, resulting in spillover effects from bank to sovereign risk (Yu, 
2017; Dell’Ariccia et al. 2018).
The third transmission channel is the collateral channel that op-
erates against the backdrop of the reduced value of collateral that 
banks hold in the form of sovereign debt, affecting borrowing costs 
of banks in the interbank market, private repo markets and oth-
er types of transactions (BIS 2011; Correa et al. 2012; De Bruyck-
ere et al. 2013). Finally, the last channel deals with sovereign rating 
downgrades that can affect banks’ borrowing capacity, leading to 
the downgrade of domestic banks. These channels have been inves-
tigated, among others, by Arezki, Candelon, Sy (2011) and Gibson, 
Hall, Tavlas (2016). The latter (2016) document that during the sov-
ereign debt crisis in Europe the decline in commercial banks’ equi-
ty prices reflected direct and indirect linkages with the sovereigns. 
Dell’Ariccia et al. (2018) also mention the macroeconomic channel, 
i.e. the three-sided relationship between banks and government sec-
tor and real economic activity.
3 Methodological Aspects
We extend the analysis of Andrieș, Ongena, Sprincean (2020) to 
the European banking sector, investigating the impact of the COV-
ID-19 pandemic on banks’ CDS spreads. Similarly to Andrieș, Onge-
na, Sprincean (2020), we employ an event study methodology to as-
sess the reaction of investors in bank bonds to: (1) general lockdown 
measures imposed in Italy on March 9, 2020; (2) the pandemic in-
tensity (the country specific day when the number of cases totalled 
100, the growth rate climbed to 30 cases a day, and the death rate 
surpassed 10); (3) and some dates related to the stringency of the 
containment measures, such as restrictions on internal movement 
and general workplace closing. Further, we measure spillover effects 
from sovereigns to banks and vice versa during three crisis periods: 
(i) the global financial crisis of 2007-09; (ii) the euro area debt crisis 
of 2010-13; and (iii) the current health crisis, comparing their mag-
nitude across and within groups. We follow the approach of Billio et 
al. (2012) and analyse the interdependencies between sovereigns 
and banks through Granger-causality networks. For banks from the 
same countries, we construct equally-weighted CDS indices. We use 
the 5-years CDS contracts denominated in Euro with modified-mod-
ified restructuring, written on senior obligations. The source of the 
data is Thomson Reuters DataStream.
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4 Results and Discussion
Figure 1 exhibits the evolution of sovereign CDS spreads and banks’ 
equally-weighted CDS indices for four European countries that have 
been heavily affected by the pandemic (Italy, Germany, France and 
Spain), over the January 1-April 20, 2020 period [fig. 1]. The vertical 
lines from each graph represent our main event date, i.e. March 9, 
2020. We can note that, with the exception of Germany, all sover-
eign CDS quotes increased following the announcement of gener-
al lockdown measures imposed in Italy. The same is true for banks’ 
CDS spreads, including German banks. Thus, investors reacted to 
this announcement by requiring higher premia to invest in bonds 
issued by these European sovereigns or by the banks headquar-
tered in these countries.
Figure 1 The evolution of sovereign CDS spreads and banks’ CDS spreads (equally-weighted indices) 
for Italy, Germany, France and Spain from January 1, 2020 to April 20, 2020 (in basis points). 
Note: the vertical lines represent March 9, 2020
Next, we present the findings from the event study with March 9, 
2020 as the main event date table 1.2 The event study is conducted 
over the event windows: [0; 0], [-1; 1], [-5; 5], and [0; 30] days. Thus, 
we analyse the market reaction for short and longer time frames. The 
results show little evidence in favour of a negative reaction of inves-
2 See Table A1 from the Annexes with the list of the banks used in our analysis.
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tors in bonds issued by European banks on the event day, quantified 
through an increase in cumulative average abnormal change (CAAC)3 
of CDS spreads by 94.22 basis points only. Only one test out of four 
(generalised sign test) shows statistical significance of CAACs on the 
event day. The findings for sovereign CDS spreads, however, indicate 
a clear negative effect on March 9, 2020 of 503.85 basis points boost 
in CAAC. Thus, the market reaction is more pronounced in the case 
of sovereign risk than bank risk. However, the harmful effect of con-
tainment measures to curtail the spread of the virus is present for 
banks over longer periods, especially for [-5; 5] days event window 
with an increase in CAAC by 4787.67 basis points, being highly sta-
tistically significant. 
In terms of pandemic intensity, unreported results show that the 
highest risk from investors’ in both sovereign and bank bonds is as-
sociated with a rapid increase in daily confirmed cases (i.e. 30 cases 
a day), whereas the general restrictions on internal movement worry 
more investors in bank bonds than those in sovereign bonds. None-
theless, according to investors in European sovereign debt the eco-
nomic channel of non-pharmaceutical interventions4 dominates that 
of coordination where people purposely reduce their consumption 
and labour supply to reduce the spread of the virus and the risks as-
sociated with the pandemic (Correia, Luck, Verner 2020).
3 Cumulative average abnormal change for CDS spreads is the analogue of cumulative 
average abnormal return (CAAR) from equity prices. We compute the change in CDS 
spreads as the natural logarithm of CDS quote at time t over CDS quote at time t-1. In 
event studies, the abnormal return (AR) is the difference between the actual and the ex-
pected return, the latter being calculated based on specific models. The AR can be aver-
aged across all firms in the sample to get the average abnormal return (AAR) for each t. 
In the end, one can sum the AARs over specific time intervals to get the cumulative av-
erage abnormal return, which can capture the aggregate effect of the abnormal returns.
4 Strategies carried out by people and communities to limit the spread of the virus, 
besides vaccination and medical treatment (pharmaceutical interventions), such as so-
cial distancing and public hygiene.
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Table 1 Banks’ CDS spreads reaction to the general quarantine measures imposed in Italy
CDS CAACs 9 March 2020 (b.p.)
Event window [0; 0] [-1; 1] [-5; 5] [0; 30]
29 European banks 94.22 2176.44 4787.67 3853.68
Significance tests
Adjusted-Patell test 1.07 8.13*** 10.09*** 12.87***
BMP test 1.33 7.10*** 8.40*** 8.74***
Generalised sign test -2.87*** 3.46** 3.84*** 4.21***
GRANK test -0.57 2.36** 2.61** 2.83***
Note: this table exhibits the cumulative average abnormal changes (CAACs) in basis 
points of European banks’ CDS spreads considering the following event windows: [0; 
0], [-1; 1], [-5; 5], and [0; 30] days. The event refers to March 9, 2020. The estimation 
window is 250 days and the model employed to compute the expected change is the 
market model with DataStream Banks Europe 5Y CDS index as the market index (see 
Andrieș, Ongena, Sprincean 2020 for details). The table also reports the statistics of 
the tests used to assess the significance of CAACs: two parametric tests (Adjusted 
Patell and BMP tests) and two non-parametric tests (Generalised sign and GRANK 
tests). ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Further, we quantify the dynamic interconnectedness between sover-
eigns and banks in a Granger-causality framework. Considering our 
data, changes in sovereigns’ CDS quotes can Granger-cause chang-
es in banks’ CDS spreads if information contained in the past values 
of sovereigns’ CDS and in the past values of banks’ CDS is better at 
predicting the value of banks’ change in CDS than the information 
based only on the past values of banks’ change in CDS (for details, 
see Andrieș et al. 2020). Following Billio et al. (2012) we compute the 
Dynamic Causality Index (DCI) which is based on Granger-causality 
relationships. An increase in the Dynamic Causality Index is associat-
ed with enhanced spillover effects between sovereign and bank risk.
Being constrained by the availability of data, our analysis starts on 
November 10, 2008. From figure 2, which depicts the evolution of the 
DCI index over time, we can note three spikes: two during the sover-
eign debt crisis, and one during the current health crisis [fig. 2]. The 
highest magnitude of the Dynamic Causality Index is reached during 
the European sovereign debt crisis indicating an increased feedback 
loop between sovereign and bank risk. The DCI is constantly rais-
ing during the global financial crisis. However we do not capture the 
Lehman Brothers event. Contrary to the Great Recession and sover-
eign debt crisis episodes, now banks are more resilient to shocks, be-
ing better equipped with capital and liquidity buffers and have low-
er incentives of excessive risk-taking as a direct consequence of the 
post-crisis regulatory environment. However, due to disruptions in 
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the global supply chains and reduction in demand caused by the lock-
down measures, banks could rapidly face a surge in non-perform-
ing loans amplified by the default of firms, notably small and medi-
um-sized enterprises that depend on bank funding as their primary 
source of borrowing.5 Carletti et al. (2020) point-out four challenges 
that banks’ business models will face in the post-COVID-19 era: (i) a 
prolonged period of low interest rates; (ii) increased credit risk; (iii) 
digitalisation; and (iv) stricter bank regulations.
Based on pairwise Granger-causality relationships between sov-
ereigns and banks one can construct the Granger-causality network, 
being defined as a set of nodes (sovereigns and banks) connected by 
edges. If changes in sovereign i’s CDS spreads Granger-cause chang-
es in bank j’s CDS quote, than these two nodes will be connected by 
a straight line with the arrow coming from sovereign i. Otherwise, 
there will be no connection. The arrow can also come from bank j to 
sovereign i if changes in bank j’s CDS spreads Granger-cause chang-
es in sovereign i’s CDS quote. Unreported results show that link-
ages within groups (sovereign-sovereign and bank-bank) are more 
pronounced than linkages across groups (sovereign-bank and bank-
5 The main macroprudential measures adopted at the European level to mitigate the 
negative effects of COVID-19 pandemic and avoid a credit crunch consist of relaxation 
of regulatory capital buffers, such as capital conservation buffer, countercyclical capi-
tal buffer, and systemic risk buffer. For more details, see the database from the ESRB: 
https://www.esrb.europa.eu/home/coronavirus/html/index.en.html.
Figure 2 The evolution of Dynamic Causality Index over the November 10, 2008-April 20, 2020 period
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sovereign), and the Italian banks are the most exposed to shocks that 
propagate through the network.
5 Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic is a rare disaster that has affected the glob-
al economy in an unprecedented way. Governments around the world 
have stepped in by making use of health, fiscal, microprudential, 
macroprudential, monetary, or marked-based measures in order to 
mitigate the negative effects of the health crisis and to avoid a cred-
it crunch in the banking sector. We analyze the impact of the general 
lockdown measures imposed in Italy in the context of the COVID-19 
pandemic on European banks’ CDS spreads. Compared to sover-
eign risk, we find little evidence of increased bank risk following 
the event, which also corresponds to the commencement of the pan-
demic in Europe. However, investors’ reaction was clearly negative 
in longer time frames. In addition, we quantify the feedback loop be-
tween sovereign and bank risk and document an increased intercon-
nectedness between sovereigns and banks during the current health 
crisis, but with a smaller magnitude as compared to the sovereign 
debt crisis in Europe. Banks are now more resilient to shocks, be-
ing better equipped with capital and liquidity buffers and have low-
er incentives to excessive risk-taking as a direct consequence of the 
post-crisis regulatory framework. 
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Table A1
List of the banks used in the analysis
Nr. crt. Name of the bank Country of origin
1 ERSTE GROUP BANK AG Austria
2 BAWAG PSK Austria
3 DANSKE BANK A/S Denmark
4 BNP PARIBAS SA France
5 SOCIETE GENERALE France
6 CREDIT AGRICOLE SA France
7 DEUTSCHE BANK AG Germany
8 BAYERISCHE LANDESBANK Germany
9 COMMERZBANK AG Germany
10 LANDESBANK BADEN-WÜRTTEMBERG Germany
11 IKB DEUTSCHE INDUSTRIEBANK AG Germany
12 LANDESBANK HESSEN-THÜRINGEN 
GIROZENTRALE 
Germany
13 ALLIED IRISH BANKS Ireland
14 UNICREDITO ITALIANO SPA Italy
15 MEDIOBANCA SPA Italy
16 BANCO COMERCIAL PORTUGUES SA Portugal
17 BANKINTER SA Spain
18 BANCO DE SABADELL Spain
19 BBV ARGENTARIA SA Spain
20 CAJA DE AHORROS DEL MEDITERRÁNEO Spain
21 SVENSKA HANDELSBANKEN AB Sweden
22 SWEDBANK AB Sweden
23 SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA BANKEN AB Sweden
24 CREDIT SUISSE GROUP Switzerland
25 UBS AG Switzerland
26 LLOYDS BANK United Kingdom
27 BARCLAYS BANK PLC United Kingdom
28 THE RBS GROUP PLC United Kingdom
29 HSBC BANK PLC United Kingdom
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1 Introduction
The coronavirus pandemic has been one of the most devastating 
global crises since the Second World War. It has had far-reaching 
consequences that affected all countries to varying degrees. The 
most tragic impact has been the loss of lives, but also job losses, the 
lack of healthcare access and the effects on mental health etc. have 
been devastating. The outcome of the pandemic in the financial sec-
tor has been a financial crisis, named the COVID-19 crisis. Ramel-
li and Wagner (2020; forthcoming) compare stock performances by 
industry as early effects of the crisis, and identify the Energy sector 
as being the worst hit whilst Telecom, Pharma & Biotech reaping the 
largest gains. Acharya and Steffen (2020) highlight how stock perfor-
mance depended on liquidity as stocks with high liquidity performed 
better. Aldasoro et al. (2020) raise concerns about the long-terms 
prospects of banks, as the banking sector has been more severely 
hit than most sectors, and argue that the consequences are compa-
rable with the outcomes of the 2008 global financial crisis.
Here we investigate how financial risks increased and how the 
crisis affected financial institutions, with a focus on market risk 
measurement, and we discuss the challenges faced by regulators. 
We examine the first five months of the crisis, analysing the effects 
of equity market index risk factors, and to some extent commodity 
risk factors, as these are the risk dimensions most affected by the 
COVID-19 crisis. Other risk factors indicated serious levels of mar-
ket stress. Examples include government bond yields, which reached 
historical lows, and volatility risk factors, such as the CBOE VIX in-
dex, which had its largest shocks, both positive and negative and 
reached its highest value ever of 82.69 in March 2020, as illustrat-
ed in figure 1 [fig. 1]. At the time of writing the crisis is still affecting 
the economies worldwide as well as the day-to-day lives of millions.
2 Overview of the Market Risk Regulation Before the Crisis
Market risk refers to the risk of losses arising from adverse movements 
in market prices of assets. From a regulatory perspective, the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (1996) first introduced market risk 
capital reserves against unexpected asset price movements in the trad-
ing books of banks. Since then, Value-at-Risk (VaR) has become the 
dominating measure of market risk, which financial institutions and 
regulators use to make risk-informed decisions and to calculate mar-
ket risk capital requirements. VaR is defined as the potential loss one 
may face over a given time horizon with a pre-defined confidence level. 
For example, if the 99% 10-day VaR is $1 million, there is 99% chance 
that the losses will not exceed $1 million over the next 10 trading days.
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In the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, the flaws of mar-
ket risk regulation have become evident. For instance, the VaR-based 
risk assessment has been found to underestimate the risks in tur-
bulent markets. To address these problems, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2019) published revisions to its global regula-
tory standards that include a move from Value-at-Risk to Expected 
Shortfall (ES). ES measures the average loss beyond the VaR thresh-
old in the tail of the loss distribution, producing more accurate gaug-
es of tail risk. The typical confidence level is 99% for VaR and 97.5% 
for ES, corresponding to the 1% and 2.5% worst-case losses, respec-
tively. Moreover, considering the liquidity of various assets, vary-
ing time horizons are used to evaluate financial risks, i.e. 10 days 
for large cap equities, 20 days for small cap, and up to 120 days for 
some risk categories. However, the latest regulations stipulate that 
these risk calculations are based on overlapping 10-day returns and 
we discuss this procedure in our risk assessments.
Figure 2 shows the 10-day 97.5% ES1 calculated using the most 
widely accepted risk model in the industry, Historical Simulation (de-
noted by HS in the following), based on the S&P 500 index returns 
(2000-06-26/2020-06-23), and plots it along the index [fig. 2]. Within 
one week during March 2020, the index was hit by a shock of around 
-19% cumulative return. As the figure shows, during the global finan-
1 Throughout this chapter, ES is expressed in returns, of which the value is nonneg-
ative; a rolling window scheme is used to estimate ES with a window length of 250 
trading days.
Figure 1 CBOE volatility index from 2000-01-23 to 2020-06-23
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cial crisis between mid 2007 and early 2009, as well as during the 
sovereign debt crisis which peaked between 2010 and 2012, the risk 
measure, ES, peaked. The same can be seen during the crisis wrought 
by the coronavirus pandemic, with ES reaching a level comparable 
with the ES during the financial crisis, as also discussed in Capelle-
Blancard and Desroziers (2020). It is to be noticed that the ES dur-
ing the crisis increased to multiple times the level before the crisis.
Though the first cases of COVID-19 date back to December 2019, 
the lockdown in China occurred on January 23, 2020. Following this, 
the virus spread quickly over other parts of the globe and a global 
pandemic was declared by the WHO on March 11, 2020.2 On seeing 
the widespread effects of the coronavirus outbreak on the economy 
and the banks, prudential authorities as well as local jurisdictions 
decided to delay the implementation of the latest version of market 
risk regulatory framework (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2019), called the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB), 
until January 2023. This gives regulators time to consider suitable 
changes to market risk measurement and management in the new Ba-
sel framework, if required. It also gives financial institutions breath-
ing space to reevaluate their market risk estimation methodologies 
as well as the steps needed to be taken to reduce risk exposures to 
an acceptable level. Also, risk estimates such as VaR and ES depend 
2 More information about how this global event unfolded and a detailed timeline can 
be found in https://www.who.int/news-room/detail/27-04-2020-who-timeline-
--covid-19.
Figure 2 10-day Historical Simulation ES at 97.5%, 
based on S&P 500 index returns from 2000-06-26 to 2020-06-23
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on the modelling framework, and in the following we examine this 
dependence in more detail.
3 Market Risk Measurement Over the First Five Months  
of the Crisis
For regulatory purposes and for internal risk assessment of institu-
tions, the estimation of VaR and ES measures over a given time pe-
riod is of interest, since market risk capital calculations are based 
on risk assessments. Here we focus on the estimation of ES as it is a 
central element of the recent regulations. To illustrate the dramat-
ic increase in risk witnessed in the first half of 2020,3 figure 3 pre-
sents the level of 97.5% ES risk over 10 days, for two assets: FTSE 
100 index returns as well as Europe Brent Crude Oil Spot returns, 
based on two methods: Historical Simulation, computed using over-
lapping 10-day returns, as well as the well-known GARCH(1,1) mod-
el that assumes normally distributed returns. For the GARCH model, 
the h-day ES is calculated based on the daily ES estimates, written 
as , which is called the ‘square root of time’ 
rule [fig. 3].
Figure 3 10-day HS ES and GARCH ES at 97.5% for FTSE 100 and oil returns
The first thing to notice from figure 3 is that the general level of ES 
risk computed using HS increases dramatically during March 2020, 
by a multiplier of more than 4 for the FTSE index, and by a multipli-
er of more than 5 for the risk computed from oil returns. Also, the ES 
stays at this level until the end of the sample period, unaffected by the 
3 Similarly, Ibikunle and Rzayev (2020) show a substantial increase of a cross-section-
al average volatility for 110 European stocks from 24 Jan. to 24 March in their figure 1.
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events during this period. If these values are used for capital calcu-
lation, the required capital would also increase multiple times, with 
many financial institutions not being able to meet these increased 
capital requirements.4 To address this, banks across the world are 
allowed to temporarily suspend the new capital calculation method 
against the radically increased risk, as discussed by Borio and Restoy 
(2020). Moreover, the GARCH model does a good job in terms of the 
speed of reaction to large negative returns, but it leads to risk es-
timates increasing dramatically, by a multiplier of more than 10, as 
can be seen in figure 3 for the FTSE returns, which would give capi-
tal requirements that are impossible to meet, reaching levels of more 
than 10 times the pre-crisis levels. Followed by this initial sharp rise 
in risk, the risk level estimated by GARCH decreases back within a 
month, and in the second part of the sample period it is below the 
risk level estimated by the HS method.
For oil returns, the risk estimate obtained by GARCH displays a 
large variation. After the initial sharp rise in risk at the beginning 
of March, on April 20 the market experienced its deepest fall in the 
price of a barrel of West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the benchmark for 
US oil, even leading to negative prices for this commodity – caused by 
an abrupt drop in demand. This aroused investors’ fears and created 
a turbulent oil market, as evidenced by the predictions of GARCH ES 
of oil returns, with the ES risk reaching levels more than 15 times 
higher than the level in January 2020. This shows the high depend-
ence of GARCH risk estimates on returns; although the model is quick 
to react to events, due to the high level of risk estimates it is less suit-
able to be used for capital calculations. These risk estimates high-
light the severity of the COVID-19 financial crisis, especially after 
the coronavirus pandemic was declared in March 2020.
To illustrate the effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the global fi-
nancial markets, we consider the market indices S&P 500 (spx), FT-
SE 100 (ftse), DAX (dax), Nikkei 225 (nky), and Shanghai Composite 
(sse), as well as several commodities including Europe Brent Crude 
Oil Spot prices (oil), Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Prices (gas), Lon-
don PM fix gold prices (gold), Copper Jul 20 futures contract (cop-
per), as well as the Sugar #11 Oct 20 futures contract (sugar), from 
January 2019 to June 2020. Figure 4 shows the multipliers for His-
torical Simulation ES, calculated as the ratio of the average ES over 
the last five trading days of the sample period, ending with June 23, 
2020, and the average ES over the first five trading days starting 
with January 23, 2020 [fig. 4]. We use three different time horizons (1 
4 More measures are taken by governments and banks to alleviate the adverse finan-
cial and economic effects of the COVID-19 crisis, as suggested by Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2020).
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day, 10 days and 20 days) to compute the risk estimates and the mul-
tipliers. For some assets the multipliers take large values: index re-
turns and oil returns, most noticeably. For the S&P 500, FTSE, DAX 
and Nikkei 225 index returns, the increase in the risk level shows 
a similar pattern: the risk increased by 3 to 6 times, depending on 
the risk horizon. For the Shanghai Composite index, the value of the 
multiplier is less than one, showing that this index didn’t display an 
increase in the level of ES risk estimates. The gas market seems un-
affected as well in terms of risk estimates. The other commodities 
considered – gold, copper and sugar – show an increase in the risk 
level by about twofold, whilst the risk estimates obtained from oil re-
turns increased dramatically during the crisis. 
It is interesting to note the dependency of the multiplier on the 
risk horizon: for most assets considered, the multiplier for the 1-day 
risk horizon is smaller than the multiplier for the 10-day horizon, and 
the multiplier for the 20-day horizon is the largest. If the ‘square root 
of time’ rule was valid, then these multipliers should have been at 
the same level, regardless of the time horizon. However, this is not 
the case, which highlights that longer horizon risks were affected by 
the COVID-19 crisis more than short horizon risks, with some of the 
risk estimates going up sixfold over the sample period. This pattern 
is not followed by all asset classes, but it seems to be a typical be-
haviour of risk estimates for the majority of assets considered here.
Figure 4 Multipliers for HS ES at 97.5% over 1, 10 and 20 days across various assets, 
calculated as the ratio of the average ES over the last five trading days of the sample period 
divided by the average ES over the first five trading days of our sample
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4 Challenges to the Regulatory Framework
In the following we consider the current Basel framework for mar-
ket risk calculations, with a focus on the risk horizons considered 
in these assessments. As specified by the regulation, different risk 
horizons are applied to different categories of risk factors, ranging 
from 10 days for the most liquid asset classes and up to 120 days for 
some risk factor categories. Under the current framework, these cal-
culations are based on 10-day ES assessments, and then the ‘square 
root of time’ rule is used to compute risk over longer horizons, writ-
ten as The question we are asking here is 
whether this approximation was proved to be correct or not during 
the recent crisis.
Figure 5 investigates three different approaches to estimate ES of 
an individual asset,5 the FTSE 100 index, over h days: 1) in the first 
approach, the h-day ES is calculated based on the daily ES using the 
‘square root of time’ rule, so ; 2) in the second 
approach, we follow the FRTB recommendations and calculate the 
h-day ES from the 10-day ES estimates (computed from overlapping 
observations) as , hereafter referred to as 
the regulatory ES; 3) in the third approach we directly use the h-day 
overlapping observations to get h-day ES [fig. 5]. We focus on the cal-
culation of 40-day ES (h = 40) at 97.5% level, considering the above 
5 For simplicity, we illustrate the calculation of ES where only one risk factor is con-
sidered. 
Figure 5 Comparison of three approaches to compute 97.5% HS ES over 40 trading days, based on FTSE 100
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Figure 6 Time-varying number of VaR exceptions (the daily returns being 
below the negative of the daily HS VaR at 99%) over a 250 trading day backtesting period
three approaches with the estimates displayed in figure 5. It is to 
be noted that the regulatory ES (as shown using a red line) overes-
timates the actual risk (as shown by the yellow line), whilst the ap-
proach based on the simple ‘square root of time’ rule computed from 
daily ES estimates (as shown by the blue line) gives a better fit. This 
pattern, which we noticed for other asset classes and for other risk 
horizons as well, suggests that regulatory capital might overesti-
mate risk in such cases.
Whilst market risk measurement has moved from VaR to ES, back-
testing ES is a debating area and the current regulation stipulates 
VaR backtesting only. As such, the focus is on counting the number of 
daily VaR exceptions (cases when the daily return is below the nega-
tive of daily VaR estimate) over a period of 250 days. Coloured zones 
are considered, with the green zone applying if the number of excep-
tions is less than or equal with 5, amber zone when the number of ex-
ceptions is more than 10, and yellow zone in between. Different zones 
carry different levels of multipliers applied for capital calculations.
In figure 6, over a five-month period in early 2020, we show the 
total number of exceptions of HS VaR, with a backtesting period of 
250 trading days specified in the regulatory framework [fig. 6]. Nev-
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ertheless, the major indices (except for the Shanghai Composite in-
dex, sse) and oil experienced a steep increase in the number of ex-
ceptions between March and April 2020 (with the FTSE, DAX and 
oil risk estimates in the amber zone), indicating that the Historical 
Simulation method is unable to accommodate for the extreme market 
events of early 2020. This shows a weakness of the HS method, and 
raises a point that needs to be addressed by regulators and financial 
institutions, namely to improve on the current market risk models.
5 Looking Ahead
As the previous sections highlight, some of the challenges in terms of 
market risk measurement, as a result of the COVID-19 crisis, faced 
by the regulatory bodies, local jurisdictions, and financial institu-
tions can be summarised as: 
1. as a result of the increased values of risk measures, obtained 
using regulatory calculations, the level of capital require-
ments rose dramatically, which is a challenge because such 
high capital needs are very hard to meet; as such, improve-
ments should be made to the risk and capital calculations that 
would lead to more realistic capital requirements;
2. risk assessments depend on the models used; and the estimat-
ed risks can display large variations as a result of this; this 
model dependence needs to be addressed; 
3. risk estimates obtained over longer horizons seem to be af-
fected more by the crisis, as compared to risk estimates ob-
tained over shorter horizons, which is a pattern shown by the 
majority of assets considered in this study. This highlights that 
the suitability of the ‘square root of time’ rule, which is cur-
rently stipulated by the regulation, needs more investigation;
4. a typical pattern we found is that market risk calculation 
based on the current regulatory framework overestimates the 
actual risk, which leads to the question of how the currently 
stipulated risk calculations can be improved;
5. the large number of VaR breaches over the first 5 months of 
the COVID-19 crisis is worrisome; these can be addressed via 
improved risk calculations, or via improvements in the reg-
ulatory framework (e.g. the number of exceptions allowed).
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6 Conclusions
As seen above, the events of early 2020 have had devastating con-
sequences globally including serious financial outcomes. In terms of 
market risks, we found that in general the effects of the COVID-19 cri-
sis were more pronounced for longer horizons. It is vital for financial 
institutions to do their best to prepare for such events, and for regu-
lators to encourage banks to set aside enough capital for future cri-
ses. So, it is important to have an appropriate modelling framework 
that is able to quickly and appropriately respond to crisis events, 
whilst leading to realistic and suitable bank capital requirements.
Bibliography
Acharya, V.V.; Steffen, S. (2020). “The Risk of Being a Fallen Angel and the Cor-
porate Dash for Cash in the Midst of COVID”. CEPR COVID Economics, 10. 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~sternfin/vacharya/public_html/
pdfs/dash-for-cash.pdf.
Aldasoro, I.; Fender, I.; Hardy, B.; Tarashev, N. (2020). “Effects of Covid-19 on 
the Banking Sector: The Market’s Assessment”. BIS Bulletin, 12, 7 May. htt-
ps://www.bis.org/publ/bisbull12.pdf.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1996). Amendments to the Capital 
Accord to in Corporate Market Risks. Report, January. Bank for Internation-
al Settlements. http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs24.pdf.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2019). Minimum Capital Require-
ments for Market Risk. February. Bank for International Settlements. 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.pdf.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2020). Measures to Reflect the Im-
pact of Covid-19. Report, April. Bank for International Settlements. htt-
ps://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d498.pdf.
Borio, C.; Restoy, F. (2020). “Reflections on Regulatory Responses to the Cov-
id-19 Pandemic”. FSI Briefs 1, 15 April. https://www.bis.org/fsi/fsi-
briefs1.htm.
Capelle-Blancard, G.; Desroziers, A. (2020). “The Stock Market and the Econ-
omy: Insights from the COVID-19 Crisis”. VoxEU, 19 June. https://vox-
eu.org/article/stock-market-and-economy-insights-covid-
19-crisis.
Ibikunle, G.; Rzayev, K. (2020). “Grey Rhinos in Financial Markets and Venue 
Selection: the Case of COVID-19”. https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ss-
rn.3586410.
Ramelli, S.; Wagner, A.F. (2020). “What the Stock Market Tells Us About the Con-
sequences of COVID-19”. Baldwin, R.; Weder di Mauro, B. (eds), Mitigating 
the COVID Economic Crisis: Act Fast and Do Whatever. London: CEPR Press, 
63-70. https://voxeu.org/content/mitigating-covid-economic-
crisis-act-fast-and-do-whatever-it-takes.
Ramelli, S.; Wagner, A.F. (forthcoming). “Feverish Stock Price Reactions to COV-






Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1
ISBN [ebook] 978-88-6969-442-4
Open access  111
Published 2020-07-31
© 2020  Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Publich License
DOI 10.30687/978-88-6969-442-4/008 
A New World Post COVID-19
Lessons for Business, the Finance Industry and Policy Makers
edited by Monica Billio and Simone Varotto
COVID-19 and the Stock Market
Stefano Ramelli
University of Zurich, Switzerland
Alexander F. Wagner
University of Zurich, Switzerland; Swiss Finance Institute; European Corporate 
Governance Institute; CEPR
Abstract When disaster strikes, the weak suffer mightily, the strong only slightly. That 
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1 Introduction
The outbreak of COVID-19 took the world economy by surprise. The topic 
“infectious diseases” was ranked number 10 in terms of impact in the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Risk Report 2020, published on January 15, 2020, 
but was considered quite unlikely. Only a few weeks later, attention shift-
ed dramatically. On March 11, the World Health Organization character-
ised COVID-19 as a pandemic. While in the second quarter of 2020 in many 
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countries – except notably in the US, Brazil, and some other coun-
tries – case and death growth rates had slowed down or reversed, at 
the end of June 2020, uncertainty is again rising as countries such as 
China experience new outbreaks and are again considering severe 
lockdowns. Especially in light of the possibility of a second pandem-
ic wave, it is useful to look back and consider what can be learned 
from financial market responses to the first wave.
As a tool supporting decisions about public policy interventions 
but also private sector choices, asset price changes can be extreme-
ly valuable. In essence, asset markets provide ongoing, high-stakes 
surveys regarding future expected outcomes. For corporate decision-
makers, it is especially important to learn from COVID-19 about what 
makes firms resilient when a tail risk is realised. 
Although the focus currently is on COVID-19, it should be stressed 
that tail risks do exist in various domains. The lessons learnt from 
this pandemic are likely to be valuable also in the context of other tail 
risks, for instance those related to climate change or cybersecurity. 
This paper begins by reviewing the worldwide stock-market de-
velopment in section 2. Section 3 summarises which firms were most 
affected by the crisis. Section 4 reviews the stock-market based ev-
idence on policy interventions. While virtually all research so far 
deals with the crisis period of the first quarter of 2020, section 5 
provides insights on the recovery phase in the second quarter. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 Overall Stock Returns Over Time
This section documents some facts about the global stock market per-
formance. It is important to distinguish different phases of the crisis. 
We follow Ramelli and Wagner (forthcoming) for details of the timing 
and expand the timeline of that study with newer data. Specifical-
ly, we organise our primary analysis along four periods: Incubation 
(Thursday, January 2 through Friday, January 17)1, Outbreak (Mon-
day, January 20 through Friday, February 21)2, Fever (Monday, Feb-
ruary 24 through Friday, March 20)3, and Recovery (Monday, March 
We thank an anonymous reviewer for constructive comments.
1 On December 31, 2019, cases of pneumonia detected in Wuhan, China, were first 
reported to the WHO. On January 1, 2020, Chinese health authorities closed the Hua-
nan Seafood Wholesale Market after it was discovered that wild animals sold there 
may be the source of the virus.
2 On January 20, Chinese health authorities confirmed human-to-human transmis-
sion of the Coronavirus, and the WHO issued the first situation report on the outbreak. 
3 On February 23, Italy placed almost 50,000 people under strict lockdown in Lom-
bardy, one of the country’s most productive regions.
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23 through June 8).4 Obviously, further updates may require the ad-
dition of a Relapse phase and other periods.
We retrieve daily stock prices for common shares from the Com-
pustat North America and Compustat Global databases (from Whar-
ton Research Data Services, WRDS). We adjust prices for dividends 
and stock splits, and we keep only common stocks listed on major 
stock exchanges in countries covered by the MSCI EQWI index (in-
cluding both developed and developing countries).5 We convert all 
prices in USD, and we drop firms with less than USD10 million of 
market capitalisation as of December 31, 2019. We end up with a sam-
ple of around 31,200 firms headquartered in 90 different countries. 
Figure 1a plots equally-weighted stock returns in USD across coun-
tries with at least 50 firms, while figure 1b plots the value-weight-
ed ones.6 (Figures in local currency are available on request.) Sever-
al simple facts emerge. First, most countries saw their average firm 
decline in value over the almost two quarters under consideration 
(black bars). Second, the average firm performed best in Poland, Tur-
key, and Saudi Arabia, and worst in Mexico, South Africa, and Bra-
zil. The best value-weighted performance occurred in Saudi Arabia, 
Denmark, and China; the worst in South Africa, Greece, and Brazil. 
Third, every single country experienced negative (positive) equal- 
and value-weighted average returns in the Fever (Recovery) peri-
ods [figs. 1a-b]. 
4 On Monday, March 23, the US Federal Reserve Board (Fed) announced a compre-
hensive bond purchase program (see § 4). The highest point that the S&P500 reached 
in June was obtained on June 8, so we stop this period then.
5 We defined major stock exchanges as in Chaieb, Langlois, Scaillet 2020. 
6 We consider both equal- and value-weighted figures because of the recent tenden-
cy, at least in some countries, of a pronounced concentration of market values among 
a few companies.
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Figures 1a-1b Cumulative returns across the world from January 2 through June 8, 2020
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3 What Makes Firms Resilient Against Tail Risks?  
Learnings from COVID-19
Figures 1a and 1b confirm that COVID-19 had a tremendous effect 
on stock markets. While those figures highlight the average perfor-
mance, COVID-19 has differentially affected the valuations of com-
panies in the first quarter of 2020.
First, consider industry effects. In Ramelli and Wagner (forthcom-
ing), we show that, in the US, telecom services, food and staples 
retailing, and utilities performed relatively well. Energy, consumer 
services, and transportation were among the biggest losers. As an 
ominous sign that the crisis was at least potentially wide-reaching, 
in the Fever period consumer services were among the biggest los-
ers, and food and staples retailers were among the strongest win-
ners (again, relatively speaking). The between-industry differences 
observed in the Fever period intuitively reflect different degrees of 
disruption in firms’ operations caused by social distancing and lock-
down measures.7 As shown in figure 2, similar considerations also 
emerge when looking at the between-industry performance in our in-
ternational sample of firms [fig. 2].
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Figure 2 Stock returns by industry, international sample
7 Several measures of the extent to which job activities in different sectors can be 
carried out from home and without human interaction in physical proximity are now 
available (Dingel, Neiman 2020; Hensvik, Le Barbanchon, Rathelot 2020; Koren, Pető 
2020). See Pagano, Wagner, Zechner 2020 for an analysis.
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Second, especially in the Fever phase concerns about corporate debt 
(leverage) and corporate liquidity (cash holdings) started to play an 
important role (Ramelli, Wagner forthcoming). Figure 3 illustrates 
this result in the international sample, focusing on the return effects 
of being in the top quartiles of leverage or cash holdings [fig. 3]. With-
in the same industry and controlling for standard firm characteris-
tics (size, book-to-market, and profitability), highly-indebted firms 
suffered severely in the Fever period; high-cash firms performed 
relatively better. Intuitively, high-cash firms are more likely able to 
survive and to preserve or expand their physical and human capi-
tal.8 Additionally, from a systemic perspective, the surge in the val-
ue of cash also suggests that as the crisis unfolded investors became 
increasingly concerned about a tightening of firms’ access to exter-
nal finance. The policy measures taken by central banks seek to ad-
dress this concern; indeed, in the Recovery period, the effects of cash 
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Figure 3 Relative cumulative performance of firms in the top quartile of cash holdings 
in percent of assets and in the top quartile of leverage, international sample
Third, the role of international trade has received surprisingly little 
attention. In Ramelli and Wagner (forthcoming), we document that 
US firms with more export or supply chain exposure to China ex-
perienced substantially lower cumulative abnormal returns during 
the Outbreak period, and to a lesser extent in the Incubation period. 
8 Fahlenbrach, Rageth and Stulz (2020) confirm our results for the US sample. Ding 
et al. (2020) report similar results in international data.
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More generally, internationally-oriented companies did poorly over 
these periods. Interestingly, when China seemed to get COVID-19 un-
der control, whereas the situation in Europe and the US worsened, 
the effects reversed. This suggests that a second wave hitting spe-
cific countries might again see a drop in the value of firms relative-
ly more exposed to those particular countries.
Fourth, besides ‘hard’ factors such as the degree of exposure to 
lockdown measures, financial strength, and reliance on internation-
al trade, some ‘softer’ factors may play an important role. For exam-
ple, Albuquerque et al. (2020) and Garel and Petit-Romec (2020) doc-
ument that stocks of firms with high environmental and social (ES) 
ratings fared better during the market turmoil. Li et al. (2020) show 
that stocks of firms with a strong corporate culture did better.
One natural question raised by these results is which investors val-
ued which aspects and why. Our early-stage work in Glossner et al. 
(2020) suggests that institutional investors overall focused on hard 
measures of financial resilience and did not noticeably increase their 
stakes in high-ES firms (suggesting that retail investors may have 
been responsible for the strong performance of these companies).
4 Policy Interventions and Stock Price Reactions
Some interventions, such as lockdowns or stay-at-home orders, were 
directly aimed at containing the spread of the virus. The financial 
market responses to such interventions have been investigated in a 
number of studies. The first-order effect is negative for business ac-
cording to some studies, at least in the short term, though these in-
terventions do reduce infection and death rates (Barrot, Grassi, Sau-
vagnat 2020). However, because stock returns do respond to daily 
unanticipated changes in COVID-19 cases (Alfaro et al. 2020), such 
interventions can also have indirect beneficial effects for businesses 
(Ashraf 2020; Chen et al. 2020). Further research is needed to clari-
fy the conditions under which interventions are (perceived as) harm-
ful or beneficial to the value of firms.
There were important and novel interventions by central banks.9 
For example, on Monday, March 23 the US Federal Reserve Board 
(Fed) announced two new facilities – the “Primary Market Corporate 
Credit Facility” and the “Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facili-
ty” – to support credit to large corporations at least up to the end of 
9 The initial intervention by the US Federal Reserve Board to cut interest rates was 
met with a negative stock market response. Presumably, it was interpreted as a signal 
that the situation was about to get worse.
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Q3 2020.10 On April 9, the Fed expanded those programs.11 Consider-
ing short-term corporate bond reactions, D’Amico, Kurakula and Lee 
et al. (2020), Haddad, Moreira and Muir (2020) and Nozawa and Qiu 
(2020) find evidence in line with the notion that the Fed’s actions en-
hanced overall economic prospects and thus reduced default risk of 
borrowers.12 In Ramelli and Wagner (forthcoming), we find differen-
tiated effects of the March 23 announcement. Stocks with high lev-
erage and low cash-holdings initially benefited, but after ten days, 
the effect had reversed. Investors’ concerns about corporate leverage 
and liquidity seem to have diminished somewhat after April 9, when 
the Fed announced a significant expansion of its programs. One dif-
ficulty in assessing the impacts of these measures is that there was 
also news about the spread of COVID-19, which would work against 
the potential positive effects of the Fed’s intervention. The future will 
reveal the long-term effects of these interventions.13
There were also fiscal policy interventions. For example, Ashraf 
(2020) finds a neutral effect of income and debt relief support to 
households, whereas K.J. Heyden and T. Heyden (2020) find that the 
announcement of country-specific fiscal policy measures has negative 
effects on stock returns. Future research should investigate under 
which conditions such programs may have positive effects, and how 
different firms were affected by these various types of interventions.14 
Finally, appropriate political communication is likely to have 
played a major role.15 Uncertainty plays a key role in the market 
response (Gormsen, Koijen 2020; Landier, Thesmar 2020). Political 
credibility and clear communication are key to reduce uncertainty 
on both the pandemic and the policy responses, and hence, in turn, 





12 Brunnermeier and Krishnamurthy (2020) provide a theoretical analysis.
13 Although large central banks’ interventions in the corporate debt and equity markets 
can certainly help listed corporations accessing external capital, they may also have unin-
tended effects in terms of pricing distortion. See, for instance, Barbon, Gianinazzi 2019.
14 For example, as described in Wagner, Zeckhauser, and Ziegler (2020), various pro-
visions of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act that had been relevant to stock price responses at 
the implementation of that Act were rolled back or altered by the CARES Act.
15 Coibion, Gorodnichenko and Weber (2020) provide survey evidence that household 
beliefs and spending plans do not appear to be affected much by policy responses. Inter-
estingly, Hanspal, Weber and Wohlfart (2020) show that the stock market crash severely 
affected expectations of households, for example, regarding retirement age. Thus, tan-
gible, realised losses do appear to shift household expectations. It will be interesting 
to see whether these expectations reverse as well as the market in the second quarter. 
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5 What is Behind the Exuberant Second Quarter of 2020?
The first quarter of 2020 saw extreme uncertainty and steep stock 
market declines. The real economy entered a state of emergency, un-
employment soared in many countries, corporate earnings proved 
dismal, and double-digit percentage GDP drops never seen before 
occurred. Yet, in the Recovery period the stock market rose virtu-
ally everywhere.
Large stock price reversals were common across firms, as figure 4 
illustrates. This figure is a binned scatter plot. We sort all 29,465 in-
ternational firms for which data is available into 100 equal-sized bins 
of cumulative returns in the Fever period. The vertical axis plots the 
average cumulative returns in the Recovery period within each bin. 
The stock returns in the Recovery period strongly negatively corre-
late to those in the Fever period. Interestingly, companies that had 
small negative or even positive returns did not on average experi-
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Figure 4 Returns in Fever and the Recovery Periods
How should one interpret the extraordinary market performance in 
the second quarter and the pattern in figure 4? This question will 
surely spur substantial future research. In the following, we suggest 
a few possible explanations which might be worth further investigat-
ing (and which may not be mutually exclusive).
First, suppose that investors genuinely expected the worst to be 
over, and hence inferred that valuations at the end of the second 
quarter should be back to their pre-crisis levels (or slightly higher, 
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 120
A New World Post COVID-19, 111-124
as investors also need to earn their cost of capital). Simple arithme-
tic then yields a shape consistent with the one plotted in figure 4.16 
Intuitively, a stock that falls by 50% has to rise by 100% to get back 
to the initial level, whereas a stock that falls by 10% only has to rise 
by 11.1%. Notice that for this Recovery Arithmetic to be a candidate 
explanation, investors would need to see both expected future cash 
flows and uncertainty at similar levels as in the pre-crisis period. 
While it is plausible that discount factors substantially declined dur-
ing the second quarter, general macroeconomic forecasts remain dis-
mal in many countries.
Second, figure 4 shows that the few firms that had been winners 
in the Fever period and had exhibited positive returns do not, in fact, 
on average show negative returns in the Recovery period (as they 
would under the Recovery Arithmetic). This finding may reflect sus-
tained and structural changes in the economy and in how we live 
and work, which give especially certain technology companies enor-
mous advantages.
Third, the medium-term stock price reaction to the Fed’s inter-
vention announcements may drive the returns. In other words, the 
Fed is providing enormous liquidity and is indirectly supporting also 
firms that did not suffer that much in the Fever period. (There is no 
official distinction by industry in the Fed’s bond purchase programs, 
for example.) This would also imply that there is distortion in market 
prices away from fundamentals.
Fourth, the Recovery returns may be driven by individual inves-
tors, who may have ‘bought the dip’ gambling on the rebound of stock 
prices perhaps amplified by a prolonged intervention of the Fed in-
to capital markets.17
In work in progress, we are seeking to distinguish these explana-
tions, in particular with the goal of determining the relative impor-
tance of fundamentals versus liquidity provided by central banks in 
driving assets prices.
16 Consider a stock with an annual cost of equity of k%. Suppose for simplicity that 
the stock pays no dividend. Roughly, we would expect a price appreciation for that stock 
for the first two quarters of 0.5*k%. Suppose the stock price change in the first quar-
ter (or in the Fever period, assuming things were flat before) was f% (where for most 
stocks, f<0). Then, to get to the expected price target by the end of Q2, the stock price 
change in the Recovery period would need to be r = (1+0.5*k)/(1+f). Plotting this rela-
tionship with r on the vertical axis and f on the horizontal axis yields a non-linear re-
lationship such as figure 4.
17 In Glossner et al. (2020) we find that investors on “Robinhood” (a low-cost platform 
increasingly popular among retail investors) tended to increase holdings in high-lever-
age and low-cash holdings during the first quarter of 2020. Thus, these investors tar-
geted companies that suffered heavily in the Fever period; conversely, they may, there-
fore, have done very well in the Recovery period.
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6 Implications for Business and Public Policy 
It is far too early to declare that an end is in sight for the COVID-19 
pandemic. While the stock market, as a forward-looking device, has 
been sending positive signals through the steep rise in the second 
quarter of 2020, valuations remain tenuous. A resurgence of uncer-
tainty may lead to another round of sharp drops in equity markets. 
Thus, it is not clear whether the second quarter was indeed a sus-
tainable recovery, or just a temporary phase before a heavy relapse 
or perhaps even a devastating collapse.
Regardless, for corporate decision-makers and policy-makers, 
some lessons of the first quarter 2020 are already clear. A powerful 
driver of corporate resilience – which, in turn, helps also to secure 
jobs and sustain the broader economy – has been a sufficiently strong 
financial position before the pandemic hit. Worryingly, the COVID-19 
crisis is leading to a substantial increase in both corporate and pub-
lic debt, which will potentially exacerbate the existing fragilities of 
the financial markets. A critical policy objective will be to find new 
ways to reduce these fragilities.
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kets were exacerbated by panic, fear of the unknown, fear of the end of the world as we 
knew it. This panic obfuscated our ability to make rational predictions on future cash 
flows and asset values. Overall though, our economic system is bouncing back. We can 
learn from this experience and build more flexible models which can help us to better 
manage severe systemic risks.
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1 Introduction
This crisis has had huge costs in terms of human lives lost, great physical and 
psychological suffering caused either directly by the disease or indirectly by 
the drastic measures adopted to contain the spread of the virus. This pan-
demic will have enduring consequences on the world population, the econo-
my, our societies, the environment, and the financial systems. Notwithstand-
ing the enormity of the physical and psychological pain caused by the virus, 
in this chapter 1 only reflect on the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
equity markets. Financial markets, more generally, provide an essential price 
discovery function. They aggregate demand and supply for assets and prod-
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ucts and help us discover the value of these assets and products so 
that we can properly allocate resources to particular projects, sec-
tors/industries and enterprises.
2 The Perfect Storm: Panic and Uncertainty
To assess the level of panic in the equity markets due to the COV-
ID-19 pandemic we can refer to two major volatility indices: the VIX 
(CBOE Volatilty Index) in the US and the Vstoxx (Euro Stoxx 50 Vol-
atility Index) in Europe. These are the indices for the level of volatil-
ity implied from option contracts on major equity indices, the S&P 
500 and the Euro Stoxx 50 in the US and Europe, respectively. The 
VIX and the Vstoxx are often referred to as fear gauges capturing 
the level of uncertainty in financial markets. Over the last 20 years, 
these indices had two major peaks which reflect episodes of extreme-
ly high levels of uncertainty in the financial markets. The first peak 
was in October 2008 during the credit crisis, and the second was in 
March 2020 when the Western world went into lockdown. 
In mid-March 2020, the announcement of drastic restrictive meas-
ures by US authorities precipitated the crisis. Market participants re-
alised that the COVID-19 pandemic was not going to be confined to 
Asia. It had already started showing the first signs of potentially dev-
astating effects on Western economies and the lockdown increased 
the likelihood of the most catastrophic scenarios. As the graphs in 
figure 1 show, the US markets became even more fearful of the ef-
fects of the pandemic on equity values than what they were at the 
time of the credit crisis [fig. 1]. Perhaps this is because the pandem-
ic severely affected New York, the main US financial centre. In Eu-
rope instead, financial markets reflected a relatively greater level of 
uncertainty during the financial crises. The pandemic created hav-
oc in Italy and Spain sparing, at first, Europe’s main financial cen-
tres such as London, Frankfurt, and Paris. With so much fear and un-
certainty markets do not function well in discovering asset prices.
3 The Timeline of the COVID-19 Pandemic
So, how and when did it all begin? A new mysterious virus was first re-
ported by Chinese authorities to the World Health Organisation (WHO) 
on December 31, 2019, although now scientists believe the virus was 
already circulating in China since November 2019. Despite the dras-
tic containment measures taken by the Chinese authorities to try to 
limit the contagion, unfortunately the virus spread to other countries 
in South East Asia. The virus was showing unexpected strength and 
high infection rates which could yield high mortality rates. By the end 
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Figure 1 The volatility indices. This figure presents the time series for the daily values of the VIX 
and the VSTOXX indices from 29 May 2000 to 30 May 2020. The data were downloaded 
from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform
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of January, the virus had spread to 18 countries outside China. On Jan-
uary 30, 2020, the WHO officially declared the status of Internation-
al Health Emergency. This declaration triggered a series of health 
procedures and travel restrictions across the world. On February 11, 
2020, the WHO named the new coronavirus as COVID-19. On March 
11, 2020, the WHO declared the outbreak of a global pandemic.1
The first western country to enter into a national lockdown was It-
aly on March 10, 2020. On March 13, 2020, President Trump declared 
a national emergency initiating a series of government response pro-
cedures.2 In the following days, a number of other European coun-
tries adopted restrictive measures and on March 23, 2020 the UK 
also entered into a national lockdown.3 In the US, the first “stay at 
home” order was issued by California on March 19, 2020.4 Although 
a US-wide lockdown was never implemented, most states adopted re-
strictive measures.5 
4 The Effects of the COVID-19 Crisis on Equity Markets
The Italian, UK and US stock markets started a rapid decline on Feb-
ruary 20, 2020 when the new virus was rapidly spreading across Eu-
rope and the US [fig. 2]. The Italian equity market suffered the steep-
est fall and reached the lowest level on March 12, 2020 [fig. 3]. In less 
than a month, the Italian equity market fell by more than 41%. It took 
a bit longer for the US and the UK markets to reach their lowest lev-
el. This came on the March 23 when the FTSE 100 Index closed down 
by almost 200 points for the day.
1 The timeline of the pandemic is based on a report by the World Health Organisa-
tion detailing its response to the COVID-19 crisis. The report is available at https://
www.who.int/news-room/detail/29-06-2020-covidtimeline.
2 See for example, https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/13/politics/states-coro-
navirus-fema/index.html.
3 On March 9, 2020, the Italian prime minister Giuseppe Conte signed a decree for 
the implementation of a national lockdown starting from March 10, 2020. Detailed in-
formation on the measures implemented by governments in response to the pandemic 
is provided by Oxford University’s COVID-19 Government Response Tracker, which is 
available at https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/covidtracker.
4 See the Executive Order N-33-20 issued by California at https://www.gov.ca.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2020/03/3.19.20-attested-EO-N-33-20-COVID-19-HEALTH-OR-
DER.pdf.
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Figure 2 The scale for the S&P 500 Index is indicated on the left-hand side and the scale for the FTSE 100 index 
is indicated on the right-hand side. The sample covers the period from September 3, 2019 to June 25, 2020. The 
data was downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform
Figure 3 The scale for the FTSE 100 Index is indicated on the left-hand side and the scale for the FTSE MIB 
index is indicated on the right-hand side. The sample covers the period from September 3, 2019 to June 25, 
2020. The data was downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform
Over the period from February 19 to March 23, 2020, the UK FTSE 
100 index lost about 33% and the S&P 500 index about 34% of their 
values, respectively. The worst daily price change for the UK equi-
ty market was recorded on March 12 when the FTSE 100 Index lost 
10.87% in a single day. This is the largest single-day drop recorded 
over the last 20 years (since May 30, 2000). Table 1 shows the dis-
tinct phases of the COVID-19 crisis so far and summarises the chang-
es in the values of the benchmark Italian, UK and US equity indices.
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Italy Feb 19 -
Mar 12, 2020
-41.54 Mar 12 -
Jun 8, 2020
30.02 Feb 19 -
Jun 8, 2020
-20.59
UK Feb 19 -
Mar 23, 2020
-33.03 Mar 23 -
Jun 8, 2020
29.61 Feb 19 -
Jun 8, 2020
-13.20
USA Feb 19 - 
Mar 23,  2020
-33.92 Mar 23 -
Jun 8, 2020
44.47 Feb 19 -
Jun 8, 2020
-4.54
The equity indices used for Italy, UK and USA are FTSE MIB, FTSE 100 and S&P 500, 
respectively. Returns were computed using daily data which was downloaded from 
the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform.
5 Industry Groups
The performance of the various industry groups during the decline 
and recovery phases of the crisis is summarised in tables 2 and 3 be-
low. The industry returns are value-weighted and thus they will be 
driven by the performance of the largest companies in each sector. 
In the UK, the transportation industry was the most affected (-63%). 
With the lockdown in place, aeroplanes were grounded, international 
travel stopped almost completely, and most people were housebound. 
More surprisingly, the media and entertainment industry (WPP, Pear-
son, etc.) was the second worst performing industry during the de-
cline phase. With many businesses halted by health and safety re-
strictions, advertising budgets froze, and fairs and exhibitions were 
cancelled; this hit the UK media industry, which relies almost exclu-
sively on ad revenue. However, in the US the increased demand for 
news and home entertainment helped online American media com-
panies (Google, Facebook, Walt Disney, etc.) to recover more rapid-
ly than other industries. 
Industries providing core and essential services or those that were 
able to adapt quickly to flexible/distance working conditions suffered 
lower declines and recovered very quickly (for example, e-commerce, 
technology, software services). In the US, the retailing (Amazon, 
Ebay, Dollar General) and technology industries managed to weath-
er the COVID-19 storm better than other industries posting double 
digit increases in aggregate industry values. 
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Table 2 The performance of the FTSE 100 index components by industry groups 
over the COVID-19 crisis from December 2019 to June 2020
Decline Recovery Overall
FTSE 100 - Industry Groups 1 Jan 
-27 Mar 20 (%)
Rank 27 Mar 
-26 Jun 20 (%)
Rank 27 Dec 19 
-26 Jun 20 (%)
Rank
Banks (5) -28.11% 16 -16.74% 22 -40.86% 20
Capital Goods (9) -24.95% 14 9.81% 9 -19.16% 12
Commercial & Professional 
Services (5)
-8.05% 4 10.89% 8 0.72% 5
Consumer Durables & Apparel (5) -30.55% 18 9.11% 10 -24.02% 17
Consumer Services (5) -30.87% 19 5.08% 15 -28.00% 18
Diversified Financials (8) -20.28% 10 11.65% 7 -11.47% 10
Energy (3) -35.76% 20 -7.16% 21 -41.59% 21
Food & Staples Retailing (3) -8.83% 5 -1.60% 19 -10.23% 9
Food, Beverage & Tobacco (5) -18.77% 7 6.59% 13 -14.05% 11
Health Care Equipment & 
Services (1)
-23.47% 12 6.13% 14 -20.82% 13
Household & Personal Products (2) -6.15% 2 13.56% 6 5.63% 2
Insurance (6) -24.54% 13 3.07% 16 -22.50% 15
Materials (14) -25.54% 15 23.04% 2 -8.78% 8
Media & Entertainment (6) -38.76% 21 6.75% 12 -35.42% 19
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology 
& Life Sciences (3)
-12.26% 6 16.83% 4 0.74% 4
Real Estate (3) -28.81% 17 7.35% 11 -22.27% 14
Retailing (5) -19.49% 8 31.95% 1 7.00% 1
Software & Services (3) -19.53% 9 17.07% 3 -7.06% 7
Technology Hardware  
& Equipment (1)
-6.76% 3 14.65% 5 5.50% 3
Telecommunication Services (2) -21.00% 11 -0.92% 18 -23.47% 16
Transportation (1) -62.96% 22 -1.90% 20 -63.72% 22
Utilities (5) -1.92% 1 2.46% 17 -0.78% 6
The table presents cumulative returns for the various industry groups. These are 
percentage changes in the aggregate value (market capitalisation) of each industry 
group. The lowest rank is given to the best performing industry group during each 
phase. The best 5 performing industries are coloured in green and the worst 5 in red. 
The data was downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform.
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Table 4 The performance of the S&P 500 index components by industry groups 
over the COVID-19 crisis from December 2019 to June 2020
Decline Recovery Overall
S&P 500 - Industry Groups 1 Jan 20 
-27 Mar 20 (%)
Rank 27 Mar 
-26 Jun 20 (%)
Rank 27 Dec 19 
-26 Jun 20 (%)
Rank
Automobiles & Components (4) -40.92% 23 19.74% 8 -29.66% 22
Banks (18) -36.59% 22 4.43% 23 -34.05% 23
Capital Goods (48) -25.28% 18 8.63% 18 -19.33% 20
Commercial & Professional 
Services (10)
-16.69% 12 16.55% 10 -2.54% 7
Consumer Durables & Apparel 
(18)
-27.58% 19 17.97% 9 -14.38% 17
Consumer Services (15) -31.48% 21 8.29% 19 -26.14% 21
Diversified Financials (26) -21.56% 15 10.47% 15 -13.64% 16
Energy (26) -48.69% 24 22.92% 5 -37.03% 24
Food & Staples Retailing (5) -9.27% 3 6.07% 21 -4.19% 9
Food, Beverage & Tobacco (21) -17.37% 13 7.96% 20 -10.68% 14
Health Care Equipment & 
Services (38)
-16.68% 11 13.76% 12 -5.39% 10
Household & Personal Products (7) -12.57% 6 10.81% 14 -3.19% 8
Insurance (22) -28.04% 20 12.01% 13 -19.09% 19
Materials (28) -25.13% 17 20.32% 7 -9.83% 12
Media & Entertainment (22) -15.69% 10 24.63% 3 3.64% 5
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology 
& Life Sciences (24)
-12.36% 5 14.57% 11 0.04% 6
Real Estate (31) -19.15% 14 9.89% 17 -10.38% 13
Retailing (24) -7.63% 2 34.48% 1 23.31% 1
Semiconductors & 
Semiconductor Equipment (16)
-12.03% 4 22.04% 6 6.62% 4
Software & Services (35) -7.08% 1 23.14% 4 13.73% 3
Technology Hardware & 
Equipment (20)
-14.27% 9 32.43% 2 14.56% 2
Telecommunication Services (4) -13.90% 7 5.28% 22 -9.18% 11
Transportation (15) -23.11% 16 10.26% 16 -15.92% 18
Utilities (28) -14.25% 8 0.64% 24 -13.07% 15
The table presents cumulative returns for the various industry groups. These are 
percentage changes in the aggregate value (market capitalisation) of each industry 
group. The lowest rank is given to the best performing industry group during each 
phase. The best 5 performing industries are coloured in green and the worst 5 in red. 
The data was downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform.
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The share prices of US and European banks have been falling signif-
icantly since the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis as investors have 
been fearing that the disruption to business caused by the lockdown 
may increase default rates on bank loans, while continuing monetary 
stimulus may keep interest rates low, thus hurting banks’ margins 
and profitability. In addition, regulators have urged banks to freeze 
dividend payments to shareholders and strengthen their core capi-
tal so that they would be able to absorb larger than expected losses 
in their loan portfolios.
Another industry hit hard by the pandemic has been the energy 
industry. The travel restrictions and the lockdown created a sharp 
fall in the demand for oil. Such a deep and sudden negative demand 
shock combined with a relatively sticky supply created the perfect 
storm with devastating effects on oil prices. The negative pressure on 
oil prices was amplified by the delays in finding an agreement among 
oil-producing countries on the appropriate, joint response to dwin-
dling energy demand. Thus, the excess oil supply led to increases in 
oil inventories and a sharp fall in oil prices. All available storage was 
full and sellers had to pay buyers to take oil off their hands. Oil was 
cheap but the cost of storage had surged. On Monday April 20, 2020, 
the light crude oil contract trading on the New York Mercantile ex-
change reached a minimum of about negative $40 per barrel. This cre-
ated a problem. Traditionally, financial models assume that asset pric-
es do not go below the zero level. Thus, how do we price an asset with 
negative prices? Financial markets had to scramble and implement 
ad-hoc models to allow commodity prices to reach negative values.6 
6 The Prediction of Financial Models (CAPM Beta)
Usually, our financial models would suggest taking refuge in defen-
sive stocks during downturns and then shifting to more aggressive 
stocks during the rebound. Stocks would be classified using the be-
ta coefficient of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) which in-
dicates how correlated and sensitive a particular stock is to move-
ments in the whole financial market. Low beta stocks (with beta less 
than 1) are often called defensive stocks. They have more stable per-
formance and relatively lower volatility. Whereas, high beta stocks 
(with beta greater than 1) are called aggressive stocks. These are 
riskier but can potentially deliver higher returns. How did so-called 
6 See the note released by the CME on April 8, 2020 at https://www.cmegroup.com/
content/dam/cmegroup/notices/clearing/2020/04/Chadv20-152.pdf. Eventually, 
on 22 April 2020, CME Clearing adopted the Bachelier Option Pricing Model (https://
www.cmegroup.com/notices/clearing/2020/04/Chadv20-171.html).
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defensive stocks perform during the declining phase of the pandem-
ic? Did the market behave as expected supporting financial theories 
or instead provided further evidence of the limitations of existing fi-
nancial models and thus calling for new theories to be developed? 
I used industry CAPM beta coefficients computed by Aswath Da-
modaran in January 2020 for US stocks and related them to cumula-
tive stock returns during the two main phases of the COVID-19 pan-
demic.7 Figure 4 shows scatter plots relating cumulative returns for 
the stocks included in the S&P 500 index with their industry beta 
during the decline and recovery phases of the COVID-19 pandemic 
[fig. 4]. The scatter plots also show the trend line which summaris-
es the relationships between cumulative returns and CAPM betas. 
The CAPM model worked very well during the recovery phase 
when high beta stocks clearly bounced back more rapidly than low 
beta stocks posting high cumulative returns. This evidence seems 
consistent with the more rigorous work conducted by Savor and Wil-
son (2014) which shows how on days with macroeconomic announce-
ments there is a strong positive relation between average returns and 
stock betas as predicted by the CAPM model. On other days though, 
the same relationship does not hold. Hence, our financial models 
seem to work well during the recovery phase of the crisis as well as 
on announcement days because, as Savor and Wilson (2014) note, in 
these days there is “a clear link between macroeconomic risk and as-
set returns”. When traders are driven by panic and fear instead, our 
traditional models based on long-term expectations and rational be-
haviour break down. The return-risk relationship observed during 
the decline phase is almost flat. Thus, the intuition of investing in de-
fensive stocks might have just marginally limited investment losses. 
This preliminary evidence seems to support Lopez de Prado (2019)’s 
call for the development of more flexible models which are optimal 
under different regimes and market conditions. 
7 The CAPM beta data is available at http://people.stern.nyu.edu/adamodar/New_
Home_Page/datacurrent.html. The cumulative returns were computed using data 
downloaded from the Thompson Reuters Eikon platform.
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Figure 4 Cumulative stock returns (%) versus CAPM industry beta coefficients 
for the S&P 500 Index stock components. A dotted trend line is shown. Cumulative 
returns were computed using stock data downloaded from the Thompson 
Reuters Eikon platform. The CAPM industry beta coefficients were estimated 
by Aswath Damodaran for January 2020
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7 Conclusions
This pandemic has destabilised our financial markets and severely af-
fected our economies. Governments have now committed enormous 
resources to help the economy recover. Financial markets and finan-
cial infrastructures will have to play their part. It is time to start re-
flecting on the lessons from the pandemic. We are now in a world with 
potentially negative prices and with negative interest rates. We are 
very interconnected and therefore vulnerable to factors which may 
lead to systemic crises (credit and liquidity shortages, pandemics, 
cybersecurity attacks, etc.). Given the extreme scenarios created by 
the pandemic, it is important to gather relevant data and reflect on 
whether our models are still fit for purpose. If not, we should use the 
evidence to guide the development of new theories and models. These 
theories and models should help us better rationalise the effects of 
these crises on asset values and prevent reaching extreme levels of 
uncertainty which may have contributed to escalating the crisis. At 
the outburst of the pandemic, the priority of governments and regu-
lators correctly focused on adopting all measures necessary to save 
human lives. Perhaps for future pandemic scenarios we should more 
promptly implement measures to mitigate the impact of the pandem-
ic on our businesses and financial markets hence preventing reach-
ing such an extreme level of uncertainty about firm and asset values.
Clearly, we are not out of the woods yet with respect to COVID-19. 
The disease is still spreading around the world and a second wave is 
still likely if a vaccine is not developed before the next flu season. The 
economic engine of the Western world was temporarily switched off 
to “stop the virus and save the NHS” as we were saying in the UK. It 
is now the time to switch on the economic accelerator and take the op-
portunity to learn from the crisis and set the foundations for creating 
an even stronger, more resilient, and more equitable financial system.
Bibliography 
López de Prado, M. (2019). “Tactical Investment Algorithms”. Working paper. 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3459866.
Savor, P.; Wilson, M. (2014). “Asset Pricing: A Tale of Two Days”. Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics, 113, 171-201. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfine-
co.2014.04.005.
Alfonso Dufour
Stock Performance when Facing the Unexpected




© 2020  Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Publich License
DOI 10.30687/978-88-6969-442-4/010
A New World Post COVID-19
Lessons for Business, the Finance Industry and Policy Makers
edited by Monica Billio and Simone Varotto
The COVID-19 Challenge  
to European Financial Markets
Lessons from Italy
Nicola Borri
LUISS Guido Carli, Roma, Italia
Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic has sickened more than 10 million people around 
the world and killed at least 500,000. In this chapter, we focus on the experience of Italy, 
which is the first country hit by the virus in Europe. While the lockdown measures appear 
to have successfully contained the virus, the economic consequences have been very 
severe. Policy makers should study the Italian experience to evaluate the cost-benefit 
effectiveness of different policies in containing the pandemic.
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1 Introduction
As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, nearly 3 billion people worldwide have 
been under lockdowns put in place by governments to stop the virus, with se-
vere consequences for workers, firms, and public finances. The pandemic is 
also expected to have long-run effects on the economy and individuals’ well-
being which cannot be fully assessed yet.
The diffusion of the pandemic, according to data and evidence current-
ly available, was very fast. The starting point is usually traced back to Wu-
han (China), at the end of 2019, when dozens of cases from an unknown vi-
rus were registered. In January 2020, Japan and South Korea confirmed the 
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first cases outside mainland China, and towards the end of Febru-
ary 2020 infections surged in South Korea and Italy. Since then, most 
countries in the world have been affected, although with different in-
tensities, in part depending on the type and timing of social distanc-
ing measures in place.
In this chapter, we focus on the experience of Italy, which is the 
first country hit by the virus in Europe. We believe the example of 
Italy is of particular interest for at least three reasons. First, Italy is 
considered approximately 2-3 weeks ahead of other advanced econ-
omies in the state of the pandemic. Second, Italy put in place one of 
the stricter lockdown policies, practically halting a large fraction of 
the economic activities and the movement of people not only across 
the country, but also within cities and towns. Therefore, Italy is an 
interesting case study to evaluate the effectiveness of different pol-
icies in fighting the pandemic and their economic and social costs. 
Third, because Italy is one of the advanced countries with the most 
fragile government finances, and with a stagnant economy for at least 
a decade, the COVID-19 shock could spark an economic crisis which 
could potentially propagate to the Eurozone and beyond.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 describes 
the evolution of the health crisis in Italy. Section 3 presents the gov-
ernment response to the health emergency. Section 4 describes the 
economic effects of the pandemic in Italy. Finally, in Section 5 we 
present our conclusions.
2 The Evolution of the Health Crisis in Italy
After four months since the outbreak of the pandemic, the situation 
in Italy is finally stabilising, but the death toll is dramatic. The num-
ber of active cases is declining, as is the number of daily deaths due 
to COVID-19, which is approaching zero. Figure 1, using official data 
from the Italian Protezione Civile, shows a breakdown of the evolu-
tion of the pandemic in Italy into active cases (roughly 16 thousand at 
the end of June), deaths (roughly 35 thousand at the end of June) and 
recovered cases (roughly 200 thousand at the end of June) [fig. 1]. The 
figure shows that the number of active cases reached a peak at the 
end of April 2020, and then slowly declined as the number of recovered 
cases increased. Differently from other countries, like the US, where 
the diffusion of the pandemic resumed to grow after a first stabilisa-
tion, current data for Italy do not show any resurgence of the virus.
Figure 2 considers alternative measures of the state of the pan-
demic, and in particular the number of patients hospitalized or in 
quarantine [fig. 2]. 
One of the lessons from the Italian experience with the pandemic is 
that congestion of hospitals, and in particular of intensive care units 
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Figure 1 The Evolution of the COVID-19 Pandemic in Italy. Notes: the figure shows the evolution of the 
COVID-19 pandemic in Italy. The black solid line corresponds to the cumulated number of cases; the orange-
shaded are active cases; the blue-shaded area are COVID-19 deaths; the gray-shaded area indicates recovered 
cases. Data are from Protezione Civile and available at: https://github.com/pcm-dpc/COVID-19 
Figure 2 Patients Hospitalized and in Quarantine. Notes: the figure plots the evolution of the patients 
hospitalized in ICUs (top panel); hospitalized, but in less severe conditions (middle panel); and in quarantine 
at home (bottom panel). The black solid lines correspond to the 7-day moving average. Data are from 
Protezione Civile and available at: https://github.com/pcm-dpc/COVID-19
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(ICUs), should be avoided at all costs. In fact, given the exponential 
path of the uncontrolled pandemic, hospitals are likely to work at ca-
pacity, unable to cure all COVID-19 patients, and forced to postpone 
non-essential treatment to non COVID-19 patients with health conse-
quences that are difficult to predict. The current data show that both 
the number of patients in ICUs, and the number of hospitalized pa-
tients in less severe conditions, are currently steadily declining (see 
the top and middle panels of figure 2). Specifically, the number of pa-
tients in ICUs reached a maximum value of approximately 4,000 in 
April, at the peak of the pandemic. As the diffusion of the pandemic 
was particularly severe in the North of the country, ICUs in these re-
gions worked at full capacity, and this might have increased the true 
death toll (e.g. Bonanno, Galletta, Puca 2020; Galeotti, Surico 2020). 
Finally, the bottom panel of figure 2 shows the evolution of the pa-
tients in quarantine at home which has also been steadily declining. 
Although these are patients with less severe symptoms, they risk in-
fecting their relatives and/or anyone living in their homes.
The diffusion of the pandemic in Italy has been very heteroge-
nous across the Italian regions. Specifically, the pandemic was con-
centrated in the North of the country, and in particular in Lombar-
dia, Piemonte, Veneto and Emilia Romagna. These regions account 
for approximately 40% of the Italian gross domestic product (GDP) 
and are populated by a large number of firms with interactions with 
firms scattered around the world. This could have been at the origin 
of the first contagion with the COVID-19 virus. Figure 3 shows the 
number of current active cases, along the number of cases at the be-
ginning of three different phases of the lockdown (described in the 
next section), at the province level (note that these numbers are not 
divided by population) [fig. 3]. A quick look at the figure immediately 
reveals the strong geographic component of the pandemic and indi-
cates that the lockdown was successful in containing the spreading 
of the virus throughout the country.
It is important to notice that the heterogeneity in the diffusion of 
the pandemic does not depend on, for example, differences in the fre-
quency of testing. For example, we observe similar heterogeneity in 
the evolution of the COVID-19 deaths across Italian regions. Figure 
4 shows that approximately 65% of the total COVID-19 deaths oc-
curred in five regions: Lombardia, Piemonte, Emilia Romagna, Vene-
to and Liguria [fig. 4].
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Figure 3 Number of COVID-19 Positives. Notes: The figure plots the total number of active COVID-19 cases 
at the province level. The size of the circles increases with the number of active cases. The colors correspond 
to different dates: first phase of national lockdown (blue, March 9, 2020); second phase of national lockdown 
(orange, May 4, 2020); third phase of national lockdown (yellow, June 15, 2020); current time (violet, June 30, 
2020). Data are from Protezione Civile and available at: https://github.com/pcm-dpc/COVID-19
Figure 4 Evolution COVID-19 Deaths at Regional Level. Notes: The figure plots the evolution of the COVID-19 
deaths for a sample of Italian regions. For each region, the values on the horizontal axis correspond to the 
number of days since the first COVID-19 death. The y-axis is in log-scale, the y-ticks correspond to numbers 
in levels. The straight lines from the origin correspond to daily growth rates of, respectively, 10%, 20%, 
and 33%. Data are from Protezione Civile and available at: https://github.com/pcm-dpc/COVID-19
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3 The Government Response to the Pandemic
In this section we consider the response of the Italian government to 
the health emergency, while in the next section we additionally con-
sider the government response to the economic crisis. 
The response of the Italian government to the pandemic has been 
a strict lockdown. We can roughly distinguish three phases of the 
lockdown. The first phase started on March 9 in all regions and im-
plied the closing of schools, some economic activities (for example, 
restaurants, hospitality and non-food retail sectors), and the restric-
tion of movement of people not only across regions, but also within 
regions and municipalities. In addition, on March 23 all non-essen-
tial economic activities were also shut down, affecting approximate-
ly 51% of firms and 55% of workers. The lockdown of economic activ-
ities, because of the heterogeneity in the geographical distribution 
of essential activities, determined differences in the fraction of inac-
tive workers across different provinces [fig. 5]. 
Borri, Drago, Sobbrio (2020) used exactly this policy induced het-
erogeneity in the fraction of inactive workers to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of the economic lockdown. Table 1 summarises their results. 
Specifically, while the estimated effect of the share of inactive work-
ers goes in the right direction and is associated to a reduction in the 
number of COVID-19 infected patients, the estimates are not statis-
tically significant. Borri, Drago, Sobbrio (2020) argue that their re-
sults, rather than evidence against the effectiveness of the lockdown, 
highlight the importance of good quality granular data, for exam-
ple at the municipal level, and/or accounting for mobility patterns.
Table 1 Effect of the economic Lockdown
COVID-19 positive cases (province level)
All provinces Provinces  
in North
Provinces above median 
at lockdown
∆ inactive post-lockdown -139.977 -356.936 -305.268
(87.030) (218.068) (229.712)
Obs. 3640 1540 1540
FE province level YES YES YES




Notes: robust standard errors clustered at provincial level. Regression includes five 
lags of dependent variable. The table report the estimates of a panel estimation model 
for the COVID-19 positive cases (at the province level) on the share of inactive workers 
as a consequence of the lockdown. The estimations always include a fixed effect at the 
province level; a fixed effect at the region-day level. The table is from Borri et al. 2020.
Nicola Borri
The COVID-19 Challenge to European Financial Markets. Lessons from Italy
Nicola Borri
The COVID-19 Challenge to European Financial Markets. Lessons from Italy
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 143
A New World Post COVID-19, 137-148
Figure 5 Share of Inactive Workers. Notes: The figure represents the share of inactive workers 
as a consequence of the first phase of the economic lockdown. Dark (lighter) colours correspond 
to a higher (lower) fraction of inactive workers. The figure is from Borri et al. 2020 
The second and third phases correspond to the relaxation of the lock-
down. Specifically, the second phase started on May 4, with the re-
opening of economic activities, and the relaxation of the restrictions 
to the movement within regions. Finally, the third phase started 
on June 15, and implied the relaxation of most lockdown measures. 
However, all schools remained closed and the use of masks in public 
places is currently mandatory. It is too early to be able to evaluate 
the risks and/or effects associated to the relaxation of the lockdown 
measures in the second and third phases in Italy.
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4 The Economic Effects of the Pandemic
While the lockdown, decided by the Italian government, has been so 
far effective at containing the pandemic, its economic effects have 
been very severe. Italian GDP is expected to drop by approximate-
ly 10% in 2020 (Bloomberg). This historically large drop in GDP de-
pends on the expected decrease in consumption (-11.8%), investment 
(-15.4%), and industrial production (-14.5%). Government deficit is ex-
pected to be large and equal to 12.2% and, correspondingly, public 
debt is expected to reach 150% of GDP. The large increase in public 
debt depends on both the increase in public spending put in place to 
limit the negative effects of the pandemic (i.e. unemployment ben-
efits, credit guarantees to firms, healthcare investments, etc.), and 
the sharp reduction in tax revenues because of the lower output. 
The fiscal response by the Italian government has been so far limit-
ed and constrained by the large public debt. The approved measures, 
worth around 1% of GDP, are associated to emergency financing of 
the health system; employment and income support; tax deferrals and 
utility bills; and support of credit supply. Most analysts also expect 
a quick recovery in 2021, after the end of the lockdown. For exam-
ple, for 2021, they expect an increase in GDP of approximately 5.6%. 
However, there is substantial uncertainty around all these estimates, 
as well as over the likelihood that a second COVID-19 wave could hit 
advanced economies in the Fall/Winter of 2020. 
Because of the large public debt and low economic growth before 
the COVID-19 shock, Italy is particularly exposed to the recent crisis. 
In addition, the fragile public finances limit the resources that the gov-
ernment could inject in the economy, thus increasing the risk of a deep 
recession. In fact, Italy is expected to be one of the economies most se-
verely hit in the Eurozone. The response of equity markets, which are 
forward looking, confirms the difficult economic Italian outlook. Fig-
ure 6 shows the evolution of three equity indices, normalised to 1 on 
January 1, 2020 [fig. 6]. The equity indices correspond to the S&P500 
for US equity markets, the Eurostoxx50 for Eurozone equity markets, 
and the FTSE MIB for the Italian equity market (data are from Bloomb-
erg). The figure shows that while the initial drop in the equity market 
in Italy and the rest of the Eurozone was similar, the recovery has been 
weaker in Italy. In fact, equity markets dropped, first, by roughly 35% 
in Italy and the rest of the Eurozone, and by 30% in the US. The inter-
vention by the major central banks, which announced large asset pur-
chase programmes like the Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program 
(PEPP) by the European Central Bank (ECB), helped to put a floor to 
the fall in equity markets. However, while the US equity market has 
gained back almost all of the lost ground, the Eurozone market and, 
especially, the Italian market, are still approximately 15% lower than 
their values at the beginning of the year.
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Because investors and policy makers expect a large increase in public 
debt, and a significant fall in output and tax revenues, they also worry 
about the possible default of one, or more, members of the Eurozone, 
overwhelmed by a striking crisis and thus compelled to stop servic-
ing their debt. Figure 7 shows the evolution of government bond yields 
for Italy, Spain and Portugal (the data are from Bloomberg) [fig. 7]. As 
we have seen for equity markets, also for government bonds we first 
see a sharp increase in yields (and, thus, a sharp drop in prices). For 
example, the yield on the 10-year Italian government bond increased 
from 150 to more than 250 basis points. We observe a similar increase 
in yields also for Spain and Portugal which, however, had lower yields 
before the COVID-19 shock. Even so, it appears that the intervention 
by the ECB, with the announcement of the PEPP asset purchase pro-
gramme, was able to avoid the risk of a sovereign debt crisis. 
Bonaccolto, Borri, Consiglio (2020) find also evidence of an in-
crease in the redenomination risk for France and Italy since the be-
ginning of January 2020, i.e. the risk that one, or both, of these two 
countries abandon the Euro for a new, undervalued, currency. Howev-
er, they also find that this risk is historically lower than after political 
shocks, like the recent election in Italy of an anti-euro government.
Figure 6 Equity Markets around the Great Lockdown. Notes: the figure shows the evolution of the prices 
of the S&P500 (solid yellow line), Eurostoxx50 (solid red line), and FTSE MIB (solid blue line) indices. 
All series are normalised to 1 on January 1, 2020. The vertical lines correspond to the Wuhan lockdown, 
the first lockdown in Italy limited to some regions in the North, and the announcement of the ECB PEPP 
programme. Data are from Bloomberg
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5 Conclusions
Italy is one of the first advanced economies hit by the COVID-19 pan-
demic. After approximately four months, the health crisis has stabi-
lised, and the pandemic appears to be under control. However, there 
is still a lot of uncertainty around the possibility that a second wave 
could hit the country in the next Fall. 
One of the lessons from the Italian experience is that strict lock-
down measures are necessary to stop the pandemic and avoid that 
the virus spreads across regions. In addition, large scale testing is 
crucial to identify positive cases with no or small symptoms. In fact, 
within Italy, we observe very different outcomes for two neighbour-
ing regions, Lombardia and Veneto. Although these two regions were 
the first to be hit by the COVID-19, they subsequently experienced 
very different evolutions of the pandemic, with Lombardia suffering 
many more deaths. While the Veneto region started early with a large 
testing programme which was effective at identifying positive cas-
es, the Lombardia region started a large testing programme only at 
a later date. Finally, the strict restriction to the movement of people 
within the country is likely to be one of the reasons for the virus not 
to spread to, for example, the South of the country.
Figure 7 Government Bond Yields around the Great Lockdown. Notes: the figure shows the evolution 
of the yields of the Italian (solid blue line), Spanish (solid red line), and Portuguese (solid yellow line) 10-year 
benchmark government bonds. The vertical lines correspond to the Wuhan lockdown, the first lockdown in 
Italy limited to some regions in the North, and the announcement of the ECB PEPP programme. Yields are 
reported in basis points. Data are from Bloomberg
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While the lockdown measures appear to have successfully con-
tained the virus, the economic consequences have been very severe. 
The economic situation is very fragile, and critically supported by in-
ternational institutions, like the ECB, which has been able to avoid 
the risk of a sovereign debt crisis. This experience confirms the need 
for a risk-sharing mechanism in the Eurozone. So far, the actions of 
the ECB have filled this hole in the design of the European institu-
tions. However, for the future, it is crucial to think of new, and per-
manent, instruments that guarantee some forms of risk-sharing.
In this light, an objective cost-benefit analysis of lockdown meas-
ures is crucial for at least three reasons. First, to guide and inform 
policy makers in their decisions regarding a safe and effective relax-
ation of the lockdown measures after the end of the medical emer-
gency. Second, to guide and inform policy makers in the design of 
the social distancing measures that are likely to be in place up until 
a vaccine against COVID-19 has been found or that should immedi-
ately become effective in the event of a second ‘wave’ of the pandem-
ic. Third, to understand the overall cost-effectiveness of the different 
lockdown measures in the containment and/or prevention of future 
pandemics. In fact, because different “nonpharmaceutical interven-
tions” (NPIs) differ from each other in terms of their economic and 
psychological cost, it is crucial “to identify the interventions that 
most reduce transmission at the lowest economic and psychological 
cost” (Haushofer, Metcalf 2020).
This type of analysis remains, however, a daunting task, as it hing-
es upon the evaluation of a causal effect of these measures on the 
spread of the pandemic, or the economy (see, for example, Goodman-
Bacon, Marcus, 2020). While challenging, the heterogeneity in the in-
troduction of these measures in Italy – both at the geographical and 
the temporal level – and the availability of detailed data on mobility 
and deaths at the city level provide researchers with a unique qua-
si-experimental pre-test/post-test design to elicit the causal effects 
of the lockdown.
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1 Introduction
On May 22, 2010, Laszlo Hanyecz reported that he bought two medi-
um sized pizzas from Papa John’s for 10,000 Bitcoins.1 Ten years lat-
er, the price of a Bitcoin closed at $9,238 suggesting that this trans-
action would then be worth more than $92 million. Such a huge rise 
in value attracts speculative interest leading to the introduction of 
very many competing products and consequently to the development 
of a whole new asset class we now call ‘cryptocurrencies’. Nowadays, 
there are some 2,700+ cryptocurrencies with an overall market val-
ue of more than $250 billion. 
As this market is in its infancy, many questions arise regarding the 
purpose, value, and use of cryptocurrencies. The academic literature 
notes the issues with governance and the association of cryptocur-
rencies with criminality (Corbet et al. 2019), while much of the liter-
ature examines the diversification, safe haven and hedging proper-
ties of cryptocurrencies using a variety of econometric techniques.2 
From this literature we understand that cryptocurrencies work best 
as safe havens and for portfolio diversification and less so for hedg-
ing strategies. González, Jareño and Skinner (2020) examine the sta-
tistical connectedness between Bitcoin and other popular cryptocur-
rencies finding substantial amounts of co-movements in the long and 
short run amongst the top ten largest cryptocurrencies. This chap-
ter contributes by examining the role cryptocurrencies can play as 
an asset class added to traditional portfolios. More specifically, we 
examine the role cryptocurrencies can play in moderating the risk 
or enhancing the return of traditional cash portfolios comprised of 
stocks and bonds during the run up to and after the heart of the COV-
ID-19 inspired financial crisis. 
To accomplish this task, we first describe nine different cryptocur-
rencies. We then review the performance of cryptocurrencies from 
February 5, 2018 to May 15, 2020 thereby incorporating the COV-
ID-19 crisis. Recognising that the COVID-19 crisis presents an op-
portunity to discover if cryptocurrencies can play a role of either im-
proving investment performance or controlling risk or both, we form 
portfolios of stocks and bonds as of January 1, 2019. We then meas-
ure the actual return and risk experiences of this portfolio and com-
pare them to the actual return and risk once a cryptocurrency such 
as Bitcoin is added to the cash portfolio. We do this for the top nine 
cryptocurrencies, namely Bitcoin, Ethereum, Ripple, Bcash, Tether, 
Litecoin, Eos, Bfinance and Tezos. We also incorporate Gold into our 
1 See https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=137.msg1195#msg1195.
2 Bouri et al. (2017), Shahzad et. al. (2020), and Baur and Hoang (forthcoming) are 
examples.
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analysis for comparison purposes. After discussing our results, we 
then draw conclusions.
2 Cryptocurrencies
As a class, cryptocurrencies perform all the basic functions of a cur-
rency, including representing a store of value, a medium of exchange 
and a common denominator to measure value of goods and servic-
es. In contrast to traditional currencies, cryptocurrencies are not 
issued by a central bank and so do not derive their value as being 
backed by the resources of the issuing authority’s credit. Instead, the 
value is supported by technology that makes it impossible to create 
unauthorised units of a given cryptocurrency. For some cryptocur-
rencies, supply is determined by miners, traders who solve complex 
mathematical problems to earn new cryptocurrency coins. The in-
teraction between the demand and supply of a given cryptocurrency 
determines its value. All cryptocurrencies are convertible into tradi-
tional currencies on cryptocurrency exchanges at rates determined 
by open and transparent transactions. While the above is common 
to most types of cryptocurrencies, each one has a different price as 
the technical structure of each cryptocurrency is different. There-
fore, our first task is to describe Bitcoin and outline how each of the 
remaining cryptocurrencies in our sample is different.
2.1 The Main Type of Cryptocurrencies
Table 1 reports the nine cryptocurrencies we examine in this chap-
ter. On May 15, 2020, Bitcoin, with a market capitalisation of near-
ly $175 billion and with a 24-hour trading volume of more than $50 
billion, dominates the rest of our sample in terms of size and liquid-
ity. Meanwhile, Tezos has the smallest market capitalisation and the 
least liquidity with a market capitalisation of under $2 billion and a 
24-hour trading volume of approximately $120 million.
Table 1 This table reports the market capitalisation as a measure of the size  
and 24-hour trading volume and circulating supply as indicators of liquidity  
of nine top cryptocurrencies as on May 15, 2020
Name Ticker Market Cap 
(Billions)
Price Volume  
(24h-Billions)
Circulating Supply
Bitcoin BTC $174.72 $9,507.28 $50.24 18,378,018 BTC
Ethereum ETH $22.09 $199.13 $17.94 110,938,751 ETH
Tether USDT $8.83 $1.00 $56.06 8,798,069,379 USDT 
Ripple XRP $8.82 $0.20 $2.07 44,112,853,111 XRP 
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Name Ticker Market Cap 
(Billions)
Price Volume  
(24h-Billions)
Circulating Supply
Bcash BCH $4.38 $237.94 $3.33 18,407,919 BCH
Litecoin LTC $2.80 $43.21 $4.51 64,735,081 LTC
Binance Coin BNB $2.50 $16.07 $0.35 155,536,713 BNB 
EOS EOS $2.39 $2.59 $4.19 922,646,994 EOS 
Tezos XTZ $1.78 $2.51 $0.12 710,520,732 XTZ 
Total M/A $228.32 N/A $138.80 N/A
Bitcoin is a digital currency. It is the original popular cryptocurren-
cy and holds the market lead in size and acceptance for retail trans-
actions. For example, Amazon accepts bitcoins as payment for gift 
cards. Since the development of Bitcoin there has been an explosion 
in the number of alternative coins (hereafter altcoins) that seek ways 
to improve on Bitcoin. Successful innovations include increasing the 
range of applications, increasing the volume, speed and reducing the 
cost of transactions and improving the security and governance of 
altcoin operating systems.
Ethereum moved beyond being a digital currency by allowing 
users to develop their own applications such as online betting and 
ticket sales via an open source platform. These decentralised appli-
cations also reduce the likelihood of being hacked by operating on 
decentralised networks instead of centralised servers. Like Ethere-
um, EOS uses a decentralised operating system and allows users to 
create their own commercial sized applications. However, EOS is al-
so designed to alleviate the scalability issues of Bitcoin and Ethere-
um by being capable of handling millions of transactions per second 
without transaction fees. While Tezos is also an Ethereum style de-
centralised system, it distinguishes itself by improving the security 
and governance of the system. Tezos rewards coin holders for veri-
fying transactions and contracts thereby reducing the likelihood of 
malicious attacks. Governance is improved by empowering coin hold-
ers to vote on proposed updates to the network.
Bcash and Litecoin are direct competitors of Bitcoin by making 
some technical adjustments to the block chain technology that drives 
cryptocurrency transactions thereby allowing for more transactions 
to be processed faster. Ripple is designed to aid financial institutions 
to settle global transactions more efficiently and more cheaply. For 
example, Ripple can settle up to 200 times more transactions a sec-
ond than Bitcoin. Potentially, Ripple can replace the SWIFT system 
currently used by financial institutions as the facilitator of cross-bor-
der transactions between currencies. Ripple can handle millions of 
transactions per second, settles transactions in seconds (rather than 
days for SWIFT) with a transaction cost of less than $0.01. 
Other altcoins seek to compete with Bitcoin by offering servic-
es to coin holders. Bfinance, while having its own coin, is a Tokyo 
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based cryptocurrency exchange designed to facilitate trading be-
tween cryptocurrency pairs. Like any other exchange, Bfinace offers 
limit, market, and stop limit orders as well as listing and delisting fa-
cilities. It has also proved to be a valuable venue for initial coin offer-
ings for new cryptocurrencies. Meanwhile, Tether is a type of sta-
ble coin – meaning that the value of the coin is benchmarked against 
another asset. In the case of Tether, the value of one unit is calibrat-
ed to be one US dollar. Originally, this was accomplished by being 
convertible to US dollars on a one to one basis. Since then, howev-
er, Tether has been backed by a variety of assets and in practice the 
value can fluctuate from one dollar. 
3 Investment Potential of Cryptocurrencies
Our choice of beginning and ending dates for our study is dictated 
by the need to cover the heart of the COVID-19 crisis and the need 
to maximise the number of cryptocurrencies we can examine. We 
first selected the top 10 Cryptocurrencies ranked by market capital-
isation from investing.com only to discover that Bitcoin SV did not 
started trading until November 2018. As this will give us too few da-
ta points to reliably measure performance, we decided to drop Bit-
coin SV. The next most recently issued altcoin, Tezos, was issued on 
February 5, 2018 giving us 220 daily observations to measure start-
ing values we need to measure investment performance quarterly 
from January 1, 2019. Accordingly, we collect daily stock, bond, gold 
and cryptocurrency prices from February 5, 2018 to May 15, 2020.
Daily cryptocurrency information is from investing.com. To repre-
sent the stock, bond and gold markets we collect the Wiltshire 5000 
total return index, the Wiltshire global bond total return index and 
gold prices from the Federal Reserve Database FRED. The Wiltshire 
5000 is a market weighted index of more than 3,000 US stocks that is 
intended to be a very broad indicator of US stock performance. Sim-
ilarly, the Wiltshire Global Bond index has a very broad coverage of 
all types of taxable US dollar denominated bonds that reflects the 
actual holdings by US institutional investors. Finally, gold prices are 
the London daily 15:00 price fixing. 
Figures 1a to 1e report daily returns of cryptocurrencies and fig-
ures 2a and 2b report the daily returns of stocks, bonds and gold 
from February 5, 2018 to May 15, 2020. Figure 1 clearly shows that 
cryptocurrencies can suffer catastrophic daily loses [figs. 1a-e]. Notice 
that the daily (not annualized) gains and losses range from plus and 
minus 40% prior to the COVID-19 period whereas the corresponding 
range in figure 2 is a much more modest plus or minus 3%. Figure 2 
clearly illustrates that uncertainty related to COVID-19 began to be 
incorporated into the cash markets about the third week of February 
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2020 [fig. 2]. During this heightened period of uncertainty, unannual-
ized daily stock returns were sometimes greater than 5% and loss-
es were greater than 10%. On COVID-19 day March 12, 2020, most 
cryptocurrencies lost approximately one half of their value whereas 
equity lost a little more than 10%. Despite a strong rebound, the fol-
lowing day a further catastrophic loss was experienced on Monday 
March 16 where most cryptocurrencies lost 10% of their value and 
equities 13%. Given these wild gyrations in the financial markets, it 
is interesting to determine if we can moderate the risk of investing 
in cash assets by adding a cryptocurrency to a cash portfolio.
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Figures 1a-e Cryptocurrency Daily Returns. February 5, 2018 to May 15, 2020
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Our testing strategy is as follows. We first measure expected returns 
and risk as inputs to determine what portion of each asset should be 
included in a three-asset portfolio comprising of stocks, bonds and 
an alternative asset such as gold or a cryptocurrency. Using these 
inputs, we set a target risk level and then optimise by changing the 
portions invested in each of the three component assets to obtain 
the highest possible return given the target risk level on January 1, 
2019. This optimisation is accomplished via the solver function in 
Excel. Using these optimised portions, we then measure the return, 
the risk (portfolio standard deviation) and the ratio of return to risk 
(hereafter Sharpe ratio) three months later on March 31, 2019 and 
Figure 2b Gold Daily Returns. February 5, 2018 to May 15, 2020
Figure 2a Stock and Bond Daily Returns. February 5, 2018 to May 15, 2020
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compare these actual values to what was promised initially. We then 
repeat by rebalancing our initial portfolio using updated risk meas-
ures – the variances and covariances amongst included assets in the 
portfolio – on March 31 2019, but retain the initial target returns 
and portfolio target standard deviation and then measure the sec-
ond quarterly returns, risk and the Sharpe ratio on June 30, 2019. We 
continue rebalancing the portfolio at the beginning of each quarter 
to compare to the actual performance at the end of the quarter until 
March 31, 2020. To capture the rapid bounce back after March 31, 
2020 we rebalance the portfolio on March 31 and measure the per-
formance of this portfolio seven weeks later May 15, 2020.
We use the five-year average, from January 1, 2014 to December 
31, 2018, to calculate the expected value for the mean returns of 
stocks, bonds and gold. We use the annualised daily averages over the 
220 daily observations from February 5, 2018 to December 31, 2018 
to calculate expected values for the variances and covariances for 
all assets. However, the five year (or part thereof) return of the nine 
cryptocurrency returns were incredible and using a similar five-year 
average would result in portfolios dominated by cryptocurrencies. 
This would defeat the purpose of this study as we wish to examine 
how cash portfolios can be improved by including cryptocurrencies 
as an additional rather than a substitute asset class in the portfolio. 
Therefore, we arbitrarily chose 4% as the target return, which is part 
way between the average target return for stocks, bonds and gold at 
8, 3.5 and 0.5% respectively.3
Once chosen, the starting values will be used to form a portfo-
lio with a controlled level of risk by minimising risk to a chosen lev-
el. We chose an overall portfolio standard deviation of 9.9% as the 
target risk. This is the average five-year standard deviation for the 
Wilshire 5000 index up to December 31, 2018, the idea being that 
investors are willing to invest some portion of their wealth in cryp-
tocurrencies, provided that this does not result in an expected ma-
jor increase in risk. Using our chosen expected values, we now opti-
mise portfolios by finding the portions invested in each asset that in 
combination obtains the highest possible portfolio expected return 
based on the expected values, consistent with an overall portfolio 
standard deviation of 9.9%.4 Short selling is not allowed so the min-
imum investment in any given asset is zero. 
3 We experimented with a range of values for the target cryptocurrency target return 
from 0.5% to 5%. Using lower values resulted in very little investment in cryptocurren-
cies whereas using a value greater than 4% lead to portfolios with more than 50% in-
vested in cryptocurrencies. As shown in table 2, the use of a 4% target return allowed is 
to form portfolios with a significant, but not dominant investment in cryptocurrencies.
4 We initially set the investment in Equity as 100% and zero for the remaining as-
sets and then optimise.
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Table 2 This table reports the initial percentage allocations, expected returns, 
variances and covariances from Q1 the first quarter of 2019 to Q6 the second part 
quarter of 2020 ending on May 15 based on information prior to the date portfolios 
are formed. All figures are in percent
Q1 Cash Gold Bitcoin Ethereum Ripple Bcash Tether Litecoin Eos Bfinance  Tezos
Equity 60.3 58.4 44.4 36.5 57.4 59.2 58.4 23.8 33.7 54.2 59.4
Bonds 39.7 21.4 47.2 56.4 40.7 39.2 21.7 67.4 60.4 42.6 39.2
Alternative 0.0 20.2 8.3 7.0 1.9 1.6 19.9 8.8 5.9 3.2 1.4
Q2
Equity 62.4 60.6 43.8 45.4 34.8 60.6 60.6 26.1 35.1 52.2 29.2
Bonds 37.6 20.3 46.6 48.4 57.9 37.5 20.6 65.2 58.7 43.4 64.7
Alternative 0.0 19.1 9.6 6.2 7.3 1.9 18.8 8.7 6.1 4.4 6.1
Q3
Equity 65.1 63.4 49.7 27.1 65.1 64.3 63.3 29.6 35.1 53.9 59.2
Bonds 34.9 18.8 41.6 64.0 34.9 34.2 19.2 61.8 58.4 41.4 37.7
Alternative 0.0 17.8 8.7 8.9 0.0 1.6 17.5 8.6 6.5 4.8 3.0
Q4
Equity 65.8 64.3 55.3 29.4 65.8 64.7 64.0 30.0 36.0 53.9 48.3
Bonds 34.2 18.1 37.5 61.7 34.2 33.6 18.9 61.3 57.4 41.0 46.7
Alternative 0.0 17.5 7.3 8.9 0.0 1.8 17.1 8.7 6.6 5.0 5.0
Q5
Equity 68.6 67.4 57.9 31.9 68.6 67.4 67.0 31.8 37.0 51.3 48.6
Bonds 31.4 16.5 34.7 58.8 31.4 30.8 17.3 59.1 55.9 42.5 46.0
Alternative 0.0 16.1 7.4 9.3 0.0 1.8 15.7 9.1 7.0 6.3 5.4
Q6 (Part)
Equity 40.6 32.9 20.9 40.6 40.6 30.9 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6 40.6
Bonds 59.4 36.3 70.6 59.4 59.4 65.3 30.1 59.4 59.4 59.4 59.4
Alternative 0.0 30.8 8.5 0.0 0.0 3.9 29.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
The initial allocations are reported in table 2. Based on the expect-
ed returns, variances and covariances, these allocations are optimal 
as they give the highest possible returns given the target of holding 
the overall standard deviation of the portfolio to 9.9%. The portion 
invested in Gold and Cryptocurrencies do vary substantially. For ex-
ample, the initial allocation for the first quarter has 20.2% invested 
in gold and 1.4% invested in Tezos. It is interesting to note that on-
ly Gold and Tether regularly enter the rebalanced portfolios with al-
locations of between 15 to 30%. All other cryptocurrencies have al-
locations of less than 10%. Also, for the part quarter from April 1 to 
May 15, when the markets bounced back from the heart of the COV-
ID-19 crisis, six cryptocurrencies do not even enter the rebalanced 
portfolios as, clearly based on past data, they were ‘too risky’. Includ-
ing them would results in a rebalanced portfolio with a standard de-
viation greater than 9.9%.
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Table 3 This table reports the mean, standard deviation SD and Sharpe ratio quarterly 
from Q1 the first quarter of 2019 to the end of the part second quarter of 2020 on May 
15, 2020. The means and standard deviations are annualised percent rates
Q1 Cash Gold Bitcoin Ethereum Ripple Bcash Tether Litecoin Eos Bfinance  Tezos
Mean 39.6 36.5 36.0 31.7 37.2 39.8 35.4 50.4 41.2 41.2 42.9
SD 7.8 7.9 9.9 7.4 7.6 7.9 7.9 8.8 7.4 7.4 8.2
Sharpe 5.1 4.6 3.6 4.3 4.9 5.0 4.5 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.3
Q2
Mean 18.0 22.4 58.2 36.7 27.7 26.0 13.8 45.1 27.9 32.5 18.8
SD 7.1 7.2 7.7 6.7 7.8 6.7 7.4 9.0 7.6 6.7 7.7
Sharpe 2.5 3.1 7.5 5.5 3.5 3.9 1.9 5.0 3.7 4.8 2.5
Q3
Mean 4.0 4.7 -9.0 -11.6 4.0 -0.1 3.3 -18.9 -12.3 -9.5 3.2
SD 9.9 9.8 10.2 9.0 9.9 9.9 9.7 9.1 8.7 9.4 10.0
Sharpe 0.4 0.5 -0.9 -1.3 0.4 0.0 0.3 -2.1 -1.4 -1.0 0.3
Q4
Mean 22.2 22.3 14.7 -0.9 22.2 20.5 21.5 -0.5 8.8 15.6 25.7
SD 6.1 5.8 6.6 5.6 6.1 6.1 5.9 6.3 5.5 6.0 6.0
Sharpe 3.7 3.8 2.2 -0.2 3.7 3.4 3.6 -0.1 1.6 2.6 4.3
Q5
Mean -64.0 -59.9 -57.2 -27.1 -64.0 -62.4 -63.1 -30.0 -37.6 -49.4 -40.4
SD 39.6 41.1 39.4 30.5 39.6 40.5 38.4 29.1 29.4 36.8 35.7
Sharpe -1.6 -1.5 -1.5 -0.9 -1.6 -1.5 -1.6 -1.0 -1.3 -1.3 -1.1
Q6 
(Part)
Mean 55.6 77.1 72.3 55.6 55.6 54.2 48.8 55.6 55.6 55.6 55.6
SD 16.3 15.1 12.4 16.3 16.3 13.4 15.8 16.3 16.3 16.3 16.3
Sharpe 3.4 5.1 5.8 3.4 3.4 4.1 3.1 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4
Table 3 reports the mean, standard deviation and the Sharpe ratios 
for the twelve portfolios formed quarterly between January 1, 2019 
and May 15, 2020. Recalling that all portfolios were calibrated to 
have an expected standard deviation of 9.9%, we can see that the 
actual risk experienced by these portfolios were sometimes far high-
er than expected based on the prior data. For all of 2019, the cash 
portfolio realised a standard deviation that was the same as expect-
ed or lower, but from January 1 to May 15, 2020, the cash portfolio 
had a much higher realised standard deviation clearly reflecting the 
heightened risk associated with COVID-19.
First, looking at the 2019 calendar year, with few exceptions, the 
risk of a cash portfolio is not materially increased by the inclusion of 
a third asset. In fact, there are only four out of a possible 36 instanc-
es where risk increased by more than 100 basis points and eight of 
36 instances where risk increased by more than 50 basis points over 
the cash portfolio. Meanwhile, in nearly half, 17 of 36 instances, risk 
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is less, sometimes by substantial amounts, than the risk experienced 
by the cash portfolio. Bitcoin seems to create the most excess risk, 
followed by Litecoin and Tezos. In contrast, Bcash and Tether consist-
ently realise risk no great than 50 basis points than that experienced 
by cash portfolios and Ethereum and Bfinance consistently have a re-
alised risk lower than the risk of the cash portfolio.
For the COVID-19 period from January 1, 2020 to March 31, 2020, 
we find that including a cryptocurrency asset increases risk only in 
the case of Bcash, whereas the remaining cryptocurrencies reduced 
risk sometimes by substantial amounts. The worst performing asset 
was gold as inclusion of gold resulted in a 150 basis point increase in 
risk while the corresponding figure for Bcash was 90 basis points. It 
is difficult to draw any conclusions regarding the bounce back peri-
od as it includes only seven weeks of information and six of the nine 
cryptocurrencies do not even enter the portfolios as they were too 
risky based on data from the COVID-19 period. However, we do ob-
serve that the three cryptocurrencies that did enter the portfolios 
all have a lower risk than the cash portfolio.5
Finally, we examine the trade-off between risk and return by ex-
amining the Sharpe ratio where the higher the ratio the greater the 
reward for taking risk. Here we see that in 21 out of a possible 36 in-
stances inclusion of a cryptocurrency results in a lower Sharpe ra-
tio. For the COVID-19 period, the Sharpe ratio is always higher or the 
same as the cash portfolio and all ratios are negative.
4 Conclusions
We conclude that cryptocurrencies have the potential to control risk 
as most cryptocurrencies consistently experienced risk no higher 
than 50 basis points of the risk experienced by cash portfolios com-
prised of stocks and bonds. However, some cryptocurrencies appear 
to control risk less well than others. In particular, Bitcoin appears to 
be the least stable followed by Litecoin and Tezos. On the other hand, 
two cryptocurrencies, Ethereum and Bfinance combined with cash 
assets result in portfolios that have a realised risk that is less than 
5 It is interesting to speculate whether an investment in gold or a cryptocurrency would 
form a hedge during the heart of the COVID-19 financial crisis from Thursday March 12 
to Monday March 16, 2020. We note that except for Gold and Tether, all cryptocurrencies 
moved in the same direction during these three working days as the stock market experi-
enced losses on Thursday and Monday and an increase on Friday. This suggests that dur-
ing this critical period most cryptocurrencies could form a hedge had the investor short 
sold the corresponding cryptocurrency. To confirm this, a study of hedge portfolios formed 
of long bonds and stocks with a short position in the candidate cryptocurrency designed to 
minimise portfolio variance needs to be conducted – a task beyond the scope of this chapter.
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the risk of the corresponding cash portfolio. However, there is no free 
lunch because clearly, while risk can be controlled, it comes at the 
expense of a lower Sharpe ratio suggesting that the reward for tak-
ing on the risk is higher when we ignore cryptocurrencies in forming 
portfolios. More specifically, the two cryptocurrencies that best con-
trol risk, Ethereum and Bfinance, also often have Sharpe ratios that 
were lower than the corresponding Sharpe ratio for cash portfolio.
These results add to the literature by finding that while cryptocur-
rencies can control the risk of well diversified cash portfolios, not all 
cryptocurrencies are able to do this during the run up to and during 
the COVID-19 financial crisis. Our findings implies that investors seek-
ing to control the risk of well diversified cash portfolios should consid-
er altcoins, particularly Bfinance and Tether, rather than Bitcoins but 
all the while realising that a reduction in risk is likely to be accompa-
nied by a lower return. In contrast, the literature mostly concentrates 
on Bitcoin finding some evidence that bitcoins can effectively diversi-
fy cash portfolios in the case of extreme events (Bouri et al. 2017) but 
gold appears to have more stable diversification properties than Bit-
coin (Shahzad et. al. 2020). In contrast, we find Gold did not control risk 
well during the height of the COVID-19 financial crisis and there were 
better performing altcoins than Bitcoin. Perhaps the variation in di-
versification effectiveness can be traced to the structure of an altcoin. 
Altcoins designed to attract the interest of professional investors by in-
corporating the altcoin to the trading on an exchange – Bfinance – or 
tied to another asset – Tether or provide ancillary services – Ethereum 
lead to more rational trading and less speculation resulting in more ef-
fective diversification than other alternatives.
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1 Introduction
Economic and social upheavals always affect oil markets and the COVID-19 
pandemic is no exception. Short-term disruption to the consumption of fuels 
and plastics derived from oil is inevitable, as the spread of the disease dis-
rupts economic activity and trade, while the response of governments world-
wide sees large parts of the global population subjected to some form of cur-
tailment of movement. The rapid contraction in economic activity, the collapse 
of trade, and the dramatic increase in the unemployment rate are all with-
out precedent. So, too, is the collapse in oil demand and the subsequent cut 
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in supply, both voluntary and in response to economic forces (Fer-
nandes 2020). The main objective of this chapter is to explore how 
the COVID-19 pandemic might affect oil demand in both the short and 
long term and the implications that has for the oil industry.
Difficult though these short-term dislocations are to overcome, the 
more fundamental question is what will be the long-run consequenc-
es of the pandemic for the oil market. Will the fear that has been in-
stilled in populations required to shelter at home for weeks on end 
and keep their distance from fellow human beings dissipate quickly 
as restrictions are eased, or will it result in fundamental and long-
lasting changes in behaviour that will impact global demand for fu-
els? Will the experience of a long period of remote working and vir-
tual meetings change the behaviour of companies and their staff, or 
will it reinforce the importance of face-to-face contact and interna-
tional business travel?
2 The Effect of the COVID-19-Pandemic on Oil Markets 
Some experts are suggesting that “the COVID-19 crisis accelerates 
what was already shaping up to be one of the industry’s most trans-
formative moments” (Barbosa et al. 2020). Focusing on the pressure 
placed on the industry, it is useful to look at the broader environment. 
The long megacycles of shifting demand and supply tend to have wide 
swings. Without doubt, the combination of demand disruption due to 
the pandemic as well as excess supply created a deep crisis for the 
industry. Almost a fifth of global demand for oil is expected to disap-
pear during the second quarter of 2020 and it is not expected to return 
to pre-pandemic levels before the end of 2021. All three of the major 
forecasting agencies – The International Energy Agency (IEA), the Or-
ganization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the US Ener-
gy Information Administration (EIA) – now agree that the world faces 
its biggest-ever slump in oil consumption, after governments imposed 
movement restrictions on billions of people to combat the coronavi-
rus. “The scale of the demand hit means that despite producers im-
plementing unprecedented output cuts, stockpiles will soar this year” 
(Lee 2020b). This unprecedented stockbuild will create an overhang 
that will suppress prices even as demand recovers, until it is drawn 
down and inventories return to more normal levels. The forecasts of 
the IEA indicate that the world will consume about 1.7 billion barrels 
less oil in the second quarter of 2020 than it did during the same pe-
riod of 2019. Over the whole of 2020 and 2021, the volume of lost de-
mand compared with pre-pandemic forecasts balloons to about 5.4 
billion barrels, equivalent to the entire proven oil reserves of Mex-
ico [fig. 1]. In addition, the decades-long upward movement in crude 
oil demand has been undermined by a repeated pattern of declining 
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oil-intensity of GDP (oil consumption/GDP) followed by a brief and in-
complete recovery in which intensity did not return to its pre-decline 
levels (Fagan 2020). The oil intensity of the global economy been de-
clining since the 1980s and 1990s mainly in non-OECD countries as 
well as in some OECD countries.
Figure 1 The effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on world oil demand
The unprecedented collapse in oil demand has required a similar-
ly unique response from oil producers, who simply could not keep 
pumping at pre-pandemic rates without filling all the available stor-
age capacity for crude and refined products. Storage tanks at key 
hubs like Rotterdam, Singapore and Saldanha Bay were filling fast 
and any available space had already been contracted. The industry 
was forced to turn to the more expensive option of storing oil in tank-
ers at sea. Oil analytics firm Vortexa Ltd estimates that the volume 
of crude oil in floating storage soared to more than 180 million bar-
rels, over three times its average level in 2019, as oil demand tum-
bled [fig. 2]. That will start to draw oil out of stockpiles, but the over-
hang is huge. The volume of crude oil stored in tankers rose to more 
than 200 million barrels by June 19, according to data from analytics 
firm Vortexa supplied via Bloomberg (Bloomberg 2020). That is four 
times as much as at the same time in 2019 (Lee 2020e).
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In April 2020 the world oil price made history. US West Texas Inter-
mediate (WTI) crude turned negative for the first time in the 160-year 
history of the oil industry, as holders of contracts for future delivery 
sought to unload them before they expired and they had to take de-
livery of physical barrels [fig. 3].
Figure 3 West texas intermediate crude price in early 2020
Figure 2 Crude stored on tankers at sea soared as oil demand collapsed
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The normal buyers of such contracts faced difficulties of their own, 
with almost no available storage capacity at the contract’s delivery 
point of Cushing, Oklahoma. “Dismissing the historic move in the 
May contract for West Texas Intermediate crude as ‘more of a finan-
cial thing than an oil situation,’ as U.S. President Donald Trump did, 
misses the point” (Lee 2020a). Although the negative oil price was a 
peculiarity of the WTI contract, it was also a wake-up call to oil pro-
ducers in America that they had to get serious about reducing their 
own supply, rather than simply waiting for others to make the cuts that 
would rebalance supply and demand and allow them to keep pumping. 
Global financial markets have been hit severely by the oil price col-
lapse. Two serious shocks, the collapse of oil prices two months af-
ter the onset of the COVID-19 epidemic in Wuhan city as well as af-
ter the unexpected decision of Saudi authorities to offer record price 
discounts of as much as $13 against regional benchmarks to their 
main customers, sent worldwide stock markets into free fall (Sharif, 
Aloui, Yarovaya 2020).
Despite record output cuts of almost 10 million barrels a day 
agreed by the members of OPEC and a group of allied oil produc-
ers, combined with unprecedented reductions in supply from pro-
ducers in the US, Canada and other countries outside the so-called 
OPEC+ group, inventories have continued to build. US commercial 
crude stockpiles hit a record high in June, surpassing the previous 
peak set in 2017 [fig. 4].
Figure 4 US commercial crude stockpiles hit a new high in June 2020
In the short term, the only way to stabilise the oil market was to meet 
the biggest ever collapse in demand with the largest reduction in sup-
ply. The 23 members of the OPEC+ group of countries, which joins the 
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OPEC members with ten non-OPEC countries, including Russia, Mex-
ico, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, met by video conference in April and 
eventually agreed to reduce their collective oil production by an initial 
9.7 million barrels a day in May and June 2020 and to taper those cuts 
in two steps, with output restrictions that would last until April 2022.
Oil producing countries outside this group were reluctant to make 
formal commitments to cut output, but many said that their indus-
tries would cut production in response to market forces, with the Ca-
nadian oil sands and the US shale oil sectors seen to be particular-
ly vulnerable to the downturn. High operating costs and long routes 
to markets made operations in Canada’s Alberta Province vulnera-
ble, while the constant need to drill new wells to offset steep decline 
rates at US shale wells put that sector at risk.
The reluctance to cut production and close wells is understanda-
ble. Most of the costs of producing oil are already sunk by the time 
crude starts flowing out of the ground; the operating costs of keep-
ing a well flowing are usually only a small fraction of the total cost 
and oil prices have to fall to very low levels indeed to stop covering 
cash operating costs. Furthermore, shutting a well is not cost-free. 
Getting them pumping again can be even more expensive. The deci-
sion to shut the well will involve a number of factors such as the cost 
and technical challenges of restoring the wells back to pre-curtailed 
volumes (Adams-Heard, Wethe, Crowley 2020).
US oil production had fallen by 2 million barrels a day by mid-
June from a peak of 13.1 million barrels a day in mid-March, before 
the pandemic caused oil prices to tumble, according to preliminary 
weekly data from the EIA. The number of rigs drilling for oil in the 
US has slumped to its lowest level since June 2009, figures from Bak-
er Hughes show; a drop of 72% in the space of 14 weeks [fig. 5].
Output cuts are doing their job, with forecasts from the IEA (IEA 
2020) and others indicating that demand will be running ahead of 
supply in the second half of 2020, as countries begin to recover from 
the worst effects of the lockdowns imposed to combat the COVID-19 
pandemic and production rates remain curtailed.
While production cuts have helped to balance oil supply and 
demand on a day-to-day basis, the global oil industry still faces a 
daunting task. The most recent forecast from the IEA shows demand 
growth recovering more slowly than the group previously thought. 
“Global demand will still be below pre-pandemic levels by the end of 
2021, never mind this year” (Lee 2020d).
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3 The Effect of the COVID-19-Pandemic on Transportation 
The COVID-19 pandemic has severely impacted travel, by road, rail, 
sea and air. As the pandemic spread, individual behavioural chang-
es took place, partly the result of individual choices and partly in re-
sponse to government-imposed restrictions on movement and eco-
nomic activity. Working from home became the normal practice for 
those who could do so, commuting to work virtually ceased, public 
gatherings were banned and international travel severely curtailed. 
People stopped driving, flying, or travelling on public transport. 
Data from FlightRadar24, which tracks both commercial and non-
commercial air traffic, show that by mid-June, even though the num-
ber of commercial flights worldwide had doubled since the depth of 
the pandemic, it was still down by about 60% from the pre-virus lev-
el (Reed 2020) [fig. 6].
One of the biggest questions that remains unanswered is to what 
extent travel behaviour will return to its pre-COVID-19 normal once 
restrictions are lifted. Congestion on Chinese city streets rebounded 
quickly after lockdowns were eased and congestion even surpassed 
pre-lockdown levels, as people chose to use private cars to get to work 
rather than crowded transit systems. But high-frequency journey-time 
data from TomTom Traffic Index show that the return of congestion 
is not uniform [fig. 7].
The congestion data show that roads are still much emptier in the 
evenings and during the middle of the day during the weeks and that 
traffic levels remain well below pre-pandemic levels during week-
ends. In other parts of the world, where lockdowns are only gradu-
Figure 5 Domestic US crude production has tumbled
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Figure 6 Commercial flights are recovering, but remain 60% below pre-COVID-19 levels
Figure 7 Congestion has returned to Beijing streets during commuting hours, but not outside them. 
The chart shows average congestion for working days (left) and weekends (right)
ally being eased, similar patterns are emerging. These may change 
as a greater range of economic activities are permitted and leisure 
travel in particular can be expected to increase as more leisure op-
portunities become available.
Whether the loss of oil demand is a brief anomaly, as it was dur-
ing the financial crisis of 2008-09, or reflects a structural change 
in consumption remains to be seen. It is too early yet to determine 
whether the pandemic will alter fundamentally people’s attitudes to-
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wards air travel, or commuting to work, or whether it will lead com-
panies to reassess working-from-home opportunities for their staff, 
or international corporate travel to attend meetings and events. UBS 
Group Chief Operating Officer Sabine Keller-Busse said that as many 
as a third of its employees could work remotely on a permanent ba-
sis (Halftermeyer, Lacqua 2020).
Bloomberg economists Jamie Rush, Maeva Cousin and David Pow-
ell see a rapid economic recovery in Europe running out of steam. 
The big questions here are how quickly the rebound will be and how 
much social distancing will be an obstacle for this (Rush et al. 2020).
By mid-June of 2020, Ben Luckock, co-head of oil trading at Trafig-
ura Group told Bloomberg News that demand for crude was already 
back to 90% of normal levels as countries emerge from pandemic-re-
lated lockdowns, but that returning to normal could prove difficult. 
He believes that 5% (of the remaining 10%) will be recovered in a 
few months, although he expressed his worries that complete recov-
ery to pre-crisis levels may be difficult. There are many obstacles for 
this and some ‘new normal’ patterns like working-from-home as well 
as reduced air travels (Blas 2020).
4 Conclusion
If long term oil demand settles at a level some 5% lower than the 
pre-COVID-19 trajectory, the implications for the oil sector will be 
significant. Investment in the oil projects needed to provide the pro-
duction capacity in the coming decade are not being made. Oil com-
panies from the supermajors like ExxonMobil and Royal Dutch Shell 
to the small operators in the US shale patch have all slashed their 
budgets. Shell has cut its dividend for the first time since the Second 
World War (Hurst 2020).
The combination of lower oil demand and green post-COVID-19 
stimulus packages could transform the energy landscape. Germa-
ny has committed 130 billion euros ($145 billion) to pandemic recov-
ery, with about 30% to be spent on activities that will cut emissions. 
That compares with about 15% of the stimulus money injected into 
the global economy during the 2008-09 financial crisis that went to 
green initiatives (Rathi, 2020).
Goldman Sachs analysts see spending on renewable power over-
taking oil and gas drilling for the first time in 2021. Clean energy af-
fords a $16 trillion investment opportunity through 2030 Renewa-
bles policies including biofuels which will account for about a quarter 
of all energy spending next year. This is up from about 15% in 2014, 
driven in part by diverging costs of capital, as borrowing rates have 
risen to as high as 20% for hydrocarbon projects compared with as 
little as 3% for clean energy (Murtaugh 2020).
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The current disequilibrium in global energy markets is a signal that 
the post-COVID-19 new energy normal would be characterised by a 
more uncertain future for the oil and gas industry. To a certain extent, 
the COVID-19 Pandemic has and will reshape of our energy future. The 
oil and gas industry will experience short and long term impacts from 
the crisis to which it will have to adjust, with the potential for future 
oil demand to be significantly reduced from pre-pandemic forecasts.
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Abstract The real estate industry was severely affected by the COVID-19 in both the 
residential and the commercial sectors due to travel and site-visit limitations, rent sus-
tainability issues and a decrease of or higher uncertainty about disposable income. 
During the lockdown, houses became more important and were analysed in depth. It 
can be assumed that a new demand could emerge after this crisis making households 
looking for more comfortable houses since this asset will increase its importance for 
living and working. Similarly, the commercial real estate sector will change due to lower 
rent sustainability. However, the main expected change is related to the building type 
and the standards requested by tenants in the new economic environment.
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1 Introduction
After the SARS in 2003, the literature started to study the economic impact of 
similar diseases by considering not only the social cost of the deaths related 
to the infection but also the negative effects of government policies that aimed 
to reduce infection and protect lives (Keogh-Brown et al. 2010). Theoretical 
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models applied to Europe tried to test the impact of a pandemic sim-
ilar to the Spanish influenza in 1918-19. Results showed sector and 
country differences but assumed a short-term effect that would last 
a few quarters (Jonung, Roeger 2006). The coronavirus disease has 
unique features with respect to previous pandemics because it is the 
first time that we are experiencing such an event in a globalised and 
interconnected world. Preliminary analysis of the data available to 
date shows that, during the lockdown period, consumption behaviour 
changed significantly with negative effects on some sectors (food and 
beverage, hospitality, etc.) and positive effects on others (e-commerce, 
healthcare, etc.) (Backer et al. 2020). These effects will be long last-
ing because companies will require several months to recover from 
the losses suffered during the lockdown and customers will require 
time in order to adapt themselves to the new economic environment.
The real estate sector was severely affected by the pandemic since 
commercial tenants had lower revenues for paying rents during the 
lockdown period and households had lower income to pay rents or 
mortgages. Moreover, there is a change in the perception of the effi-
cient use of space that may have an impact on the demand for exist-
ing and new real estate assets (Taltavull 2020). This chapter analyses 
the real estate market by considering separately residential (section 
2) and commercial (section 3) real estate. The focus will be on Eu-
ropean real estate markets and the analysis will consider the differ-
ent approaches adopted by policy makers for managing the pandem-
ic and the lockdown period.
2 Residential Real Estate
The analysis of household residence in Europe shows significant dif-
ferences among countries [fig. 1].
On average, more than 70% of citizens own their house (with or 
without an outstanding mortgage). But the percentage is significant-
ly lower in some North and Central European countries (e.g. Switzer-
land, Germany, and Austria) and higher in some East European coun-
tries (e.g. Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Slovakia) where less than 
20% of citizens are renters.
Looking at the type of dwelling, on average less than 50% of Eu-
ropeans are living in a flat but this percentage is significantly high-
er in the main cities compared to the countryside [fig. 2].
Countries like Switzerland, Latvia and Spain have more than 60% 
of citizens living in a flat while other North European countries (like 
Ireland, UK and Netherlands) have more than 80% of citizens living 
in detached and semi-detached or terraced houses.
The lockdown experience showed some limitations of the exist-
ing housing stock. People that experienced ‘smart working’ often 
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Figure 1 Population distribution by tenure status in 2019. Source: Eurostat data processed by the Authors
Figure 2 Population distribution by dwelling type in 2019. Source: Eurostat data processed by the Authors
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suffered from the lack of space necessary for working from home. 
A dedicated table and comfortable seat for working appeared to be 
necessary. The entrance of the flat was eliminated in some develop-
ments and now could be repurposed, as a ‘decontamination room’. 
Therefore, demand is expected to change in the near future with an 
increase of the average size of houses. Families with children, in 
particular, will look for independent real estate units (detached and 
semi-detached houses) with gardens and terrace that may make liv-
ing at home more enjoyable. Households that expect to work from 
home (even only for few days per week) may have an incentive to buy 
outside downtown areas where prices per square meter are general-
ly lower, making it possible to buy a bigger house.
However, the pandemic had a negative effect on the disposable in-
come of individuals that were obliged to stop working during ‘phase 
one’ of the lockdown, or are facing higher redundancy risk or sala-
ry cuts (Mann 2020). Moreover, the economic crisis and the credit 
conditions are getting worse in the short term which may reduce the 
number of transactions in the real estate market.
3 Commercial Real Estate
3.1 Office Market
The office market has slowly been changing in the last years with 
an increase of flexible spaces and a more intensive use of desks (i.e. 
less dedicated desks), causing a decline in the square metre per em-
ployee. The main driver was cost reduction. Therefore, companies 
changed the style and the layout of offices and landlords had to adapt 
to the new requirements of the market with a switch from the mod-
el of small, independent rooms to open spaces, with a lot of common 
areas, to minimise the consumption of space per employee [fig. 3].
The demand for office space in the last years gave more importance 
to ancillary services (conference rooms, canteens, fitness centres, and 
so on) that could represent a benefit for the employees and increase 
job satisfaction and corporate loyalty (Cushman & Wakefield 2020).
During the COVID-19 emergency many firms were obliged to increase 
the use of smart working solutions in order to reduce the risk of infection 
for their employees and avoid stopping their business during the lock-
down. Data showed a huge increase in home working and, independent-
ly of the country selected, from 60% to 70% of the European companies 
used smart working solutions for the months of April and May (JLL 2020).
The social distancing rules have changed the layout of the office, 
increasing the space necessary for each employee. The impact of this 
change could be disruptive for the industry because companies will be 
obliged to reduce people that will be in the office at the same time by 
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applying rotation and smart working. Otherwise, they will be obliged 
to leave the current buildings and move to new and bigger ones. More-
over, companies may be encouraged to avoid downtown buildings (or 
towers) and may prefer to look for secondary office areas where big-
ger buildings are more affordable. This could become a new trend if 
employees start moving out of urban areas and prefer to drive to their 
office. In some markets, shared workspace companies, like Regus or 
WeWork, have grown significantly (e.g. Greater Paris). They offer an 
alternative model for big corporations that may opt to rent desks in co-
working spaces located in the suburbs near to residential areas where 
employees live. This may be more cost effective than investing new 
money in developing owned corporate real estate (Knight Frank 2019).
3.2 Retail
The retail sector has been experiencing a significant change in the last 
decade. This was characterised by a crisis of the commercial centres 
not located in prime areas and a decrease in the volume of the new 
investments in some of the major locations in Europe. A comparison 
between commercial retail property investment and consumer online 
spending shows that countries with higher rates of their population 
Figure 3 Average office square metres per employee in the main European cities in 2019. 
Source: Cushman & Wakefield data processed by the Authors
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 182
A New World Post COVID-19, 177-190
spending online have weaker retail property investment volumes. The 
ongoing shift away from bricks-and-mortar retail in some areas has a 
direct impact on commercial property market trends (RCA 2019) [fig. 4].
The COVID-19 and the lockdown measures have had an effect on 
almost all retail activities causing a significant decrease of annual in-
come and impacting on the sustainability of rents paid to landlords. 
Groceries and supermarkets were the only businesses that saw an 
increase in monthly revenues following the lockdown. The real es-
tate market showed some interest in developing such businesses in 
areas previously not served (Savills 2020).
During the lockdown, consumers’ behaviour has changed and 
some changes are expected to last: an increased importance of food 
and drinks expenditure for home consumption (in supermarkets) and 
the use of e-commerce solutions. Restaurants and bar are expected to 
suffer in the short and medium-term until the contagion control meas-
ures will be permanently removed. This is because the smart work-
ing (or more precisely home working) and travel restrictions affect 
negatively the demand. Moreover, social distancing measures reduce 
the number of customers that can be served at the same time. The 
forced experience of using e-commerce during the lockdown period 
to buy goods may represent a disruptive event for the economy, with 
more customers developing a preference for the internet channel. 
Figure 4 European retail volume vs Online spending. Source: RCA and Eurostat data processed by the Authors
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3.3 Industrial and Logistic Real Estate
Industrial and logistic real estate in Europe showed an increase in 
the volume of take-ups in areas with a good connectivity by ship, 
plane, or train that represented the main market for new investments 
(Mattarocci, Pekdemir 2017) [fig. 5].
In 2019, the main global gateways were located in Benelux, Ger-
many and UK (the so called ‘blue banana’). But there are new mar-
kets that are growing as critical supply chain links and regional hubs 
outside of this area in Northern, Eastern and Southern Europe (Cush-
man & Wakefield 2020).
During COVID-19 the industrial and logistic sector suffered an in-
crease in time to delivery, a reduction of the number of connections 
and several constraints applied by each country to reduce commerce 
for inessential goods. Immediately after the end of the lockdown, the 
time necessary for re-activating businesses was significantly longer 
for companies with few logistic nodes for acquiring inputs and deliv-
ering goods (Deloitte 2020). The pandemic showed the limits of ex-
cessively globalised supply chains, which turned out not to be suffi-
ciently resilient (Hohenstein et al. 2015). It also pointed out the need 
of a new strategy for procurement and sales that would reduce de-
pendence on international trade in order to avoid the risk of simi-
lar supply chain disruptions in the future (Choi, Rogers, Vakil 2020).
Main logistic ports in Europe Ports that showed the highest increase from 2010









Figure 5 European Logistic and Industrial Hubs. Source: Colliers International, 2015
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Figure 6 The expected impact of the COVID-19 on leisure hotels. Notes: Faster recovery: countries 
that depend to a larger degree on domestic tourists and tourism represent a limited part of the economy; 
Gradual recovery: countries that can still count on domestic tourism and less reliant on international tourism; 
Prolonged recovery: countries largely depending on international travellers; Slow recovery: countries where 
tourism play a small role in the economy. Source: Colliers International, 2020
Moreover, consumer behaviour has changed due to the experience of 
e-commerce during the lockdown period and the opportunities relat-
ed to home delivery. For some countries, the growth of e-commerce 
is expected to change radically the logistic and the industrial mar-
kets with an expected growth in the demand of “last mile” warehous-
es near the main cities (Prologis 2020).
3.4 Hospitality
The hospitality sector was the first to be directly affected by the 
COVID-19 with hotels, both leisure and business, closing even be-
fore the enforcement of the lockdown measures. Therefore, it is cur-
rently one of the sectors that is suffering the most from the pandem-
ic and the social distancing rules (Fernandes 2020).
Many hotels registered cancellation not only during the lockdown 
period but also for the following summer holidays. The negative ef-
fect is related to a lack of confidence of travellers regarding safety 
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Figure 7 Importance of domestic land (car) based travel. Source: Colliers International, 2020
and hygiene as well as the decrease of disposable income that may 
oblige individuals to avoid unnecessary expenses. The impact on the 
sector is expected to vary across countries also in relation to the in-
cidence of domestic versus foreign tourism [fig. 6].
An analysis of EU shows that the speed of the recovery for the 
hospitality industry will vary across countries. The majority of coun-
tries (13) expect to recover quickly because the size of their tourism 
sector is small and mainly driven by domestic demand. In contrast, 
other countries will recover slowly since the demand is mainly driv-
en by foreigners (Belgium, Bulgaria, Hungary, Switzerland) or be-
cause the tourism sector is one of the most important sectors of the 
economy (Spain). The worst scenario is for countries that were tar-
geting mainly foreign tourism (Croatia, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Portu-
gal). But among these countries there could be significant differenc-
es. For some of them the recovery could be faster due to a change in 
the habits of their citizens that in the past preferred to go on holi-
day abroad (e.g. Italy) or due to the financial support offered by their 
governments to the tourism industry (Colliers 2020).
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Figure 8 The Impact of the COVID-19 on the companies’ business travel policy. 
Source: GTBA data processed by the authors
Another relevant issue is the main type of transport used by tour-
ists (plane/boat or car), which varies significantly across countries 
[fig. 7]. As international air travel is curtailed, markets more prone 
to demand from international air travel are most exposed to a sharp 
downturn. Markets that can function on domestic car-based travel 
are probably the most resilient.
Looking at the hotel typology, business ones were also significant-
ly affected by the pandemic. This is because companies have changed 
radically their travel policies due to government restrictions on citi-
zen mobility, issues related to the safety of their employees, and the 
reduced profit margins available [fig. 8].
The effect on the hospitality sector is expected to last because al-
most all the companies were obliged to switch to online meetings 
during the last months and it may represent an opportunity for busi-
nesses to reduce travel costs in the coming years. The impact is ex-
pected to be higher for the one-day journeys.
A forecast about the effects of the COVID-19 on the hospitality in-
dustry could be made by starting from comparable disruptive events 
in the past [fig. 9].
A forecast of the hotel occupancy rate dynamics after the COVID-19 
could be done by considering the SARS outbreak in Asia in the 2003. 
The hotel statistics in the main urban areas in China show that af-
ter just two months from the discovery of the disease the hotel mar-
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Figure 9a-b Effects of comparable disruptive events on the Hospitality Industry. 
Source: Colliers International, 2020
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ket collapsed in term of occupancy and fell below 10% of capacity. 
When the country was able to control the pandemic, travel restric-
tions were removed allowing the hospitality industry to recover the 
standard occupancy rates in only three months.
The main difference between the current pandemic and SARS is 
that now the economy is expected to slow down significantly due to the 
lockdown period, with a loss in average disposable income. The more 
comparable event in the last decades in term of economic impact on the 
hotel industry is the last financial crisis. More than seven years were 
required to recover the average revenue per available room recorded 
in 2007, and two more years to recover the gross operating profits per 
available room. Moreover, the impact on the hospitality sector will be 
different across countries depending on the length and severity of lo-
cal travel restrictions and quarantine rules (Voth 2020).
4 Conclusion
The economic slowdown related to the COVID-19 pandemic is not ex-
pected to last in the long term. The real estate market will likely be 
one of the key drivers of economic growth in the recovery phase. How-
ever, the pandemic will change the standards requested for both resi-
dential and commercial assets. The expected change is not only relat-
ed to the rent or the price per square meter but also to a new demand 
composition. This will oblige the landlords to adapt their supply to this 
new market and offer assets in line with the requests of the tenants.
This process of adaptation will take several years and will not 
be the same across countries and real estate sectors. The resulting 
transformation of the real estate market will create new opportuni-
ties and accelerate ongoing trends.
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1 Introduction
Private equity is medium- to long-term finance that is invested by profession-
al fund managers in unquoted companies in return for equity stakes in those 
companies (Arundale 2007; Gilligan, Wright 2014). It includes equity finance 
for established businesses often provided to assist management teams to buy 
out businesses from their existing owners (management buyouts – MBOs) or 
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growth capital for later stage expansion and early stage finance, oth-
erwise known as venture capital (VC), to help companies grow quick-
ly and scale successfully. 
Private equity-backed enterprises make a significant contribu-
tion to the global economy in terms of greater innovation, increased 
productivity, enhanced competitiveness and, in the longer term, in-
creased employment opportunities (Frontier Economics 2013). Ven-
ture capital has financed many so-called ‘unicorns’ (privately held 
start-up companies valued at over $1 billion). For example, 82% of the 
190 European start-ups that have achieved unicorn status are ven-
ture capital-backed (EuropeanStartups.co 2020). With its long-term 
investment horizons, with funds typically having lives of 10 years or 
more, private equity is usually less susceptible to the ups and downs 
of economic cycles. The asset class successfully weathered the 2008 
financial crash, despite debt finance used to leverage deals being in 
short supply, and with far fewer failures than had been predicted by 
some observers. Private equity maintained its relatively stable, long-
term overall returns of 13% to 14% pa. (BVCA 2010, 2019) which make 
the asset class attractive to institutional investors and so provides es-
sential funding for high growth enterprises. The question is whether 
this historic resilience will be apparent with the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Many private equity and VC funds are constituted as limited part-
nerships (Gilligan, Wright 2014) whereby investors, such as pension 
funds, banks, insurance companies, family offices, sovereign wealth 
funds and endowment funds (the limited partners or LPs), commit 
capital to funds which are managed by fund managers (the gener-
al partners or GPs). In 2019 alone over $600 billion of private equity 
funds were raised globally, with accumulated funds of around $1.5 
trillion now awaiting investment (Preqin 2020a).
In previous economic crises, fundraising for both private equity 
and VC funds initially declined but then recovered, eventually hitting 
new peaks as shown in table 1. Both fundraising for private equity 
and VC funds declined following the dot-com and global financial cri-
ses periods but then quickly recovered. It is too early to tell wheth-
er fundraising has been impacted severely by COVID-19 in 2020 to 
date. Certainly, both the number of funds and amount raised in Q1 
2020 has fallen by 32% and 29%, respectively for private equity as 
a whole, compared to Q4 2019 but this is not unusual with the rela-
tively slower fundraising that always occurs at this time of year. The 
amount of capital raised by venture capital funds actually increased 
in Q1 2020 by some 44% from the previous quarter, although this has 
declined significantly in Q2 to date with a steep decline in the number 
of funds closed (Preqin 2020b). As at April 2020 there were 3,620 pri-
vate equity funds in the market globally seeking to raise some $933 
billion for their investment funds (Preqin 2020a).
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Year of final 
close 
No of funds Aggregate 
capital 
raised ($bn)




1999 225 92.9 293 42.2 
2000 285 130.4 488 76.4 
2001 256 91.0 359 43.5 
Global financial crisis
2007 659 366.2 424 46.5 
2008 655 357.5 445 52.7 
2009 447 185.5 360 26.9 
Pre-coronavirus pandemic
2018 833 537.9 1,105 108.5
2019 733 548.8 872 95.7 
2020 Q1 211 102.6 225 37.7 
2 Trends in the Pandemic Period
2.1 Fund Raising
Whilst LPs remain committed to private equity the amount of their 
commitments is likely to fall as a result of recent stock market falls 
which may lead to some rebalancing of asset allocations to private 
equity and other asset classes (Real Deals 2020b). This is partly for 
technical reasons – the ‘denominator effect’: if the value of their oth-
er types of investments go down then they will become over-allocat-
ed to private equity, prompting them to pull back on investing both 
directly and indirectly, via funds, in private equity and venture cap-
ital (Mason 2020). Buyouts will compete with growth and venture 
capital for investors’ preferred fund type. There has been a trend 
in recent years of limited partner investors targeting fewer fund 
managers with larger commitments in order to focus their GP rela-
tionships whilst maintaining their overall allocations to the private 
equity asset class; this is likely to continue into and beyond the cur-
rent pandemic. Co-investment, where LPs invest in portfolio compa-
nies alongside their commitments through a GP managed fund, may 
decline as LPs focus on their existing co-investments and shy away 
from new single company investments. LPs may also be called upon 
to commit additional capital to shore up existing companies in GPs’ 
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portfolios. For GP firms seeking to raise capital additional to their 
usual fund structures there has been a trend of GPs selling minori-
ty equity stakes in their firms as an alternative to seeking a public 
listing; there are now fund of firms vehicles dedicated to building 
portfolios of GP minority stakes. Teams trying to raise a fund for the 
first time may find the fund raising process takes longer than usual, 
possibly extending over two years, due to limitations on travel and 
fewer opportunities to develop face-to-face relationships in what is 
very much a people business. Where LPs were already well into due 
diligence on prospective funds prior to the pandemic lockdown this 
is likely to continue to completion. Whilst LPs may have put new in-
vestment activity on hold, a recent survey of LPs has noted that they 
remain “cautiously optimistic” that activity will pick up once the cor-
onavirus pandemic abates (Houlihan Lokey 2020).
2.2 Investment Trends
On the investment side, in 2019 funds invested $393 billion in man-
agement buyouts (MBOs), down 20% from a record high in 2018, and 
$224 billion in VC deals, down 17% from the prior year (Preqin 2020c). 
Whilst a number of mega deals helped to prop up the value of buy-
outs in Q1 2020, the overall downward trend in 2019 is likely to con-
tinue further into 2020 with GPs focusing their efforts on safeguard-
ing existing portfolio companies, reserving more finance for follow-on 
rounds and spending less time on sourcing new deals – at least initial-
ly in the pandemic. Buyout investments in Asia particularly declined 
significantly by value in Q1 2020 although the number of deals held up; 
possibly due to GPs not completing the larger deals due to the COV-
ID-19 crisis. VC deals fared worse in Q1 2020 both in terms of the de-
cline in number of deals completed and the overall value of deals with 
Greater China, the initial location of coronavirus, suffering the most 
with a 60% year on year decrease between Q1 2019 and Q1 2020 in 
the aggregate levels of equity investment (Brown, Rocha 2020). En-
couragingly, deals in Asia have picked up again in Q2 2020 with a 21% 
increase in aggregate deal value and a 6% increase in the number of 
deals compared to Q1 2020, reflecting that VC is now emerging from 
the earlier onset of the pandemic in Asia (Preqin 2020b).
Many GPs have been cancelling deals in the pandemic, or at least 
delaying them, because of the uncertainty whether, in the absence of 
a vaccine, there may be a second spike in cases which will result in 
another global lockdown that will close businesses again (Real Deals 
2020d). There is evidence that GPs have been dropping out of auc-
tions and investment committees are taking much longer to sign off 
on even relatively small deals (Real Deals 2020a). It has also been re-
ported that some VCs have withdrawn from investments after sign-
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ing term sheets and sending letters of intent (Beauhurst 2020a). GPs 
are revising the scenario analyses of portfolio companies, building 
in much longer holding periods to exit and downgrading valuations. 
BVCA members reported that they expect to significantly mark down 
portfolio valuations, by an average of some 20% (BVCA 2020a). Lat-
er-stage start-ups are expected to be hit the hardest as they reflect 
the decline in public markets. Where deals are still being pursued 
due diligence procedures on management and staff need to be com-
plemented with questions on furlough arrangements, termination 
clauses, regulatory, data protection and employment law issues with 
regard to requiring employees to take COVID-19 tests (Real Deals 
2020e). Due diligence on rent and leasing agreements will need to 
assess where rent has not been paid. Some VCs have been carrying 
on with due diligence remotely via video conferencing such as Zoom 
and DingTalk. It is unlikely that digital platforms will completely re-
place face-to-face relationship development between private equity 
and VC investors and management teams but they are likely to con-
tinue to be used post-pandemic and may well help facilitate more 
cost-effective interface with start-ups and other companies which 
are located away from the investment hubs (Financial Times 2020c). 
For their part, private equity and VC portfolio companies have 
been cancelling, or at least postponing, their capital spend, concen-
trating on stocking levels, reviewing supply chains where these are 
being challenged, renegotiating rent and leasing agreements, fur-
loughing staff and overall cutting costs where possible and, above 
all, preserving cash. Firms with only a short runway of cash of, say, 
less than 6 months are particularly vulnerable. Early communication 
with banks and other lenders is required to arrange interest payment 
holidays, relaxation of amortisation payments and suspension of loan 
covenants. Other companies will need capital in order to exploit COV-
ID-19 opportunities, to pivot their business models and take advan-
tage of sectorial trends.
Governments have introduced new schemes to assist business-
es impacted by the pandemic. For example, in the UK these include 
the Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) where-
by the government provides an 80% guarantee on each loan offered 
by selected lenders through the state-owned British Business Bank. 
However, CBILS does not support unprofitable companies and there 
is also evidence that some banks in the UK and Europe have been 
rejecting applications from PE-owned companies because of the fi-
nancial engineering from use of debt in buyouts that makes them 
non-compliant with EU state-aid rules (Financial Times 2020a). Then 
there is the Future Fund which provides convertible loans of between 
£125 thousand and £5 million provided this is matched by private in-
vestment and the recipient companies have raised £250 thousand of 
equity investment in past 5 years from third parties. Also private eq-
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uity firms should themselves have the resources in terms of finance 
and expertise to help support and turnaround viable companies.
3 Opportunities for Private Equity Firms
Private equity often benefits from a crisis and change. According-
ly there will be opportunities for PE firms to take public companies 
private at lower valuations, buy up underperforming corporate sub-
sidiaries, engage in bolt-ons and carve-outs and profit from ‘special 
situations’ (distressed assets, rescues and restructurings) as long as 
there are no severely underfunded pension schemes involved. Some, 
mainly US private equity groups, are taking a bullish view and are 
aggressively striking deals during the crisis to take advantage of low-
er valuations (Financial Times 2020f). Some VCs have resumed in-
vesting, focusing on companies which are seeking new opportunities 
in the crisis with in-demand services and sectors. Exits, essential for 
PE funds to show returns to their LP investors and to generate car-
ried interest for the GPs, are likely to be delayed with longer hold-
ing periods. Investec’s annual GP trends survey reveals that some 
83% of GPs do not expect to make an exit in the next 12 months (Bain 
& Co 2020). Whilst M&A activity may be somewhat reduced for pri-
vate equity firms, opportunities for exits may come from some of the 
large technology companies, such as Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Fa-
cebook and Microsoft, which have been energetically pursuing deals 
following recent stock market falls (Financial Times 2020b). Howev-
er, this is raising concern that “a few powerful firms are set to gain 
more clout”, prompting governments in various countries to consid-
er tightening their rules on foreign takeovers (Mason 2020); indeed 
a number of European countries have already announced stricter 
screening measures on foreign investment following new guidance 
issued by the European Commission (Real Deals 2020c). On a posi-
tive note, there has been a recent resurgence of interest in IPOs (Fi-
nancial Times 2020e). 
Private equity firms are increasingly focused on specific industry 
sectors. To the extent that changes can be made to the sector strat-
egies set out in private placement memoranda and limited partner-
ship agreements and the expertise of the individual investment ex-
ecutives, firms may need to rebalance their portfolios away from the 
hardest hit sectors such as hospitality and travel. Those firms focused 
on the tech sectors, including digital healthcare, fintech, cybersecu-
rity, artificial intelligence, edtech, gaming and more traditional phar-
ma, medical devices and e-commerce should be better able to weath-
er, and even benefit from, the current crisis. For example, investors 
are actively targeting health-tech start-ups from those involved with 
remote-healthcare apps to those developing new drugs targeting cor-
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onavirus (Financial Times 2020d); VC-backed health-tech deal values 
are rising in the COVID-19 environment (Preqin 2020b). 
4 Impact on Start-ups
Whilst the pandemic is clearly impacting on private equity firms and 
their portfolio companies, many of which will have been subject to 
a management buyout or a take private transaction in the past, it is 
perhaps the effect on start-ups and VC financing that the pandem-
ic is having the greatest effect. There is a clear consensus that this 
economic crisis will result in a decline in VC (Mason 2020). As evi-
dence of this the Plexal Start-Up Tracker1 monitors start-ups and fast-
growth businesses in the UK that have attracted equity or venture 
debt funding and publishes statistics each week on investments by 
value and number of deals. For the period from March 23 to June 17 
2020, when the country was in the lockdown, the tracker revealed 
that there was a 48% decrease in the value of start-up investment 
and a 34% decrease in deal numbers compared to the same period 
in 2019. As noted above, VCs are backing existing portfolio compa-
nies and focusing their new deals on the more established later stage 
companies. It is likely that there will be a decline in VC investing over 
the remainder of 2020 and possibly beyond for three reasons: (1) port-
folio companies in sectors impacted most severely by the crisis are 
finding it difficult to increase revenues and scale, (2) VCs are finding 
it much harder to raise new funds and (3) opportunities to exit from 
investments are relatively scarce (Mason 2020). The situation is par-
ticularly concerning for start-ups seeking their first round of VC fi-
nance when they have little or no cash buffer to cope with their lack 
of revenues. Funding for UK start-ups raising for the first time fell by 
83% between March 23 and May 17 compared to the same period in 
2019 (Sifted 2020c). These companies will likely fail, go into hiberna-
tion or continue to bootstrap. A survey of 250 growth businesses in 
the UK seeking investment reported that 9 out of 10 will close with-
in the next 12 months if their current investment plans, disrupted by 
the coronavirus crisis, fail to materialise (Save Our StartUps 2020). 
There is evidence that some business angel investors, who usual-
ly precede VCs in the “funding escalator” (Mason, Botelho, Harrison 
2016) and who are the dominant source of early stage equity capi-
tal, are continuing to invest in start-ups during this pandemic. A sur-
vey of angel investors and early stage VCs in May 2020 by Activate 
our Angels2 revealed that 67% of the 223 respondents were still in-
1 https://www.plexal.com/startup-tracker.
2 https://www.activateourangels.com.
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vesting during the lockdown (51% investing in new deals and 16% in 
their existing portfolios); they are getting deals done at reduced val-
uations. However this optimistic view is qualified by other surveys 
and commentary which suggest that business angels might be seek-
ing to conserve cash to support their existing investments (Mason 
2020). The on-going support by angels appears to vary by country 
and type of angel investor, with occasional (or ‘tourist’) angels hav-
ing largely disappeared (Sifted 2020d). With many VCs now focusing 
on their existing portfolios to the detriment of new investments, an-
gels will need to fund their scale up businesses for longer. The neg-
ative impact of the current crisis on angel investing could be similar 
to that experienced in the post dot-com era and the global financial 
crisis (Sohl, Lien, Chen 2020). 
Equity crowdfunding platforms, such as Crowdcube and Seedrs, 
have experienced a drop in investment activity of around 20% since 
lockdown (Sifted 2020a). Crowdfunding is an important component 
of the funding escalator, often preceding or complementing angel in-
vestment and acting as an additional “proof of concept” and market-
ability for VC investors.
Table 2 Summary of issues and opportunities for private equity and venture capital
Investors (LPs) PE firms VC
Reduced allocations to PE asset 
class
Deals postponed or cancelled Favoured sectors
Longer fund raising process Extended due diligence for deals 
in progress
Reduced valuations
Extensions to fund terms Longer holding periods Non-existent exits
Difficulties in raising first-time 
funds
Stricter rules on foreign acquirers Reduced finance for start-ups
Additional commitments  
to support portfolio companies
Opportunities with take privates 
and distressed assets
New government support 
schemes – but not for start-ups
Wall of funds raised not invested 
from prior years
Continued support from business 
angels 
5 Government Intervention 
Governments have introduced a wide variety of support measures for 
the small business sector in the coronavirus pandemic to help them 
preserve cash, providing loan finance, both directly and by providing 
guarantees to banks, subsidising employee costs, and allowing the 
deferral of tax, business rates and social security payments. However, 
these schemes will have limited benefits for high-growth enterprises. 
For example, the UK’s CBILS scheme referred to above, which pro-
vides financial support in the form of guaranteed bank loans to small-
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er businesses across the UK that are losing revenue and seeing their 
cashflow disrupted as a result of the COVID-19 outbreak, requires 
businesses to meet the lending criteria of banks in order to qualify. 
However, many would not meet this requirement as they might not 
have sufficient trading record or, typical of VC backed companies, 
may currently be loss making and hence unable to service a bank 
loan. A new loan guarantee scheme for companies not able to access 
CBILS has been advocated. Support to enable firms to furlough staff 
provides few benefits to new and small firms as staff are not permit-
ted to work if they are furloughed and companies must continue to 
trade in order to survive. The Future Fund which provides converti-
ble loans of between £125 thousand and £5 million that is matched by 
private investment is only available to businesses that have received 
£250,000 of external investment in the previous 5 years. Moreover, 
the investment by private investors is not eligible for relief under the 
EIS, SEIS and VCT schemes (BVCA 2020b) and so is unattractive to 
business angels (SeedLegals 2020). In addition, if companies choose 
to repay the loan and not convert to equity they are required to pay 
back double what they borrowed, plus interest (Beauhurst 2020b); 
this onerous constraint should be reviewed (Sifted 2020b). 
6 Prospects
The decline in both private equity and venture capital investment in 
terms of the amount invested and the number of deals that we are 
seeing in this current coronavirus crisis will impact on the speed 
and strength of the economic recovery. Many deals will be follow-on 
rounds as investors seek to strengthen the financial runway of their 
portfolio companies. As noted above there are opportunities for pri-
vate equity firms to take undervalued public companies private and 
to restructure underperforming businesses. The lack of venture cap-
ital will mean that recent start-ups will close resulting in the loss of 
businesses that might otherwise have flourished and preventing com-
panies that have traction to develop and scale. It is likely that seed 
investing will suffer the most, making it difficult for start-up busi-
nesses to get off the ground. This has serious implications as when 
current furloughing arrangements cease a larger number of redun-
dancies are likely to occur; finance for redundant employees look-
ing to start their own businesses will be in short supply. This needs 
urgent government review along with a revitalisation of local gov-
ernment supported training programmes to reskill workers and to 
provide business planning and finance raising advice. Whilst the ma-
jority of such businesses will be SMEs with fewer than 10 employees 
and little potential or ambition for growth, some may develop into the 
high-growth enterprises that are the bedrock of private equity and 
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entrepreneurial finance investment and which drive innovation, em-
ployment creation and productivity growth. Amendments or additions 
to current government financial support schemes are required which 
are aimed particularly at start-up businesses and which better suit 
the characteristics and needs of high growth potential enterprises.
Fund managers will need to be openly transparent with their in-
stitutional investors with frequent communication on capital calls, 
delays in distributions and plans to mitigate the impact of COVID-19. 
They will also need to continue spending more time in supporting 
their portfolio companies in helping them to adjust to the new envi-
ronment, seek new opportunities arising from the pandemic, pivot 
business models and manage cash.
To conclude on a positive note, private equity has successfully 
weathered economic shocks before and the signs are that it is well 
prepared to do so again despite the immediate cutback in activity. 
Many successful companies are founded in recessions – WhatsApp, 
Instagram, Uber, Pinterest, Slack and Square were all founded in 
the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis. This is reflected in 
fund returns with some of the best performing vintages established 
in periods of economic crisis.
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Abstract Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been less frequent during crises. The 
COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in a global economic shock and a surge in uncertainty, 
depressing M&A activity to record low levels. The unpromising economic prospects, the 
persisting high valuations, and potential liquidity crunches will restrict acquisitions for 
the foreseeable future. Companies with large cash balances may perform opportunistic 
acquisitions when asset prices drop to attractive levels. Acquisition activity can be fur-
ther affected by government actions, especially if governments discourage acquisitions 
to promote market competition.
Keywords Mergers. Acquisitions. Growth. Corporate investments. Investment banking.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 M&A Activity. – 3 Valuation Multiples and Premia. – 
4 Liquidity, Cash Reserves and Dry Powder. – 5 Concluding remarks, the Future of M&As 
and the Role of Regulators.
1 Introduction
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As) have been an integral part of the corpo-
rate success story for the last few decades. Acquiring firms have been ab-
sorbing other companies with the aim of improving their offering, enhance 
their market share, or enter new markets. At the same time, companies have 
been divesting assets and company segments in an effort to shift their activ-
ity focus (Mavis et al. 2016). Selling or target firms have been divesting full 
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or partial ownership of their assets, usually in exchange for hefty re-
turns, i.e. ‘premia’,1 or for a chance to save their business from a wide 
array of challenges, such as financial constraints, obsolescence, and 
productivity inefficiencies (see e.g. Hopkins 1991). A sizeable indus-
try serving both sides of the transaction has mushroomed over the 
years, providing auxiliary services such as due diligence, financing, 
even match-making between buyers and sellers.2 While M&A activ-
ity almost never stops, it follows a wave-like pattern over the years, 
with peaks and troughs in the number and total value of deals. The 
troughs usually coincide with economic shocks related to surges in 
market uncertainty, economic slowdown, and liquidity crunches. 
The current COVID-19 pandemic posits an unprecedented shock 
to the modern, global economy. While an accurate prediction on the 
economic damage is impossible at the time of writing (June 2020), the 
OECD expects the impact to be the worst during peace-time for at least 
the last 100 years (Giles 2020). As a result, M&A activity has also tak-
en a hit. In this chapter, we will look at several aspects of M&As and 
the ways the current pandemic has affected them. When appropriate, 
we will extrapolate from past experience and try to predict the impli-
cations for prospective acquirers and the overall M&A industry for 
the foreseeable future.
2 M&A Activity
The number of deals and aggregate deal value per annum fluctuate 
over time. In 2019, the global M&A market saw 49,849 deals totalling 
a value of $3.70 trillion, which is markedly higher than 2009, when 
the market saw 40,710 deals totalling $2.19 trillion (IMAA 2020). 
In 2007-08, all major economies were affected by the Global Finan-
cial Crisis and, as a result, the number of transactions plummet-
ed. The US market, which usually yields most of the global deal ac-
tivity, experienced a severe drop in deal making as well. Figure 1 
shows the annual M&A activity in deal numbers and total value for 
the US [fig. 1]. Both activity metrics follow the pattern of waves that 
span over several years; activity usually plummets at the onset of an 
economic shock, which introduces uncertainty for corporate perfor-
mance and, therefore, unfavourable economic prospects for acqui-
sitions. Three distinct waves can be identified in figure 1: the “Dot-
Com” wave in the late 1990, a consolidation wave in the mid-2000s, 
1 For a review of acquisition premia, see Laamanen 2007; Alexandridis et al. 2013; 
Nielsen, Melicher 1973.
2 For a review of investment banks and deal auxiliary services, see Chemmanur, Ert-
ugrul, Krishnan 2019; Golubov, Petmezas, Travlos 2012; McLaughlin 1992.
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and a mega-deal wave in the 2010s, where the total deal value sur-
passed the previous wave, but deal number did not recover (see e.g. 
Alexandridis, Antypas, Travlos 2017).
Figure 1 Deal activity by year. The deals include transactions by US-based acquirer and deal value of at least 
$1 million. The following types of transactions have been excluded: Minority Stake Purchases, Privatizations, 
Leveraged Buyouts, Repurchases, Recapitalizations, Self-Tenders, Exchange Offers, Acquisitions of Remaining 
Interest. Source of data: Securities Data Company (SDC) by Refinitiv
The economic uncertainty introduced by COVID-19 has resulted in 
the near total suspension of deal-making in 2020. The decrease in ac-
tivity, as presented in figure 1, shows an unprecedentedly low level of 
deals, although the 2020 data reflect only the activity during January-
June. In order to have a fair understanding of the COVID-19 impact on 
deals during early 2020, I have created a month-by-month comparative 
analysis. In figures 2-3, we see the number and total value of deals, 
respectively, during the first few months of 2020 and the average of 
the same months over the years 1985-2019 [figs. 2-3]. The M&A activity 
started deteriorating in February, when COVID-19 was developing in-
to a pandemic and capturing an increasing portion of the news head-
lines. Since then, most US-listed companies have announced a major 
hit to their first-quarter earnings due to the sudden drop in econom-
ic activity across most sectors, especially in transportation, consum-
er products, and hospitality services (see e.g. Morris 2020). The broad 
economic effect of the pandemic has cast doubts, not only on the short-
term prospects for the economy, but also on the duration of the reces-
sion. As the crisis persists, transaction metrics are expected to re-
main depressed.
Corporate executives have acknowledged the unpredictable dura-
tion and impact of the pandemic, which has forced them to revise their 
acquisition plans. According to a small-scale survey, more than 50% of 
prospective acquirers have either withdrawn from deal negotiations 
or postponed their acquisition plans, while about 23% expect to con-
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Figure 2 Number of Deals per Month. The deals include transactions by US-based acquirer and deal value 
of at least $1 million. The following types of transactions have been excluded: Minority Stake Purchases, 
Privatizations, Leveraged Buyouts, Repurchases, Recapitalisations, Self-Tenders, Exchange Offers, 
Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. Source of data: SDC by Refinitiv
Figure 3 Total Deal Value per Month. The deals include transactions by US-based acquirer and deal value 
of at least $1 million. The following types of transactions have been excluded: Minority Stake Purchases, 
Privatizations, Leveraged Buyouts, Repurchases, Recapitalisations, Self-Tenders, Exchange Offers, 
Acquisitions of Remaining Interest. Source of data: SDC by Refinitiv
tinue their investments in the second half of 2020 (Herndon, Bend-
er 2020). Their plans should be contingent to two main factors. First, 
a potential second wave of infections may lead state governments to 
enforce a second lockdown, unless an effective and readily available 
treatment has been introduced by then. Second, consumption may not 
recover to pre-pandemic levels, since the increase in unemployment 
and bankruptcies may have resulted in a permanent loss of income 
for a critical proportion of the population. Therefore, prospective ac-
quirers may have to postpone their plans once again and wait for mar-
ket prospects to improve before continuing with their investments.
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It is important to note that regardless of the changes in the ag-
gregate level of M&A activity, companies may still conduct acquisi-
tions while the pandemic persists. Their decision will have to fac-
tor in the economic and strategic prospects of the deal, the absolute 
and relative cost of the acquisition, capital availability, and poten-
tial regulatory concerns. We will be looking into these factors in the 
following sections.
3 Valuation Multiples and Premia
One of the most important features of a deal is the price. Acquirer 
and target shareholders have to come to an agreement on a fair price 
for the target firm’s shares, as well as the appropriate consideration 
structure, i.e. cash, stock, or a mix of the two. It is common for acquir-
ers to pay a ‘premium’ for a target’s shares. In general, the premium 
is an amount paid on top of the target’s fair equity value. In the case 
of publicly listed targets, the premium is defined as the percentage 
by which the target market capitalisation implied by the offer price 
exceeds the target’s recent market capitalisation. Historically, the 
average premium has been around 20-30%.3 The premium serves as 
an enticement to target shareholders, who would otherwise have lit-
tle incentive to sell their shares at current market prices. The premi-
um can also be viewed as the target firm’s share of the future syner-
gistic gains that are expected to be achieved by the new, combined 
entity. If the premium is low, the acquirer’s shareholders may enjoy 
a larger share of the future synergies; while if it is too high the ac-
quirer’s shareholders may receive only a small part of the synergies, 
or they may lose part of their current value. Therefore, it is apparent 
that the pricing exercise is a key step in designing an acquisition, and 
is the single most important aspect that can ‘make or break’ a deal.
The complexity of pricing has been further complicated during 
the pandemic. In previous economic and financial crises the market 
has reflected the decrease in economic prospects in security pric-
es. The lower expected revenue and higher probability of insolven-
cy have led to a decrease in stock prices, even for individual stocks 
with relatively good prospects. However, in 2020 the stock market 
in most western countries has substantially recovered after a quick 
and sharp correction, while the economic prospects of the respective 
countries have deteriorated. Although it may be too early to identify 
the causes of the market-economy disconnection, the prevalent ex-
planation is complex and involves the following factors: 
3 The premium figure is calculated based on SDC data for deals with US acquirers 
that are valued at more than $1 million.
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1. the reported willingness of central banks to provide unlimit-
ed support to the economy (Lewis 2020),
2. optimism for the discovery of an effective vaccination within 
the next 12 months (Gallagher 2020),
3. the gradual re-starting of economic activity in countries with 
imposed lockdowns (BBC 2020).
Regardless of the causes for the market-economy disconnection, 
stock prices do not reflect the cash flow potential of the underlying 
businesses. As can be seen in [fig. 4], US stock prices have remained 
near an all-time high, after a sharp, short-lived correction. In order 
to understand the stock market optimism and the disconnection be-
tween the market and the economy, we will look into the price-to-
earnings (P/E) ratio for the S&P 500 index. For shares, the P/E ratio 
shows the amount investors are willing to pay today in order to have 
a claim on one unit of earnings. The aggregate index P/E ratio can be 
interpreted as being based on investor expectations for future earn-
ings growth; a high P/E ratio can indicate either high growth expec-
tations or overvaluation, while a low P/E ratio indicates uncertainty 
about future growth or undervaluation.
Figure 5 shows the S&P 500 P/E ratio since 1985. The recent P/E 
ratio is no lower than for the past 20 years [fig. 5]. Despite the 13.3%4 
US unemployment rate and the 45 million new unemployment claims 
in the US between February and June,5 the market seems to have 
maintained unreasonably high expectations regarding future earn-
ings growth. We can refine this conclusion after adjusting the P/E ra-
tio for inflation and long-run earnings. The refined measure, labelled 
“Shiller P/E ratio” after Robert Shiller, provides a smoothed meas-
ure of valuation.6 Figure 6 shows the S&P 500 Shiller P/E ratio since 
1985 [fig. 6]. The interpretation of this new measure suggests that val-
uations have been near the highest levels since the outbreak of the 
“DotCom bubble” in the late 1990s. Most surprisingly, if we ignore the 
period of irrational valuations of the late 1990s and go further back 
in time, the current S&P 500 Shiller P/E ratio is near its highest lev-
el since the retro-fitted estimation of the index for back to 1872. This 
is indicative of the market-economy disconnection, and the optimism 
portrayed in the markets despite the dreadful recession ahead of us. 
Prospective acquirers attempting to take control of a public tar-
get should be willing to pay a premium on top of the aforementioned 
historically high prices, while the prospects of revenue and earn-
4 For more details, see http://www.bls.gov. 
5 For more details, see https://www.dol.gov. 
6 For more details on the calculation and interpretation of Shiller’s P/E ratio, see htt-
ps://www.multpl.com/shiller-pe. 
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Figure 4 S&P 500 Index. Source of data: EIKON by Refinitiv
Figure 6 S&P 500 Shiller P/E ratio. Source of data: https://www.multpl.com/
Figure 5 S&P 500 P/E ratio. Source of data: https://www.multpl.com/
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ings growth are uncertain for the foreseeable future. Cautious ac-
quirers usually avoid the risk of overpaying for assets, and the high 
stock market valuations may hamper M&A activity during the pan-
demic. An exception to this expectation can be the consolidation of 
ailing sectors, such as transportation and hospitality, where com-
panies may need to join forces in order to survive. In these cases, 
we may see more mergers of equals instead of acquisitions.
Nevertheless, some deal activity may also continue in the least af-
fected sectors, especially deals with stock swap consideration, since 
there is evidence suggesting that the absolute level of valuation may 
be less important than the relative valuation between the acquir-
er and the target (see e.g. Rhodes‐Kropf, Viswanathan 2004). Spe-
cifically, acquirers that are overvalued relative to their targets will 
still pursue the acquisition in order to take advantage of the benefi-
cial overvaluation. The window of opportunity for such acquisitions 
is unknown, since the disconnection between the securities market 
and the economy may be reduced at any time. In any case, due to the 
high uncertainty in the securities market, we may see the applica-
tion of strict price collars, that define the exchange rate of acquir-
er and target shares within and outside pre-agreed price ranges.7
4 Liquidity, Cash Reserves and Dry Powder
The poor short- and mid-term prospects for the economy may be less of 
a deterrent for aspiring acquirers with sufficient liquidity. Robust cash 
reserves fulfil a double role during the pandemic. First, they support 
the operations of the companies during the recession. Since the dura-
tion of the downturn cannot be forecast with reasonable accuracy, the 
large reserves place these cash-rich firms at the advantage of main-
taining operational capacity and being ready to capture the recover-
ing demand. Second, the excess cash reserves can be used as con-
sideration for M&As in case raising capital in the securities markets 
is too slow for a time-sensitive investment opportunity, or the mar-
ket uncertainty results in low demand for equity and debt issuance.
Large companies have been amassing cash for the better part of 
the last decade, waiting for the opportunity to buy undervalued as-
sets of strategic importance to their business (Rocco 2019). In table 
1, we can see the cash balance in absolute terms, and as a percent-
age of total assets for the largest 10 US companies in 2008 and 2019. 
The reason we compare these two years is because they preceded 
years of major economic shocks. We also see the net cash position 
for each firm, which is calculated by subtracting debt from cash. One 
7 For a review of price collars, see Officer 2004.
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takeaway from table 1 is that many of the top 10 cash-holding firms, 
as a group, have stronger positions in 2019 ($754 billion) compared 
to 2008 ($323 billion) even after accounting for inflation. This can 
be partially attributed to the companies that were in the list in 2008 
having even larger cash balances in 2019. Another key insight, tak-
en from untabulated information, is that the top cash-holders of 2008 
proceeded to perform a series of strategic acquisitions in the after-
math of the crisis. We expect that this will be the case for the post-
COVID-19 era as well, especially since cash balances have grown 
more than ever before.
Table 1 Top 10 cash-holding companies in 2008 and 2019. Financial and utility 
companies have been excluded from the list due to dissimilarities in accounting 
standards and regulatory treatment. Source of data: Compustat by Capital IQ
2008 Company name Cash Cash over Net Cash
(in 2019 $bn) Total Assets (in 2019 $bn)
1 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 59.59 6% -332.41
2 EXXON MOBIL CORP 38.01 14% 29.67
3 FORD MOTOR CO 37.23 14% -70.3
4 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 35.19 11% -3.95
5 CISCO SYSTEMS INC 31.16 45% 23.57
6 APPLE INC 29.09 62% 29.09
7 PFIZER INC 28.18 21% 18.73
8 MICROSOFT CORP 28.1 33% 28.1
9 ALPHABET INC 18.82 50% 18.82
10 WYETH 17.27 33% 4.42
Sum 322.64 -254.26
Average 32.26 29% -25.43
     
2019 Company name Cash Cash over Net Cash
(in 2019 $bn) Total Assets (in 2019 $bn)
1 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY 135.22 17% 36.39
2 MICROSOFT CORP 133.82 47% 54.71
3 ALPHABET INC 119.68 43% 104.91
4 APPLE INC 100.58 30% 8.77
5 AMAZON.COM INC 55.3 25% -7.91
6 FACEBOOK INC 54.86 41% 44.92
7 ORACLE CORP 43.06 37% -27.67
8 ABBVIE INC 39.92 45% -23.3
9 GENERAL ELECTRIC CO 36.92 14% -33.48
10 FORD MOTOR CO 34.65 13% -67.76
Sum 754.01 89.58
Average 75.40 31% 8.96
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A considerable portion of the M&A activity during the next few 
months may originate from professional investors such as Private 
Equity (PE) and Hedge Funds (HF). The capital available for invest-
ments, i.e. ‘dry powder’, was at a record of $2.5 trillion in 2019 (Es-
pinoza, Platt 2019). PE companies rely on their ability to pinpoint 
the firms with strong cash-flow statements, as well as growth and 
cost-cutting potential. A market fall may trigger a buying spree from 
professional investors. It is important to note that both PE and HF 
companies have a unique advantage compared to other investment 
management firms: their investment horizon is significantly longer 
than the average investor, and spans more than the few years the 
pandemic is expected to directly affect the markets. The average in-
vestment horizon for PE companies is about seven years, while some 
HFs invest with horizons of decades. As a result, we may see pro-
fessional investors wait patiently for short-term liquidity crunches 
to occur, rendering them irresistible partners to distressed firms.
The overall outlook in terms of capital availability can be favoura-
ble for some acquirers, regardless of the downturn in aggregate eco-
nomic output. An additional contributing factor is the persisting and 
historically low interest rates. The Federal Reserve, the Bank of Eng-
land, and the European Central Bank have declared that they will allow 
benchmark interest rates to remain at low, even negative levels, for the 
foreseeable future in order to support their respective economies (Fi-
nancial Times 2020). As a result, corporations with healthy cash flows 
and sustainable leverage levels could take advantage of the favourable 
debt market, and fund their M&A plans with inexpensive debt capital.
5 Concluding remarks, the Future of M&As  
and the Role of Regulators
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the US economy has experi-
enced at least seven M&A waves, i.e. wave-like patterns of M&A ac-
tivity levels. There are various theoretical explanations for the forma-
tion of waves (see e.g. Maksimovic, Phillips, Yang 2013; Goel, Thakor 
2010), and the most widely accepted framework is the neoclassical 
theory (see e.g. Ahern, Harford 2014), which is based on the field of 
neoclassical economics. The neoclassical theory of acquisitions is that 
the market for corporate control reacts to an industry-wide shock, 
such as the introduction of ground-breaking technology, or a sudden 
decrease in supply of raw materials. When industry-specific shocks 
coincide and, most importantly, capital availability is high, a market-
wide M&A wave is formed (Harford 2005). If all these conditions are 
fulfilled, we could be soon see the onset of a new merger wave. 
Regulators should be aware that the form of economic stimulus 
they provide, and the criteria they attach to the help they offer, may 
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contribute to a rise in deal activity and the creation of an M&A wave. 
For instance, if companies are offered debt in order to survive the 
economic slowdown in the short-run, they may face accelerated insol-
vency issues when they need to pay back the loans, unless econom-
ic activity recovers materially or state support is prolonged until re-
covery. This predicament will increase the acquisitions of distressed 
firms by more liquid acquirers. Instead, if companies are incentiv-
ised to cut costs and downsize, which would be a politically charged 
policy, more companies would divest their assets and focus on their 
core business segments. The policies to be announced and imple-
mented may yet be the most significant factor determining M&A ac-
tivity during and after the crisis.
The contribution of the state is significant, even if a merger wave 
does not materialise in the near future. As has been mentioned ear-
lier, the cash balances of some companies have stayed strong for a 
few years, and these companies have increased their relative ‘buy-
ing’ power relative to companies that are struggling during the reces-
sion. As a result, we may observe sector-specific market consolidation 
led by industry leaders with large cash reserves, spare debt capaci-
ty, or high stock valuations, e.g., price-to-earnings ratios. There have 
been discussions among regulators about preventing a consolidation 
wave during the pandemic, especially banning acquisitions by firms 
that have received state funding, so that markets remain competitive 
(Fontanella-Khan, Fedor 2020). The government institutions respon-
sible for maintaining market competition, such as the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) in the US and the Competition and Markets Au-
thority (CMA) in the UK, may face intense pressure to forbid deals 
that could save target companies from insolvency, so that markets 
remain competitive.
At every turn of the economy, the market for corporate control has 
followed suit in an attempt to decrease efficiencies and empower cor-
porations to thrive. The current pandemic is poised to become one of 
the sharpest turns in modern economic history and, thus, the M&A 
activity during and after this crisis should reflect the proportions of 
such a novel shock. Companies with good access to capital are ex-
pected to benefit most from this turmoil, while companies that have 
already been struggling will become inexpensive targets when se-
curity markets adjust to match their share price with their poor eco-
nomic prospects. Finally, regulators will have to balance their efforts 
between saving existing corporate structures via allowing consoli-
dation, and maintaining market competition at healthy levels. What-
ever lies ahead, we will most certainly look back to these times for 
instruction in extremity, same as we do with the Global Financial Cri-
sis and previous major crises.
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1 Introduction
Undeniably, the set of social-distancing measures adopted in the ma-
jority of advanced economies hit by the COVID-19 pandemic since the 
beginning of February 2020 led to a severe drop in the global aggre-
gate demand. According to current knowledge, it is also very likely 
that the COVID-19 virus will continue to spread around the world in 
coming months and that the high degree of uncertainty surrounding 
its diffusion will certainly generate further drops in market demand, 
especially in some economic sectors. Not surprisingly, estimates of 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicate a cross-country aver-
age drop in real GDP among the G7 countries of almost 9.5% for 2020.
Table 1 IMF Real GDP growth estimates for 2020 (Source: IMF)
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
-8.40% -12.50% -7.80% -12.80% -5.80% -10.20% -8.00%
Notes: this table depicts the IMF Real GDP growth estimates for 2020 in the G7. 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook (June 2020)
With a total number of cases (deaths) of almost 240,000 (35,000), It-
aly has been one of the advanced economies most severely hit by the 
COVID-19 virus. This has forced the government to implement more 
stringent social distancing measures than in other countries. Differ-
ently from other contexts, Italy took some time to implement such 
measures. Indeed, the first measure was adopted 23 days after the 
first 100 confirmed cases of COVID-19 were reported, amplifying thus 
the risk of infection. France, Germany and the US reacted instead af-
ter 12, 8 and 15 days, respectively. Needless to say that, in facing a 
pandemic emergency, timely policies are fundamental to support the 
economy in case of an imminent slowdown. This initial delay in im-
plementing the social-distancing rules and the subsequently stricter 
COVID-19-related measures (such as lockdown and forced stop of in-
dustrial production), together with a fragile fiscal and political struc-
ture, are responsible for the estimated 12.80% drop in the Italian re-
al GDP [tab. 1]. More probably, this figure is also the result of the high 
level of uncertainty induced by both the delay and the lack of clari-
ty in the measures adopted and implemented by the Italian govern-
ment. In particular, the vagueness of policy communication had siz-
able adverse effects on business and consumer confidence, leading 
to a further drop in private consumption and investment. 
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Of course, some sectors have been more affected than others.1 
More importantly and, most likely for some sectors, the COVID-
19-induced crisis will last longer than the virus itself. Not surpris-
ingly – due to current and future, national and international, trav-
el restrictions for people – the most suffering sector is (and will be) 
“hospitality and tourism”. For instance, Prometeia (2020) has esti-
mated a post-COVID-19 scenario characterized by a drop in added 
value in “accommodation and food service activities” of around 30%, 
which is more than twice compared to other sectors such as “man-
ufacturing” and “construction”. It is clear that in Italy, where the 
overall impact of tourism on GDP is around 13%, the return to pre-
COVID-19 aggregate macroeconomic conditions is going to be quite 
slow. The “transportation and storage” and “art, leisure and enter-
tainment” sectors are also expected to suffer more than others (Pro-
meteia, 2020). 
Some direct economic measures to stimulate these sectors have 
been adopted and will be soon implemented by the Italian govern-
ment. However, whether or not these economic incentives will be 
enough to mitigate the devastating economic impact of COVID-19 still 
remains an open issue. In the current scenario, the effectiveness of 
such incentives depends on many factors. One of them is the politi-
cal uncertainty that has recently rocketed in both Italy and Europe 
[fig. 1]. Indeed, in March 2020 the level of EPU rose by 110% in Eu-
rope (70% in Italy). As already shown in Bernanke (1985) and Baker 
et al. (2016), among others, political-related uncertainty could make 
consumers and entrepreneurs more cautious, discouraging both cur-
rent and future consumption, as well as investments. In addition, the 
adverse effects of political uncertainty on production and labour mar-
ket conditions have been shown to be more severe during bad times 
and when the economy is at the Zero Lower Bound (Caggiano et al., 
2017a, b). Due to its recessionary effects, the rising of EPU would call 
for a cut in the central bank policy rate (CBPR). However, when rates 
are close to zero, there is no room for conventional monetary policies 
and the loss of their effectiveness makes EPU shocks more harmful. 
Of course, unconventional monetary policies might help, but (some-
times) at the cost of rising perceived policy uncertainty.
1 Further discussion could be also devoted to the relation between a company’s tech-
nological automation level and the impact of containment policies on the firm’s perfor-
mance during the pandemic. The less employees of a firm are required to work within 
restricted physical limits, more it is likely that such firms are not subjected to manda-
tory cessation of production. If such perspectives had also been considered when decid-
ing the industrial lockdown, maybe some firms could have continued production even 
during the pandemic. In other words, the fostering of automation in industrial produc-
tion processes could be a potential solution to avoid production shut down during a po-
tential new pandemic wave.
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The effects of political uncertainty on the real economy are well 
known. However, the recent and still ongoing pandemic comes with 
unprecedented EPU levels, in particular in the US as well as globally 
[fig. 2]. According to Baker, Bloom, Davis (2020) this is due to the fact 
that the COVID-19 has boosted several aspects of uncertainty: (i) un-
certainty related to the disease (e.g. degree of infectiousness, lethal-
ity and mortality rate, capacity and efficiency of the health system, 
timing and development of vaccines); (ii) uncertainty induced by so-
cial distancing measures (e.g. duration and stringency of the imple-
mented measures, probability of further lockdowns, implementation 
of new mitigation and containment strategies) and (iii) economic-re-
lated uncertainty (e.g. policy effectiveness, recovery timing, the num-
ber of firms at risk of default). COVID-19 induced uncertainty is not 
strictly related to macroeconomic policy issues, but it also includes 
health and science-related topics,2 which have been shown to be sig-
nificant business cycle drivers (Donadelli, Gerotto 2019). This is al-
so confirmed by the rise observed in the World Pandemic-related un-
certainty index over the past three months [fig. 3].
2 The efficiency of the health system and the ability of the scientific community to 
provide quick feedbacks to the policymakers played a key role in the evolution of the 
pandemics. The complex cooperation between local health systems, governments and 
the World Health Organization (WHO) is responsible for increasing COVID-19 relat-
ed uncertainty. Furthermore, it is important to underline that further investigations 
must be done regarding the relationship between the past public (as well as private) 
funding assigned to both the health system and scientific research and the country’s 
‘COVID-19 performance’.
Figure 1 The Evolution of Political Uncertainty in Italy and Europe. Notes: this figure depicts the dynamics 
of the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for Italy (left axis, red line) and Europe (right axis, blue line). 
Data at monthly frequency have been retrieved from https://www.policyuncertainty.com/. 
Sample: 2008:M1-2020:M4
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Figure 2 The Evolution of Political Uncertainty in the US and in the World. Notes: this figure depicts the 
dynamics of the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for the US (blue line) and World (black line). Data at monthly 
frequency have been retrieved from https://www.policyuncertainty.com/. Sample: 2008:M1-2020:M4 
According to Baker et al. (2020), the role of the sky-scraping level of 
uncertainty generated by the pandemic concerns the effectiveness 
of economic policies and thus the length of recovery times, especial-
ly in some sectors. According to the authors, half of the US GDP con-
traction is due to COVID-19 induced-uncertainty, and standard EPU 
accounts only for 50% of the drop.
Figure 3 The Evolution of Pandemic-Related Uncertainty in the World. Notes: this figure depicts 
the dynamics of the World Pandemic Uncertainty Index (WUPI). Source: FRED. Sample: 2008:Q1-2020:Q1
In this respect, the implementation and the subsequent communica-
tion of efficient strategic economic-sectoral plans will help to mit-
igate part of this uncertainty, allowing the Italian economy, and in 
particular those sectors that have never recovered from past crises, 
to breathe again. In a country like Italy, already weakened by previ-
ous economic crises (i.e. the subprime and the sovereign debt crises) 
and constrained by the extremely high level of public debt, solving 
the COVID-19 induced uncertainty has to be considered a priority. 
The absence of a national industrial policy able to solve, at least par-
tially, the uncertainty generated by this health emergency, amplified 
by weak and confused government economic measures, as well as 
by litigious EU economic policy makers, can be lethal especially for 
sectors such as (i) hospitality and tourism, (ii) transport and storage, 
and (iii) art, leisure and entertainment. 
In this chapter, we assess the macroeconomic implications of COV-
ID-19 induced uncertainty on company revenues, gross operating mar-
gin and employment in 16 different Italian sectors by means of a stand-
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ard VAR analysis. Our results confirm COVID-19 induced uncertainty to 
be detrimental for the majority of Italian sectors, with significant drops 
in revenues and gross operating margin. ‘Construction’, ‘education’, 
‘manufacturing activities’, ‘professional, scientific and technical activ-
ities’ and ‘hospitality’ are among the most seriously affected sectors.
2 Empirical Analysis
Data and methodology
From ISTAT we retrieve revenues, gross operating margins and em-
ployment data for Italian businesses across 16 ATECO sectors.3 Un-
fortunately, the aggregated company data available in the ISTAT 
database are recorded with annual frequency. Standard linear in-
terpolations are performed to obtain quarterly figures with the aim 
to match the quarterly frequency of our uncertainty measure. As 
measure of political uncertainty, we employ the EPU index of Bloom, 
Baker and Davis.4 All data run from 2008:Q1 to 2017:Q1.
During the subprime crisis,5 EPU for Italy settled at 97.93. The 
average Italian EPU after the lockdown (March and April 2020) was 
218.32, more than twice compared to the great financial crisis era 
of 2007-09. Prometeia (2020) shows that the impact of COVID-19 is 
not symmetric across sectors. Thus, following these estimates and, in 
the spirit of Baker et al. (2020) and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, Figueres 
(2020), we reparametrize our calculations accordingly. Specifical-
ly, we calibrate the magnitude of the uncertainty shock due to COV-
ID-19 to be 2.3 times higher than during the subprime crisis in all 
sectors, except for ‘hospitality’ and ‘art, leisure and entertainment’, 
for which a factor of 3 and 2.8 is used, respectively. Our choice of re-
scaling the size of EPU shocks in all sectors is motivated by the fact 
that political uncertainty will last for several months. In addition, 
we believe that the ongoing and future social distancing measures 
(including several travel restrictions) in addition to the anxiety and 
general bad mood induced by COVID-19 will certainly have stronger 
recessionary effects on tourism and leisure activities. For this rea-
son, we applied an even higher factor for the ‘hospitality’ and ‘art, 
leisure and entertainment’ sectors. 
In the spirit of Baker et al. (2020) and Caggiano, Castelnuovo, 
Figueres (2020), we estimate the impact of COVID-19 by means of 
3 ATECO is the coding system used by the National Institute for Statistics (ISTAT) to clasO-
sify national economic activities. It complies with the European nomenclature, Nace Rev. 2.
4 See https://www.policyuncertainty.com/.
5 Note that this occurred from October to December 2008.
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standard bivariate VAR models. We thus ask: what is the effect of an 
EPU shock in the 16 ATECO sectors, once the greater magnitude of 
EPU induced by COVID-19 is accounted for?
Evaluating and understanding the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on 
the economy is rather challenging. News-based uncertainty metrics 
do not capture direct effects of COVID-19 (such as lockdowns or oth-
er social distancing measures and infection dynamics or other health-
related issues) and our analysis focuses on COVID-19 induced-uncer-
tainty shock only. Actually, even though there are similarities between 
the subprime crisis and the COVID-19 one, especially in terms of in-
creased economic-policy uncertainty, we have no knowledge yet about 
the persistence of this crisis given the risk of further waves of conta-
gions. In addition, EPU hardly takes into account likely drops in fu-
ture productivity due to social distancing measures and the reduction 
of investments. In other words, our approach is not capturing all the 
dimensions of uncertainty induced by the COVID-19. In this respect, 
one could expect stronger impact than those observed in our analysis.6 
Results
Figure 4 shows the impulse response of COVID-19 induced uncertain-
ty on company revenues [fig. 4]. The overall impact of COVID-19 on to-
tal revenues is negative in most sectors. The most affected sectors are 
‘construction’, ‘education’, ‘manufacturing activities’, ‘business sup-
port services’ and ‘hospitality’, which also show the longest recovery 
time (i.e. almost 18 months). Note that the daily activity of these sec-
tors has been interrupted from 21 March 2020 to mid-May 2020 by the 
Italian government due to social distancing measures. It is worth not-
ing that in the majority of sectors heavily hit by the COVID-19 growth 
has shown a negative trend over the period 2008:Q1-2017:Q1. The COV-
ID-19 is thus worsening a pre-existing critical economic outlook, in 
particular in those sectors that have never fully recovered from the 
2007-09 financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis. In general, the 
short-run drop vanishes within 12 quarters in most sectors. In other 
words, only after three years these sectors are supposed to return to 
their long-term equilibrium production and employment levels. 
Exceptions are the ‘electricity and gas supply’ and ‘health and so-
cial care’ sectors, which show a positive response following a COV-
ID-19 induced uncertainty shock. However, the positive effect is sta-
tistically significant only in the “electricity and gas supply” sector 
from two quarters after the shock. 
6 Not surprisingly as of June (2020) the IMF revised its estimates on the real GDP 
growth for 2020 indicating a worsening across G7 countries.
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Figure 4 COVID-related uncertainty impact on company revenues (% deviations from mean). 
Notes: this figure depicts impulse responses (expressed as deviations from long-term mean) of company 
revenues (in different economic sector) to a COVID-19-related uncertainty shock. For each sector the impulse 
response function is estimated from a bivariate-VAR where COVID-related uncertainty is ordered first. 
Black solid lines and dashed black ones: point estimates and 68% percent confidence bands. 
Data on company revenues are from the ISTAT. Sample: 2008:Q1-2017:Q1 
Estimates on gross operating margin are presented in figure 5 and 
show a very similar pattern compared to revenues [fig. 5]. Once again, 
the sectors most adversely affected by the COVID-19 are ‘construc-
tion’, ‘education’, ‘manufacturing activities’, ‘business support servic-
es’ and ‘hospitality’. Dynamics in figure 5 indicate also that in these 
sectors the effects of the pandemic will last for almost two years. 
Differently from aggregate revenues, the impact on the gross oper-
ating margin is found to be larger in magnitude. For instance, ‘con-
struction’, ‘hospitality’ and ‘art, leisure and entertainment’ drop by 
more than 3%.
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Figure 5 COVID-related uncertainty impact on employment (% deviations from mean). 
Notes: this figure depicts impulse responses (expressed as deviations from long-term mean) of company gross 
operating margin (in different economic sectors) to a COVID-19-related uncertainty shock. For each sector the 
impulse response function is estimated from a bivariate-VAR where COVID-related uncertainty is ordered first. 
Black solid lines and dashed black ones: Point estimates and 68% percent confidence bands. 
Data on company revenues are from the ISTAT. Sample: 2008:Q1-2017:Q1
Lastly, we present and discuss the estimated COVID-19 impact on 
the number of employed workers in each sector [fig. 6]. Estimates are 
generally less significant with respect to the previous cases. Never-
theless, similar conclusions can be drawn. ‘Business support servic-
es’ show the highest (negative) impact on employment, with a drop 
of -0.5% after one quarter and a full recovery not earlier than three 
years, followed by ‘education’ with almost -0.5% after six months. A 
key difference with respect to responses on revenues and gross op-
erating margin regards the recovery time. Due to certain rigidities 
in the labour market, the effects of COVID-19 induced uncertainty 
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Figure 6 COVID-related uncertainty impact on employment (% deviations from mean). Notes: this figure 
depicts impulse responses (expressed as deviations from long-term mean) of company employment (in 
different economic sectors) to a COVID-19-related uncertainty shock. For each sector the impulse response 
function is estimated from a bivariate-VAR where COVID-related uncertainty is ordered first. Black solid lines 
and dashed black ones: point estimates and 68% percent confidence bands. Data on company employment 
level are from the ISTAT. Sample: 2008:Q1-2017:Q1
shocks on employment are more persistent. It is important to under-
line that – at the end of 2019, before the virus spread – Italy was one 
of the EU countries with the highest unemployment rate (9.9% com-
pared to an EU average of 6.7%).7 The slowdown of the economy in-
duced by COVID-19 is undoubtedly worsening a pre-existing Italian 
economic scenario. With regard to ‘hospitality’, it is noteworthy that 
employment levels follow a seasonal trend and most of the workers in 
7 Source: Word Bank data, Total Unemployment (% of total labor force).
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this sector are hired during the tourist season (i.e. from May to Oc-
tober). The consequences on employment are thus likely to be worse 
than those estimated in figure 6.
Finally, table 2 shows the cumulative impact of COVID-19 at 6, 12 
and 18 months after the EPU shock. On average, the impact on rev-
enues after 18 months is -2.1%. Estimates on GOM depicts a more 
dramatic framework among Italian sectors. The average cumulative 
impact equals -3.4% after 6 months, -4.5% after 12 and -5% after 18. 
Clearly, many Italian sectors are not going to recover quickly from 
this pandemic.




















6 Rev -1.549 -1.532 1.713 -1.574 -3.024 -1.059 -1.478 -1.403
GOM -1.777 -4.973 0.030 -2.847 -7.148 -3.943 -4.374 -5.832
E -0.836 0.094 0.391 -0.091 -0.204 -0.364 -0.004 0.009
12 Rev -2.569 -2.147 2.994 -2.286 -4.177 -1.488 -2.059 -2.010
GOM -1.945 -7.000 0.167 -4.365 -10.260 -5.759 -6.614 -8.065
E -1.501 0.206 0.727 -0.187 -0.508 -0.620 0.079 0.025
18 Rev -4.303 -2.441 3.710 -2.541 -4.633 -1.665 -2.274 -2.313
GOM -2.031 -7.729 0.248 -5.036 -11.423 -6.572 -7.527 -8.924




























6 Rev -0.566 -0.998 -2.103 -0.315 -2.758 0.091 -1.263 -1.549
GOM -1.438 -0.585 -4.169 -2.454 -4.194 0.756 -5.249 -1.614
E 0.095 -0.565 -1.120 -0.050 -0.511 -0.184 0.008 0.579
12 Rev -0.854 -1.383 -2.983 -0.295 -4.140 0.124 -1.809 -2.569
GOM -2.124 -1.018 -5.853 -3.253 -6.673 1.214 -7.259 -2.379
E 0.035 -0.957 -1.768 -0.084 -1.114 -0.471 0.022 0.934
18 Rev -1.019 -1.605 -3.325 -0.284 -4.662 0.140 -2.081 -4.303
GOM -2.505 -1.330 -6.423 -3.621 -7.751 1.351 -8.032 -2.765
Emp -0.005 -1.138 -2.047 -0.113 -1.388 -0.643 0.033 1.116
Notes: this table depicts the cumulative impulse responses of company revenues (Rev), gross operating margin (GOM), and employment 
(E) in different economic sectors to a COVID-19-related uncertainty shock after 6, 12 and 18 months. For each sector the impulse 
response function is estimated on the basis of a bivariate-VAR where COVID-related uncertainty (i.e, EPU) is ordered first. Data on 
company revenues, gross operating margins and employment level are from the ISTAT. Sample: 2008:Q1-2017:Q1
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3 Concluding Remarks
Since March 2020, the rising number of confirmed COVID-19 cas-
es around the World has made it necessary to implement a series of 
social distancing measures (including lockdowns) aimed at slowing 
down the rate of infection. Naturally, these measures have generat-
ed a direct effect on the real economic activity. In particular, a rapid 
drop in production and subsequently in employment levels. Even be-
fore the virus was detected in Italy, the country was in a thorny eco-
nomic situation. In fact, it was one of the last EU countries in terms 
of economic growth performance and among the first for level of un-
employment and public debt. Certainly, for Italy the economic effects 
related to COVID-19 could be more harmful than for other countries.
Measuring the true impact of COVID-19 may be challenging. What 
is sure is that this newly declared pandemic has generated an un-
precedented level of uncertainty. Even if not strictly related to eco-
nomics or politics, such uncertainty seems to be induced by topics 
associated (on average) with bad news that are well known to be det-
rimental for production. 
The lack of clarity in managing the pandemic and the absence of 
immediate, efficient and concrete government actions8 failed in re-
storing market confidence and resolving uncertainty. This will lead 
to more severe adverse effects on the real economy. Intuitively, un-
clear policies and measures make consumers and businesses more 
averse to ambiguity. Consequently, investments and hiring are post-
poned to obtain additional information on future outcomes (Baker, 
Bloom, Davis 2016). More importantly, COVID-19 induced uncertain-
ty seems to be responsible for a delay in economic recovery. More 
severe and long-lasting negative effects have been found in particu-
lar in the ‘construction’, ‘education’, ‘manufacturing activities’, ‘busi-
ness support services’ and ‘hospitality’ sectors. 
COVID-19 hit 208 countries worldwide representing thus a global 
shock. In order to mitigate its adverse effects, any government should 
implement policies aimed at reducing the overall level of domestic po-
litical uncertainty and slowing down contagions while boosting the 
economy. This with the ultimate goals of recovering more quickly. 
8 In the case of Italy, it is also important to underline the significant delay of nation-
al government in establishing a scientific-economic committee. The scientific health 
committee was formally set up in early February 2020, whereas the economic one was 
established only in April 2020. First lockdown measures started in early March 2020 
whereas industrial shutdown was declared from mid-March 2020. Since containment 
policies aimed to protect population health also affect economy, the government should 
have defined earlier and more concisely the economic compensation policies. By imme-
diately identifying the optimal mix between containment policies and economic com-
pensation this would have reduced the overall uncertainty induced by the COVID-19 
pandemic as well as its negative impact on economy.
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Indeed, uncertainty related to this pandemic may represent the 
trigger of a deep change in the current paradigm of economic devel-
opment. The need of a different approach to the economic growth has 
been widely recognised over the last 10 years. The tackling of climate 
change, inequality and hunger are at the centre of the world debate 
from many years and still local governments lack of concrete actions in 
their policy strategies. This ‘new world’ re-designed by the pandemic 
represents the perfect field to put finally such strategies into actions. 
Close cooperation between EU members represents a fundamen-
tal element for the success of any economic, as well as health, policy 
identified by each country. In the last years, European Union played a 
central role in boosting innovation in green technologies sector for in-
stance, but such specific interventions are not enough now to address 
the economic challenge drawn by the COVID-19 virus. The institution-
al role of EU and its economic policy in response to ongoing COVID-19 
induced crises are crucial for the economic recovery of the continent.
Italy has been in need of a consistent industrial policy for many 
years. The labour market was subject to different reforms but all 
of them were constrained by the high level of political uncertainty. 
Digitalisation and sustainability topics were key elements of sever-
al electoral programmes but they remained so even after the elect-
ed government settled. The current pandemic has emphasised the 
effect of policymakers’ behaviour to postpone such interventions, 
which instead firms necessitated even before the COVID-19 diffu-
sion. Italian policymakers identified short-term solutions to support 
the economy during the pandemics, and contain the virus diffusion 
at the same time, by selecting specific industrial sectors to exclude 
from the mandatory cessation of production and providing econom-
ic compensation measures to the others. In a medium term perspec-
tive, it is very unlikely that this solution to be optimal for the nation-
al economy. In addition to the traditional economic policies aimed at 
fostering the growth of an economy after a shock like this one, poli-
cymakers are called to identify specific interventions aimed at sup-
porting firms’ innovation so that production to continue even during 
a second potential wave of pandemic (i.e. supporting automation of 
industrial process, home automation, digitalisation, implementation 
of smart working system...).9 The success of such instruments is con-
ditioned by the presence of a high level of efficiency in public insti-
9 With reference to the Italian case and the economic measures to be adopted for 
those sectors affected the most by this pandemic, the different entrepreneurial per-
spectives at regional level must be taken into account. As also during the pandemic, 
the governors of the regions will play a central role on this aspect. Since the Italian 
firms’ environment is characterised by a significant level of family-owned SME, a spe-
cific dialogue with each trade association must be open to understand the different en-
trepreneurs’ perspectives.
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tutions, infrastructures and national health care system. Thus, eco-
nomic reforms must focus also on these aspects. 
With reference to the health system in particular, we underline 
the importance of a close cooperation and coordination between pri-
vate and public health institutions, as well as of the role played by 
academic research. Regulations regarding the former must be re-
defined learning from the experience of the last months of pandem-
ics (by increasing the employees in the sector, the compliance of the 
health structures to operational and safety standards in line with the 
pandemic critical issues and the level of technological endowment…), 
so that the uncertainty related to the pandemic is reduced. In addi-
tion to that, public funding strategies for these sectors must be re-
organised with a specific attention to their contribution in respond-
ing to the emergency. Reducing the uncertainty in public funding in 
these two sectors could increase their qualitative performance and 
outputs, which in turn can be considered as a key element to prevent 
or manage the next pandemic wave.
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1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic and the associated lockdown has had big negative ef-
fects on national economies – sharply reduced gross national product (GNP), 
depressed share prices, considerably increased unemployment, forced firms 
into liquidation, reduced interest rates, lowered government tax revenues, and 
caused very large amounts of government spending. The economic consequen-
ces of COVID-19 have affected pension schemes in a variety of ways. In addi-
tion, COVID-19 has led to the death of hundreds of thousands of people glo-
bally, which also has implications for pension schemes and annuity providers.
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2 Types of Pension Scheme
There are two main types of pension scheme – defined benefit (DB) 
and defined contribution (DC) (Sutcliffe 2016). DB schemes are offe-
red by employers (sponsors), and promise to pay a pension calcula-
ted using either a member’s final or average salary, and the number 
of years of membership of the scheme (accrued years). Both the em-
ployer and members make contributions which are a percentage of 
the member’s salary. This money is then invested in a pooled man-
ner by the DB scheme to provide the cash to pay the promised pen-
sions. Every year (or every three years in the UK) each DB scheme 
undergoes an actuarial valuation when the assets are compared with 
the present value of the scheme’s liabilities, i.e. the promised pen-
sions. This may lead to a change in both the member and employer 
contribution rates, although the ultimate responsibility for meeting 
the pensions promise lies with the employer. 
DC schemes receive contributions from both the members and 
their employer, and this money is paid into segregated pots of money, 
each ‘owned’ by the member concerned. Members can usually choo-
se how their pot of money is invested (although the vast majority do 
not), and when they retire they choose what to do with the final va-
lue of their pot of money – buy an annuity, take it in cash, or go into 
drawdown (i.e. invest the money and make withdraws as required). 
The relative importance of DB and DC schemes in terms of assets 
and accrued liabilities differs between countries, as shown in table 1.
Table 1 asset split between DB and DC occupational schemes and total assets  
in 2019 (Willis Towers Watson 2020b)
Japan Canada Netherlands UK US Australia
DB 95% 95% 94% 82% 39% 14%
DC 5% 5% 6% 18% 61% 86%
Assets US$ bn. 3,386 1,924 1,690 3,451 29,196 2,077
3 Longevity
By 17th June 2020 there were 8,006,427 confirmed cases of COVID-19 
globally, including 436,899 deaths, reported to the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO 2020). The death of many members and pensioners 
from COVID-19 has reduced the liabilities of DB pension schemes, as 
the deceased will not receive any pension payments. The death of a 
pensioner terminates their pension, leaving only a spouse’s pension, 
which is usually half the full pension. The death of an active member 
results in a death-in-service payment, which is generally a lot less 
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than the actuarial value of the pension they would otherwise have 
received. Similarly insurance companies, who sell annuities mainly 
to former members of DC schemes, will also benefit. The death of an 
annuitant terminates the annuity payments, although survivor be-
nefits (e.g. spouses) may continue at a much reduced rate. The size 
of these beneficial effects of COVID-19 for DB pension schemes and 
insurance companies is unclear. There may be repeat waves of CO-
VID-19 infection, and increased deaths from other causes indirectly 
caused by COVID-19, e.g. the temporary withdrawal of treatment for 
some medical conditions, people not seeking medical treatment due 
to the fear of contracting COVID-19, the damage caused by COVID-19 
to the health of those who have recovered shortening their longevity, 
etc. Cairns et al (2020) modelled the likely effects of COVID-19 on UK 
longevity, and concluded that the main effect is to advance the date 
of death by a few years, e.g. people who would otherwise have died 
at age 85, are dying at the age of 80 (40% of deaths from COVID-19 
in the UK were aged over 85). The implication of this model is that 
the beneficial effect of COVID-19 for DB schemes and annuity provi-
ders from the elevated death rate is small; and makes little differen-
ce to the funding of DB schemes and the price of annuities. In short, 
UK mortality has been declining over time, but COVID-19 has incre-
ased it to its level in 2008.
4 State Pensions
State pension schemes often have unique and complicated designs. 
Many state pensions, e.g. the UK, are pay-as-you-go with contribu-
tions by current employers and employees used to pay current pen-
sions. Other state pensions are funded, and invest the contributions 
to pay the promised state pensions at a later date, e.g. China. CO-
VID-19 has affected state pensions in a variety of ways.
Following COVID-19, the Finnish government temporarily redu-
ced the employers’ state pension contribution rate by 2.6% until the 
end of 2020, and will finance this using a reserve fund. The reduc-
tion in contributions will be recouped from employers by increasing 
their contribution rate for 2022-25. COVID-19 may lead to reductions 
in US Social Security benefits, as they are based on the US average 
wage index. Biggs (2020) has forecast that COVID-19 will automati-
cally reduce US Social Security expenditure. He has estimated that, 
if this index drops by 15% in 2020, Social Security benefits for those 
aged 60 in 2020 will be around 13% per year lower when they reti-
re. This will lower the cost of US Social Security and extend the da-
te when it runs out of money to beyond 2034 (OASDI Trustees 2020). 
However, the large increase in the US unemployment rate from 3.5% 
in February 2020 to 14.7% in April 2020 has reduced total Social Se-
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curity contributions paid by employees and employers (US Bureau of 
Labor Statistics 2020). There has also been a small increase in So-
cial Security payments, due to unemployed workers retiring early. 
These effects may bring the date of exhaustion of the Social Securi-
ty fund forward to 2029 (Gladstone, Akabas 2020).
The very large cost of COVID-19 to governments, in terms of sup-
porting individuals and companies, and the drop in tax revenues from 
the reduction in economic activity may have a negative effect on the 
level of state pensions as governments seek to offset the costs of CO-
VID-19. Since 2011 the UK has had a “triple lock” on annual increases 
in the state pension; which must rise by at least the highest of infla-
tion, average earnings growth and 2.5%. The Social Market Founda-
tion has estimated that removing 2.5% to leave a “double lock” would 
save the government £4 billion per year (Corfe 2020). 
Since over eight million UK workers have been furloughed on 80% 
of their wages, average earnings are forecast by the Office for Bud-
get Responsibility (OBR 2020) to drop by 7.3% in 2020. So state pen-
sions will rise by the guaranteed minimum of 2.5%. For 2021, after 
the furlough has ended, average earnings should rise by 7/93 = 8%, 
while the OBR has forecast they will increase by 18.3%. If this OBR 
forecast is correct state pensions will also rise by 18%, unless the 
rules are changed.
Some governments have set aside a specific revenue stream, e.g. 
North Sea oil, to create a sovereign wealth fund to provide for state 
pensions (e.g. Norway, Chile, Ireland, France, China). Governments 
seeking to fund their COVID-19 expenditure and loss of revenue may 
draw money from their sovereign wealth fund. Norway has a $1,000 
billion sovereign welfare fund (the Government Pension Fund Glo-
bal, GPFG) which receives government revenues from North Sea oil. 
Due to the pressures on government finances caused by COVID-19, 
the 2020 Norwegian budget has been amended, and instead of paying 
$0.4 billion into the GPFG, the Norwegian government will withdraw 
$38 billion from the fund. Further withdrawals from the GPFG may 
be needed in subsequent years. In France, as well as suspending 
major pension reform due to COVID-19, the French Pension Reserve 
Fund (FRR) will pay at least an additional €13 billion to help finan-
ce state pensions. 
5 Asset Values
COVID-19 and the associated economic disruption has led to drama-
tic falls in stock markets around the world. From 12th February 2020 
to 23rd March 2020 the FTSE 100 and S&P 500 indices both fell by 
34%, although they then rose. As DB and DC pension funds hold lar-
ge amounts of equities, this caused big reductions in the value of the 
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assets available to pay pensions. During the first quarter of 2020 the 
value of US DB pension assets dropped by 14.9%, and the value of UK 
DB pension assets dropped by 19.7% (Evestment 2020). For DB sche-
mes this led to a deterioration in their funding ratios (i.e assets/liabi-
lities); while the pension pots of DC scheme members became smaller.
If DB schemes have a deficit they need to eliminate it over a num-
ber of years, usually by additional contributions. Higher contribu-
tion rates will put extra financial pressure on employers, leading 
them to reduce their dividends, investment, and other discretionary 
expenditure. There may also be an increase in the contribution ra-
te for members, reducing their disposable income and incentivising 
them to leave the pension scheme and become deferred pensioners. 
For DC members the drop in asset values has reduced the expected 
size of their pension pot at retirement, which may mean they need 
to work longer before they can afford to retire.
The drop in equity prices caused by COVID-19 may be a short term 
phenomenon having little long term effect, with DB scheme funding 
and the value of DC pension pots recovering to their pre-COVID-19 
levels. However, even if this happens, there will be losers. In some 
countries active members of DC schemes are allowed to withdraw 
money from their pension pot before they retire. Those members who 
transfer out of a DB scheme, or who cash in part of their DC pension 
pot before asset values recover, will be losers. To prevent this the Ca-
nadian government has placed a temporary ban on pension transfers 
and the purchase of annuities (Government of Canada 2020). In the 
UK DB scheme members can transfer their accumulated benefits to 
a DC scheme and, if they are over the age of 55, withdraw some or 
all of the money in their new DC pension pot. Transferring out of a 
DB scheme when asset values are depressed results in a low valua-
tion of the member’s accumulated pension benefits (the cash equiva-
lent transfer value) that are transferred to the DC scheme, and the-
refore a poor deal for the member.
Australia has allowed unemployed members to remove $20,000 
from their pension pot, leading to a sharp increase in withdrawals. 
The US CARES Act 2020 allows DC scheme members to withdraw up 
to $100,000 from their pot without penalty (Anzalone 2020), and 30% 
of US DC scheme members have withdrawn money from their pen-
sion pots since the COVID-19 pandemic (Berger 2020). Iceland has 
allowed withdrawals from pensions of up to €75,000, regardless of 
age. While helping to deal with the immediate pressures of COVID-19 
on household budgets, withdrawals reduce the size of pension pots 
available to finance retirement. It also means members are liquida-
ting their pension assets when values are low.
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 240
A New World Post COVID-19, 235-244
6 Discount Rate
COVID-19 has resulted in cuts in interest rates to exceptionally low 
levels, e.g. the Bank of England rate went from 0.75% on 11th March 
2020 to only 0.10% on March 19, 2020. Cuts in interest rates reduce 
the discount rate used to compute the present value of DB scheme 
liabilities, leading to larger liabilities and reductions in scheme fun-
ding ratios. This may result in higher pension contributions being re-
quired from employers and members, and members leaving or decli-
ning to join DB schemes due to the higher cost.
Most DB scheme members in the UK and US are in the public 
sector (e.g. civil servants, armed forces, police, teachers, NHS, fi-
re fighters). Almost all these UK schemes are unfunded, and contri-
butions are set using the forecast rate of UK economic growth to di-
scount the liabilities. It is widely forecast than COVID-19 will result 
in a substantial drop in long-term economic growth rates, with nega-
tive growth in the short run. This will increase the liabilities of un-
funded public sector schemes, requiring higher contributions by pu-
blic sector employers and scheme members.
7 Companies
By June 9, 2020 8.9 million workers in the UK had been furloughed 
(i.e. supported by the government not to work), and 2.5 million self-
employed workers were also being supported by the government 
(BBC 2020). A further 2.1 million were claiming unemployment be-
nefits in April 2020 (ONS 2020). The UK pensions regulator has allo-
wed employers to defer making their agreed deficit repair contribu-
tions to restore the funding of their DB schemes for three months or 
longer, on condition they do not pay any dividends during the defer-
ment period and receive agreement from their trustees. This offer 
has been taken up by more than 10% of UK DB schemes. UK sche-
mes are also free to alter the employer’s contribution rate for DB 
and DC schemes, provided the scheme rules are followed; and De-
loitte and the Financial Times have substantially reduced their DC 
contribution rates on a temporary basis. Only 15% of UK DB sche-
mes plan to make up for these temporary reductions in contribu-
tions by making additional contributions in the future (Willis Towers 
Watson 2020a). Most UK DB schemes are cash flow negative, so su-
spending employer contributions may increase the sale of assets at 
depressed prices. Cuts in dividends will also reduce the income re-
ceived by pension funds on their equity holdings, e.g. Royal Dutch 
Shell has cancelled its £2 billion dividend. Given the financial pres-
sures on employers, the UK pensions regulator will not pursue em-
ployers who are late in making their pension contributions; although 
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it will pursue employers who do not pass on the member contribu-
tions deducted from salaries.
Due to the financial pressures on employers from COVID-19, em-
ployers in the Netherlands have been allowed to delay making their 
contributions to DB schemes, as have those in Bulgaria; while Ger-
man employers have been allowed to delay making DB deficit repair 
contributions until 2021. Finland has also allowed employers to su-
spend contributions by themselves and their employees to occupa-
tional schemes for up to three months, and US employers have redu-
ced or suspended their contributions to DC schemes (Mitchell 2020). 
In order to reduce their workforce due to the economic effects of 
COVID-19 on their revenue, some companies may offer early retire-
ment on more generous terms. Providing these enhanced terms will 
deplete the funding of DB schemes.
The lockdown and associated drop in income will result in corpo-
rate failures. For those firms with DB pension schemes, this may me-
an their DB scheme has a deficit, and is unable to meet its pensions 
promise. In some counties such schemes enter a government autho-
rised compensation scheme such as the Pension Protection Fund in 
the UK, and the Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation in the US. 
COVID-19 will put pressure on the finances of these compensation 
schemes, and this will probably lead to an increase in the levies they 
impose on DB schemes.
8 Members
Most of those made unemployed by COVID-19 will probably beco-
me deferred pensioners, or perhaps transfer their pension to ano-
ther scheme. Oku (2020) has estimated this will increase the number 
of dormant pensions in the UK by 32%, and the deferred pensioners 
may lose track of these pensions. Older people who are made unem-
ployed may decide to retire and start collecting their DB pension, or 
cash in their DC pension pot, while still looking for work. This will re-
duce the size of their annual DB or DC pension because they will be 
retired for longer. For those who continue to be employed, pressure 
on household finances and the possibility of higher contribution rates 
has meant that three million UK members of DC schemes have redu-
ced or stopped their contributions, which will reduce the size of their 
pension pots at retirement. Similarly in the US, 47% of DC scheme 
members have lowered or stopped their contributions (Berger 2020).
The UK pension freedoms of 2015 brought the UK into line with 
other counties by allowing DC pensioners to invest their pension pot 
themselves, rather than buy an annuity with a guaranteed income 
when they retired. These pensioners in drawdown have suffered a 
sharp drop in their wealth as a result of the drop in asset values cau-
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sed by COVID-19. By giving members much more choice over their 
pensions, pension freedoms have permitted an increase in pension 
scams, and COVID-19 has led to a big increase in such scams. In May 
2020 Canada Life (2020) found that since the COVID-19 outbreak be-
gan pension scams in the UK have risen by about 40%, with one mil-
lion people being targeted. This has reduced the pension assets of 
the victims, making them more likely to experience poverty in retire-
ment. Many other counties have also warned against pension scams 
in connection with COVID-19.
COVID-19 may lead to runaway inflation (Amundi 2020). In the UK 
all DB pensions are required to be indexed to inflation up to 2.5%, 
and some annuities are also inflation indexed. To the extent that DB 
pensions and annuities are subject to limited price indexation, since 
asset prices tend to increase with inflation, DB schemes should be 
protected or even gain. But pensioners will be losers, as their pen-
sions will rise by less than inflation, reducing the real value of their 
pension for the rest of their retirement.
9 Regulation
The response of pension regulators has differed across countries in 
terms of suspending employer and member contributions, allowing 
members to access their pension assets, and the relaxation of other 
regulations. The US CARES Act has suspended the requirement for 
DC pensioners over the age of 72 to make minimum withdrawals 
from their pension pot. The UK has relaxed its insolvency laws and 
now restricts the right of creditors to recover debts, which reduces 
the ability of DB schemes and the Pension Protection Fund to pursue 
employers for unpaid pension contributions. Due to fears that foreign 
investment by Icelandic pension funds would devalue the krona, the 
central bank asked them to refrain from making foreign investments 
from March 2020 until September 2020. Regulators who have suspen-
ded rules (e.g. employer contributions, member pension withdrawals, 
insolvency), extended deadlines (e.g. actuarial valuations, reports to 
the pension regulator) and tolerated rule breaches, as well as placed 
restrictions on some activities (e.g. paying dividends, discouraging 
transfers from DB schemes), must decide when and how to restore 
the rules and their enforcement to pre-COVID-19 levels.
10 Conclusions
While COVID-19 has clearly had a negative short run effect on pen-
sions, most of these negative effects should largely disappear in the 
long run, depending on the speed and extent to which the economy, 
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asset prices and interest rates recover to pre-COVID-19 levels. Tho-
se who transferred out of a DB scheme, or who cashed in their DC 
pot during the period when asset prices were depressed, are losers. 
Employers who fail as a result of COVID-19 may have underfunded 
DB schemes, and the pension compensation schemes usually repla-
ce most, but not all, of the promised pension. Therefore the members 
(but not the pensioners, as they are usually fully compensated) of the-
se DB schemes will also be losers, as will victims of the increased le-
vel of pensions fraud stemming from COVID-19. Pensions regulators 
face difficult decisions about when to end their forbearance, and re-
quire employers to revert to pre-COVID-19 regulations and contribu-
tions. They will also need to address the time scale over which emplo-
yers are required to make their deferred contributions. Unless there 
is an upsurge in deaths from COVID-19, the benefit to DB pensions 
and annuity providers from the temporary increase in elderly morta-
lity will have little short term effect on DB pension schemes, and no 
long term effect.
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1 Introduction
Risk management in insurance companies requires careful contingency plan-
ning. The plans incorporate the actions that management would take follow-
ing well predefined stress and scenario tests upon the realisation of very low 
probability events. Insurance groups have been well prepared for this crisis 
with strong capital positions. Still, the current pandemic raises many ques-
tions regarding the sector’s product offerings and investment portfolio mix. 
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Section 2 of this chapter briefly reviews the impact of past crises on 
economic output. Section 3 discusses the role of insurance and the 
impact of the current crisis on the sector.
2 A First Glance on the Impact of Pandemics  
on the Wider Economy
Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) will 
reclassify1 the emergence of infectious diseases amongst the key top 
risks, in terms of impact and likelihood of occurrence, that should 
be anticipated in financial institutions’ business planning. Given the 
right conditions, COVID-19, the name of the disease caused by the 
highly virulent pathogen SARS-CoV-2, unexpectedly spread across 
borders to disrupt the longest run of world economic growth on re-
cord, to devastate communities, cities and continents posing unprec-
edented health and financial stability challenges.
This event is not the first pandemic event in history. Pandemics 
are amongst the deadliest events in human history. Events such as 
the 1918-19 ‘Spanish Flu’ and the medieval 1347-51 bubonic plague 
known as ‘Black Death’ tortured the world causing pronounced in-
creases in excess mortality.2 DeWitte (2014) reports that Black Death 
is estimated to have killed 30% to 50% of the European population 
at that time. In addition to widespread increases in mortality and 
morbidity, pandemics can cause fiscal deficits in the short-term and 
can be the primary cause for long-term pronounced negative shocks 
to economic growth. Table 1 presents a non-exhaustive list of these 
events over the last century, and details the significant blow to life 
and to the economy that these have delivered in the past.
1 Infectious diseases were kept consistently outside the World Economic Forum’s 
(WEF) top five risks. The WEF, in its 2020 Global Risks Report, classified infectious 
diseases amongst the top 10 risks in terms of impact, but assigned a lower probability 
of realisation than the average probability assigned to other risks (http://www3.we-
forum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risk_Report_2020.pdf).
2 Excess mortality is a term used in epidemiology and public health to refer to the 
number of deaths above the level expected under normal conditions. The World Health 
Organisation define ‘excess mortality’ as the “mortality above what would be expected 
based on the non-crisis mortality rate in the population of interest. Excess mortality is 
thus mortality that is attributable to the crisis conditions. It can be expressed as a rate 
(the difference between observed and non-crisis mortality rates), or as a total number 
of excess deaths” (https://www.who.int/hac/about/definitions/en/).
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Table 1 Notable pandemics and epidemics and the impact on human life  
and the economy. Adapted mainly from Madhav et al. 2018 and other sources  
as stated in the table
Starting 
Year
Event Estimated mortality Estimated economic 
impact
1918 ‘Spanish Flu’ 20mn-100mn deaths
(Johnson, Mueller 2002)
GDP loss of 11% in the US,  
17% in the UK and 15%  
in Canada (McKibbin, 
Sidorenko 2006)
1957 ‘Asian flu’ 0.7mn-1.5mn deaths
(Viboud et al. 2016)
GDP loss of 3% in the US,  
UK, Canada, and Japan  
(McKibbin, Sidorenko 2006)
1968 ‘Hong Kong Flu’ 1mn deaths (Mathews  
et al. 2009)
US $23bn to US $26bn direct  
and indirect costs in the US  
(Kavet 1977)
1981 HIV/AIDS 36.7mn death 2%-4% annual loss in GDP 
growth in Africa
2003 SARS 744 deaths across 37 
countries (Wang, Jolly 2004)
Overall economic loss 
of US $50bn (FT 2009)
2009 ‘Swine Flu’ 151.7k to 575.5k deaths 
(Dawood et. 2012)
GDP loss of US $1bn
2013 Ebola outbreak 11,323 deaths
Mainly West Africa
US $2.8bn for Guinea, Liberia 
and Sierra Leone  
(World Bank 2014)
2015 Zika virus outbreak 2,656 reported cases  
of microcephaly (WHO 2017) 
across 76 countries
US $7bn to US $18 bn loss 
in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (UNDP 2017)
The coronavirus pandemic is savaging the world economy. By the 
end of Q2 2020, the “global economy is in its most precarious posi-
tion since the global financial crisis”,3 and was entering the deepest 
and possibly the shortest recession in living memory. That view is re-
flected in the IMF’s recent update on the growth of the world econo-
my. The IMF forecasts a contraction of -4.9% in world GDP, a change 
of -1.9% from its previous update in April. At the end of 2019, world 
GDP is reported at c. US $142 trillion in purchasing power parity 
terms (i.e. international dollars). The IMF’s estimate would imply a 
staggering contraction of c. -$6.95 trillion from the 2019 year-end 
figure in purchasing power parity terms.
At the time of writing (end of May-mid June 2020), the latest eco-
nomic data point to a rapid slowdown to economic activity resulting 
3 Quote from Laurence Boone’s, OECD Chief Economist, article “Tackling the Fallout 
from the Coronavirus”, published at https://oecdecoscope.blog/2020/03/02/tack-
ling-the-fallout-from-the-coronavirus/.
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in widespread business closures, near-universal event cancellations, 
remote working, and a general disruption of supply chains. Some of 
these key risks can be covered privately through insurance.
3 The Role of Insurance and the Impact of the Pandemic 
Crisis on the Sector
The insurance sector plays a key role in absorbing systemic risks un-
der normal conditions, and its role is particularly important in tak-
ing losses following a pandemic or natural catastrophe caused by an 
earthquake or extreme weather event. Insurers and reinsurers act 
as financial intermediaries to provide effective risk transfer of finan-
cial and biometric risks, natural catastrophes and man-made disas-
ters and pandemic risks. Reinsurers provide cover to life insurers 
against adverse mortality experience and stand to incur losses as big 
as the economic losses inflicted by natural catastrophes. Traditional 
retrocession and risk pooling methods provide the mechanisms for 
effective risk transfer and accumulation of capital.
For example, the Swiss Re Institute (2020) reports that in 2019, 
insurance provided cover for US $60 billion of the US $146 billion 
of economic losses inflicted by disasters. This cover is lower than in 
each of the previous two years due to the absence of severe hurri-
canes in the US, and is below the annual average of US $75 billion 
over the previous 10 years.
SCOR, the French reinsurance group, limits its exposure to natu-
ral catastrophes to 10% of its eligible own funds4 (i.e. €980 million) 
and 20% for pandemic risks (i.e. €1.970 billion). SCOR monitors its 
key risk drivers and extreme scenario exposures against predefined 
risk tolerance limits. Table 2 provides SCOR’s expected loss in ex-
treme scenarios calibrated to the 1-in-200 year single events. The 
cost of a pandemic event is estimated just under €1.5 billion.
4 Eligible own funds as the name implies are the insurers/reinsurers’ own capital that 
are available to absorb losses. Pursuant to Article 88 of the Solvency 2 Directive (EU 
Directive 2009/138/EC), own funds are composed of the excess of assets over liabilities 
and subordinated liabilities. Own funds items are classed into three tiers.
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Table 2 Controlling risk appetite. Lessons from SCOR. Source: Company disclosure5
in €mn Risk Capacity* in €mn
North Atlantic Hurricane 660 980
U.S Earthquake 460 980
EU Wind 670 980
Japanese Earthquake 250 980
Terrorist Attack 230 980
Pandemic 1,470 1,970
* The exposure amount by risk that SCOR is willing to accept in pursuit of its 
business objectives.
Pandemics could also have serious consequences for insurers. The 
economic loss caused in 2003 by the SARS epidemic is estimated at 
c. US $50 billion and was mostly attributed to decreased travel and 
consumer spending. It is conceivable that all the shocks in table 2 
could eventually materialise someday, but it is highly unlikely that 
all these single events will occur in the same year.
Today, the current impact of the coronavirus is being felt on both 
sides of insurers’ balance sheets. Lloyd’s of London projects total in-
dustry losses6 amounting to more than US $200 billion, half of which 
is attributed to general insurance business, and the other half is due 
to losses from volatile investment markets. The lines of general in-
surance business that are likely to generate a larger proportion of 
the overall insured losses are event-cancellation cover, and US, UK 
and European business interruption cover. Other lines such as Con-
tingency, Director and Officers, employment practices liability, gen-
eral liability, mortgage, marine aviation, trade credit and surety and 
workers compensation will contribute less to the total insured loss-
es. Other lines of business such as motor classes provide a positive 
offset to the bottom-line earnings along with an expected reduction 
in expense ratios.
Figure 1 illustrates the industry’s largest reported losses real-
ised in Q1 2020 in the EMEA region [fig. 1]. Munich Re’s and Allianz 
Group’s losses are associated mostly with general insurance business 
lines, but are mixed with losses realised due to natural catastrophes. 
No material COVID-19 claims impact (either mortality or critical ill-
ness) emerged in the first quarter of 2020.
5 Kessler 2019. Presentation to investors.
6 See https://www.ft.com/content/51d32286-5264-4c93-80c3-3d0b0fd4558a.
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 250
A New World Post COVID-19, 245-256
3.1 Business Interruption (BI) Cover
BI cover protects a business against economic losses due to property 
damage inflicted during periods of suspended operation. Most business-
es carry BI insurance as part of their property insurance. In most cas-
es, contagious diseases do not constitute property damage, especial-
ly when passed from person to person. Most of the BI cover provides 
cover against flood, fire and other physical damage to buildings. Only 
a minority of insurance policies have extensions that provide cover for 
infectious diseases. For example, in 2003, Mandarin Oriental hotels in 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand suffered economic losses 
due to cancellations and reduced restaurant sales stemming from the 
SARS outbreak. Mandarin Oriental International Ltd recovered US $16 
million from its insurers to pay for such business interruption losses.7
Following the aftermath of the SARS epidemic, insurers sought to 
re-design the type of insurance cover offered by adding exclusions for 
bacterial or viral infections to their coverage. Most insurers applied 
ISO standard wordings to exclude business interruption claims caused 
by an infectious disease. However, displeased policyholders, especially 
small businesses, argue that these new additions are subject to inter-
pretation. In particular, they argue that policy wording such as the “in-
7 Page 3 of Jardine Strategic Holdings Ltd 2003 Press release recovered from SEC’s 
archive at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/0401/04010312.pdf.
Figure 1 Q1 of 2020 pandemic losses reported by selective European insurance groups. The figure illustrates 
that in Q1 Munich Re and Allianz Group reported the largest losses associated with the pandemic and natural 
catastrophes. Loss estimates reflect the actual figures reported in the interim reporting figures of the selected 
insurance groups: * denotes a conversion of the loss in € using the average exchange rate over Q1, 
** denotes only travel insurance and disability insurance claims
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ability to use the office due to restrictions imposed by a public author-
ity during the period of insurance following an occurrence of notifiable 
human disease” implies that cover is provided for the current crisis.
An industry wide solution is required, and concessions need to be 
made. This is a key controversial area and the UK’s financial regula-
tor8 is seeking answers to the question “should insurers remain lia-
ble?” at the High Court in late July. This involves 17 disputed policy 
wordings offered by eight insurance groups. This existential battle 
for some UK businesses has a global audience, given that European, 
US and Asian insurers are also facing the same issue.
3.2 Variability in Investment Returns 
The sharp downturn in economic activity resulting from the COVID-19 
outbreak has put significant pressure on insurer’s profitability in the 
near term, as already reflected in insurers’ equity prices. Figure 2 illus-
trates the sharp change in risk appetite which caused a panic ‘sell-off’ 
across all major stock market benchmarks [fig. 2]. The shares of insurance 
groups in most jurisdictions have also fallen. At the end of Q2 2020, the 
sector’s performance, approximated by the fall in the MSCI Global In-
surance Index, experienced a drop of c. 22%. During the Great Financial 
Crisis (GFC), the sector experienced a dramatic fall of c. 53%, underper-
forming the broader equity indices, as illustrated in panel 1 of figure 2. 
Falling equity prices (panel 1) were accompanied by widening cor-
porate spreads (panel 2), which were marginally offset by declines in 
government yields, as illustrated in figure 3. This further exacerbat-
ed the under performance of the insurance sector, relative to broader 
stock market indices. Insurance companies’ portfolios are heavily in-
vested in long-term sovereign and corporate bonds, and the market’s 
reaction anticipated potential mark-to-market losses on the invest-
ment portfolios of insurers. Large falls in the market prices of corpo-
rate bonds are linked to the widening of credit spreads [fig. 2, panel 2]. 
These losses are largely offset by gains on government bond portfolios 
due to the negative change in government yields [fig. 3, panels 1 and 2].
Over Q1 2020, the dislocation in financial markets was more pro-
nounced in the sub-investment grade corporate bond markets. Figure 
2, panel 2, illustrates the widening of the credit spreads across four 
different credit indices over three different periods. The change to 
the Barclays high yield credit spreads reached levels not seen since 
the 2007 GFC, although they fell short of touching the GFC peaks. 
This index along with the widening of spreads in investment grade 
iBOXX indices indicate pronounced levels of credit risk. These are 
8 See https://www.ft.com/content/fafc4037-b86d-4feb-8c98-0ac6afa5da83.
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associated with the weakening credit quality of borrowers in vulner-
able corporate sectors (i.e. the retail, travel, transportation, leisure 
and gambling, hotels and oil and gas sectors), some of which operate 
with significantly higher liquidity requirements, maturity mismatch-
es and leverage. Further weakening of the corporate sector for the 
above reasons could significantly increase the credit downgrade and 
default losses experienced by insurance groups.
Figure 2 Equity and bond market performance over selected periods. Source: Author’s calculations, 
Bloomberg, IHS Markit. Panel 2 includes the UK Non-Gilts iBOXX 7-10 Year indices that include bonds 
rated A and BBB with terms to maturity between 7 to 10. The quotes spread is the change 
of the OAS (option adjusted spreads) over the stated period
3.3 Sensitivity of Solvency Capital to Key Risk Drivers
Declines in interest rates are not necessarily associated with strong 
solvency9 positions. Life insurance groups’ balance sheets are gener-
ally more sensitive to declines in short-term interest rates. That sensi-
tivity is associated with the long-dated nature of policy holder annuity 
9 In Europe, the Solvency 2 directive requires insurance and reinsurance groups to 
have enough capital buffers in place over one year to be able to survive with at least a 
99.5% probability (i.e. having assets in excess of its liabilities in one year’s time) and then 
being able to fully de-risk its balance sheet. In Switzerland, the aim of the Swiss solven-
cy test (SST) is similar. The required capital is calibrated at the 99th percentile. The sol-
vency ratio is defined as the ratio of eligible own funds to the required solvency capital. 
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liabilities, and with investment guarantees embedded in the invest-
ment products that are usually wrapped by life insurance contracts. 
Life insurance companies usually seek long duration assets, in or-
der to match the long-term duration of their annuity liabilities, and in 
effect minimise any duration gaps in their asset and liability manage-
ment processes. This active management is required due to the biom-
etric nature of their liabilities. Life insurance companies are exposed 
to changes in life expectancy, which in turn affects the duration of 
the insurers’ annuity liabilities. If this change in duration is left un-
managed, it will affect the company’s earnings and solvency capital 
position. Therefore, insurers engage actively in managing duration 
gaps by ensuring that cash flows from their fixed income portfolio 
match the annuity liability outgoings, either through lengthening the 
maturity of their asset portfolio, and/or engaging in hedging activity. 
Insurance groups also maintain a high-quality asset portfolio, pri-
marily consisting of government bonds, corporate bonds (average 
credit quality of A) with limited exposure to sub-investment grade 
bonds (i.e. average 2%, but varies between 0% to 8%), and to the most 
vulnerable corporate sectors impacted by the coronavirus pandem-
ic. The fixed income portfolios also include portfolios of privately rat-
ed assets (i.e. up to 30% to 40% of the overall portfolio) made up of 
commercial real estate loans secured by property assets, equity re-
lease mortgages, infrastructure loans and loans extended to hous-
ing associations and universities.
Panels 3 and 4 of figure 3 illustrate the solvency ratio as at the 
year-end 2019 and the change to the solvency ratio of major Euro-
pean insurance groups recorded over Q1 2020, respectively. For in-
stance, AXA’s solvency ratio was 182% on March 31, 2020; down 16% 
points on its year-end 2019 position. The negative change in AXA’s 
solvency ratio, as for most groups, is mainly driven by unfavourable 
market conditions, primarily higher corporate and sovereign spreads 
and lower interest rates. Thus far, the COVID-19 crisis and the vola-
tility market environment have depleted earnings and reduced sol-
vency capital within each group’s acceptable ranges. Q1 losses were 
offset by positive operating returns for the quarter.
Given that events are still unfolding, credit risk remains a pro-
nounced exposure for European insurers. Groups with holdings of 
direct property and commercial real estate loans have provided rent 
concessions to tenants in response to the ‘Great Lockdown’ and in 
accordance with the authorities’ guidance. Depending on the dura-
tion of this lockdown, these rent concessions could create short-term 
cash flow mismatches that could lead to bigger concerns in terms of 
liquidity, asset-liability management and capital. If this is prolonged, 
insurance groups will experience further downgrades and defaults in 
their fixed income portfolios associated with non-financial business-
es operating in the most vulnerable sectors of the economy.
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The impact of current defaults remains below the 2009 peak lev-
el.10 AXA has disclosed that its solvency sensitivity is -6% points to 
a credit rating migration that assumes a full letter downgrade (i.e. 
three notches) to 20% of its corporate bonds (including privately rat-
ed debt). This is not an unlikely scenario given the IMF’s current out-
look on the world economy, as discussed in section 2.
4 Conclusions
Thus far insurance groups have comfortably covered their losses 
caused by the current pandemic. The duration of the lockdown im-
pacts the speed of the economic recovery, which in turn determines 
10 As per Moody’s most recent default report. This forecasts an increase in sub-invest-
ment grade bond default rates from the current level of 4% to 10.4% by the end of 2020.
Figure 3 Long-term rates and solvency of selected European groups. The figure illustrates the levels 
and changes to the 10-year government nominal rates and to the solvency levels as reported in the year-end 
2019 audited financial disclosures of each insurance group. Almost all European groups are on a Solvency 2 
basis. Only Swiss insurance groups, Zurich, Swiss Re and Swiss Life are on a Swiss Solvency Test (SST) basis. 
Note: Swiss Re’s (denoted with *) quarterly change to its solvency ratio (panel 4) is an estimate, and not an 
actual disclosed figure. Swiss Re noted in its recent quarterly announcement that the Solvency ratio for Q1 
2020 is comfortably above 200%
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the extent of the impact on the grown of the economy and on the in-
surance sector. Further vulnerabilities in the corporate sector could 
lead to further falls in financial markets. This would adversely impact 
earnings and could marginally reduce the solvency position of large 
life insurance groups. Impairments and revaluations due to credit 
rating migrations would further impact investment income, creating 
liquidity concerns and asset and liability mismatches. The key focus 
is disciplined asset-liability management, through duration exten-
sion and increased use of traditional retrocession. Life annuity writ-
ers could see an increase in their liabilities over the next five years, 
driven by a slow down in life expectancy improvements.
In the non-life segment, there is uncertainty around the underwrit-
ing performance of the property and casualty business. Few groups 
have withdrawn their earnings guidance partly due to the potential 
for further COVID-19 relation claims, as well as the lower investment 
yield environment. The current High Court case on business inter-
ruption claims adds litigation and reputational risks to the repertoire 
of risks that concern insurers.
Coming out of this crisis, insurance groups will need to re-design 
specific product lines to align more closely with policyholders’ needs 
and meet regulators’ expectations. Regulators will also be focused 
on the adequacy of the industry’s solvency capital, the appropriate-
ness of their regulatory frameworks and on the effectiveness of the 
industry’s current risk management frameworks.
Finally, in a post COVID-19 world, governments could play a more 
active role in providing pandemic insurance. The US insurance in-
dustry is supporting new legislation that would allow federal states 
to share pandemic losses with the industry. This would not be un-
precedented, as the Terrorisms Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), which 
was introduced in response to 9/11, allows for a federal loss shar-
ing programme for certain insured losses resulting from certified 
act of terrorisms.
Bibliography
Dawood, F.S. et. al. (2012). “Estimated Global Mortality Associated with the 
First 12 Months of 2009 Pandemic Influenza A H1N1 Virus Circulation: A 
Modelling Study”. The Lancet Infectious Diseases, 12(9), 687-95. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S1473-3099(12)70121-4.
DeWitte, S.N. (2014). “Mortality Risk and Survival in the Aftermath of the Me-
dieval Black Death”. PLoS ONE, 9(5), e96513. https://doi.org/10.1371/
journal.pone.0096513.
FT, Financial Times (2009). “Plan for Pandemic but Avoid Panic”. Financial 
Times. 27 April. https://www.ft.com/content/d115adfe-335e-11de-
8f1b-00144feabdc0.
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 256
A New World Post COVID-19, 245-256
IMF, June 2020, World Economic Outlook Update. https://www.imf.org/
en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/06/24/WEOUpdateJune2020.
Johnson, N.P.A.S.; Mueller, J. (2002). “Updating the Accounts: Global Mortal-
ity of the 1918-1920 ‘Spanish’ Influenza Pandemic”. Bulletin of the History 
of Medicine, 76(1), 105-15. https://doi.org/10.1353/bhm.2002.0022.
Kavet, J. (1977). “A Perspective on the Significance of Pandemic Influenza”. 
American Journal of Public Health, 67(11), 1063-70. https://dx.doi.
org/10.2105%2Fajph.67.11.1063.
Kessler, D. (2019). “SCOR Delivers in a World of Extremes”. Bank of America Mer-
rill Lynch conference. https://www.scor.com/sites/default/files/
boaml_25-09-2019_final_v2_1.pdf.
Mathews, J.D.; Chesson, J.M.; McCaw, J.M.; McVernon, J. (2009). “Understand-
ing Influenza Transmission, Immunity, and Pandemic Threats”. Influenza 
and Other Respiratory Viruses, 3(4), 143-9. https://doi.org/10.1111/
j.1750-2659.2009.00089.x.
Madhav, N.; Oppenheim, B.; Gallivan, M.; Mulembakani, P.; Rubin, E.; Wolfe, N. 
(2018). “Pandemics: Risks, Impacts, and Mitigation”. Jamison, D.T.; Gelband, 
H.; Horton, S.; Jha, P.; Laxminarayan, R.; Mock, C.N.; Nugent, R. (eds), Disease 
Control Priorities: Improving Health and Reducing Poverty. 3rd ed. Washing-
ton, DC: World Bank, 315-45. Disease Control Priorities 9. http://dcp-3.
org/chapter/2601/pandemics-risks-mitigation-and-costs.
McKibbin, W.J.; Sidorenko, A.A. (2006). “Global Macroeconomic Consequences 
of Pandemic Influenza”. Lowy Institute for International Policy, Sydney, Aus-
tralia, February 2006. https://bit.ly/2CAzHxT.
Swiss Re Institute (2020). “Sigma 2/2020: Natural Catastrophes in Times of 
Economic Accumulation and Climate Change”. https://www.swissre.
com/institute/research/sigma-research/sigma-2020-02.html.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (2017). “A Socio-Economic Im-
pact Assessment of the Zika Virus in Latin America and the Caribbean: With a 
Focus on Brazil, Colombia, and Suriname”. Synthesis report, UNDP, New York.
Viboud, C.; Simonsen, L.; Fuentes, R.; Flores, J.; Miller, M.A.; Chowell, G. (2016). 
“Global Mortality Impact of the 1957-1959 Influenza Pandemic”. Journal 
of Infectious Diseases, 212(11), 738-45. https://doi.org/10.1093/in-
fdis/jiv534.
Wang, M-D.; Jolly, A.M. (2004). “Changing Virulence of the SARS Virus: The Ep-









Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1
ISBN [ebook] 978-88-6969-442-4
Peer review | Open access  259
Published 2020-07-31
© 2020  Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Publich License
DOI 10.30687/978-88-6969-442-4/019
A New World Post COVID-19
Lessons for Business, the Finance Industry and Policy Makers
edited by Monica Billio and Simone Varotto
Pandemics, Climate  
and Public Finance
How to Strengthen Socio-Economic 
Resilience across Policy Domains
Stefano Battiston
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia; Universität Zürich, Schweiz
Monica Billio
Università Ca’ Foscari Venezia, Italia
Irene Monasterolo
Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria; Boston University’s Global Development  
Policy Initiative, US; University of Zurich, Switzerland
Abstract The outbreak of COVID-19 and the containment measures are having an un-
precedented socio-economic impact in the European Union (EU) and elsewhere. The 
policies introduced so far in the EU countries promote a ‘business as usual’ economic re-
covery. This short-term strategy may jeopardise the mid-to-long-term sustainability and 
financial stability objectives. In contrast, strengthening the socio-economic resilience 
against future pandemics, as well as other shocks, calls for recovery measures that are 
fully aligned to the objectives of the EU Green Deal and of the EU corporate taxation policy. 
Tackling these long-term objectives is not more costly than funding the current short-term 
measures. Remarkably, it may be the only way to build resilience to future crises.
Keywords COVID-19. Climate change. Public debt sustainability. Green Deal. Fiscal in-
equality. Resilience. Policy complementarity.
Summary 1 Socio-Economic Impact of COVID-19: Is This Time Different? – 2 The Fiscal 
and Monetary Policy Response. – 3 Mind the Gap: Misalignment of Current Policies with 
the EU Green Deal and EU Tax Policies. – 4 COVID-19 Recovery and Climate Mitigation: A 
Role for Policy Complementarity? – 5 Doing More and Better Does not Cost More: A Role 
for Policy Complementarity?.
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 260
A New World Post COVID-19, 259-268
1 Socio-Economic Impact of COVID-19: Is This Time 
Different?
Unprecedented socio-economic impact. Yet, are estimates too 
optimistic? The COVID-19 health crisis is playing a main role in to-
day’s policy, business and financial discussion. The COVID-19 epidem-
ics’ death and infection toll, and the measures (such as lockdown and 
social distancing) taken to mitigate it, are expected to drive major 
fiscal and macroeconomic impacts globally. In April 2020, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) in its World Economic Outlook (IMF 
2020) projected the global economy to contract sharply by -3% in 
2020, much worse than during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Current 
impact and estimates of future impact are already very large. Yet, 
the estimates elaborated by the World Bank and the IMF are likely to 
be optimistic because they are based on the assumption that Gross 
Value Added of sectors such as tourism, remittance, and export will 
return to pre-COVID-19 levels by 2021.
Cascading shocks from local to global. The measures intro-
duced to contain the COVID-19 pandemic affected international and 
domestic demand triggering immediate demand and supply shocks 
on the local economy. In addition, they can induce cascading effects 
in the global economy and can be then transmitted to the financial 
sector with implications on financial stability. The COVID-19-induced 
economic crisis could lead to a new liquidity crisis and higher cost of 
debt, affecting public debt sustainability and inequality, in particu-
lar in low-income and emerging countries (Gallagher 2020). In turn, 
inequality contributes to accrue the COVID-19 crisis and its effects 
on the socio-economic and financial conditions (Ahmed et al. 2020). 
Further, FAO1 highlighted that the pandemic has increased the risk of 
food crises in 53 countries (representing 113 million people), many of 
which are already experiencing acute severe food insecurity. Similar 
food crises are likely in vulnerable communities already exposed to 
other crises (e.g. the Desert Locust outbreak in the Horn of Africa),2 
in Small Islands Developing States that depend on primary exports 
and tourism, and in countries relying on remittances. 
Is this time different? The COVID-19 crisis is the first large and 
global shock originating in the real economy since WWII and spread-
ing to the financial sector. Specific to this shock is that it has hit, at the 
same time, both the external and the internal demand sides of many 
countries for several months. In particular, shocks on tourism demand, 
Contributions: all authors contributed to the development of the paper idea and to ad-
dress the editor’s comments. Stefano Battiston and Irene Monasterolo wrote the paper.
1 http://www.fao.org/2019-ncov/q-and-a/impact-on-food-and-agriculture/en/.
2 http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/1258877/icode/.
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export prices and remittances affected firms’ production, employment, 
nominal wages and households’ income. The shock on internal demand 
was then amplified by domestic lockdown measures, triggering self-
reinforcing supply and demand side dynamics. There has been a loss 
of social, intellectual and financial capital. For instance, when a sub-
stantial number of firms, large and small, default, and production stalls 
for a few months, an important portion of a country’s economic infra-
structure may become severely compromised. This is in stark contrast 
with the estimates of standard economic models where shocks are id-
iosyncratic and their impact is fully reversible. In contrast, the socio-
economic impact of the COVID-19 shock appears to be persistent and 
self-reinforcing, as analysed more in detail below.
2 The Fiscal and Monetary Policy Response
In this section, we report on the main policy measures introduced 
by several countries to mitigate the socio-economic impact of the 
COVID-19 shock, and will focus on fiscal and monetary policies in-
troduced in the EU. This information serves as background for the 
policy analysis in Section 3.
A wide range of proposals to finance the recovery. It has been 
recently highlighted that the speed and duration of the COVID-19 eco-
nomic recovery will depend on the breadth and scope of emergency 
government funding (Toporowski, Calvert Jump 2020). In this regard, 
several proposals to finance the COVID-19 recovery have been put 
forward, including: coronavirus bonds3 and a Covid Credit Line4 with-
in the European Stability Mechanism (in Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2020); 
enhanced central banks’ purchasing programmes; liquidity lifelines 
(Brunnermeier et al. 2020) to overcome firms’ liquidity shortages; cen-
tral banks’ helicopter money (Couppey-Soubeyran 2020; Galí 2020); 
and the expansion of the role and scope of international financial in-
stitutions such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) in the EU.
Fiscal policies. Governments both in high-income and develop-
ing countries have introduced various forms of fiscal policies. These 
include increased healthcare spending, reduction or deferred pay-
ment of some taxes, credit support guarantees to companies, expan-
sion of unemployment benefits and income support, payroll support 
to the affected sectors (such as tourism) just to name a few. Such 
measures have contributed to smoothing the negative impacts of the 
COVID-19 lockdown measures on demand and supply (Monasterolo, 
Billio, Battiston 2020). The breadth and scope of the measures vary 
3 A proposal by Giavazzi, Tabellini 2020.
4 A proposal by Bénassy-Quéré et al. 2020.
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significatively across countries. In low income and emerging coun-
tries, the level of government spending ranged from 0.5% of GDP in 
Kenya to over 5% of GDP in the Philippines, dwarfing the financial 
support provided by development banks (e.g. the World Bank) during 
the COVID-19 crisis. In contrast, in advanced economies, COVID-19 
fiscal spending was the highest in Germany, where it reached 12% 
of (2019) GDP, followed by the US (9.1%), Japan (7%), the UK (4.5%) 
and China (4%). In the EU, the European Commission (EC) launched: 
1. a €540 billion support to the EU member states via the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) (up to 2% of 2019 GDP for 
each euro area country, based on existing precautionary es-
timates) to finance health related spending; 
2. €25 billion in government guarantees to the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) to provide up to €200 billion of financial sup-
port to corporations, and a €100 billion temporary loan-based 
instrument (SURE) to protect workers and jobs. 
3. In addition, €37 billion of the EU Budget (about and 0.3% of 
2019 EU27 GDP) was mobilised to extend the scope of the EU 
Solidarity Fund to incentivize banks to provide liquidity to 
small and medium enterprises and mid caps (as a guarantee 
to the European Investment Fund). Further, it is also aimed to 
support credit holidays to crisis-affected debtors, and to pro-
vide macro-financial assistance to ten countries included in 
the EU Enlargement and Neighborhood Partnership.5 
4. The EC also enabled EU member states to compensate com-
panies for the damage directly caused by COVID-19, includ-
ing measures in sectors such as aviation and tourism. Overall, 
the national liquidity measures, including schemes approved 
under temporary, flexible, EU State Aid rules, could lead to 
support funding up to a total of €2.9 trillion.
Monetary policies. Given the low interest rate environment, cen-
tral banks around the world have engaged in asset purchasing pro-
grammes, refinancing operations, and foreign exchange operations. 
For example, the ECB has taken action on several fronts: it has (i) 
expanded the asset purchase programme of private and public sec-
tor securities (Pandemic Emergency Purchase Program, PEPP) to 
€ 1.35 trillion until at least June 2021; (ii) revised the Non-Perform-
ing Loans and prudential floor to banks’ current minimum capital re-
quirements; (iii) provided more favourable terms and new liquidity 
facilities within the existing targeted longer-term refinancing opera-
tions and a new liquidity facility (PELTRO) of non-targeted Pandemic 
Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations; (iv) grandfathered 
5 https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/node_en.
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until September 2021 the eligibility of marketable assets used as col-
lateral in Eurosystem credit operations falling below current mini-
mum credit quality requirements of ‘BBB-’; (v) expanded the range 
of eligible assets under the CSPP, and relaxed collateral standards 
for Eurosystem refinancing operations (MROs, LTROs, TLTROs) to 
include Greek sovereign bonds; (vi) allowed institutions6 to operate 
temporarily below the Pillar 2 Guidance (P2G) with regard to the cap-
ital conservation buffer and the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) of the 
Basel III agreement on bank regulation. 
3 Mind the Gap: Misalignment of Current Policies  
with the EU Green Deal and EU Tax Policies
Climate action. The policy measures discussed above could help to 
mitigate the effects of the lockdown and help the economy to bounce 
back in the short-term. However, in the long term, they could also neg-
atively impact on the achievement of the global climate targets (i.e. the 
Paris Agreement aimed to keep the global temperature increase be-
low 2 degrees Celsius with respect to pre-industrial times) and the ob-
jectives of the EC Sustainable Finance Action Plan,7 aimed to align fi-
nance to sustainability. Achieving these objectives is also at the heart 
of the 2019 EU Green Deal program.8 Fiscal measures that provide 
tax reductions or exemptions to firms that either base their profits on 
fossil fuels or carbon intensive activities (e.g. fossil fuels extraction, 
traditional automotive), without any conditionality (e.g. on the decar-
bonization of their business), contribute to the misalignment of the 
economies with respect to the climate targets and objectives of the 
EU Green Deal programme. This, in turn, makes the risk of carbon 
stranded assets9 more material. Indeed, as shown by Battiston et al. 
(2017), investors’ portfolios are largely exposed to carbon stranded 
assets and, more generally, to Climate Policy Relevant Sectors (CPRS 
i.e. sectors of economic activity that are affected positively or nega-
tively by a late and sudden transition to a low-carbon economy).
CPRS represent also a large share of the ECB’s expansionary mon-
etary policy as already shown in the context of the ECB’s CSPP QE 







9 Stranded assets are assets subject to write-downs or devaluations caused by new 
climate policies (see van der Ploeg, Rezai 2020). 
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 264
A New World Post COVID-19, 259-268
should signal the importance of decarbonizing portfolios to support 
the EU Green Deal programme. This would contribute to rewarding 
the firms that demonstrates progress in the low-carbon transition rel-
ative to their own sector of economic activity, rather than only penal-
ising all carbon intensive firms.
The misalignment of asset purchases contributes to (i) widen the 
gap between the COVID-19 recovery and the governments’ climate 
pledges (e.g. the Paris Agreement and the Green Deal programme 
in the EU), (ii) foster the realisation of carbon stranded assets in the 
economy, (iii) reverse years of ‘signalling’ by central banks and fi-
nancial regulators engaged in supporting climate related financial 
disclosure, e.g. within the premises of the Network for Greening the 
Financial System (NGFS) (NGFS 2019). Further, by reducing cap-
ital requirements for credit institutions, and by revising the Non-
Performing Loans regulation, without conditioning these measures 
to countercyclical capital accumulation and to the decarbonization 
of their balance sheets, the recovery measures counteract the reg-
ulatory efforts introduced after the 2008 financial crisis aimed to 
strengthen financial stability. 
4 COVID-19 Recovery and Climate Mitigation:  
A Role for Policy Complementarity?
An approach to operationalize EU solidarity in response to the 
COVID-19 crisis, while exploiting ways to address the impending 
climate crisis, has been proposed by Monasterolo and Volz (2020). 
For EU member states with low fiscal space and high debt, financ-
ing the COVID-19 response is perceived to have higher priority than 
the EU’s climate targets. The proposal foresees the coordinated issu-
ance of COVID-related bonds by the EC as well as Green Deal bonds 
by the EIB. The EC issues COVID crisis-conditioned bonds, avail-
able for purchase by private and public investors. The bonds pro-
ceeds are to be used exclusively for funding an immediate response 
across the Union to alleviate the socio-economic impact of the pan-
demic. At the same time, the EIB issues new Green Deal bonds that 
support projects in the COVID-19 recovery phase via structural in-
vestments aligned with the Green Deal carbon neutrality targets. 
The Green Deal bonds could be used to finance both climate-aligned 
private investments as well as strategic pan-EU infrastructure in-
vestment, at low cost, to support the recovery phase in all member 
countries. The proposal by Monasterolo and Volz has three interest-
ing features. First, it provides a ‘common debt instrument’ that does 
not generate a moral hazard by individual member countries (since 
it is conditional to the COVID-19 response). Second, it would avoid 
compromises between using scarce national finances for either the 
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COVID-19 response measures or Green Deal investments. This would 
ease the public debt burden of member states, thus preserving finan-
cial stability at the individual country and Eurozone level. Third, it 
would foster a deeper integration of EU institutions and coherence of 
EU funding programmes with the Green Deal objectives. This would 
open the way to a responsible shared management of these funding 
programmes and objectives among member states and generations.
Deepening fiscal inequality: why it matters for public debt 
sustainability. An important debate is emerging about the relation 
between taxation policies and the economic recovery. Many firms 
that are benefitting from fiscal measures introduced in EU countries 
belong to holdings or groups which have fiscal residency in countries 
with very low effective tax rates (such as The Netherlands, Luxem-
bourg, Ireland or Switzerland).10 Using a wide range of legal strate-
gies, multinational enterprises are able to shift profits from the coun-
try where the revenues are generated to a country with a very low 
effective tax rate. The problem is well-known and long standing. In 
the aftermath of the 2009 financial crisis, because of the strain on 
public finances, an OECD/G20 project called “Base Erosion and Prof-
it Shifting” (BEPS)11 was created. “Multinational enterprises exploit 
gaps and mismatches in the international tax rules to artificially shift 
profits to low or no tax jurisdictions and avoid paying their fair share 
of tax”.12 When these strategies are legal, the practice goes under 
the name of tax avoidance. The 2016 Panama Papers scandals led to 
renewed efforts in the EU on combating tax avoidance. Remarkably, 
the Public-Country-by-Country Reporting (CBCR) directive was re-
jected by the EU Council thanks to the vote of the member states 
with low taxation regimes. The directive would have mandated mul-
tinational companies to disclose key fiscal financial information of 
their subsidiaries by country (Garicano 2019). 
In the context of the COVID-19 recovery, there is a concern that 
firms benefitting from public aid in a country in which they generate 
revenues will avoid taxation by shifting elsewhere their profits. The 
phenomenon results in an unintended cross-border subsidy and con-
tributes to increasing the inequality between countries. In the EU, 
this phenomenon is particularly relevant because it works against 
the EU Cohesion Policy, which represents now the largest item on 
the EU budget. The aim of the EU Cohesion policy is to narrow the 
inequality gap by fostering the economic convergence of EU regions. 
It is important to notice that all EU countries, including those with 
10 For a review of the top ten tax haven see e.g. Zuckman, Wright 2018.
11 https://www.oecd.org/about/impact/combatinginternationaltaxavoid-
ance.htm.
12 Cf. footnote 9.
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low taxation, benefit from the EU Cohesion Policy. Conversely, even 
countries that are damaged by this fiscal dumping (e.g. Italy) large-
ly contribute to the funds of the EU Cohesion policy. There is thus a 
double negative distributive effect.
5 Doing More and Better Does not Cost More:  
Policy Complementarity is a Matter  
of Understanding and Management
As we have discussed above, the fiscal and monetary policies intro-
duced so far in the EU countries promote a ‘business as usual’ eco-
nomic recovery. This is a short-term strategy that may jeopardise the 
mid-to-long-term environmental sustainability and financial stability 
objectives. In particular, the fiscal measures introduced so far ham-
per the climate policy measures and halt the already difficult progress 
on tax transparency. Indeed, the problem of reconciling taxation fair-
ness, efforts to restart the economy and climate change have been 
recently explicitly discussed by the EU Commissioner for Economy.13 
Perhaps, the most important thing to realise is that a short-term 
approach to the COVID-19 response that does not consider the cli-
mate and the taxation issues are more costly and less effective than 
tackling these issues together. Indeed, we can choose between fi-
nancing now a carbon intensive economic recovery (i.e. supporting 
firms unconditionally to their decarbonization efforts) and later a 
low-carbon transition (thus paying twice), or to finance right away a 
green economic recovery (thus paying only once), exploiting creative 
destruction in the Schumpeterian sense. Similarly, governments can 
choose to give state aid to firms that engage in tax avoidance strat-
egies. In this case, they will face the continued reduced income tax 
resulting from profit shifting (thus paying twice). Alternatively, they 
can choose to resolve this taxation policy issue right away and reduce 
tax income losses in the future (thus paying only once). 
To conclude, strengthening the socio-economic resilience against 
future pandemics, as well as other future shocks, calls for recovery 
measures that are fully aligned to the objectives of the EU Green 
Deal and of the EU corporate taxation policy. Tackling these objec-
tives together is more cost effective than addressing the COVID-19 
crisis with short-term measures. Remarkably, because of the inter-
connectedness between climate risk, pandemic risk and financial risk 
(Monasterolo, Billio, Battiston 2020), this may be actually the only 
feasible way to build resilience to future crises. 
13 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_20_398.
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Abstract If loan issue falls faster than repayments, money becomes increasingly 
scarce, leading to deflationary pressures and unemployment. Central banks have re-
sponded by ‘quantitative easing’, a regressive form of money printing which buys off the 
national debt. Such credit could instead finance green infrastructure, health and social 
care, a basic income, and debt relief. Fiscal policy expansion which is not monetised, 
in contrast, results in crowding out. Given the ecological crisis caused by greenhouse 
emissions, the aim ought not to be resumption of business as usual. A social-ecologi-
cal response to the crisis would deploy a mixture of public credit creation deployed in 
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1 Introduction
If one asks the general public who creates the money supply, the majority re-
sponse is invariably the government, via the central bank. This is emphat-
ically not the central bank’s understanding, however. As Sir Mervyn King 
said in 2012, then governor of the Bank of England (hereafter “The Bank”): 
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When banks extend loans to their customers, they create money 
by crediting their customers’ accounts […] a damaged banking sys-
tem means that today’s banks are not creating enough money. We 
have to do it for them. […] Insufficient money creation can lead to 
a contraction of the money supply and a depression.1
The governor was talking in the aftermath of the 2008 global finan-
cial crisis, and referring to Quantitative Easing (QE), rather than 
printing notes and coin. In fact, only 3% of the UK money supply is 
created as notes and coin in circulation in the modern era, and 97% 
is virtual credit, ordinarily supplied as private bank loans. The cri-
sis in the wake of COVID-19 is estimated to be greater than that of 
2008, with severe and immediate impact on jobs and GDP.
Whilst much media attention has been focused on the ability of 
firms and households to service their debts, less attention has been 
paid to the flow and composition of new loans. The balance between 
new loans and repayments determines how much money is circulating 
in the economy. If new lending dries up but the existing loans contin-
ue to be serviced, the means of payment present in the economy re-
duces, since the principal on the loans is destroyed when repaid, un-
der banking rules of account. This dynamic is believed to have been 
responsible for the Great Depression of the 1930s. People found the 
depression hard to understand, since the workers, machines and ma-
terials were all still perfectly functional. It was as if the ghost in the 
machine had vanished. Nowadays, central banks are prepared to cre-
ate credit to compensate.
Credit markets have been strongly affected. UK households repaid 
a record £7 billion (net) of bank loans in April, following £3.8 billion in 
March with a further £4.6 billion in May, and real estate transactions, 
which account for the bulk of UK credit, were just 10% of their pre-
COVID count in May (BE 2020). Anticipating contraction The Bank has 
thus far increased its QE program by an enormous £300 billion at the 
time of writing (July 2020), increasing the stock of government bonds it 
holds to £745 billion, over 40% of the UK national debt. In the remain-
der of this article, I explain why such ‘money printing’ is the general 
form that any net ‘stimulus’ activity has to take, rather than through 
the government borrowing to spend. I then discuss implications of 
prospective stimulus activity of the burgeoning climate emergency.
Public understanding of these matters remains weak, not helped 
by economics texts portraying banks as ‘intermediaries’ passing 
money between lenders and borrowers, rather than creating credit. 
For example, see Williams and Turton (2014, ch. 5), who also state 
1 Speech to South Wales Chamber of Commerce, The Millenium Centre, Cardiff, Oc-
tober 23, 2012.
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that QE does not create money. The authors contradict themselves 
by saying that QE has maintained M4, the broad measure of money 
supply, when bank lending fell after 2008. The QE part of this con-
tradiction can be resolved if the government pays off the bonds and 
The Bank retires the funds received. It seems unlikely that this will 
actually happen however. In the meantime, QE is clearly expanding 
the money supply.
2 Why Fiscal Stimulus Cannot be Financed by Bond Issues
Many commentators apparently believe that government deficits 
must be financed by selling bonds, and that therefore if the gov-
ernment wants to stimulate the economy by spending more, it must 
sell more bonds. This overlooks the fact that bonds are purchased 
using existing money, not new credit. Thus, every pound that goes 
towards purchasing bonds is a pound that is not being invested 
elsewhere. Necessarily, no new purchasing power is created, and 
therefore additional bond issues do not counteract monetary con-
traction taking place through falling bank loan volume. This is the 
lesson of Japan’s apparent failure to use fiscal policy to boost output 
following the collapse of its land value bubble in the 1990s. These 
points are argued convincingly, both theoretically and empirical-
ly, by Werner (2005). 
For example, the UK’s “Green New Deal” group argued for a pack-
age including green infrastructure spending financed by bond is-
sues, repeating their call in the wake of COVID-19 (GNDG 2008). The 
TUC amongst others have also called for government spending to in-
crease “given the low cost of borrowing”, seemingly unaware of any 
crowding-out problem. A common argument is that only government 
spending can stimulate demand in a recession, as monetary policy 
to expand bank lending is ‘pushing on a string’. It remains the case, 
however, that new government bonds are not bought with new bank 
credit. So to the extent that fiscal deficits are financed by bond issues, 
government borrowing competes for existing (and declining) liquid 
funds in the hands of pension funds and other investors.
The upshot is clearly that fiscal and monetary policy are not, con-
trary to what central bankers routinely profess, independent. The 
viewpoint typical of financial sector actors, including ratings agen-
cies, that governments should not print money to finance expendi-
tures (‘monetise the deficit’) arguably aligns with the interests of 
the financial sector to control the supply of money and debt. This in-
terest has recently crystallised into arrangements such as central 
bank independence and diplomatic agreements such as that in the 
Maastricht Treaty not to monetise deficits. This situation may help 
explain why convoluted procedures such as QE are devised to do so 
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when necessary. Central bank independence is itself dubious howev-
er, when the government appoints the governor and can veto its key 
decisions, as under the Bank of England Act 1998.2
3 Why Debt Monetisation Should not be Done by QE
QE involves the central bank buying government bonds and other as-
sets including company bonds, on the ‘secondary’ market, meaning 
bonds that have been auctioned by the government previously. For ex-
ample, it involves buying gilts3 held by pension funds, with the latter 
receiving deposits in their bank accounts in return. Since The Bank 
is publicly owned, this means the public sector is effectively print-
ing money to buy back its debt (‘debt monetisation’). 
The problems with QE include firstly that it is regressive; because 
it raises asset prices it benefits owners of bonds and shares, who tend 
to be well off. Persons with property also benefit through lower inter-
est payments on mortgages, and the effects of this on land values as 
reflected in house prices. The Bank itself reported that the top 5% 
of households by financial assets held 40% of them, with most house-
holds owning little or none. Asset-holding households gained an es-
timated £600 billion from £325 billion of purchases in the first wave 
of QE (BE 2012). Secondly, QE is strategically blind, since there is 
no control over where the money that is printed ultimately ends up. 
Those selling their bonds might use the money to buy more bonds, 
shares, land, property or related financial products. Mostly these 
will be trades in existing assets, not generating new goods or ser-
vices. A third problem is that low interest rates, though they lower 
debt service costs, discourage bank lending by making it less profit-
able. Finally, there are adverse effects on pension funds, motivating 
the abandonment of defined benefit pensions, undermining people’s 
financial security in retirement.
Given its demonstrable ills, QE should not be continued if there 
are viable alternative forms of monetising deficits. There are at least 
three. One is that The Bank simply credits government accounts as 
necessary. Equivalently, the treasury may order The Bank to credit 
non-government accounts as appropriate for its purchases. Alterna-
tively, The Bank can buy government bonds with new credit. Finally, 
the government could make loan contracts with banks to finance its 
deficits. These would result in fresh credit being issued, unlike sales 
2 See in particular the extensive “reserve powers” of the Government under the 
section 19 of the Act: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/11/section/19.
3 Gilts (gilt-edged securities) are UK government liabilities offering investors regu-
lar payments before maturity. See DMO (nd).
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of bonds in the primary market. The contracts could be made non-
tradable to prevent them becoming, as bonds are, objects of specula-
tion (Werner 2014). It is worth noting in passing that as an issuer of 
the currency via The Bank, the government cannot be in a position 
not to pay debts denominated in sterling. It is therefore strange to 
suggest, as the current governor of The Bank has,4 that the govern-
ment might somehow run out of cash. The usual objection to monetis-
ing a deficit is that it is inflationary. This apparently applies in full to 
QE, however, so is out of place in a discussion of alternative methods. 
Perhaps one reason that The Bank has not pursued open debt 
monetisation is that it is against the terms of the Maastricht Trea-
ty, the economic cornerstone of the EU project. Should it continue 
to be politically necessary to avoid open monetisation by The Bank, 
it is not clear why the option outlined by Werner (2014) would be ob-
jectionable.
4 Why We Do not Simply Need ‘Recovery’  
of the Previous Economy
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, environmentalists were 
hoping to see reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. They were 
severely disappointed. Carbon emissions fell only for one year before 
continuing a relentless upward trajectory (Peters et al. 2019), with 
policy-makers’ attention fixated on the economy.
Similarly, many progressive commentators have been speculating 
that a different economy might emerge after COVID-19 lockdown. 
We have to realise that economic ‘recovery’ conceived only in terms 
of stimulus instruments (the budgetary measures we have been dis-
cussing) means increasing greenhouse emissions again. It was no 
accident they grew alongside GDP. This is because there is limited 
substitutability of fossil fuel energy for renewables, given the much 
higher “power density” of the former (Giampietro, Mayumi 2010). 
That is, to achieve the same power output to the rest of society, re-
newable energy infrastructure uses far more land and labour, mak-
ing fossil fuel use inevitable for most industrial applications. Whilst 
it seems possible, then, to reactivate the economy by monetised gov-
ernment spending without any structural planning, this is not what 
should happen given the imperative to reduce global GHG emissions. 
Le Quéré et al. (2020) estimate that following the large fall in 
economic activity by April when economic activity was largely con-
4 Interview with The World Tomorrow, Sky News, June 22 2020. https://news.sky.
com/story/coronavirus-governor-says-bank-of-england-saved-britain-from-
effective-insolvency-12012369.
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fined to essentials, if economies operated at their previous intensity 
by mid-June, there would be a 4% annual reduction in GHGs. There 
would be a 7% fall if certain restrictions remained until the end of 
the year, comparable to what would be needed to meet the aims of 
the UN Paris Agreement on climate change.
In the medium term, energy supply constraints following ‘peak 
oil’ reinforce these considerations. Conventional crude oil, which has 
more favourable energetic properties than unconventional hydrocar-
bons, has been static since around 2006 (Bentley, Mushalik, Wang 
2020), suggesting an imminent decline. To simply ‘restart’ the econo-
my and recover its previous intensity would, it seems, squander much 
of the remaining higher quality energy resources on inessential con-
sumption.
5 A Post-COVID Social Ecological Policy Package
There is limited space here to expound an appropriate response to 
the ecological crisis. Bardsley (2012) proposed a policy package in 
detail which I now summarise. To prevent a repeat of the 2009 expe-
rience, fossil fuel use needs to be constrained. This could be imposed 
by capping quantities of coal, oil and gas upstream, that is, requir-
ing fossil fuel companies to purchase emissions permits covering the 
carbon content of any fuel they sell. An equitable way of doing this 
is for the emissions rights (permits) to be allocated to the popula-
tion, either individually (a policy proposal named ‘cap and share’) or 
in trust (‘cap and dividend’), so that when permits are sold the pop-
ulation acquires the revenue. This would compensate them finan-
cially for price increases deriving from energy scarcity, and house-
holds with the lowest emissions would benefit the most. See Comhar 
(2008) for an evaluation applying the E3ME model of Barker (1999), 
plus Kunkel and Kammen (2011) and Bardsley, Schnepf and Buechs 
(2017) for illustration of redistributive effects of the policy applied 
to specific sectors. 
Green spending is necessary, financed directly by the central bank 
or with loan contracts with private banks, and has potential to pro-
vide many jobs. This should include extensive thermal insulation up-
grades both for commercial and residential property, in addition to 
development of renewable energy infrastructure. Agroecological and 
other land management schemes should be developed and deployed 
to combine enhanced carbon storage in soils and biomass with im-
proved food security. Biochar techniques for example appear prom-
ising, if complex.
In a future defined increasingly by resource and ecological limits 
to growth, extreme inequality will become increasingly abhorrent as 
the position of the worst off becomes more precarious. A substantial 
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land (site) value tax would be a powerful tool for redistribution, and 
would also help to reduce burgeoning housing costs by eroding specu-
lative gains from landholdings. A shift of the revenue base away from 
taxes on labour and capital also makes sense to encourage produc-
tive activity, and this would not exacerbate GHG emissions given an 
overall cap. Spending on public health and social care systems, which 
should be more resource efficient and equitable than private sector 
counterparts because of the sharing of resources across the popula-
tion, will also serve to alleviate inequality. Efficiency should not be 
over-emphasised however, as having excess capacity has proved cru-
cial to the ability of health systems to respond to the crisis.
Debt relief should be introduced if household mortgage debts 
prove intolerable. This would be problematic if it were to reward ir-
responsible borrowing, however. A solution could be for each house-
hold to receive vouchers which can be exchanged for debt, with the 
loan issuer exchanging the voucher for central bank money, allevi-
ating bank losses. If the household does not have debt the voucher 
could instead be exchanged for domestic thermal upgrades or re-
newable energy bonds. Since this relief scheme would benefit the 
banks this measure should be conditional, for example on reintro-
duction of credit controls to give government more power to direct 
economic activity.
A universal basic income could be partly constituted by the debt 
relief and carbon revenue elements of the package but could be sup-
plemented as necessary with government spending. This concept 
could be extended to one of universal basic services encompassing 
minimum standards of energy and food provision.5
It must be admitted that such a program seems very unlikely to 
happen. However, given the alignment of the current economic sys-
tem towards ecologically disastrous outcomes, a package that would 
actually operate in the other direction must inevitably be radical. 
The objective should be to find the least improbable set of measures 
that would work to constrain and reduce emissions, whilst maintain-
ing welfare in an increasingly resource-constrained world. Compare 
it to the UK government’s actual response: massive money printing 
for QE, loan schemes for business, including loans to big business un-
derwritten by the treasury with few conditions attached, a small in-
crease in benefits, temporary income / employment support schemes 
for those in work, grants for home insulation which benefit property 
owners, some mortgage relief but no rent relief except for business. 
There are to be no new controls on GHG emissions. Further infra-
structure spending has been announced but it is not yet clear if this 
5 I owe this observation to Brian Davey (personal correspondence).
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adds to pre-COVID manifesto commitments.6 The regressive nature of 
QE deserves repeating. BE (2012) estimated that the first wave of QE 
gave an average transfer of £10,000 per UK household but reaped on-
ly by the richest 50%. It seems the UK is largely helping the better off.
Perhaps the main problem with the package proposed is the dif-
ficulty of implementing hard controls on fossil fuel use unilaterally. 
It might be possible to devise a way of doing this via carbon tariffs. 
But it would be difficult to drive emissions down year on year, as Le 
Quéré et al. (2020), along with the mainstream of climate scientists, 
deem necessary, without international cooperation.
6 Conclusions
Printing money to buy back bonds (QE) is regressive and strategical-
ly blind. A social ecological stimulus would, in contrast, openly mone-
tise the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement without raising asset 
prices, and strategically direct credit towards green infrastructure, 
agroecology, and essential goods and services, including health and 
social care. Curbing greenhouse emissions is however, inconsistent 
with maintaining current levels of consumerism, so the overall aim 
should not be a general upturn in output. The economic response 
to COVID should rather take place within a framework of hard con-
straints on greenhouse gas emissions. Suitable policies exist, but 
plausibly require international cooperation to be implemented. In 
the absence of such a framework, government spending packages 
should be targeted, at provision of essential goods and services on a 
universal basis, development of post-fossil-fuel infrastructure, envi-
ronmental and agroecological schemes. 
6 An overview of government-funded schemes responding to the COVID crisis is giv-
en by Deloitte (2020). The overall stimulus effect depends how they are financed, which 
is not outlined in the document.
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Abstract Although the movement towards gender equality in the labour market has 
slowed in recent decades, a long-term view over the 20th century shows the significant 
narrowing of the gender employment gap in the UK, a result of the increases in women’s 
labour force participation and employment combined with falling attachment to the 
labour force among men. It is too early to assess with precision the extent to which these 
patterns will be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic but emerging evidence and informed 
speculation do suggest that there will be important distributional consequences. Various 
studies, produced at an unprecedented rate, are pointing out that the effects of COVID-19 
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1 Introduction
This chapter aims to assess the existing evidence on the extent to which the 
COVID-19 pandemic has affected the relative labour market prospects and out-
comes of women and men in the UK. We will first introduce the most relevant 
aspects of the pandemic, underlying the nature and extent of the economic 
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shock. This will help us to focus on the impact of the shocks on labour 
market outcomes, particularly jobs and pay. Given the well-established 
relationship between the labour market and the division of domestic 
and unpaid labour, and the clear connection between the latter and 
the nature of the shock produced by the pandemic, we will also assess 
the emerging evidence on the gender gaps in household production. 
Before proceeding, however, a brief note on the evidence we are 
able to rely on is needed. Official labour market statistics are derived 
from the Labour Force Survey (LFS), the largest household survey in 
the UK. Unfortunately, the LFS is not as timely as we would need in 
these circumstances to assess the impact of the COVID-19 pandem-
ic on the labour market; the Office for National Statistics (ONS) is 
therefore making great strides into producing real time labour mar-
ket data, which is still experimental and, more often than not, does 
not report the information by gender. For this reason, we comple-
ment the data from the ONS with studies that have a specific gender 
focus, carried out by other organisations and academics, often rely-
ing on surveys with much smaller sample sizes and not always rep-
resentative of the UK population. However, these are fundamental 
to our understanding of the current impact of the pandemic and, al-
though not rich and comprehensive, they are nevertheless sufficient 
to establish the key emerging patterns if not orders of magnitude.
2 Context and Policy Background
It was January 29, 2020 when the UK’s first two patients tested pos-
itive for COVID-19, after two Chinese nationals from the same fam-
ily staying at a hotel in York fell ill. More than a month later, on 5 
March, the first victim in the UK was a woman in her 70s, at the Roy-
al Berkshire Hospital in Reading. It is on the 11th of March that the 
World Health Organisation officially declares a pandemic and the UK 
Government announces a £12 billion package of emergency support, 
while, on March 17, the Chancellor announced a £330 billion pack-
age to help businesses furlough staff, saying that “the UK has never 
in peacetime faced an emergency like this” and that he would aban-
don “orthodoxy” and “ideology” in response. It is on March 20 that 
the Government ordered schools, nurseries and pubs to close and on 
March 23 that the Prime Minister announces a national lockdown, 
telling people that they may only leave home to exercise once a day, 
to travel to and from work where absolutely necessary, to shop for 
essential items and to fulfil any medical or care needs. These were 
unprecedented measures that the Government introduced to contain 
the spread of the coronavirus across the country. They have led to 
businesses being shut down temporarily and extensive restrictions 
on travel and mobility.
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The two major fiscal measures adopted by the Government to pro-
tect employment have been the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme 
and the UK Self-employment Income Support Scheme. The former 
originally allowed firms to furlough workers for up to three months 
with the Government replacing 80% of employees’ wages, up to a 
maximum of £2,500 per month plus the associated Employer Nation-
al Insurance contributions and pension contributions. This scheme 
has now been extended until the end of October 2020 but the extent 
of the wage replacement paid by the Government has been scaled 
back. The UK Self-employment Income Support Scheme originally al-
lowed self-employed individuals to claim a taxable grant worth 80% 
of their trading profits up to a cap of £7,500 in total for three months. 
This has also been extended until the end of August but with a re-
duction in the extent of the Government’s contribution to 70% and a 
cap of £6,570 in total. 
3 The Economic Shocks
The economic effects of these measures combine aspects of so-called 
supply and demand side shocks. The former are associated with re-
duction in the economy’s ability to produce goods and services and, 
therefore, with shocks to the supply of labour. For instance, these 
arise from mortality and morbidity due to the infection and, above 
all, from the withdrawal of labour due to the social distancing meas-
ures put in place. The latter are associated with reduction in consum-
ers’ ability to purchases goods and services. For instance, consum-
ers are likely to both increase their demand for health services and, 
seeking to reduce their risk of exposure to the virus, decrease the 
demand for products and services that involve close contact with oth-
ers.1 The extent of the initial economic impact arising from the com-
bination of these shocks of course depends on the duration of the out-
break, the public health restrictions imposed to contain the spread 
of the virus as well as other voluntary social distancing measures 
that people take to reduce their chances of catching it. At the outset 
of the lockdown policies in the UK, various estimates of the possible 
impact ranged from a low of 15% to a maximum of 35% reduction in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP).2 The latest available official figures 
1 In the early days of the outbreak, stockpiling behaviour also resulted in a direct de-
mand increase in the retail sector.
2 The Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR) estimated that GDP may fall by as much 
as 35% in its “reference” scenario. The National Institute of Economic and Social Re-
search (NIESR) estimated that the fall could be between 15% and 25%, and the Or-
ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates were at the 
top end of this range.
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by the ONS report that monthly GDP fell by 20.4% in April, the big-
gest monthly fall since the series began in 1997, more than three 
times larger than the fall of the previous month and almost ten times 
larger than the steepest pre-COVID-19 fall. In April the economy was 
around 25% smaller than in February. Importantly, this affected the 
whole of the economy, with particularly severe impact on manufac-
turing and construction. Other notable impacts have been on educa-
tion, which fell by 18.8% as a result of school closures; on food and 
beverage service activities, which fell by 38.8% as a result of the clo-
sure of bars and restaurants and even on health, which fell by 11.4% 
as a result of reduced activity in elective operations and fewer acci-
dent and emergency visits (ONS 2020a). The extent of this contrac-
tion in economic activity is really abnormal, thinking that, in April 
2020, the decline in GDP has been three times greater than the fall 
experienced during the Great Recession of 2008-09.3 
The virus and the subsequent economic shocks we have outlined 
above will have an impact on the world of work across key dimen-
sions: the quantity and quality of jobs and work, including employ-
ment and earnings. Importantly, emerging studies have shown that 
this impact will not be homogeneously felt across the population but 
will be more pronounced for specific groups who are more vulner-
able to adverse labour market outcomes than others. In the follow-
ing section, we assess this emerging evidence, starting with the em-
ployment outcomes.
4 Labour Market Impacts
Employment adjustment typically follows economic contraction with 
some delay. In fact, the latest LFS estimates for the period Febru-
ary to April 2020 show that employment, unemployment and inac-
tivity remained mostly unaffected by the impact of the pandemic at 
that point in time. In order to capture the extent of the impact of the 
pandemic on the labour market, these more ‘traditional’ sources of 
information have limitations. We would also need to look at other 
information, such as real time information and the intensive mar-
gin and the number of hours of work. Indeed, Real time information 
data from HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) shows that the num-
ber of paid employees fell by 612,000 between March 2020 and May 
2020 (ONS 2020b).
3 During the global financial crisis, from the peak in February 2008 to the lowest 
point of March 2009, a total of 13 months, GDP contracted by 6.9%. Between March 
2020 and April 2020, GDP has fallen by 20.4%, equivalent to a fall of approximately £30 
billion in Gross Value Added.
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The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) have assessed the distribu-
tional impact of the recession caused by COVID-19. They report that, 
on the eve of the crisis, around 15% of employees in the UK worked 
in a sector that has largely or entirely shut down during the lock-
down. These include non-food retail, restaurants and hotels, passen-
ger transport, personal services and arts and leisure services. Wom-
en were about one third more likely to work in a sector that was shut 
down than men: 17% of female employees were in such sectors, com-
pared to 13% of male employees (Joyce, Xu 2020). Claudia Hupkau 
and Barbara Petrongolo (2020) assessed the proportion of working 
men and women who work in critical sectors, defined according to 
the UK Government’s guidelines on “critical workers” and “business-
es that must remain closed”, and in sectors that have been explicitly 
locked down. They report that about 39% and 46% of working men 
and women, respectively, are employed in critical sectors, while 13% 
and 19%, respectively, are in locked-down sectors. This leaves 35% 
of women and 48% of men relatively less affected in terms of employ-
ment and, therefore, earnings. However, an important characteristic 
of a job is the percentage of tasks individuals can do from home, so 
the likelihood of these men and women to avoid loss of employment 
and earnings is linked to their ability to work from home. Adams-
Prassl et al. (2020) show that there is a clear relationship between 
the percentage of tasks one can do from home and job loss and, in the 
UK, this relationship has become even steeper as the crisis has un-
folded. They also confirm that the percentage of people having lost 
their jobs varies substantially across the different occupations and 
industries. We see that both in the US and the UK people working in 
‘food preparation and serving’ and ‘personal care and service’ are 
very likely to have lost their job due to the pandemic. On the other 
side of the spectrum, people working in ‘computer and mathemati-
cal’ occupations or ‘architecture and engineering’ have been most 
likely to keep their job. Hukpau and Petrongolo show that women 
are more likely than men to be in jobs that can be done from home, 
such as in education as opposed, for instance, to construction. De-
spite this possibly mitigating factor, in terms of gender equality, the 
key point remains that because women disproportionately work in 
retail and hospitality, COVID-19 is likely to have a bigger effect on 
their employment and earnings. The study from Adams-Prassl et al 
(2020), which collected two waves of data in the UK and the US from 
almost 15,000 people, found that a total of 15% of the UK population 
have lost their jobs due to the economic impact of coronavirus by 
mid-April. Moreover, women are four percentage points more likely 
to have lost their job than men in the UK, with 17% of women newly 
unemployed compared to 13% of men.
The pandemic has also impacted on actual hours worked. Reasons 
for changes to the intensive margin of employment are similar to those 
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mentioned above and include the level and distribution of aggregate 
economic activity, changes in labour supply arising from health re-
strictions or other responsibilities such as child care. The survey from 
Adams-Prassl et al (2020) reports a stark decline in the number of 
hours worked, with the average change in hours worked (compared 
to a typical week in February) being 7 hours in the UK. This is con-
firmed by official statistics from the ONS, which shows that, in the 
period February to April 2020, the total actual weekly hours worked 
in the UK decreased by 94.2 million compared to the same period in 
2019, or 8.9%. The ‘accommodation and food service activities’ sector 
saw the biggest fall in average actual hours: a decrease of 6.9 hours 
to 21.2 hours per week (ONS 2020b). We have seen that women are 
more likely than men to be employed in those activities.
The evidence on the impact of the recessions on the gender gap 
in earnings is even more limited. The IFS estimates that the larg-
est distributional impact of the recessions associated with the pan-
demic is by earnings level: those with the lowest earnings are about 
seven times as likely to work in shut-down sectors as those with the 
highest earnings. 34% of employees in the bottom tenth of the earn-
ings distribution work in sectors directly affected by the lockdown, 
compared to just 5% of those in the top tenth (Joyce, Xu 2020). Wom-
en are substantially overrepresented in the bottom of the earnings 
distribution. A survey of more than 2,000 working age adults by the 
national poverty charity Turn2us reports that women’s earnings are 
expected to fall by £309 (26%) compared to an 18% drop (£247) in 
earnings for men, resulting in a widening of the mean gender pay 
gap of £62 a month (Turn2us 2020). A nationally representative sur-
vey found that 48% of mothers and 38% of fathers, compared with 
27% of non-parents, are worried about making ends meet in the next 
three months (WBG 2020)
One potential reason for these differences is given by the gender 
gap in home production and women being more likely than men to 
spend more time in unpaid activities, such as taking care of children 
and homeschooling, the latter having been a direct consequence of 
the school closures imposed by the Government to control the spread 
of the virus.
5 Home Production Impacts
The impact of home production represents possibly the most signif-
icant difference between the economic recessions caused by the 
COVID-19 pandemic and previous recessions, including the most se-
vere ones. This is because of the lockdown measures imposed by the 
Government, which included the closures of schools from March 23, 
2020. This difference is also likely to be the main reason as to why 
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the immediate, short-term gender impact of this recession is likely 
to be different from those of previous recessions, which have typi-
cally affected men more than women.4
Despite the long-term trends towards increased marketization of 
household production, whereby some of the unpaid activities usually 
undertaken by women at home have been acquired in the marketplace, 
gender gaps in the amount of time spent on unpaid tasks at home have 
remained stubbornly high even before the lockdown put in place at the 
end of March 2020. One study by the ONS estimated that women car-
ried out 60% more unpaid work than men (ONS 2016). The gender divi-
sion of household work depends on a series of factors, including house-
hold composition and number of children. In the UK, almost one-fifth 
of households with dependent children are single mother households. 
Some studies have assessed the impact of the lockdown measures on 
the gender division of household work. One such study by Sevilla and 
Smith (2020) reports that women have borne the majority of the ad-
ditional burden of childcare associated with the lockdown measures. 
More specifically, they report a substantial burden of childcare for 
families with young children, who are doing the equivalent of a work-
ing week of additional childcare, often on top of paid work. The fact 
that women are less likely to be working than men cannot fully ac-
count for their greater burden of childcare. The amount of time wom-
en spend on childcare is much less sensitive to their employment than 
it is for men. Women do a lot of childcare irrespective of whether they 
are working or not, while men put in a lot more childcare when they 
are not working compared to when they are. The longer term impact 
of this, for instance on career progression, cannot be underestimat-
ed: mothers’ childcare comes more at the expense of their productiv-
ity and future career prospects than it does for fathers’. However, the 
substantial increase in the need to take care of children and home 
schooling when schools have been closed has resulted in a sizeable 
increase in childcare done by fathers. Sevilla and Smith (2020) report 
that fathers who are not working and, to a lesser extent, those who 
were working from home, have substantially increased the number 
of hours that they do and assumed an equal (or in some cases great-
er than equal) share of childcare. This has resulted in a slight reduc-
tion in the within-household gender gap from 30.6 percentage points 
to 27.2 percentage points. The survey from Adams-Prassl et al (2020) 
also reports that women spend a lot more time on childcare than men.
4 It is important here to emphasise that the finding on men being more affected by 
recessions than women refer to the short-term, immediate impact of recessions, typi-
cally associated with gender industry segregation. When a fuller account of industry 
and occupational segregation is taken, as well as other factors, such as fiscal austeri-
ty measures in the last great recession, women’s employment is not less affected than 
men’s (see Razzu, Singleton 2018).
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6 Concluding Remarks
COVID-19 is a public health crisis with huge economic and social con-
sequences. Emerging evidence shows that the economic and social 
impacts are not felt evenly across the population. 
Two aspects of the crisis have contributed to making its econom-
ic impact peculiar and possibly more severe than previous crisis: the 
combination of demand and supply side shocks and the nature of the 
government intervention in terms of lockdown measures and direct 
closure of economic activities to control the spread of the virus. The 
latest available data on output shows that GDP contracted by more 
than 20% in the month of April. Although this will show later on in 
statistics on employment and participation, real time experimental 
data indicate a substantial reduction in the number of paid employ-
ees between March and May 2020 and in the hours of work. This im-
pact has been felt across the economy but, given the nature of the 
lockdown measures, it has affected some sectors more than others, 
particularly retail, accommodation and food services sectors. Dis-
tributional analysis also shows that the impact is most salient at the 
bottom of the earnings distribution than for high paid jobs. The fact 
that women are more likely than men to be employed in those sec-
tors, and more likely than men to be at the bottom of the earning dis-
tribution, means that their labour market outcomes are more likely 
to be negatively affected than men’s. 
The nature of the lockdown measures, including the schools clo-
sure, has resulted in a substantial additional burden on child-caring. 
The impact of this additional burden on gender equality depends on 
various factors, including household composition, number of children 
and employment status. The emerging evidence presents two find-
ings. On the one hand, in absolute terms, women have seen a sub-
stantial increase in the number of works devoted to household pro-
duction and childcare. They are also doing a lot more juggling of 
childcare and work than men are. The impact this is likely to have on 
women’s productivity and therefore their career progression could 
be very substantial.
On the other hand, given that many men have had their working 
hours reduced, being furloughed or having lost their jobs since lock-
down at the end of March, they have also substantially increased the 
hours of childcare. 
In order to address some of the more pronounced labour market 
consequences of the crisis, the Government has intervened with two 
main schemes, supporting the wages of employees and self-employed 
who have been furloughed. To the extent to which women’s labour 
market outcomes have been affected by the crisis more than men’s, 
these schemes will benefit them relatively more. However, important 
aspects of the crisis that possibly have significant impact on gender 
Giovanni Razzu
COVID-19 Pandemic and Gender Inequality in the Labour Market in the UK
Giovanni Razzu
COVID-19 Pandemic and Gender Inequality in the Labour Market in the UK
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 289
A New World Post COVID-19, 281-290
equality in the medium term in the labour market have not received 
necessary government attention. Women are over represented in sec-
tors that have been mostly affected by the lockdown, such as retail, 
accommodation and food services sectors and it is not clear what 
long-term impact the lockdown measures will have on the sustain-
ability of many businesses active in those sectors. The UK Govern-
ment has not yet announced a comprehensive post-COVID economic 
recovery plan in this respect. 
Regarding pay, the Government suspended the legal requirement 
for all UK firms with more than 250 employees to publish measures 
of the gender pay gap within their own organisations, which was due 
annually at the beginning of April. This is unfortunate not just be-
cause the emerging evidence suggests the gender pay gap may have 
increased as a result of the crisis but also because it gives a strong 
message that gender equality in the labour market is not a priority 
and can be sacrificed in certain circumstances. The crisis has also 
started a new dialogue on health, key workers, social care and pay, 
also epitomised by the Thursday night clapping across the nation. We 
know these are areas where women’s contribution is overwhelming. 
It would be another missed opportunity if concrete actions on pay 
and support to these sectors did not follow.
Gender inequality in the labour market is the product of many fac-
tors: the issues are complex, manifold and interrelated. Most nota-
bly, they are often the result of a structured system of institutions 
and norms in which gender plays a very important part. This is evi-
dent when looking at the role of social attitudes towards gender and 
employment and the associated impact of motherhood on women’s la-
bour market prospects. The pandemic has clearly resulted in an ad-
ditional burden on childcare; its possible long-term consequences on 
women’s work prospects would need to be addressed. Increasing the 
amount of child benefit, as proposed by various organisations and ac-
ademics earlier on in the crisis, is one possible intervention but more 
can be done to raise awareness and provide practical tools to fam-
ilies on how the distribution of work within the household could be 
more gender equal, now that many fathers are likely to be at home 
and are sharing more of the burden than they used to do. Building on 
this to ensure it becomes engrained would be important. Any discus-
sion, analysis and intervention related to new ways of working rep-
resent a great opportunity to address the systemic issue of the rela-
tionship between paid and unpaid work in the household.
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1 Introduction
The threat of COVID-19 assumed ominous proportions in India by mid-March 
2020, and even the Government of India, which had so far made few attempts 
to prepare for the looming crisis, could not brush it aside any longer. In an at-
tempt to contain the spread of the disease, the government announced a total 
lockdown on March 24, 2020. The announcement came at 8 pm on March 23, 
with lockdown in effect from midnight. As the incessant churn of life of a bil-
lion people across overcrowded metropolises and sprawling semi-urban con-
urbations of India came to a sudden halt, as transport stalled, shops put down 
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their shutters, public places fell silent, and a billion people huddled in-
doors, a surreal saga unfolded on television screens across the coun-
try. In several big cities, roads that were supposed to be empty were 
in fact teeming with masses carrying children and bundled posses-
sions, waiting at bus and train stations, and, having given up hope of 
finding transport, embarking on journeys of hundreds of kilometres 
on foot. These are the seasonal workers of India – a labour force of 
over 120 million villagers who travel in search of work to urban cen-
tres in the fallow seasons. They live in city slums and work mostly in 
the informal sector in industries such as construction, garment mak-
ing and small manufacturing, or work as street vendors, rickshaw 
pullers and domestic help. Once the lockdown was imposed, most 
of these jobs vanished overnight. The employers themselves faced a 
cash crunch and stopped paying casual workers. Having little access 
to the public welfare system (a problem we will come back to later), 
and in many cases evicted from tenements by landlords concerned 
about the virus, the workers had little choice but to try to return to 
their villages. In an article in the Financial Times, the writer and ac-
tivist Arundhati Roy writes movingly about their plight: 
Many driven out by their employers and landlords, millions of im-
poverished, hungry, thirsty people, young and old, men, women, 
children, sick people, blind people, disabled people, with nowhere 
else to go, with no public transport in sight, began a long march 
home to their villages. They walked for days, towards Badaun, 
Agra, Azamgarh, Aligarh, Lucknow, Gorakhpur – hundreds of kil-
ometres away. Some died on the way. (Roy 2020)
The great exodus and its human cost raise several economic ques-
tions, to which we now turn. How might we think about the economic 
impact of the exodus? Where in the economy would it show up? What 
policies might ameliorate the human cost? What role has the govern-
ment played and what light does that shed on the nature of govern-
ment policy? If government policy is inadequate, what is the source 
of the distortion? And, last but not the least, how should social insti-
tutions change to address any endemic government failure? 
2 “Othering” and Distortion
But before we talk about such questions, an ontological issue deserves 
our attention. The seasonal workers come to urban centres from vil-
lages across the country – and in most cases they travel across states1 
1 India is a federal union of 28 states and 8 union territories.
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to seek work. Crossing a state border by an Indian citizen should be 
an unremarkable event, yet these workers are labelled migrants. In-
deed, even those who cross state lines to settle elsewhere, but remain 
poor, are routinely referred to as migrants. This “othering” through 
categorisation is unfortunate to say the least and reflects a public at-
titude that makes for institutional discrimination and insidious biases 
in public policy. As we discuss economic aspects of the exodus below, 
this socio-political background is worth keeping in mind. In seeking 
policy solutions, we need to look for appropriate incentives within this 
structure. As will become clear later, simply making policy proposals 
assuming the utopia of a welfare-maximising policymaker is not very 
useful in the current context.
3 Economic Impact
Returning to the questions we posed above, let us first try to deci-
pher the potential economic impact of the exodus. Here it is key to 
gain an understanding of the setting within which the problem man-
ifests. The Indian economy is large, but mostly informal and most of 
the over half-a-billion labour force is engaged in relatively unproduc-
tive employment. Indeed, this lack of productivity is a crucial rea-
son for the majority of the 1.3 billion population to remain so poor. A 
staggering 90% of the employment is in the informal sector including 
agriculture, and produces a little more than 50% of the GDP, leaving 
the formal sector, with 10% of the labour force, to produce the oth-
er half. The productivity gap is obvious. 
Even though many of the informal sector workers have basic bank 
accounts, they lack access to credit or insurance, and are therefore 
largely financially excluded. The Government of India spends rela-
tively little on health and education,2 and in the poorer areas peo-
ple largely rely on their social networks to provide some support. In 
this backdrop of endemic poverty and low levels of infrastructure 
provision, the remittances sent by the seasonal workers play an im-
portant role in supporting a large number of households.3 Removing 
these remittances not only hurts the households concerned, but has a 
multiplier effect on many others in the local economy. In the absence 
of formal credit or insurance, social networks can take some of the 
strain when only a few households receive a negative shock. But when 
2 Health spending is 1.28% of GDP and education spending is 3.8%. To compare, Bra-
zil spends 9.2% of GDP on health and 6% on education. The UK spends 9.6% of GDP on 
health and 5.5% on education. 
3 See Deshingkar, Akter 2009 for a detailed description of the occupation structure 
of migrants and their contribution to GDP.
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whole local economies get a macro shock, the networks run out of ca-
pacity to cope. Poverty and deprivation rise. Many small business-
es go bust permanently. The result is a deep recession in these local 
economies. And while the removal of the remittances will have an 
impact on certain areas, it also serves as a weathervane, signalling 
ill-winds of lockdown for the whole of the informal economy, where 
many jobs will be lost permanently. This will eventually reduce over-
all GDP growth estimates. Indeed, the informal sector had already 
suffered a setback in 2016 from the poorly conceived demonetisation 
policy,4 which drained liquidity from an economic system entirely de-
pendent on cash transactions and had a large and long-term nega-
tive impact. Given the long duration of the lockdown,5 the total im-
pact on the informal economy is likely to be even greater this time. 
The exodus has a negative impact also from an epidemiological 
point of view. Large numbers travelling to remote locations carry the 
risk of introducing COVID-19 to previously disease-free areas. These 
are also precisely the areas without any public health infrastructure, 
exacerbating the potential downside risk.
4 Policy Proposals
What policies might mitigate these problems? In an insightful and 
wide-ranging work, Debraj Ray and S. Subramanian (2020) have writ-
ten about the impact of the lockdown. This includes a condensed anal-
ysis of policy suggestions made by a variety of commentators. Two 
broad themes emerge from this. The first is an observation on mac-
roeconomic policy. Given that the contraction in economic activity is 
driven by a pandemic, both demand and supply sides are hit, and nor-
mal channels of monetary policy do not work. On the other hand, fis-
cal policy stands a much better chance of being effective. If the gov-
ernment were to invest heavily on public infrastructure and create 
a safe working environment through testing, distancing, and provi-
sion of proper equipment, that could indeed have a positive impact 
on the economy, including the informal economy. Second, and more 
relevant for our focus on seasonal workers, a consensus has emerged 
on calling for direct transfers, perhaps the obvious policy in such 
a crisis. In India, the main channel for transfers is the Public Dis-
4 See Kumar 2018 for a description of the impact of demonetisation on the informal 
sector. See also Chodorow-Reich et al. 2018 for a theoretical and empirical analysis of 
demonetisation in a macroeconomic model, which finds strong evidence of the effect of 
money on output in India and shows why cash matters a great deal in India.
5 The lockdown started on March 24, 2020, and was extended in phases until May 30, 
2020. Subsequently, some restrictions were lifted, but a lockdown continues in sever-
al areas that have been identified as COVID-19 hotspots.
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tribution System (PDS). Access is through home-state issued ration 
cards, so that out-of-state workers are excluded from PDS transfers. 
Expanding the scope of transfers in a crisis requires relaxation of 
such requirements. Many commentators, including the dream-team 
of Amartya Sen, Raghuram Rajan and Abhijit Banerjee (2020), have 
made the case for universal access to the PDS with minimal checks. 
Writing in The Wire, Dipa Sinha (2020) discusses a specific policy 
along these lines. She proposes that the government allocate 10 kg 
of grains per head per month, and make the coverage universal, re-
quiring minimal documents simply to keep track of everyone. She es-
timates that if 20% of the population were to self-select out, the plan 
would require 65 million tons of grains over 6 months. The govern-
ment of India has a large stockpile of 75 million tonnes of grains, with 
another 30 million tonnes incoming soon, so that the plan is feasible. 
In our view, apart from the virtue of being simple to implement, the 
plan has exactly the right incentives. Given universal coverage, the 
scope for capture by special interests or middlemen is low (and in any 
case, a second-order concern in a crisis). Further, the long queues 
that are bound to form to access the rations would serve as an en-
dogenous incentive for the better-off to stay away. The policy there-
fore targets the needy and goes a long way to solve the problems of 
hunger and starvation.
5 The Policy Stance of the Government
Contrast the proposals with the actual schemes adopted by the gov-
ernment. The policy response has been surprising, mainly because 
even the most obviously effective suggestions about greater transfers 
with broader coverage and fewer checks seem to have fallen on deaf 
ears. The government did announce certain relief measures includ-
ing transfers of 5 kg of grains per head per month through the PDS 
list just after the lockdown started. However, as noted above, sea-
sonal migrants had no access to such transfers. Almost seven weeks 
later the government announced further measures that expanded 
coverage for two months to those without a ration card, but then re-
quired other documents to grant access. This pathological insistence 
on identity checking for basic food transfers in a time of crisis – a 
stance diametrically opposite to the proposals mentioned above – has 
limited the effectiveness of the policy for migrant workers. A report 
from the Stranded Workers Action Network (SWAN 2020) notes that 
as late as early June, over nine weeks since the lockdown started, 
80% of the seasonal migrants have not received any grains under 
the scheme. A similar apathy characterised the response to millions 
walking long distances. The government only arranged special trains 
to carry workers home after six weeks had passed from the imposi-
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tion of the lockdown. Indeed, the government’s overall response to 
the economic crisis brought about by the lockdown amounts to spend-
ing only around 1% of GDP – meagre compared to 9% in the US, 7% in 
Germany and 4.5% in the UK.6 And if we were to use a deflator tak-
ing the relative poverty indices into account, the comparative figure 
would be much more unflattering.
6 Lockdown and Inconsistent Government Policy
The response raises a more fundamental policy question: is the lock-
down itself justified? Recall that starting March 24, the lockdown 
went on till May 30, and as we write it continues in several areas with 
only some rules relaxed. There is no question that the lockdown has 
saved lives by halting the spread of the disease. In an ideal world, 
the government would supplement the lockdown with appropriate-
ly scaled transfers to the poor. But given the actual policy response, 
the lockdown has itself become an agent of death for the poorest and 
the most vulnerable, who have little to fall back upon when their dai-
ly livelihoods vanish. We do not know precisely how many lives have 
been saved by the lockdown, but one would hazard a guess that far 
more lives have been destroyed by it given its prolonged duration. 
Numbers aside, it is clear that if saving lives is the objective, the 
lockdown and the subsequent policy response are not consistent with 
each other. What explains the sub-optimal policy stance? To under-
stand how such distortions arise, we need to delve into the political 
economy of policymaking in India.
7 The Selectively Absent Leviathan
In their recent intellectual tour de force, The Narrow Corridor, Daron 
Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (2019) discuss the idea of liberty, 
and how it requires both a strong state and a strong society. Liber-
ty, they argue, requires not being subject to the capricious will of an-
other. “It requires the capacity to stand eye to eye with your fellow 
citizens, in a shared awareness that none of you has a power of arbi-
trary interference over another” (7). Starting from Thomas Hobbes’ 
idea of “Leviathan” as the solution to anarchy, and using examples 
from history, they show that liberty can be violated both in the ab-
sence of a strong state (absent leviathan) and if a strong state were 
to declare war on its own citizens (despotic leviathan). The plight of 
6 See, for example, Jha 2020 and Sibal 2020. Ray and Subramanian 2020 contains a 
detailed description of policies adopted. 
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the seasonal migrants in India clearly demonstrate an absence of lib-
erty. Yet, the Indian state power cannot be properly characterised as 
either absent or despotic. For India, Acemoglu and Robinson point to 
the caste system as a powerful cage of norms that fragment society 
against itself. The consequent inability to monitor the state fuels the 
absence of liberty even in a participatory democracy. We would ar-
gue that this is not the whole story. The plight of the seasonal work-
ers points to a further cause of loss of liberty in India. Even in the 
absence of caste-based fragmentation, the poorest sections of the 
society are too distracted by their daily struggle for survival to gel 
as a unified front with ‘voice’. The absence of voice is complete: nei-
ther the state nor any structure in society including the press pay 
them much attention. Thus, the leviathan can be selectively absent.
Let us give a further example to delineate a selectively absent le-
viathan. A second epidemic – deadlier than COVID-19 – rages in In-
dia at this very moment. An entrenched disease, it has been ravag-
ing sufferers for several years now. Yet, many Indians are unaware of 
it, the press hardly reports on it, and the government devotes some, 
but by no means sufficient resources to combat it effectively. This is 
the epidemic of tuberculosis. The World Health Organization’s latest 
report (WHO 2019) estimates that in 2018, 2.7 million Indians con-
tracted the disease, of which 450 thousand died. Absolute numbers as 
well as the death rate (17%) far exceed that of COVID-19 so far. What 
explains the institutional apathy towards the problem? The answer 
is again linked to poverty. Indeed, tuberculosis is known as a dis-
ease of poverty, proliferating in densely inhabited areas such as ur-
ban slums. It is therefore the same absence of voice that distorts the 
government’s response to the plight of the seasonal workers as well 
as that of the victims of tuberculosis. Clearly, these groups would be 
denied liberty even without a cage of norms.
8 A Ray of Hope?
Can we envisage a way out of the problem? The National Capital Ter-
ritory (NCT) of Delhi offers a promising case study. Delhi has a large 
community of settled ‘migrants’. As we discussed before, these are 
people originating from other states who settle in Delhi but remain 
poor. Given our previous discussion, it does not come as a surprise 
that they have historically lacked voice and suffered the absent levia-
than. However, with rising numbers, and with a growing recognition 
that their votes should be cast in a way that brings benefit, their po-
sition has gradually changed. Around 2013, a regional political party 
sensed an opportunity and started putting up members of the com-
munity as candidates in a significant number of seats. This helped the 
migrants leapfrog into a voting bloc, now controlling between 30% 
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and 40% of the vote, and the party concerned has held sway in Delhi 
NCT elections since. Indeed, across the political spectrum, anyone 
in power seeking re-election can no longer ignore migrant welfare 
issues. To employ another metaphor from Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2019), by voting as a bloc on development, the settled migrants of 
Delhi have finally had some success in chaining the leviathan.
For seasonal workers, two entitlements are critical. First, workers 
who cross state lines should still have access to the Public Distribu-
tion System. The government is indeed implementing such a scheme 
under the banner One Nation One Ration Card, which should be up 
and running sometime this year. Second, as the Delhi case study 
shows, to chain the leviathan successfully, the workers also need to 
participate in India’s democracy as an effective bloc. Since voting 
rights are tied to place of residence, the majority of seasonal work-
ers, working across state lines, are in effect disenfranchised. Even 
though the group is large – they number somewhere between 120 
and 150 million (the government does not have a separate database 
for seasonal migrants) – their voice is thereby curtailed. Suggestions 
have been made that they should be allowed postal votes or that in-
dividuals should be allowed to carry their vote, enabling exercise of 
suffrage at the place of work. The government currently has no plans 
to implement such policies. However, the great exodus has firmly im-
printed the worker underclass in the nation’s psyche. The political 
scientist Pratap Bhanu Mehta (2020) writes eloquently about the jus-
tice that society owes them. Indeed, if their harrowing stories bring 
about greater solidarity from social institutions, together they might 
be able to gain the required rights, escape being subject to the ca-
pricious will of others, and have liberty at last. At least we hope so. 
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1 Pandemic Economy and Work
From the industrial revolution to the present day, the global economy has ex-
panded – albeit with peaks and troughs interspersed throughout – and creat-
ed transformative innovations from the Ford motor car to the iPhone. Howev-
er, the troughs are what we humans feel the most. We are still reeling from 
the last major recession in 2008, as global debt sharply increased, wages 
remained low and productivity stagnated. Yet, the recession caused by the 
coronavirus pandemic is different to previous downturns. This COVID-19 re-
cession was not caused by flaws in the global financial system like in 2008, 
but instead it was the threat of illness and death on a global scale. The rapid 
and unprecedented worldwide shutdown impacted every human on the plan-
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et, with countless deaths, jobs lost, and livelihoods uprooted. How-
ever, the COVID-19 recession has also coincided with the increased 
worldwide adoption of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and automation, a 
process that has already streamlined work patterns. 
The pandemic has also enabled faster adoption of digital technol-
ogy. In the familiar world of food retail, we’ve seen reduced human 
interaction with consumers turning to online shopping, supermar-
ket scanners and even robot food deliveries.1 The pandemic has also 
caused a shift in healthcare, from the use of robots, to GPs treating 
patients via WhatsApp video. We have also witnessed the worldwide 
shift of education from classroom to virtual learning which has al-
lowed – broadly speaking – teaching to continue. Organisations are 
reconfiguring how ‘work’ can be done including balancing conflicting 
ideas that it does not need to happen in offices, against knowing that 
organisational culture is aided by face-to-face interactions. While we 
applaud technology for keeping work going, it indicates that more AI 
integration and automation will be adopted sooner and wider, carry-
ing clear implications for work and workers. 
2 History of Work, Careers and Skills
Whilst we are seeing the transformation of work, the recent history 
of work is worth reviewing. From the start to the middle of the last 
century, in the age of mass manufacturing, workers were recruited 
for similar skillsets to often work on identical jobs. Job roles were 
consistent, often not changing in scope over many years (Parsons 
1949). During this period, firms operated in hierarchies and man-
aged in tight boundaries. The watchword for this era was steady-
state. Later in the 20th Century, flexibility in work grew. Organisa-
tions moved towards a more customer-centric operation and as such, 
systems were faster. Leaders were expected to head up workers with 
a range of skills and knowledge, which could be applied and re-ap-
plied to different scenarios – and so boundaries between jobs, roles 
and organisations blurred. The watchword thus became boundary-
less, coined by Arthur (1994, 295-306). The 21st century saw anoth-
er shift including upheavals bought by AI, and now COVID-19. Work 
is more uncertain, but hyperconnected, hypercompetitive and in-
creasingly tech enabled. Companies and workers who display agility 
in either adapting or taking advantage of digital technology gain suc-
cess. And so adaptability for this era is our watchword (LeBleu 2020). 
1 “Robot Parcel Delivery Starts”. BBC News, 31 October 2018. https://www.bbc.com/
news/uk-england-beds-bucks-herts-46045365; “A New Kind Of Business”. Starship. 
https://www.starship.xyz/business/.
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3 AI, Came Slow –Then Suddenly 
Interest in AI is at all time high and has fuelled investment in AI tech-
nology. For example, the European Commission’s investment in AI has 
skyrocketed – with a 70% increase from 2017 to 2020, coming to €1.5 
billion. However, even this investment appears small in comparison to 
the €12.1 billion investment in North America, and €6.5 billion in Asia 
(European Commission 2020). But, while AI seems like a new phenom-
enon, it has existed for over 60 years. The term was coined by a group 
of scientists who came together in 1956 to explore the deep potential 
of computers. AI systems developed by early creators looked at mim-
icking human intelligences – but through a machine (hence the term 
Artificial Intelligence). The following few years offered some exciting 
innovations, but AI development slowed, and it really was not until the 
start of the 21st century with the advent of immense computing pow-
er, and crucially, access to vast data, that AI really took off. Like some 
statistical methodologies such as regression analysis, AI and Machine 
Learning programmes could observe relationships, classifications and 
predictions in data, but as AI programmes can work ‘unsupervised’ 
and on vast datasets with many variables, the results were unparal-
leled. As a result, AI innovations have influenced our work and life-
styles, from Facial AI assessing our personality in recruitment, to Con-
versational AI in our voice assistants such as Alexa who we freely talk 
to at home but will soon join us in the workplace.
Modern iterations of AI do not need to use the old model of cop-
ying humans. Instead, machine learning algorithms learn in an al-
together different way to us humans. Some AIs can bypass human 
skills, for example, a system developed by Google Health was able 
to find cancerous cells in mammograms more accurately than the 
radiologists it was tested against. In fact, the system detected 90% 
of cancerous cells compared to 78% by radiologists. AI systems like 
this can help speed up diagnosis and allow for treatment to start 
faster (McKinney et al. 2020, 89-94). A question arising from this is 
the role of doctors. Some suggest that the patient relationship part 
of a doctor’s role is to be amplified – as the machine is giving better 
data and at a faster rate to patients. But this process raises ques-
tions about all our jobs. In the next ten years, we can expect great-
er AI job integration. Take accountancy, the role of Financial AI will 
do all the back-breaking work of analysing numbers, and by using 
Machine Learning with sophisticated Data Science, it will sync with 
consumer data and predict trends faster. What then does this leave 
the accountants to do? Possibly do more human tasks such as build-
ing customer relationship. However, will companies need many ac-
countants? (World Economic Forum 2916). ‘Automation’ technology 
underpins many of the predictions of jobs disappearing (ONS 2019), 
specifically tech such as Robotic Process Automation (RPAs), where 
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‘RPAs’ will whizz round a system of routine processes and complete 
tasks that take humans days and weeks to do in days and minutes. 
And the RPA will complete with fewer inaccuracies. 
Although there is no argument that the adoption of AI technologies 
will create new jobs, it does raise the issue of automation of current 
jobs and the potential negative impact upon society. In 2017, the Of-
fice for National Statistics analysed the jobs of 20 million people in 
England (ONS 2019) and concluded that 7.4% are at high risk of being 
automated. In addition, it highlighted that women, part-time work-
ers and younger people in elementary occupations are most likely to 
be affected – many doing the jobs RPAs are primed for. A Universal 
Basic Income (UBI) has been put forward as one possible solution to 
the loss of jobs and the impact of automation upon the working pop-
ulation. It is claimed that a UBI would allow some security to work-
ers, would contribute to limiting involuntary debt, and lower stress 
levels. However, the UBI does equate ‘work’ to ‘money’ in its sim-
plest terms, negating the social aspects of work including person-
al value, relationships, a source of self-esteem, citizenship, and role 
in society (Meyer 2019). It may also increase inequality. UBI, whilst 
useful, could render the unemployed ‘the left behind‘, creating a so-
cial underclass. 
4 A Pandemic World of Work
The pandemic has made us re-think our work – and many jobs might 
be done with a mix of home and office work. For those employers look-
ing to keep the traditional office space many will look for technology 
solutions to minimise spread of disease, such as:
• track and trace software to see who might be sick;
• Wristband sensors to alert workers if they cross set boundaries;
• sensor tracking of small changes in body temperature or voice 
signatures to see who is ill;
• facial recognition software used to open doors reducing the 
need to touch surfaces;
• robots emitting UV light to kill viruses.
Ahead of us further technological advances are likely to enable fur-
ther changes to work. For example, the development of 5G is expected 
to have an enormous impact on businesses – especially so for a post-
pandemic economy as it will enable extraordinarily fast networking 
and connectivity. Workers wanting to maintain a home-based work 
lifestyle could use Virtual and Mixed Reality devices like Microsoft’s 
HoloLens that would add imaging in video conferencing. 5G will en-
able faster and clearer connection, creating a far more personal ex-
perience. 5G, coupled with growth of AI will fuel development of the 
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Internet of Things (IoT) which is expected stimulate the growth of 
Smart Cities, Smart Healthcare and Smart Work. Current planning 
on 5G + IoT adoption is intended to reach more deprived areas and 
reduce digital differences in access – with many health commenta-
tors believing it could even reduce health inequality and even man-
age pandemic outbreaks better.2 The transformative potential of 5G 
cannot be underestimated.
By 2025, IDC [2018] estimates that around 1.5 billion 5G connect-
ed devices will produce more than 175 zettabytes of data each 
year. A zettabyte is the equivalent of one trillion gigabytes. This 
rapid increase in data production through connected 5G devices 
is known as the massive Internet of Things (mIoT), which will ac-
celerate the drive to digitalisation. Many of these 5G connected 
devices will use Edge Computing to deliver super-fast, low laten-
cy, AI powered data services directly on the device without need-
ing to access the cloud. 5G is so much more than just faster 4G. 
Together with mIoT and ‘AI on the Edge’, 5G is the gateway to au-
tonomous systems at scale and human-machine collaboration that 
will make pre-connected human beings look like dinosaurs. (Rich-
ard Foster-Fletcher, Digital Strategist, Boundless Podcast)3
However, critics of AI voice fears over privacy and cybersecurity with 
5G and IoT having prompted governments to develop a stronger stance 
on AI governance. The European Union (EU) released guidelines for 
regulating AI in a white paper, applying to ‘high-risk’ technologies 
with high privacy concerns, such as healthcare, transport and surveil-
lance. For example, the impact of certain AI is deemed “high risk” by 
the EU – such as AI tools used in recruitment, as it may affect work-
ers’ rights. They acknowledge that AI has a huge impact on society, 
and EU citizens must be protected in order to keep trust high. In do-
ing so, the EU has pledged to create an ‘ecosystem of trust’, ensuring 
that tech firms comply with EU regulations and allowing citizens to 
adopt AI technologies with confidence. These governance plans are 
promised to be embedded into 5G planning – even to the extent of 
re-evaluating political and country affiliations of network providers. 
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5 Skills Building – Adapting for Surviving and Thriving
It is only through understanding the realities of any climate, both inter-
nal and external, and adapting effectively, that most creatures survive. 
We are experiencing a new reality shaped by a major shift that is im-
pacting jobs from both AI and the pandemic, and we need to push our 
minds further, understanding that we will need a mindset for constant 
‘adaptability’ to build the relevant skills to thrive. Stimulus in skilling 
from the UK government comes from the UK Office for Artificial In-
telligence (OfAI), which has three main aims: ensuring that AI has a 
positive impact on society, enabling adoption of AI across industries, 
and upskilling and investment. Key policies include increasing invest-
ment in R&D to 2.4% of GSP by 2027, investing £406 million in STEM 
education, and an additional £64 million for a National Retraining 
Scheme, enabling lifelong learning in digital and construction indus-
tries. In addition, the EU has developed an ‘ecosystem of excellence’ 
with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to boost innovation 
and the economy. This is an attempt to attract investment in Europe-
an AI, and in turn stimulate the job market. The EU Commission is al-
so developing a Skills Agenda with the goal to upskill everyone within 
Europe – with a specific effort on women to enter technology. 
Josie Cluer, EY’s lead partner on skills and learning, argues for a 
“skills-led recovery”. She says “skills is a key driver of growth, pro-
ductivity, and the government’s levelling up agenda. So the Prime 
Minister’s plan to ‘build build build’ has to be underpinned by in-
vestment in ‘skills skills skills’. Organisations too, need to invest 
in the skills of their people, because the capabilities they need will 
be different to those pre-COVID. And last, individuals themselves, 
wherever they are in the labour market, will need to invest in their 
own skills, for employment and progression”.4 
Essentially at the core of any governmental role on re-skilling is en-
couraging both organisations and individuals to have a ‘learning 
orientated’ mindset. This supports the underlying theory and ap-
plications in the dynamic approach to both individual and organi-
sational development. Two ‘dynamic’ approaches show key skills to 
survive – and thrive. The first is Dynamic Capabilities, which offers 
a methodology for organisations to gauge changes and adapt to vol-
atile and complex challenges (Teece 2019) and the second is Career 
Dynamism (Pasha 2020), which offers a career delivery model that 
enables people to develop adaptive qualities for career uncertain-
ty. The concept of dynamic capability suggests it is organisational 
4 https://www.henley.ac.uk/articles/why-we-need-a-skills-led-recovery.
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adaptive skills that enable “the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and 
reconfigure internal and external competencies to address rapidly 
changing environments” (Teece, Pisano, Shuen 1997). Dynamic Ca-
pabilities methodology suggest AI offers firms competitive advan-
tage through creating efficiencies (such as RPAs, voice assistants, 
blockchains, and bots) and innovations through 5G and IoT. Career 
Dynamism showed those people best at managing chaos and uncer-
tainty have demonstrable ‘future of work’ skills for work that is both 
uncertain and volatile in nature (Pasha 2020). Abilities such as ‘ca-
reer-resilience’ enables people to be both adaptive and pro-active, 
by demonstrating capabilities such as self-reliance and motivation to 
learn as well a positive self-concept by truly valuing their personal 
abilities. Career Dynamism highlights critical qualities such as hu-
man skills of creativity, openness and an ability to build positive re-
lationships. These are crucial skills, because robots will undertake 
routine, data-heavy, mundane and dangerous work, leaving the pos-
sibility of unknown new jobs which will unquestionably be focused 
on such human qualities.
6 What Might a ‘New Normal’ Mean for Us?
No man ever steps in the same river twice, for it’s not 
the same river and he’s not the same man.
Heraclitus
We are in a ‘new-normal’, despite so many things looking similar. We 
have shared experiment of living and working through COVID-19. At 
the same time, major activist movements occurred during the pan-
demic, such as the Black Lives Matter movement, resulting in com-
panies examining their diversity and inclusion culture – asking if 
they really do offer parity and equality. It is essential, therefore, that 
AI development is aligned to societal norms. Thus, software used in 
monitoring employee experience must ensure ethical diversity and in-
clusion practices, and be mindful of privacy needs of employees. For 
example, ensuring transparency in extracting building usage data 
and personal information from wearable tech, such as Fitbits and Ap-
ple watches. The role of ‘Responsible AI’ (Zhu 2019) will increasingly 
be a core activity that most tech producers are placing into their build 
strategy. Many firms are now using a multi-stakeholder approach to 
consider wider implications of AI, to ensure good governance, diver-
sity and social impact. In building more ethical and responsible AI 
strategies, companies should build AI to align with the ‘meaning and 
purpose’ of corporate strategy – and both organisations and individ-
uals will need to consider dynamic capabilities to achieve sustaina-
ble growth (Harreld, O’Reilly, Tushman 2007). 
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The pandemic has forced huge changes in the world of work, a 
world that was also starting to experience dramatic change from 
AI. If we can adapt well and evolve to the changes the pandemic has 
caused, and adopt AI effectively, firms are likely to see better levels 
of productivity and growth. And with it, they may see their employ-
ees being happier, better skilled and have more adaptability and re-
silience to withstand future challenges. 
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1 Introduction
In a recent article, Liu, Lee, and Lee (2020) highlight how the COV-
ID-19 pandemic is already having severe effects on both the glob-
al economy and global value chains. They emphasise that it is still 
too soon to draw definite conclusions concerning the consequenc-
es of the pandemic. However, they still point out an emerging trend, 
which shows that global supply chains are decoupling from China 
because of the pandemic. Moreover, they argue that this is happen-
ing in a time when there is a drastic reduction of air travel as well as 
severe travel restrictions (Liu, J.M. Lee, C. Lee 2020). In this chap-
ter, we continue the discussion of migration and travel restrictions 
by exploring the effects of the pandemic on talent mobility amongst 
European researchers in China. Talent attraction policies have be-
come increasingly important globally (OECD 2008). This has opened 
doors for academics around the world, only to come to a rapid halt 
because of COVID-19. The transformative issues arising in academ-
ia are highlighted in a recent series of articles published in Nature 
entitled “Science after the pandemic” (Witze 2020). The series ex-
plores some of the dramatic changes that have occurred in academ-
ia resulting from the COVID-19 outbreak. These issues include topics 
such as: what will happen to the nature of conferences, travel, and 
mobility? (Viglione 2020); what is occurring at now empty campuses? 
(Witze 2020); and how might publications change? (Callaway 2020). 
But they also deal with the effect on Chinese academia, which oth-
erwise seems to have been on the rise since China became amongst 
the leading funders of researchers and the leading producer of aca-
demic articles (Cyranoski 2020). In this chapter, we will discuss what 
is happening to foreign researchers in China. We will mainly look in-
depth at European researcher’s experiences and discuss the impact 
on European and Chinese scientific collaborations.
2 Talent Mobility: Why It Matters
Global flows of talent have become an increasingly important ele-
ment of globalisation (Liu 2019). Whether in the public or private 
sector, the recruitment of individuals that can make a difference in 
organisations have become one of the key challenges of the decade 
(Lee, Rezaei 2019). In an article published before the COVID-19 cri-
sis, Janger and Nowotny (2016) explore academic job choices and the 
international mobility of talented researchers. They find that in gen-
eral job choices in academia are driven by factors such as collabora-
tion partners, research funding, and academic freedom rather than 
personal factors. The literature on talent mobility suggests that the 
US is the first destination country for researchers and that it attracts 
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the most substantial flows of international talent, making it able to 
reap the innovative rewards that come with global talent (Kerr et al. 
2016; European Commission 2017; Kerr 2018). However, other coun-
tries have caught up and developed talent attraction schemes of their 
own (Shachar 2006; Shachar, Hirschl 2013, 2015). These schemes are 
particularly prominent in academia and often considered beneficial 
as the mobility of researchers aids in the creation and the diffusion 
of knowledge, which is of significant importance to knowledge econ-
omies (OECD 2008).
3 Talent Mobility on the Rise in EU: China as a Partner  
or Competitor
In an EU context, the introductions of both the Marie Skłodowska-
Curie actions programme and Euraxess have aimed to encourage mo-
bility amongst researchers. Here it is argued that:
[t]he main reason to foster geographic mobility lies in the fact that 
it is related to more intense knowledge flows through international 
collaboration and, as a consequence, increases scientific produc-
tivity which may, in turn, affect economic competitiveness. (Euro-
pean Commission 2017, 10)
These reasons for fostering mobility in order to compete in glob-
al research goes beyond the interest of the EU. Concerns revolving 
around the opportunities as well as risks related to being at the front 
of the research stage or falling behind are shared by countries such 
as Brazil, South Korea, India, and China – all countries that have re-
cently been boosting the mobility opportunities for researchers (Eu-
ropean Commission 2017).
4 Talent Mobility in China: Traditionally a Brain Drain,  
But Becoming Competitive
As the world’s largest transition economy, talent in science and tech-
nology is critical to the development of a flourishing knowledge econ-
omy for China (Liu, Fang 2019). Since the opening of the Chinese 
economy and the increased mobility of students as well as research-
ers, China has suffered from a significant brain drain. The state, uni-
versities, and scientific organisations have therefore been part of im-
plementing measures on both a country and local level which aim at 
attracting first Chinese returnees (Zweig, Kang, Wang 2020) and in-
creasingly also foreign talents (Miao, Wang 2017). These efforts have 
coincided with the increased quality and the improved ratings of Chi-
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nese universities as well as the development of Sino-Foreign universi-
ties (Wang, Chen 2020). Even though these efforts have been success-
ful to a certain extent, the individual talents and researchers seem 
to remain mobile whether they are Chinese or foreigners (Mouritzen, 
Rezaei, forthcoming).This reveals an element of vulnerability in the 
talent flows towards China, so although the country fairs increas-
ingly well in the global competition for human capital, according to 
the MORE3 survey (European Commission 2017) and OECD publica-
tions, China remains a relatively unattractive place for foreign tal-
ent (OECD 2013) as seen in the figure below.
Figure 1 The impact of internationally mobile scientists, inflows versus outflows, 1996-2011 (OECD 2013)
5 Data and Methods
While the data revealed significant barriers to Europeans in China that 
remain relevant, new issues have arisen with the pandemic. In particu-
lar, we examined in-depth the 2020 survey conducted by Euraxess that 
has highlighted the new reality facing European talents in China af-
ter COVID-19. The material deriving from Euraxess is included as the 
organisation has a unique coverage within the community of Europe-
an researchers in China. We complement the survey data with quali-
tative interviews collected by one of the authors of this paper during 
fieldwork in China before the pandemic and through online interviews 
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with respondents after the pandemic, although the data collected after 
the pandemic is based on a smaller sample as many respondents were 
unavailable for various reasons connected to the pandemic. Finally, 
we draw upon recently published news and regulations.
6 COVID-19 Impact on Cross Border Mobility
As noted, the outbreak of COVID-19 considerably changed the aca-
demic reality globally. In China, the inflow of foreign talent has been 
limited, while the outflow seems to have increased during the pan-
demic. The challenges emerging because of COVID-19 are already 
influencing research activities conducted in China, particularly ac-
tivities done by the group of foreign academics operating there, hav-
ing forced many researchers to leave the country at least on a tem-
porary basis. Thus, Euraxess China reports that as of March 6, 2020:
When asked if they left China amid the virus outbreak, 47% of 
researchers replied positively; among these, 63% are not plan-
ning on returning to China or are uncertain when they will. (EU-
RAXESS 2020)
The impact on foreign talents’ cross-border mobility was affected by 
travel restrictions imposed by the Chinese government since March 
28, 2020 (The Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2020b, 2020a),1 As 
stated below:
In view of the rapid spread of COVID-19 across the world, China 
has decided to temporarily suspend the entry into China by for-
eign nationals holding visas or residence permits still valid to the 
time of this announcement, effective from 0 a.m., March 28 2020. 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic of China 2020)
1 As the virus spread across the globe, first moving to Europe only to be overtaken 
by the Americas, China was no longer the world’s hotspot. Therefore, in a grander at-
tempt to combat COVID-19, China implemented a string of restrictions on internation-
al travel. These included the suspension of the entry of most foreign nationals – even 
those who were holding valid visas that were issued before the announcement on March 
26, 2020 (China Briefing 2020). Apart from all short-term visas such as transit visas 
and port visas lasting 72 to 144 hours, the visa restriction includes student visas, work 
permits, family visas, regular tourist visas, etc. Furthermore, they include such mo-
bility options as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Business Travel Card 
(ABTC), which otherwise allowed individuals to move temporarily between fully par-
ticipating economies for five years (China Briefing 2020). The few holders of the diffi-
cult to obtain green card (China Briefing 2019) are not subjected to restrictions (Eu-
ropean Union Chamber of Commerce in China 2020b). It will only be visas issued after 
March 26, 2020 that will not be affected by the recently imposed restrictions (Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs the People’s Republic of China 2020). 
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The restrictions only became additionally significant, as many re-
searchers had already left China to avoid the virus following the 
COVID-19 outbreak. As foreign holders of most visa types were no 
longer eligible to enter China, the restrictions have deeply affected 
international talents operating in China (European Union Chamber 
of Commerce in China 2020a). As a result, the European Chamber 
President contacted the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs to ad-
dress the matter and request the easing of the restrictions. Accord-
ing to the European Chamber:
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFAs’) official response recog-
nised and thanked the Chamber for its support in China’s fight 
against COVID-19, and clarified that Chinese green card holders 
are not subject to the entry restrictions. It also stated that a fast-
track system will be established for foreign nationals who need to 
return for urgent/necessary purposes, such as trade, science and 
research or humanitarian reasons. (European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China 2020b)
Foreign nationals returning to China for necessary “economic, trade, 
scientific or technological activities or out of emergency humanitar-
ian needs” will however still need to apply for a visa in order to en-
ter China at the Chinese embassies or consulates abroad and under-
go a quarantine period, affecting the travellers for at least 14 days.2 
Moreover, there have also been severe restrictions on international 
flights, initiated on March 12, 2020 (Business Traveller 2020; Reu-
ters 2020), so that only 20 international flights could land each day.3 
By the end of May, it was decided to maintain the restrictions with 
few exceptions (BBC 2020; Nikkei Asian Review 2020).
2 Travellers will be required to undergo strict testing and individuals will be subject-
ed to a quarantine period of 14 days, although it is possible to enter into a fast-track op-
tion available to individuals from countries that have signed fast track agreements with 
China. However, this requires that the company ensures that the employer remains in a 
closed circuit or a sealed of environment for 14 days, where a designated driver trans-
ports the individual from their home residence to their workplace without this employ-
ee having any physical contact with other members of the staff or other parts of socie-
ty (European Union Chamber of Commerce in China 2020a).
3 The Civil Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) further implemented changes 
that reduced air travel to and from China, taking affect from March 12, 2020. These 
changes included a reduction of international flights such that Chinese Airlines could 
only maintain one route to any country with no more than one flight per week. A sim-
ilar rule affected foreign airlines that were only allowed to maintain a single route to 
China and only fly once per week. Moreover, the rules state that each flight must “en-
sure passenger load factor no higher than 75%” (CAAC 2020).
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7 European Talents in China
The restrictions have particularly affected the foreign community of 
mobile expats in China, both those who left China at the onset of the 
pandemic and the ones who stayed behind. Nevertheless, they are on-
ly a part of the pandemic’s transformational force that we will discuss 
later, relying on a survey developed and disseminated by Euraxess 
China where 46 European researchers based in China responded. The 
survey was an early response to the COVID-19 crisis, and some of the 
results were published on March 6, 2020 (EURAXESS 2020). Current-
ly, we are working with Euraxess to develop and disseminate new ma-
terial that will be available at a later stage. While the low numbers 
challenge the representativeness of the survey, the data is still a re-
liable indicator of changes affecting talent mobility. When asked “Is 
the novel coronavirus outbreak and the resulting prevention-and-con-
trol measures having any current impact on your work and research 
activities?”, close to 75% of the respondents replied that it had a me-
dium or high impact on their activities, as illustrated below.
Figure 2 Is the novel coronavirus outbreak and the resulting prevention-and-control measures having any 
current impact on your work and research activities? With 56% responding Yes, high impact, 30% responding 
Yes, medium impact, 6% Yes, low impact, 2% no impact and 4% responding not possible to evaluate now
This finding resonates with qualitative interviews conducted amongst 
researchers based in China. Amongst these respondents, of which 
many are now living in Europe as they have been blocked from re-en-
tering China, a variety of answers emerged. Researchers who for var-
ious reasons decided to stay in China reported that they faced empty 
campuses and closed laboratories where only they could come and 
go. While this situation seems to be the new normal which has spread 
to most of the universities of the world (Witze 2020), the group of re-
searchers stuck outside of China have been affected in slightly differ-
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ent ways with online meetings that at times have to include people 
based in both the EU and America as well as China. Moreover, most 
communication seems to have moved online – both the communica-
tion between individuals, such as a student and supervisors, but also 
institutional communication. When asked “Are you and/or your insti-
tution introducing or planning on introducing new online tools (such 
as online classes, webinars, online meetings, and group works) as an 
alternative to the normal activities?”, close to 80% of the respond-
ents reported that they either had implemented new online tools or 
were working on implementing new measures.
Figure 3 Are you and/or your institution introducing or planning on introducing new online tools 
(such as online classes, webinars, online meetings, and group works) as an alternative to the normal 
activities? With 59% responding that Yes, we have launched new online activities/tools, 
20% responding Yes, we are working on that and 22% responding no
Like most institutions, Chinese universities have adapted to reali-
ty after COVID-19, and while it is still unknown what the exact ef-
fects of the pandemic will be on learning as well as migration, it is 
clear that university institutions across the globe are updating their 
teaching tools to address a new reality. In particular, the Sino For-
eign Universities have reported challenges faced by their cohorts 
being scattered across the globe and their staff being unable to re-
turn to China [tab. 1].
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Table 1 Challenges and solutions from four Sino Foreign university institutions
Challenges Initiatives that are dealing 
with COVID-19 in the short 
term
Initiatives that are dealing 
with COVID-19 and changes  
in the long term
Some international staff  
and students unable to return  
to China. These are advised 
against returning to China.
Fast transition to online teaching 
within the first month of COVID-19
Planned online teaching ranges 
from supporting the teachers 
to filling in full semesters  
for international students  
and staff blocked by entry barriers. 
Most radically seen through  
the Sino-Danish Center, which 
plans a full-semester online
Reduction or cancellation  
of physical activities, such as:  
teaching activities, ceremonies, 
research activities, and PhD 
exchange activities
Online graduation ceremony  
and other online events,  
such as choir contests and 
introductions to campus life
Reimbursed housing Flexible semester starts, opening 
according to Chinese as well as 
global dynamics
Table based on publicly available information at New York University Shanghai (2020b, 2020a), Nottingham 
University Ningbo (University of Nottingham Ningbo China 2020b, 2020a), Duke Kunshan University (2020b, 
2020a) and Sino-Danish Center (SDC 2020). Moreover, this is a brief collection of the most fundamental and 
reoccurring challenges related to travel barriers and entry issues. Research that would dive deeper into the 
actual institutions would reveal other issues and solutions, such as wearing masks on campus and connections 
between health initiatives in the university and the province.
Just like the challenges faced by the transnational institutions, indi-
vidual researchers collaborating between China and Europe report 
that their collaborations have suffered during the pandemic. When 
asked “In case you are involved in collaborations between China 
and Europe, have they been affected in some way by the current out-
break?”, a third of the respondents answered that it have had an im-
pact, but that the impact is difficult to assess at the early stage, while 
another third replied that it already either had a medium or highly 
negative impact on their collaborations.
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Figure 4 In case you are involved in collaborations between China and Europe, have they been affected in 
some way by the current outbreak? With 13% responding Yes, high negative impact, 28% responding Yes, 
medium impact, 33% responding Yes, but I cannot state what will be the impact, 4% responding No impact 
and 22% responding I’m not involved in any China-Europe collaboration
8 Conclusion
COVID-19 has abruptly put an end to talent mobility and talent flows. 
Early data suggests that research, teaching, and mutual collabora-
tion shared by China and Europe will be significantly disadvantaged 
because of the pandemic. The barriers emerging include both trav-
el restrictions and a significant reduction in the infrastructure that 
facilitates mobility across borders. This might have even stronger ef-
fects in the future by hampering students, researchers, and tech-
nicians from either entering a country in the first place or from re-
turning to their country of origin. Moreover, teaching is changing 
significantly, and particularly transnational institutions are forced 
to apply online tools that may limit the exposure to other cultures 
and thereby hinder shared experiences in the time to come. Finally, 
it seems likely that collaborations across borders will be increasing-
ly difficult to carry out. However, what this difficulty will mean for 
talent mobility and foreign talents spread out across the globe has 
yet to reveal itself fully. Therefore, questions relating to COVID-19’s 
impact on talent mobility should be raised and answered based on 
in-depth empirical research.
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Data Effectively for Social and Economic Analyses.
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1 Artificial Intelligence and Big Data Before  
and During COVID-19 Pandemic
Data has become one of the most valuable assets to determine the 
success of businesses and public sector institutions globally. Arti-
ficial intelligence (AI) and data analytics are the key factors to un-
lock the value of data assets. Data has played a vital role in the battle 
against COVID-19. From predicting epidemic progression, detecting 
infections and diagnosis, accelerating clinical discovery, optimising 
resource allocation, and supporting public policymaking, in almost 
every aspect of the epidemic response, AI and big data have made 
a positive contribution to strategic decision-making and operation-
al measures.
From the perspective of different beneficiaries, with the help of 
AI and big data applications, data-driven pandemic responses have 
taken many forms:
• The public can access the latest statistics to understand the dy-
namic of the pandemic (WHO 2020b); get information on pre-
vention (WHO 2020a; NHS 2020); receive notifications on the 
potential risk of infection – contact tracing (Google 2020); and 
get diagnostics or treatment advice from doctors (GSMA 2020; 
Ghosh, Gupta, Misra 2020). Transparent and sufficient infor-
mation exchange avoids unnecessary panic among the public 
and helps cooperation.
• AI and big data modelling help governments to improve virus 
surveillance and responses via outbreak predictions (Ardabili 
et al. 2020; Strzelecki 2020), spread tracking (Zhou et al. 2020), 
resource allocation (Morariu et al. 2020; Ibrain, Salluh 2020), 
and policy decisions support (Gao et al. 2020; Gatto et al. 2020). 
• AI empowered health institutions and agencies with quick com-
puted tomography (CT) scan image recognition systems (Huang 
et al. 2020; Mei et al. 2020). In China, more than 100 hospitals 
employed AI image recognition in lung CT identification which 
helps with large-scale infection testing (Cheng 2020). Biomedi-
cal research might be the one that benefits the most from AI and 
big data technology (Mamoshina et al. 2016). The vast amount 
of biomedical data forms the foundation of genomic sequence 
analysis, drug discovery and vaccine development (Stebbing et 
al. 2020; Beck et al. 2020). The global race for coronavirus vac-
cine is essentially a competition to leverage the advantage of 
AI and big data in bioscience (Magar, Yadav, Farimani 2020).
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2 The Trend of AI & Big Data Development in Post-Pandemic
With regard to the accelerated adoption of AI and big data, we recog-
nise three trends that are likely to influence the post-pandemic period.
The first trend is an accelerated digital transformation in vari-
ous industries with the purpose to compete or even survive through 
digitisation of the production and delivery of products and services by 
deployment of technologies such as AI and data analytics. During the 
lockdown period, the digitisation in enterprise activities and virtual 
business grew fast, partly driven by the restrictions on the traditional 
way of conducting business. The increased mode of digital business pro-
cesses may become the new normal for enterprises, public sectors and 
individuals. Therefore, traditional enterprises face an urgent necessi-
ty for digital transformation to servitise their offerings (Tien 2015) and 
use technical platforms to conduct business in digital business ecosys-
tems (Liu, Guo, forthcoming). To a large extent, as commented by At-
kins (2020), “COVID has been the catalyst for digital transformation at 
scale”. However, enterprises should maintain a balance between their 
long-term strategic targets and the immediate company benefits that 
come from technological solutions, which may pose organisational chal-
lenges. In a recent survey (NewVantage Partners 2019) administered to 
65 Fortune 1000 leading firms, about one third reckoned that they are 
not data-driven companies yet even though they have already adopted 
big data and AI and would still increase their investment in those ar-
eas. It follows that the journey of digital transformation for organisa-
tions is a long-term commitment that will require a radical shift of the 
mindset of the leadership and changes in business operations and cul-
ture across the firm (Liu, Li 2015).
The second trend is an increased exploitation of big data which 
bears broad implications for all sectors. Data harnessing involves a 
wide scope of activities starting from the ownership of data or digital 
sovereignty, to data collection, storage, management and utilisation. 
This raises a number of challenges. For instance, digital sovereignty 
is a highly debated issue that is still under the spotlight (Pinto 2019). 
When organisations grapple with increasingly larger data sets, they 
gradually improve their ability to change the landscape of business 
competition. Therefore, enhancing the ability of harnessing big data 
is critical to a company’s long-term development.
The third trend is an easing of the bottleneck due to algorithm ma-
turity. In a review conducted by Bullock et al. (2020), a broad range 
of AI-driven applications which are used against COVID-19 have been 
examined. The disappointing finding is that few of the current AI sys-
tems are mature enough to make a substantial operational impact 
in the fields of epidemiology, diagnosis and therapy. A conclusion de-
rived from the study is that “AI systems are still at a preliminary 
stage, and it will take time before the results of such AI measures 
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are visible” (Petropoulos 2020). The constrains mainly come from 
the lack of solid historical training data and the lack of quality data 
without noise and outliers (Naudé 2020). 
These three trends are interrelated as progress in one area accel-
erates the advancement of others. The development of technological 
capabilities and the penetration of technologies to business practices 
and people’s lives will bring profound changes in the years to come.
3 The Challenges in Using Data Effectively for Social  
and Economic Analyses
The need for and benefit from collaborative work in science and tech-
nology across disciplines and geographic boundaries have been rec-
ognised and even amplified during the COVID-19 pandemic. For ex-
ample, since the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
(NOAA) has made their dataset open access, 68,000 other datasets 
have become publicly available (NOAA 2018). Those datasets have 
promoted innovations in weather applications and promoted scientific 
research in related fields. Other examples are the MIMIC open data-
set, which was developed by the MIT Lab for Computational Physiol-
ogy (Moody, Mark 1996) and the datasets of the Beth Israel Deacon-
ess Medical Center (BIDMC) (Johnson et al. 2016). After more than 
20 years of continuous maintenance and updating, BIDMC continues 
to make the datasets open to researchers as a comprehensive clini-
cal and physiologic data source, which has led to significant contri-
butions to research in the medical field.
Although great advantages are reaped in technological innova-
tions from data openness, potential concerns relate to data misuse 
and the consequences of breaching data security. As new privacy and 
data protection laws are gradually put in place in many jurisdictions, 
the possible conflicts of interests between data openness and priva-
cy become a significant factor in preventing the adoption of big data 
technology and AI. In order to solve privacy and security issues, re-
searchers have attempted to train AI algorithms without using sensi-
tive data. Federated learning (Konečný et al. 2016a, 2016b; McMahan 
et al. 2016) is one of the promising solutions which adopts decentral-
ised collaborative machine learning and have been applied in retail, 
healthcare, and fintech (Yang et al. 2019). Due to differences in cul-
tural backgrounds and strategies in the development and application 
of new technologies, different geographical regions have put differ-
ent emphasis on data privacy. This represents a challenge for data 
re-use and sharing across industries and countries.
AI ethics is a topic that is much debated in academic and indus-
try circles. Due consideration on AI ethics is needed during the pro-
cess of system development. Dignum (2018) classifies AI ethics into 
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three levels: ethics by design, ethics in design and ethics for design. 
These focus, respectively, on 1) AI’s capabilities in ethical reason-
ing, 2) the methods of analysis and evaluation of AI’s ethical impli-
cations, and 3) the code that should be adopted to ensure the ethi-
cal integrity of developers and users. AI ethics is not just a technical 
issue. Rather, it is a social concern with broad implications. The Eu-
ropean Union published the first draft of ethics guidelines for trust-
worthy AI (HLEG) in December 2018 with the purpose of leading the 
discussion. Although there is still a long way to go before key regula-
tions are in place, we believe that researchers in the relevant fields 
have a critical role to play for the safe and ethical deployment of AI 
in business, government sectors and society at large. 
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Abstract Alternative data has steadily become more mainstream in investment de-
cision-making. These non-traditional datasets provide a channel to draw insights from 
information as diverse as satellite images, news, tweets, mobile and internet traffic and 
credit card purchases. While alternative data has become an industry buzzword, mak-
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COVID-19 pandemic poses unprecedented challenges. This chapter explores examples 
of how alternative data can be used to help economic recovery.
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1 Introduction
As many countries around the world continue to face unprecedented challeng-
es from COVID-19, the longer-term economic impact of the crisis is uncertain. 
In the best-case scenario, the path out of the pandemic-induced recession may 
be ‘V-shaped’, that is, a quick rebound. But a protracted ‘U-shape’ or ‘L-shape’ 
recession or a ‘W-shape’ double-dip recession caused by another wave of in-
fections may not be ruled out at present. How should governments respond to 
this situation? Could technology and alternative data sources be leveraged to 
correct the current economic contraction and pave the way for a fast recovery?
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Alternative data comprises information as diverse as satellite im-
ages, news, tweets, mobile and internet traffic and credit card pur-
chases. For example, Bloomberg, a data provider, offers a Tesla pro-
duction tracker (Randall, Halford 2019) that monitors the vehicle 
identification numbers (VINS) registered by Tesla with safety regu-
lators before production and VINS submitted to Bloomberg by Tesla 
car owners. This enables Bloomberg to provide real time forecasts of 
Tesla production rather than rely on infrequent (i.e. quarterly) com-
pany reports. Other examples are Nasdaq’s acquisition of Quandl, 
one of the largest alternative data platforms,1 and Refinitiv’s part-
nership with BattleFin to integrate alternative datasets with Eikon 
and its quantitative analytics platform.2
These non-traditional datasets also provide a channel to draw in-
sights from the financial profile of a consumer or business. These data 
sources have the potential to overcome barriers to financial inclusion 
and enable more diversified risk assessment models for marginalised 
individuals or small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Over the 
last few months, most SMEs have likely seen their liquidity buffers 
come under pressure because of the pandemic-induced economic slow-
down (OECD 2020). It is therefore necessary to accelerate the digiti-
sation of the financial industry in order to provide new frameworks 
for credit decisions, as small businesses and the self-employed are ex-
tremely vulnerable. While there is still substantial scepticism over how 
useful this new information will ultimately prove to be, this chapter 
seeks to review potential solutions and draw early lessons in order to 
effectively cope with, recover from or adapt to today’s challenging sit-
uation. For example, in the current context, it is of interest to identify 
effective ways to exploit alternative datasets to inform prompt correc-
tive actions in response to the global economic recession. This could 
include, for instance, impact analyses of markets and industry sec-
tors such as healthcare, consumer goods, transportation and utilities.
2 Alternative Data Applications
The use of alternative data for trading purposes is not new. Inves-
tors have always been adept at using it to gain an informational edge 
in the market. Venetian traders would use telescopes to inspect the 
flags of incoming ships in order to derive clues as to the type of car-
1 “Nasdaq Acquires Quandl to Advance the Use of Alternative Data”. Nasdaq, 4 De-
cember 2018. https://www.nasdaq.com/about/press-center/nasdaq-acquires-
quandl-advance-use-alternative-data.
2 “Refinitiv Makes Strategic Investment in BattleFin and Partners to Incorporate Al-
ternative Datasets within Investor Workflow”. Refinitiv, 18 June 2019. https://refi-
ni.tv/3jeZDQ6.
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go being carried and also what commodities they would buy or sell 
accordingly (Wigglesworth 2020).
The ongoing financial crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic 
is unconventional, which has led investors to seek alternative data 
with the purpose of seeing when the market rebound is likely to be-
gin (Georgiadis, Lockett, Wigglesworth 2020). Analysts mine figures 
from traffic congestion to food-delivery apps. For example, the traf-
fic index provided by Tom Tom employs data from 600 million driv-
ers to gauge the level of congestion in 416 major cities worldwide. 
It showed that the traffic congestion level of Wuhan, China, during 
the lockdown, was obviously lower than the previous year.3 Howev-
er, correlation can be misinterpreted as causation. For instance, the 
travel data provided by the Transportation Security Administration 
suggests that the number of Americans flying has been gradually in-
creasing since its nadir in mid-April.4 Further, data from Apple shows 
that more drivers have been searching for directions in the US since 
April, which might suggest that the economy is starting to recover.5 
Is this the evidence that the economic rebound is beginning? Or is 
there no relationship and the number is increasing purely because 
people feel more confident or just tired of the lockdown conditions? 
Without rigorous research, alternative data does not offer a clear pic-
ture of where the economy is heading or how quickly we might be 
able to go back to pre-crisis conditions.
Traditional monthly economic indicators such as GDP performance 
are released weeks or months after the events take place, and may be 
difficult to use for decision-makers to predict new economic trends 
and make timely decisions. As an economist aptly suggested, “Obvi-
ously, slow data is not helping us right now. We need to start look-
ing at fast data: data arriving at a daily or weekly frequency” (Mc-
Cracken 2020).
How we can access and utilise alternative data efficiently poses 
a serious challenge to its exploitation. According to Refinitiv, 80% 
of data is unstructured and must be processed into structured con-
tent (Gaumer 2020). How to use unstructured data? For example, un-
structured text analysis via machine learning algorithm can be used 
to evaluate the credit risk and default potential of a company. To this 
end, relevant unstructured data sources include conference call tran-
scripts, company filings and related news. However, finding, testing 
and using data costs considerable time, energy and money. It there-
3 “Coronavirus: Green Shoots?”. Financial Times, 2 March 2020. https://ftalphav-
ille.ft.com/2020/03/02/1583143211000/Coronavirus--green-shoots-/.
4 “TSA Checkpoint Travel Numbers for 2020 and 2019”. Transportation Security Ad-
ministration, 2020. https://www.tsa.gov/coronavirus/passenger-throughput.
5 “COVID-19 Mobility Trends”. Apple, 2020. https://www.apple.com/covid19/mobility.
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fore requires time and human resources that may not be affordable 
to every decision-maker.
Both BattleFin and Quandl, leading financial and alternative da-
ta providers, offer a solution for enabling their clients to easily ob-
tain financial data in the form of an Application Programming Inter-
face (API).6 This saves people a lot of time in obtaining, cleaning and 
processing the data. So, access to the data is not enough, but rather 
how data can be easily utilised to generate meaningful analysis. For 
example, the New York Federal Reserve’s Weekly Economic Indica-
tor7 is an example of how high-frequency data was compiled to pro-
vide a measure for current economic conditions. In particular, the 
key question is how to transform unstructured data into structured 
content, and also whether to encourage the use of APIs as key ele-
ments for data integration.
QR codes were used to track the health status of citizens and their 
movements during the pandemic in several countries. A QR code is 
an example of how we can build an interface for efficiently utilis-
ing alternative data in the digital world. In the last few months, Chi-
na has rolled out health code systems across cities (Weinland 2020) 
with the purpose of identifying those who visited areas with high in-
fection rates or who had been diagnosed with the virus, as well as to 
track whether individuals had completed a mandatory quarantine. 
Russia, France, Qatar, and many other countries also adopted simi-
lar measures to control the spread of the coronavirus.
3 Conclusion
The pandemic crisis spread extremely quickly across countries and 
much of its economic impact is likely yet to be seen. The ongoing fi-
nancial crisis is, in many ways, atypical. In the face of the unprec-
edented nature of current challenges, this chapter presented some 
examples of how alternative data can be used to support decision-
making. As the pandemic and its effects are likely to linger for some 
time, it is important that any informational advantage offered by new 
sources of data to improve our response to new infections and put 
our economies on a solid path to recovery is utilised to its fullest. Al-
ternative data appear to offer promising solutions to today’s world 
problems. Harnessing their power is the challenge of our current 
times and an opportunity to increase the resilience of our society.
6 “Financial Data API”. Quandl, 2020. https://www.quandl.com/tools/api.
7 “Weekly Economic Index (WEI)”. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2020. https://
www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/weekly-economic-index.
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1 COVID-19 - A Crisis for Travel and Tourism
Tourism has suffered more than most sectors from the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC 2020) reported that in 2019, 
the last full year before the pandemic, the travel and tourism sector global-
ly grew by 3.5%, outpacing overall economic growth of 2.5%. This pattern of 
tourism growth outpacing general economic growth had also occurred in the 
9 preceding years. By 2020, WTTC estimated that the sector accounted for 
10.3% of global GDP and 330 million jobs, or 1 in 10 jobs around the world. 
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The concept of a lockdown, brought on by COVID-19, caused instant 
harm to the sector, making its impact one of the most immediate and 
severe of any sector. Condé Nast reported that on 7 April 2020, the 
total number of U.S. air passengers recorded by the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) fell below 100,000 for the first time in 
the agency’s history – a 95% drop compared to the passenger num-
bers on the same day one year earlier. Over half of the world’s air-
craft fleet was parked up, costing the world’s airlines an estimated 
$1.6 billion of lost revenue per day (Condé Nast Traveler 2020). 
Inconvenient or annoying to those denied their holiday, lockdown 
was devastating to communities dependent on tourists’ spending. 
Hotels worldwide closed and some tourist resorts resembled ghost 
towns, at a time when they should have been buzzing with tourists 
spending their money. Governments throughout the world intervened 
with measures to support the sector, especially to counter the social 
consequences of unemployment, and to preserve supply side flexibil-
ity for when the travel and tourism sector got back on its feet again.
But as we start thinking about the post-COVID-19 world, ques-
tions have been asked about what the recovery would look like for 
the tourism sector. A crisis invariably creates opportunities as well 
as challenges. New forms of virtual substitutes for tourism have ap-
peared. Climate change protesters have celebrated the temporary 
banishing of aircraft from the skies and saw COVID-19 as a timely 
opportunity to fix the causes of global warming. Questions were be-
ing asked about the process of recovery in the sector. It was easy to 
impose a lockdown, but much more difficult to manage a return to 
normal. Indeed what would be the new normal? There has been a lot 
of crystal ball gazing, but if we draw on fundamental research about 
consumer behaviour, and reflect on historical precedents, we might 
get a better picture.
2 Which Tourism Pioneers Will Lead the Return?
Tourism will not one day suddenly be switched back on. Tourism 
will have to re-launch itself, and history tells us that most product 
launches see buyers segmented into groups of pioneers, early adop-
ters, through to the laggards who will only adopt when everybody else 
has. Pioneers have always been a feature of tourism – for example the 
first to visit warfare zones after a ceasefire and the eager pioneers to 
be the first ‘space tourists’. All eyes will be on the pioneers to kick-
start the tourism revival. Way behind them will be a mass-market 
of people who only venture out if everybody else in their peer group 
is doing so. Many research studies have demonstrated the power of 
peer group reference in making purchase decisions. So it may take 
more than the lifting of travel restrictions to entice fearful people 
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back, and will need the perception that other people like them are 
going on holiday. The most difficult thing to predict here is individ-
ual’s perception of fear – of becoming infected, or of being stranded 
away from home in a new lockdown. There may be unintended con-
sequences here which are difficult to predict. ‘Social distancing’ to 
keep people apart, the use of face masks and the ubiquity of saniti-
sation stations may be medically correct, but may reassure and cre-
ate perception of fear in equal measure.
3 Reality or Virtual Reality?
Every big downturn in tourism leads to predictions that the sector 
will never be the same again. Dire predictions were made after 9/11, 
however most indices of tourism are now well above pre-9/11 levels 
(US Bureau of Transportation Statistics 2005). “But it is different 
this time round’ is a common repost. This time, greater use of the In-
ternet has been claimed to reduce the need for travel. During lock-
down, consumers have been forced to break habits and learn to use 
new video communications, but will these bring about a long-term 
change in tourism habits?
The tourism literature has for a long time explored the reasons 
why people travel. Essentially there are push and pull factors at 
work. Pull factors relate to the inherent attractiveness of a destina-
tion – sunshine, scenery, access to friends and relatives, etc. Push 
factors represent a desire to escape the confines of current life con-
straints and to live – temporarily at least – an alternative life. A few 
days sightseeing in a historic city can be a welcome escape from the 
tedium of everyday life. But can online tourism provide such escape?
In fact, video portrayal of tourism can be both a substitute and 
a stimulus to seek the real thing. We have been here before. When 
colour television first appeared and people could enjoy the sights of 
an African safari from their armchair, the question was asked why 
would people need to go there? But seeing it on television evoked de-
sire to see the real thing, and instead of being a substitute, televi-
sion encouraged more people to go on a real safari. Many films and 
television soap operas have similarly evoked desire to go and see the 
film location, or a recreation of the film set. Simulated tourism using 
artificial intelligence may allow us to imagine that we are walking 
the streets of Paris or New York but, based on historical precedent, 
the virtual experience may lead us to seek the authentic real thing.
Customer experience and authenticity have become two big driv-
ers of consumption. Customer experience is often defined in terms 
of the memorability of an event. Tourism on a video screen can only 
ever be two-dimensional – sound and sight, with none of the smell, 
taste or touch of actually being there. So online only has two dimen-
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sions for creating memories, compared to five in real life. Consum-
ers seek out more authenticity as they get wealthier, whether it is au-
thenticity in their music, choice of yoghurt, or tourism experiences. 
This is unlikely to change, so the quest for ‘authentic’ tourism expe-
riences will continue. Of course, in an increasingly crowded world of 
tourism, and diverse media images, it can be debated how tourists 
construct their idea of authenticity.
Another emerging question, especially for millennials, is the dis-
tinction between reality and virtual realities. In a world where an 
individual’s work and leisure life is largely spent online, real-world 
experiences can stand out as a point of difference. So in a world of 
streamed music, a music festival is a point of difference in life. One 
of the reasons for recent growth in book festivals may be a desire to 
bring e-books to life. For an Instagram generation, ‘being there’ of-
fers an additional sense of identity and group leadership, reinforced 
by powerful images sent to followers. Again, we see the paradox of 
virtual realities feeding tourism demand for the real-life tourism re-
lated experiences.
4 Festivals Have Been a Growing Sector Within Tourism
Festivals are a growing generator of tourism business. They are es-
sentially a coming together of people with a shared interest. We can 
learn a lot from sociology about the way in which being a member of 
a group reinforces an identity, distinguishing a ‘tribe’ of festivalgo-
ers who are the ‘in-crowd’ from everybody else who is ‘out-crowd’. 
Festivals often involve travel away from home to be with like-minded 
people, whether it is camping out and sharing music at a music fes-
tival, or sharing a love of books at the growing number of book fes-
tivals. The Association of Independent Festivals (AIF 2018) has esti-
mated that audiences at AIF Member festivals spent more than £386 
million in 2017, with £34.7 million of that being spent in the local area 
of the festival they attended. The average festivalgoer spent £483.14 
while attending a festival, leading to local economic suffering where 
festivals were cancelled due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Festivals have also put online delivery to the test – is an online 
format of a festival a substitute or a complement for the real thing? 
Festivals which had to cancel their summer 2020 events have devel-
oped imaginative ways of keeping in touch with their followers, in-
cluding live streaming of book and music festivals and interactive 
presentations by science festivals. Festivals that have gone online 
have made either no charge or only a nominal charge – the main ob-
jective has been to retain the loyalty of followers and retain a dia-
ry slot for the following year. Organisers have realised that it would 
be very difficult to charge anything like the normal attendance fee 
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for a virtual festival – there is so much free material available online 
and high charges for an event low in experiential quality may alien-
ate loyal followers.
Online formats of festivals are probably here to stay. But with-
out the experiential qualities of face-to-face, they will probably on-
ly ever be complementary. A challenge for organisers is that having 
a high quality, creative online presence may now have become a ba-
sic expectation of followers who – after the creative adaptations as-
sociated with COVID-19 – may not be happy with the previous status 
quo of a basic static website. This follows a pattern in many service 
sectors where online has not replaced face-to-face, but created du-
plicated and complementary routes to customers which must both 
be supported with investment. How should festivals build online in-
to their business models? What will the business models of festivals 
look like in the ‘new normal’?
5 Business Tourism
Business tourism is an increasingly important source of tourism rev-
enue, and conference delegates often use resorts to fill off-peak ca-
pacity. With so many now using Zoom conferences, surely demand for 
business tourism will fall sharply post-COVID-19? This is certainly 
not a foregone conclusion, and the law of unintended consequences 
may again kick in here. In the early days of the Internet, many pre-
dicted that commuting would decline as people worked from home 
and didn’t need to travel to the office. In fact, working from home 
wasn’t a binary home or office choice, but most people typically work 
part of the time at the office and part at home. If you only need to go 
to the office twice a week, it doesn’t matter too much if you live a lot 
further away, so commuting distances increased with the appearance 
of the long-distance commuter. Could something similar happen post-
COVID-19? It is quite likely that more people will work from home. 
But this may spur a need to bring teams together face-to-face so that 
they can better identify as a team. And with office space cut back, 
meeting space may be hired in from hotels and conference centres. 
This is following a well-trodden path, with many conference facilities 
already filled with salespeople and other professionals who work from 
their homes scattered through the country, and who meet for regu-
lar team meetings at centrally located hotels and conference centres.
We even need to challenge the assumption that business tourism 
involves a cognitive, rational decision process, and will therefore be 
replaced by Zoom meetings. Business travel may be important to in-
dividuals’ self-esteem and self-image, and may be a status symbol 
which business people will fight to preserve, regardless of the ra-
tional benefits of doing business through videoconferencing. The end 
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of business tourism has been predicted before, but it remains to be 
seen whether this time round the combined effects of climate change, 
lingering virus dangers and greater familiarity with online confer-
encing will encourage firms to eschew the emotional appeal of the 
face-to-face meeting and instead opt for the cost saving and socially 
responsible videoconferencing option. 
6 Green Dividends
The other great change in tourism ‘this time round’ is the spectre of 
climate change. Restricting international travel through COVID-19 
may have been disastrous for some tourism communities, but has 
helped to delay climate change. Will this forced interruption to trav-
el break habits and focus peoples’ spending away from long-distance 
tourism to other leisure activities which are more benign to the plan-
et? This prospect is in itself unlikely.
There has been a lot of research showing holidays being high on 
households’ lists of spending priorities, for example the ABTA Holi-
day Habits report in 2019 suggested a growing commitment by UK 
consumers to spending money on holidays, despite a problematic 
economic outlook (ABTA 2019). There has been much reported hy-
pocrisy of climate campaigners using planes to travel in what they 
admit would be a harmful way. This is symbolic of a cognitive disso-
nance between peoples’ need to enjoy the benefits of tourism, yet at 
the same time feel inwardly calm and socially accepted in their sup-
port for measures to limit climate change. The tourism sector has 
been quite astute in tackling this cognitive dissonance. Flying with 
an airline which uses the most fuel-efficient aircraft and paying to 
plant trees to offset carbon emissions provides a clear conscience for 
those who feel guilty about travel.
The great expansion phases in long-distance leisure tourism have 
been associated with big reductions in the cost of travel – easyJet’s 
early promise of a flight to the Mediterranean for less than the price 
of a pair of jeans opened new markets for tourism. In the immediate 
post-COVID-19 scenario, costs of flying are likely to be increased, 
caused by restricted supply from airlines who have closed down, 
and possibly lingering measures to reduce the spread of the virus. 
Cost – including measures to address climate change and virus limi-
tation – is likely to drive or constrain long-distance tourism. And gov-
ernments may have been emboldened by COVID-19 to further help 
reduce climate change. Simply not bailing out the airline sector may 
restrict supply and raise prices, without much cost or effort by gov-
ernments. Governments may also see the break in consumers’ habits 
as an opportunity for driving through environmental changes which 
increase the costs of tourism. Demand for long-distance tourism is 
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more likely to be influenced by its cost than a general sentiment to-
wards climate change.
7 Reinvention
Tourism has had a habit of reinventing itself over many decades. 
COVID-19 will not destroy it, and if we look at historical precedent, 
it is unlikely to dampen long-term demand. Fear and cost may in the 
short-term restrict the resumption of long-distance tourism, and a re-
invigorated ‘staycation’ may lead the way. Climate change may pose 
a short- to medium-term challenge to the sector, possibly buoyed by 
experience with the COVID-19 closedown of the sector. But in the 
longer term, tourism has shown its capacity to adapt. Fear of travel 
may be a short-term constraint, but in the longer-term, falling costs 
of new climate friendly travel technologies may help to reinvent the 
sector again. And in an online world in which consumers seek great-
er authenticity, constant images of faraway places are likely to fur-
ther stimulate demand for travel, rather then replace it.
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1 Introduction
A deadly airborne virus means social distancing and threatens the entire 
business model of European professional football – sport normally involves 
large gatherings of people, where an airborne virus can spread.1 Following 
the outbreak of COVID-19, by April 2020 practically all major professional 
sports had ground to a halt worldwide. Football leagues were suspended, ei-
1 See Stoecker, Sanders, Barreca 2016 and Cardazzi et al. 2020 for evidence from North Amer-
ica that sports events can increase the mortality from influenza in local areas. See Parnell et al. 
2020 for a discussion of the implications of COVID-19 for mass gatherings and major sports events, 
such as the previously planned 2020 UEFA European Championship.
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ther by themselves or by governments, from the elite level, normally 
played in front of tens of thousands of fans, to the bottom levels, or 
‘grassroots’, played on local parks and recreation grounds.
Football has become an economically important business. In 2018-
19, the twenty highest earning football clubs in the world, all in Eu-
rope and eight of them in England, generated a combined income of 
€9.3 billion (see Deloitte 2020). The growth in European football over 
the past three decades has been remarkable. The most prosperous 
league over that period, the English Premier League (EPL), had broad-
cast rights for 2019-22 valued at £9.2 billion, with around 46% of that 
from overseas (see Svenson 2019). Figure 1 shows how the value of 
the domestic TV rights for the English Premier League increased from 
£61 million per season in 1992 to £1.7 billion by 2016 [fig. 1].
In this chapter, we discuss how this growth industry has been af-
fected by the COVID-19 global pandemic. First, we summarise how 
European football responded to the initial shock and disruption caused 
by the outbreak, mainly focusing on what happened in England. Sec-
ond, we contemplate how football and its business could be different 
in the post COVID-19 era. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks, 
suggesting that the immediate future of European football very much 
depends on the vision and priorities of its principal decision makers.
2 Finishing the 2019-20 Season
As COVID-19 spread globally, sports events that could be postponed 
were postponed, e.g. the Summer Olympic Games and the UEFA Eu-
ropean Football Championship. Annual events that couldn’t be post-
poned were cancelled, e.g. the The Championships, Wimbledon, the 
Boston Marathon and the Formula One Australian Grand Prix. 
The wrangling that took place in the suspended European football 
leagues during the spring of 2020, concerning their resumption or 
otherwise, has made clear that the two most fundamental influenc-
es are government and money.2 In France and the Netherlands (both 
countries with a rich footballing heritage), the football seasons were 
cut short due to the intervention of the respective governments. The 
bans on sports in these countries reached far enough into the sum-
mer that a resumption would be impractical, without affecting the 
start of the next season.
2 Safety played a role too, primarily affecting the timing of resumptions though, 
rather than the decision between cancelling and continuing. In the immediate weeks 
around the peak levels of infection, leagues determined that they could not justify us-
ing scarce national COVID-19 testing resources to ensure the virus was not spread-
ing among the players and other people involved in putting on football matches, even 
if they were resolved to return.
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Other seasons were cut short, such as in the English lower leagues, 
arguably because the decision makers were able to impose particu-
lar outcomes (usually applying points per game before the season was 
suspended), to determine the champions, promotion and relegation, 
without fear of significant adverse financial repercussions from le-
gal action.3 Between 2012 and 2015, a club relegated from the EPL, 
in the best case, suffered a £20 million loss in revenue, and, in the 
worst case, £50 million.4 Conversely, the minimum revenue gain to a 
club from promotion to the EPL in this period was £33 million, and 
the maximum gain was £76 million. Because of these large sums in 
English football that depend on the outcome of a season, the EPL and 
the EFL Championship, the second tier, could not be decided in 2019-
20 by some arbitrary measure, or even a forecast of likely outcomes.
The financial model of football in Europe, but especially in Eng-
land, has changed dramatically in the last thirty years, following 
the formation of the EPL as a breakaway from the English Football 
League. In 1990, average revenues within the English Fourth Divi-
3 Although not all leagues have avoided this issue. Heart of Midlothian F.C. have begun 
legal action against the Scottish Professional Football League after they were relegat-
ed from the top division when it was cut short (https://www.theguardian.com/foot-
ball/2020/jun/15/hearts-legal-action-spfl-relegation-scottish-premiership).
4 These and the following financial values are author calculations using the annu-
al reports filed by football clubs at Companies House, the UK’s registrar of companies 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/companies-house).
Figure 1 Nominal value of domestic broadcast rights for the English Premier League 1992-92 to 2021-22; 
author calculations using SportsBusiness Media Rights Tracker, accessed May 2020
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sion (now League 2) were 12% of those generated by clubs in the 
First Division (now EPL). But in 2015 the equivalent figure was 2%.
Football has operated on a professional basis for almost a century 
and a half, and yet at no point in that time has a set of circumstances 
arisen such as those imposed by COVID-19, where it was financial-
ly unviable, and in some cases legally impossible, to complete sea-
sons. One lesson from the crisis is that a set of revised rules and reg-
ulations regarding the cutting short of seasons is required. Sports 
leagues will need procedures in place that determine the exact meth-
od by which a season will be cut short, if a particular threshold of 
matches has been played, or will instead be abandoned, if too few 
have been played.5 If it is known in advance that points per game, 
weighted or otherwise by other factors (e.g. goals scored, home or 
away form, uncertainty), will be used to decide the season outcomes, 
then leagues can be cut short without fear of legal repercussions.
The increased concentration of money at the top of the game has 
had significant impacts further down the leagues too, since little of 
the revenues coming into the game make their way down to the grass-
roots level. Liberalisation of football’s labour market has resulted in 
a larger proportion of immigrant labour at the top of the game over 
the years, rather than local players making their way up the leagues 
(see for example the Taylor 2007). Opportunities for local young men 
and women to succeed in the game are reduced. In England, the Foot-
ball Association has responsibility for the grassroots, and, along with 
many small town and village clubs, it has lost out on significant sourc-
es of revenues in the summer of 2020 because of COVID-19. Festi-
vals on football pitches and music concerts at stadiums are not only 
part and parcel of the British summer but also the financial viability 
of football outside the elite levels.6 These patterns are not unique to 
English football. Without substantial support from governments or a 
fairer redistribution of wealth in the football pyramid, it seems un-
likely that the rich ecology of association football, down to its grass-
roots, with all its attendant mental and physical health benefits, will 
look the same post COVID-19.
3 How Could Football be Different in the Post-COVID-19 Era?
The future of European football in the post-COVID-19 era largely de-
pends on how soon it will be safe for the fans to return to stadiums, 
and whether they will come back. To the best of our knowledge, there 
5 This happened with the 1939-40 season in England, abandoned after only 3 matches.
6 In June 2020, England’s Football Association announced 124 job losses and expect-
ed losses of £300 million (see https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/53222021).
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is not yet any conclusive evidence regarding how easily the virus is 
transmitted at a large outdoor public gathering such as in a sports 
stadium.7 But regardless, common sense in the ongoing public health 
emergency dictates that fans should not be returning soon.
A vast literature has looked at the effects of crowds on football 
match outcomes (e.g. Garicano, Palacios-Huerta, Prendergast 2005; 
Buraimo, Forrest, Simmons 2010). Along with the familiarity of play-
ing at home and the fatigue from travelling away, the impact of the 
home crowd has been suggested as a factor in accounting for the sub-
stantial home advantage in professional team sports (Schwartz, Bark-
sy 1977), i.e. teams tend to win more often when playing in their own 
stadiums. Two studies of the rare instances when professional Euro-
pean football was played behind closed doors, before COVID-19, have 
found evidence that home advantage was disproportionately eroded 
in these matches (Pettersson-Lidbom, Priks 2010; Reade, Schreyer, 
Singleton 2020). Figure 2 describes the differences between matches 
with fans and without in the latter of these studies, showing that on 
average the normal home advantage was approximately wiped out, 
accounted for by fewer goals scored by home teams [fig. 2]. Referees 
also punished players on the away teams significantly less without 
the pressure from the crowd. However, these results were generally 
based on one-off games behind closed doors. It is not clear whether 
they were driven by the familiarity factor rather than reduced refer-
ee bias. Further, rules have been changed for the football which has 
returned since COVID-19, such as an increased number of substitu-
tions, which could also plausibly affect match outcomes. 
Nonetheless, it has been widely noted that home advantage has not 
only disappeared but even reversed in the first major European league 
to complete its domestic season.8 In the German Bundesliga geister-
spiele (ghost games), from the post-COVID-19 resumption up to the end 
of the 2019-20 season, home teams won just 32% of the matches played 
(26 of 82, compared with 43% in the same season before March). Away 
teams, however, won 45% (37 of 82) of the post-shutdown matches, 
compared with 35% in the season beforehand. Figure 3 summarises 
the trends of home advantage in professional football since 1890, as 
well as what has happened generally since the European virus-induced 
social lockdowns [fig. 3]. When football returned behind closed doors in 
May, home advantage looked to have disappeared, but this has partly 
7 There is some preliminary evidence from North American Sports that the different 
severity in local areas of the initial US outbreak was related to sports events. Aham-
mer, Halla and Lackner (2020) found that NBA (basketball) and NHL (ice hockey) games 
in early March 2020 significantly increased the rate of COVID-19 confirmed cases and 
deaths by the end of April 2020 in the areas surrounding the venues.
8 See for example ESPN, 9th June 2020 (https://www.espn.co.uk/football/german-
bundesliga/story/4107639/).
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recovered throughout June, perhaps as teams have become more fa-
miliar with the lack of fans in their stadiums.
Why does home advantage matter in football? Home advantage 
ensures that a weak team in its own stadium has a good chance of 
beating a strong visiting team (Forrest et al. 2005). If the reduction 
in home advantage without fans is greater for weaker teams, then 
stronger teams will win more often, and the competitive balance of 
leagues will be reduced. Studies have found that the demand for foot-
ball on television is increased by the uncertainty of the match outcome 
(e.g. Buraimo, Simmons 2009; Cox 2018; Schreyer, Schmidt, Torgler 
2018a, 2018b). This suggests that TV audience demand for European 
football could be affected if matches remain behind closed doors. Re-
duced home advantage should increase the attractiveness of matches 
featuring a strong home team and a weak away team, and vice versa 
when those relative strengths are reversed. In addition, there could be 
a second effect on demand, as changes in home advantage that are not 
equally distributed over team strengths would tend to affect the com-
petitiveness of overall league championships and the interest of fans.
It is also not clear that matchday revenues will recover quickly 
when fans can return to stadiums. One argument is that there will 
be a pent-up demand effect, that could offset or override the nega-
tive demand effects from any ongoing risk of COVID-19 infection. Two 
of the most sustained attendance increases in the history of English 
Figure 2 Differences in sample means of football match outcomes: closed doors vs with fans, 
2002-03/2019-20. Uses all matches in the UEFA Champions League, Europa League, Italian Serie A, Serie B, 
Serie C, Coppa Italia and French Ligue 1 since the beginning of the 2002-03 season. SOT is Shots on Target. 
See details in Reade, Schreyer, Singleton 2020
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football came after the suspensions brought about by each World War 
(e.g. Dobson, Goddard 1995). But this is a tentative parallel at best. 
Reade and Singleton (2020) found that in the initial stages of the Eu-
ropean COVID-19 outbreak there were already substantial negative 
demand responses, suggestively because of the implied risk of infec-
tion, even when the significance of the disease and its implications 
were being widely played down.
The elite European football clubs are likely to survive the outbreak 
financially, given their continued access to substantial funds besides 
match-day gate receipts. But professional football below that level 
still relies on ticket revenues. By studying the 2018-19 accounts of 
professional football clubs in England and Wales, Szymanski (2020) 
found that the majority of these businesses were already on the verge 
of insolvency before the loss of revenues and write-down of assets, 
i.e. player valuations, due to COVID-19.9 If the present structures of 
professional football are to survive, then some consolidation will be 
needed. Szymanski (2020) notes that much of football club debt is 
owed to other clubs, in the form of delayed player transfer payments. 
Therefore, if any club goes bankrupt it has knock-on effects for oth-
ers, both domestic and foreign, potentially leading to financial conta-
gion. He suggests that the consolidation of the national football busi-
ness model should involve assigning the valuable future broadcast 
rights from the top league to a collective fund, from which those un-
able to collect unpaid debts can make claims, including for delayed 
transfer fees and player wages. In other words, the only way to save 
9 This research was presented at the Reading Online Sport Economics Seminars 
(ROSES) on 17 April 2020. See here for a public recording: https://www.youtube.com/
watch?time_continue=4006&v=viPqe93rW2c&feature=emb_logo.
Figure 3 Professional football result outcomes since 1890 (left panel), and between January 2016 to June 2020 
(right panel). H refers to home wins, D refers to draws and A refers to away wins. Uses all matches in the top leagues 
of 108 countries or regions since 1890, 82 countries since January 2016, and 29 in May and June 2020. 
Author calculations using https://www.worldfootball.net/
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the existing professional football pyramids today is to leverage the 
future value of football after COVID-19.
4 Concluding Remarks
The financial pressures facing most firms in the European football 
industry will be acute unless drastic collective actions are taken. 
The benefactor club owners have deep but not bottomless pockets, 
nor endless patience. Major football clubs and national associations 
will need to prioritise their resources. The women’s game has been 
an area of substantial growth in participation and interest in recent 
years.10 Given the potential for further growth in this area and oth-
ers, football’s decision makers could find opportunities within any 
consolidation. By diverting some of the resources held by the pow-
erful elite leagues, which currently feather superstar players’ nests 
and tickle billionaire owners’ egos, such as in the EPL, they could 
make longer-term investments in the health of the European football 
industry. The football labour market is also overdue for reform. In 
the 2019-20 season, EPL clubs paid £263 million in fees to the agents 
representing players.11 The influence of these agents should be cur-
tailed, as it represents next to nothing in added value to the sport, 
but sees large sums of money exiting it, which could be used to prop 
up the rest of the pyramid and invest in the women’s game. Given the 
public good that football can deliver, in terms of public health and 
social cohesion, there may be a case for state intervention, not only 
to support the industry financially but also to force a re-evaluation 
of whom the beautiful game ultimately serves.
10 For example, in England, 11.7 million watched England’s defeat to USA at the 2019 
FIFA Women’s World Cup, compared with a peak of 2.4 million four years before in the 
previous World cup (see https://www.theguardian.com/football/blog/2020/jan/02/
womens-football-decade-of-progress-2020).
11 See for example BBC Sport, 24 June 2020; https://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/foot-
ball/53170215.
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Abstract The COVID-19 virus is severely affecting international trade, creating a nega-
tive fiscal outlook. Consequently, the global economy is receiving its sharpest reversal 
since the Great Depression. As such, we are seeing several countries invoke restrictions 
or taking action to secure medical supplies. A by-product of this is protectionism. One 
should worry most about developing countries without any domestic suppliers, who 
also need critical medical supplies, and who will be locked out, and not access essen-
tial equipment, medicines, and basic foodstuffs because of export restrictions set by 
developed nations. Therefore, collaboration is needed more than ever to ensure eco-
nomic and societal prosperity throughout the world, rather than within a small number 
of isolated, prosperous regions.
Keywords Informal economy. Protectionism. Trade. Xenophobia. Collaboration.
In response to the coronavirus crisis, there are many examples of co-oper-
ation and collaboration, from communities coming together to Clap for Car-
ers in the UK to Federal Reserve loans to other central banks. But in emo-
tive, uncertain times, the instinct to wind up the drawbridge and look after 
your own is strong and playing out across societies, nations, and communi-
ties. The pandemic is politicising travel and migration and driving self-reli-
ance and protectionism. Some view this as a much-needed retraction from 
the upper limits of globalisation, shortening supply chains, and reducing ex-
posure to risk in an unstable world. Others fear a dampening down of trade 
will leave economies vulnerable and heighten instability, leading to more risk 
aversion and inward focus.
A particular issue concerning the informal economy is intangibility: things 
which are not measured are not known to legislators, meaning, unfortu-
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nately, that over two billion workers from the informal sector, are 
threatened. Narula (2020) suggests that those affected account for 
70% of employment in the Middle East and North Africa, and 80% 
in both South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa (ILO 2020). Somewhat 
concerningly, these people will, according to Narula (2020) not re-
ceive government aid in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic. For ex-
ample, within the nation of India, 63 million micro-enterprises repre-
sent 99% of all enterprises and comprise 107 million people – who are 
not known to legislators because they are unregistered. As a result, 
they are not accounted for on government data – though the number 
may be closer to 300 million (Jayaram et al 2020).
The COVID-19 pandemic has sparked a radical reordering of busi-
ness ecosystems, suggest several business historians, such as Rita 
Trehan, CEO of global transformation consultancy Dare Worldwide 
(Laker et al. 2020). She considers the need for a collaborative ap-
proach to be crucial to success when new networks are built as lock-
down eases. But these networks should look to contain within them, 
informal workers because businesses, both foreign and domestic, are 
responding to the slowdown by reducing employment, hence there 
will be a sharp upwards increase in those below the poverty line. 
Narula (2020) suggests that informal workers typically live from 
hand to mouth. This means that, without paid work, a person cannot 
purchase essential supplies such as food – let alone apparent desirables 
such as medication. One recent example of this transactionary relation-
ship occurred within India, where earlier this year, millions of informal 
workers walked home from big cities to return to ancestral villages. 
Even if the pandemic subsides concludes Narula (2020), it is naive to 
believe activities can ever return to their pre-pandemic state. Economi-
cally weak countries will already have suffered from declining revenues 
from almost all sources, also as the pandemic raises emergency spend-
ing to mitigate the immediate challenges. Countries dependent on pri-
mary sector exports are notoriously volatile, especially in the extrac-
tive sector. Other primary good exports will likely be affected not by 
price volatility, but due to logistical challenges and restrictions, while 
imports are likely to cost more. The reduction of fiscal performance may 
lead to an increase in borrowing and, most certainly, a requirement 
for aid. There will be a number of nations that rely heavily upon remit-
tances for their foreign exchange (Narula 2020). As a result, these na-
tions will quite likely suffer a shock: Arabic counties will consider re-
turning their migrant workers, who are primarily engaged informally 
and in receipt of limited, sometimes nonexistent labour rights, both at 
home and abroad, to their home countries (Narula 2020).
That being said, there is an immediate short-term opportunity 
from the COVID-19 pandemic. With items from ventilators to masks 
in seriously short supply and prices soaring, those trying to source 
goods complained of a bidding war with other buyers, involving a 
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web of brokers and suppliers. Shipments destined for multiple coun-
tries were diverted elsewhere – often to the US ILO (2020). German 
officials accused the US of ‘confiscating’ a consignment of respira-
tors en route from China to the Berlin city police during a stopover 
in Bangkok ILO (2020).
There is somewhat of a critical opportunity for developing nations 
to enable and even support informal workers to help contribute to 
the gap of supply. This could occur through subsidies provided to lo-
cal suppliers to help maintain import prices. One striking example 
that has already implemented such a concept is apparent within the 
global shortage of personal protective equipment for hospitals (Naru-
la 2020). Medical institutions are struggling to acquire specialist 
items because prices the world over have increased. As a result, many 
small enterprises are beginning to manufacture and sell items local-
ly, and in some cases, the central government holds the responsibil-
ity for sterilising and deep cleaning the final product (Narula 2020). 
It is not just the US that has veered into protectionism. Accord-
ing to the Global Trade Alert team at Switzerland’s University of St 
Gallen, 75 countries have introduced some export curbs on medical 
supplies, equipment, or medicines this year (ESCAP 2020). They in-
clude most EU countries, India, China, Brazil, and Russia. But the 
team also found that 79 countries have liberalised trade in medical 
supplies this year. Clearly, governments and public authorities have 
a duty to show responsibility and restraint when it comes to facili-
tating the flow of supplies, treatments, and testing equipment need-
ed to tackle the coronavirus beyond their borders.
So how will global co-operation play out as lockdown eases? The 
danger is that the movement of people, goods, and capital curtailed 
during lockdown is all in danger of being politicised by agendas that 
existed long before the crisis hit. Regarding the movement of peo-
ple, the Trump administration used the pretext of the ‘Chinese virus’ 
to curtail immigration further, arguing that jobs should go to Ameri-
cans instead. He will likely be able to maintain anti-immigration poli-
cies long after the virulent phase of the epidemic because public con-
cerns will make it easier for him to retain them.
In an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, there has been an 
increase in displays of xenophobia against Chinese and East Asian 
persons in many countries across the world, fuelled by provocative 
newspaper headlines like ‘Yellow Alert’ (France) and ‘China Kids Stay 
at Home’ (Australia). Indian health authorities have campaigned to 
spread awareness that not all people who are from China have COV-
ID-19. Pointing the finger and blaming other ethnic groups for the 
disease is one response. But public opinion on immigration is often 
more nuanced than politicians give people credit for. In Europe, the 
crisis has highlighted the reliance societies have on informal work-
ers in food production and the care system, with many risking their 
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lives during the crisis. It is becoming harder than ever to see the 
world in black and white.
International tourism is set to plunge by 80% this year, but some 
regions will recover more quickly than others. Less developed coun-
tries will be hit particularly hard, but experts say this is an opportu-
nity to rebuild the industry to be more sustainable. Countries with 
pre-existing links and similar health protocols are coming together to 
create ‘travel bubbles’ as lockdown eases. Australia-New Zealand, Tai-
wan-Singapore and Greece-Cyprus-Israel are looking to collaborate 
and set up safe tourist zones to allow movement between countries.
In terms of the flow of capital, the crisis will accelerate an already-
existing trend of financial de-globalisation. State ownership of pri-
vate companies is on the increase, with the nationalization of Italy’s 
airline, Alitalia, the UK government taking control of rail companies, 
and Spain nationalizing all of its hospitals and healthcare providers 
to combat the spread of the virus. Nations looking inward are seek-
ing to shorten their supply chains and decrease reliance on overseas 
manufacturing. The global trade system that has dominated the world 
for decades is under threat from protectionist thinking, with WTO 
predicting that world trade could reduce by up to a third (Joyce, Xu 
2020). Economists argue that the way to make supply chains more re-
silient is not to domesticate them but to diversify them ESCAP (2020). 
More than ever, there is a need for firms to cultivate adaptive – rath-
er than hierarchical – structures that support rapid change, refocus-
ing, and reallocation of resources. Those organisations that can lever-
age their network and work together will come out ahead as lockdown 
eases. There is a need to integrate data from a wide range of sourc-
es to innovate and connect. Those companies that are in touch with 
their core purpose beyond making money will have better clarity on 
the way forward.
The coronavirus crisis has shown that the global economy’s gov-
ernance is made up of international institutions and informal col-
laborations that are shaped by individual nations’ willingness to co-
operate. For the sake of the world’s economic and physical health, 
collaboration needs to win over protectionism.
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Abstract This chapter briefly examines the political implications of COVID-19, focus-
ing on the potential constraints and opportunities it poses for populism. Some initial 
comparative observations suggest the following patterns. First, populists in opposition 
are likely to be weakened electorally in the short-run, as voters support non-populists on 
the basis of valence voting. Second, this may not apply to populists in power, who may 
use emergency measures for democratic backsliding. Third, in the long-run, a potential 
economic crisis as a result of the pandemic may benefit populist parties, especially those 
in opposition as discontent voters may punish those in government for the poor manag-
ing of the health/economy trade-off. In sum, what will determine the direction of future 
political developments is the extent to which governments can balance the trade-offs 
involved in the COVID-19 crisis, including effective health management versus economic 
growth and individual freedoms versus collective security.
Keywords COVID-19. Populism. Far right parties.
Summary 1 Introduction. – 2 COVID-19 Trade-offs. – 3 What Now for Populism? – 
4 Conclusion.
1 Introduction
The exponential spread of COVID-19 in early 2020 placed governments around 
the world under severe strain. Despite the global reach of the virus, nation-
states responded primarily as individual actors, seeking to contain the vi-
rus and ensure the resilience of their national health systems. Part of this 
response was the closure of borders and the grounding of airlines confirm-
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ing that, although a global phenomenon, COVID-19 required first and 
foremost a national response. Besides the health dimension, this is 
also interesting from a political perspective as COVID-19 emerged 
at a time when the retreat of the nation-state and the restoration of 
sovereignty were relevant political trends: for example Brexit and 
the rise of right-wing populist parties that pledge to restrict immi-
gration and challenge EU expansion. How may we assess the politi-
cal implications of this global crisis, especially given that it comes at 
a time when populists, who thrive on the tensions between interna-
tional initiatives and the ‘national preference’, are either in charge, 
or the main opposition party, in many countries? 
This chapter briefly examines the political implications of 
COVID-19, focusing on the potential constraints and opportunities it 
poses for populism. This is a new and fluid situation that is fast evolv-
ing. While data is novel and relatively untested, we may still draw 
some (cautious) preliminary conclusions by comparing cases in an 
attempt to identify broad patterns and exceptions. What follows is 
a brief sketch of patterns from which we may identify certain poli-
cy implications and lessons learned. The chapter first outlines a se-
ries of trade-offs with regard to the COVID-19 situation. It then pro-
ceeds to examine the political implications of these trade-offs, before 
briefly discussing the challenges and opportunities they represent 
for populist actors. Distinguishing between populists in opposition 
and populists in power, it concludes with lessons learned and ave-
nues for future research. 
2 COVID-19 Trade-offs
According to the 2019 Global Health Security (GHS) Index, fewer 
than 5% of countries included in the index scored highly, suggest-
ing that the majority of countries were poorly prepared to respond 
to, and mitigate the effect of, a pandemic. The emergence of COV-
ID-19 confirmed this overall lack of preparedness, but also revealed 
a paradox: on the one hand, some of the world’s most stable democ-
racies that scored highly in the GHS, such as the UK and the US, 
performed particularly poorly. On the other hand, developing au-
thoritarian countries, such as Vietnam, and smaller democracies fa-
tigued by economic and political upheaval in recent years, such as 
Greece, outperformed advanced Western democracies in the han-
dling of the pandemic. 
In order to explain this variation, preliminary research on this 
topic has examined short-term indicators such as the speed with 
which distancing measures were introduced, quarantine effective-
ness and willingness to comply (see e.g. Brouard, Vasilopoulos, Be-
cher 2020; Hale et al. 2020; Fenner 2020). This research suggests 
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that along with long-term infrastructural capacity, short-term polit-
ical decisions have played a very important role in the containment 
and mitigation of COVID-19. Responding early is key to responding 
effectively, so for example tracking, testing and containing infection 
clusters is of paramount importance. Countries that introduced lock-
down measures early tended to have better results, again Greece be-
ing a prime example, though some preliminary work has noted incon-
sistencies with this broad pattern (see Born et al 2020 on Sweden). 
This reality highlighted that addressing the pandemic is all about 
trade-offs and presented both governments and citizens with some 
important dilemmas: does effective health management occur at the 
expense of economic growth? Should we introduce – and adhere – to 
strict lockdown measures at the expense of our personal liberties? 
Should we trade-off these individual liberties for our collective secu-
rity? These trade-offs, in turn, have important political implications 
given the delicate political climate – rise of populism, euroscepticism, 
Brexit – at the time of the emergence of COVID-19. 
3 What Now for Populism?
Far right populist parties, which utilise a rhetoric that combines na-
tionalism and the ‘Popular Will’, have significantly increased their 
electoral performance since the 2010s. Examples abound: the French 
Front National (FN) (now Rassemblement National), the Dutch Free-
dom Party (PVV), the Austrian Party for Freedom (FPÖ), the Nor-
wegian Progress Party (FrP) and the German Alternative for Ger-
many (AfD) have all mobilised voters on their populist-nationalist 
platforms. Their electoral success has been the focus of a substantial 
body of literature in the fields of party politics and voting behaviour 
(see Mudde, Rovira Kaltwasser 2018; Stockemer, Lentz, Mayer 2018). 
Different explanations place varying emphasis on factors including 
immigration and cultural insecurity (Inglehart, Norris 2016), eco-
nomic deprivation, both actual and relative (Colantone 2018; Fetzer 
2019; Adler, Ansell 2019; Engler, Weisstanner 2020; Halikiopou-
lou, Vlandas 2020), societal decline and status anxiety (Gest 2016; 
Gidron, Hall 2019) as well as institutional mistrust and poor evalu-
ations of governance quality (Hooghe, Marien, Pauwels 2011; Ager-
berg 2017). While scholars disagree about the source of the griev-
ance that prompts voters to opt for far right populism, at the core of 
the debate is the impact of globalisation (Kriesi et al 2006) that di-
vides societies between winners and losers, thus incentivizing the 
discontent to vote for parties that place blame on the establishment. 
Populism posits that only decisions made from below are legiti-
mate – and indeed morally superior (Riker 1982), because only these 
decisions reflect the will of the people (Mudde 2004). As such, pop-
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 370
A New World Post COVID-19, 367-374
ulists tend to be sceptical of intermediary institutions, elites and 
experts, who they try to discredit. They thrive on an emotive but 
often empty rhetoric, aimed at voters motivated by the need to pro-
test their social, economic and/or cultural discontent. Far right pop-
ulism merges this narrative with nationalism. These parties pledge 
to speak on behalf of the ‘pure people’, restore national sovereign-
ty, ‘take back control’ from supranational institutions and promote 
the ‘national preference’ through strict immigration and citizenship 
policies (Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2019). This suggests competing ex-
pectations regarding the electoral fortunes of far right populist par-
ties in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. On the one hand, the limits 
placed on globalisation by the pandemic could reduce the attrac-
tions of populists. In addition, the need to manage the pandemic re-
quires effective government, expertise and efficient democratic in-
stitutions providing the organisational and infrastructural support 
that determines state effectiveness. In this respect, COVID-19 could 
pose a significant challenge to populists by exposing their lack of 
competence, and placing them under scrutiny. In accordance to the 
valence model of voting (Evans, Chzhen 2016), which suggests that 
party performance evaluations affect voter choices, voters may in-
creasingly prioritise competence over emotive narratives. Populist 
parties in opposition may become weakened electorally as non-pop-
ulists in power have tended to consolidate their support during the 
pandemic (Bayerlin, Gyongyosi 2020). 
On the other hand, potential ‘austerity’ strategies resulting from 
the health crisis could exacerbate those voters’ insecurities that 
prompt them to support far right populist parties. In addition, pop-
ulists in power could benefit from the crisis by blaming immigrants 
and refugees for the spread of the pandemic, using them as an oppor-
tunity for power abuse and an excuse to attack freedom of movement. 
Indeed far right populism is compatible with some of the COVID-19 
blame-patterns: closure of borders, exclusion of immigrants and an 
emphasis on restricting health services for natives. In a number of 
cases this has helped populists – or rather right-wing nationalist au-
thoritarians – in power to use the COVID-19 crisis to extend their 
powers in the political system. Autocratic-minded leaders, for exam-
ple Orban in Hugary, Modi in India and Bolsonaro in Brazil, have ral-
lied around the flag to increase support at a time of heightened inse-
curity. One important lesson from the past is that, in similar crisis 
situations, authoritarian and/or nationalist leaders have taken ad-
vantage of emergencies to consolidate power (Levitsky, Ziblatt 2018). 
This suggests that there is a substantial danger of further democrat-
ic backsliding by suspending democratic institutions through emer-
gency laws, for example suspending parliament and ruling by decree. 
This raises questions about the utility of the term populism to de-
scribe the challenges to democratic politics both prior to, and after 
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the emergence of COVID-19. One of the most concerning political 
developments regarding actors described as ‘populist’ is not actu-
ally their populism – referred to above as an ideology that draws on 
a distinction between the good people and the bad elites (Mudde 
2004) – but rather their nationalist, authoritarian and/or a far right 
agenda. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the extent to 
which the term ‘populism’ itself is inflated, overused and too broad 
to be analytically useful. Conflating the terms nationalism, right-
wing extremism or authoritarianism, i.e. grouping any party that has 
these attributes in the populist category because of these attributes, 
means that populism is superfluous and what really matters is the 
other attribute: nationalist, far right, or authoritarian for example 
(Halikiopoulou, Vlandas 2019). Orban was able to impose undemo-
cratic measures in Hungary not because he is a populist but because 
he is authoritarian. Marine Le Pen and Matteo Salvini blame immi-
grants for the pandemic not because they are populists, but because 
they are nationalists.
The long-term political consequences of this are significant. In 
cases where democratic institutions are weak there is a serious risk 
of further democratic backsliding. The long-term economic costs of 
the pandemic can only serve to exacerbate this. As a large body of 
literature suggests, wealth inequalities, decline of social status, and 
limited access to compensation can serve to drive voters closer to 
extremism (Adler, Ansell 2019; Gidron, Hall 2019; Halikiopoulou, 
Vlandas 2016). 
4 Conclusion
In sum, what will determine the direction of future political develop-
ments is the extent to which governments can balance the trade-offs 
involved and exit this crisis having simultaneously protected society’s 
most vulnerable and retained its democratic institutions and values. 
Future research can delve into these dynamics in greater detail. 
Comparative research across cases and across time can identify fur-
ther patterns with regard to which populist actors are more likely to 
be weakened and why. In the short term, health policies and strin-
gency measures will affect a government’s popularity. But longer 
term factors, such as state capacity and the strength and impartial-
ity of a country’s democratic institutions, will determine the extent 
to which democracy can withstand the COVID-19 shock. While the 
current pandemic may be unique in its specificities, it is not unprec-
edented in terms of what it represents: an emergency situation that 
exposes systemic weaknesses and threatens the stability of demo-
cratic societies. Lessons learned from parallel historical precedents 
may offer us the benefit of hindsight. 
Innovation in Business, Economics & Finance 1 372
A New World Post COVID-19, 367-374
Bibliography
Adler, D.; Ansell, B. (2019). “Housing and Populism”. West European Politics. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2019.1615322.
Agerberg, M. (2017). “Failed Expectations: Quality of Government and Support 
for Populist Parties in Europe”. European Journal of Political Research, 56, 
578-600. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12203.
Bayerlein, M.; Gyongyozi, G. (2020). “The Impact of Covid-19 on Populism: Will 
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Pandemics are disruptive events that have profound 
consequences for society and the economy. This volume 
aims to present an analysis of the economic impact  
of COVID-19 and its likely consequences for our future. 
This is achieved by drawing from the expertise of authors 
who specialise in a wide range of fields including fiscal 
and monetary policy, banking, financial markets, pensions 
and insurance, artificial intelligence and big data, climate 
change, labour market, travel, tourism and politics, 
among others. We asked contributing authors to write 
their chapters for a non-technical audience so that their 
message could reach beyond academia and professional 
economists to policy makers and the wider society. The 
material in this volume draws from the latest research  
and provides a wealth of ideas for further investigations 
and opportunities for reflection. This also makes it an ideal 
learning tool for economics and finance students wishing 
to gain a deeper understanding of how COVID-19 could 
influence their disciplines.
